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Abstract
Grounded within the context of modem American militarization, this 
dissertation is a descriptive, ethnohistorical, and ethnographic study focusing on the 
impacts and legacies of the development, implementation, and decommissioning of the 
western sector of the Distant Early Warning radar line (DEW Line) in northern Alaska 
and Canada’s western Arctic. Understanding the localized social and environmental 
impacts of global militarization is a critical task for anthropology and one that 
coincides in the North with the need to gather histories from Inuit perspectives. This 
study’s purposes are to elucidate how the global phenomenon of modem militarization 
penetrates and brings about change in small communities and to determine whether 
local attitudes towards security, the environment, industrialization, and political 
participation can be traced to the policies of the Canadian and American governments 
during the construction, operation, and clean up of the line. Ethnohistorical research 
and pilot studies in communities adjacent to radar sites provided background for the 
project. Personal narratives of arctic residents and employees, combined with 
documentation of the radar stations and remnants, were collected during a multi­
season voyage along the western sector of the DEW line in the Canada’s western 
Arctic and Alaska.
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1Chapter One:
The intergenerational and localized legacies of Arctic militarization 
Tatchim Jsua
Figure 1: New house at LIZ-C/Peard Bay
In the fall of 2009, Jimmy Olemaun and Tautuknaitchuaq scouted for caribou 
from the roof of their neighbor’s new house at Peard Bay, Alaska (fig. 1). The house was 
constructed that season atop a 55-year old cement pad -  a leftover foundation from a 
modular building at the small Intermediate DEW Line radar site known as LIZ-C that 
operated at that location from 1957-1963. The cement pad is large, solid, perfectly flat, 
and has functional industrial drains in it. The house commands a spectacular view of the 
lagoons and the long spits that form the eastern end of Peard Bay (fig. 2), a traditional 
living site and summer hunting camp known by the Barrow families that spend their 
summers there as Tatchim Isua, ‘end of the bay.’
Figure 2: View from LIZ-C Runway
2In the 1950s, Jimmy’s grandfather sledded materials from the radar base to an 
inland fishing site and built a tiny cabin (fig. 3). Years later, Jimmy’s parents would 
charter planes from Barrow to be dropped off at the old DEW Line airstrip so that, 
packing the kids, they could hike in to their cabin and set fishing nets across the river. 
The family still uses the inland cabin, and local search and rescue organizations have 
insulated it so that it can serve as a rescue shelter for lost or stranded travelers.
Figure 3: The Olemaun’s inland fishing cabin built out of material from LIZ-C
It used to be easier to find one’s way back from the inland cabin to the airstrip and 
Tatchim Isua because of the beloved 300-foot high tower that stood on top of the hill at 
the radar site for almost half a century. The tower provided habitat for peregrine falcons 
and ravens until it was toppled during a remediation project in the late 1990s.
Along the beach at Tatchim Isua, there are about ten small cabins and structures, 
largely constructed from the DEW Line site’s waste material. Still on its original sled, 
one cabin that is now used by elder John Tulik of Barrow is an old DEW Line bath 
house. Tulik’s late wife’s family had long lived on the spit in semi-subterranean houses
3when the beach extended another 200 feet past where it does now, and their son is the 
owner of the big new house on the hill.
When one of Tulik’s great-grandchildren was mildly ill at camp but the waves 
were too rough to return to Barrow by boat, a North Slope Borough Search and Rescue 
helicopter flew out and landed on the gravel pad that had been formed when a dump full 
of batteries and other industrial debris was covered during site clean up (fig 4). Slightly 
downhill from that dump, Tautuknaitchuaq and Jimmy have been working on an ice 
cellar, and the cellar regularly fills up with water that leaks in from the surrounding 
tundra (fig 4). On the hill above the dump is the site’s fresh water lake that, despite clean 
up, is sprinkled with 55-gallon drums. About twice a week, Jimmy and his nephews take 
the four-wheeler up the gravel road to the old radar site and haul water for camp.
These are just a few of the ways that four generations (and counting) of Olemauns 
and Tuliks have been incorporating infrastructure from this radar site into their dwellings 
and lives. Similar stories are true for almost every other Inupiaq person in Alaska, most 
of the Inuit in the Canadian Arctic, and many people in Greenland. Families have grown 
up next to and, to varying degrees, have been shaped by these “remote” U.S. military 
bases.
The effects of war are generally understood in terms of global conflicts and 
casualties in the thousands, yet the scale on which militarism affects life also includes the
Figure 4: Landing pad and ice cellar at Peard Bay
Rationale
4minutiae: the myriad consequences of seemingly insignificant and remote military 
activities (Enloe 2004). After learning the basic history of the DEW Line during earlier 
research on the militarization of Alaska (Fritz 2002), this research project was bom of an 
unrelenting curiosity about what the DEW Line was like for the people on whose 
homeland the radar bases were built. On a world map depicting the global span of U.S. 
military installations since World War II, these arctic communities could be seen among 
a thousand dots indicating places where remote, disenfranchised, and often indigenous 
peoples have been subjected to the various impacts associated with U.S. military bases.
Such maps present a very generalized overview of modem U.S. militarization. 
While there are characteristics and impacts that are common to many of those 
installations and an understanding of the global empire of bases is vital to the broader 
history of modem U.S. militarism, it is equally important to search for the perspective of 
those bases from the bottom up -  the standpoint of people who, as children, looked up 
one day and saw enormous amphibious assault ships landing on their beaches to unload 
bulldozers and construction crews. This research project was designed to explore how 
individuals and communities were affected by the constmction, presence, and clean up of 
the Distant Early Warning radar sites in the western Arctic. Study findings revealed that 
the short life cycle of a very small arctic radar base can literally and figuratively permeate 
and shape the land and the lives of several generations of people around it. While the 
sites are a largely normalized part of everyone’s lives along the arctic coast, each 
community has its own particular history with the DEW Line and each individual has 
their own opinions on militarization in the Arctic.
Their stories are a critical part of a genuine history of the DEW Line -  a history 
that, in Alaska, has received little attention and has not been represented in ways that 
include the perspectives of those most affected by it. My personal perspectives influenced 
the selection of this topic and clearly shaped this dissertation, but I do not want nor do I 
think it would be possible (or interesting, or productive) to relate this story in a way that 
neatly corroborates any theories or preconceptions I might have. The legacies of arctic 
militarization do not lend themselves to clean or politically useful reports because,
5despite the many negative consequences of military activities, people have also gained 
from military employment and materials. The military, moreover, is the most trusted 
institution in the United States.1 This trust is due in large part to the fact that that the U.S. 
military is one of the least elitist and most diverse institutions of power in American 
society. Otherwise disenfranchised groups of people have access to the military (Astore 
2008), and military service plays a significant role in the lives of many Native Alaskans. 
Accepting the complexity inherent in such situations, this project was guided by the 
beliefs that deconstructing the ideology of militarism is a critical task for humanity, and 
that making explicit how the processes of militarization are undergone by men, women, 
and children around the world contributes to that goal.
Historical Context: Project 572
In the late 1940s, the American government secretly launched ‘Project 572’: code
name for a string of fifty-seven radar stations along the 70th parallel that would provide 
early warning of a Soviet bomber attack, giving the U.S. time to attempt interception and 
to retaliate. Within the first years of planning, Project 572 had resulted in over 40 new 
airfields and helicopter landing sites and a major hydrographic survey of the arctic 
coastline (Neufeld 2002).
Eventually stretching from the Aleutian Islands to Greenland, contractors built six 
Main radar stations about 500 miles apart, 23 Auxiliary stations every 100 miles, and 28 
Intermediate stations every 50 miles (fig. 5). By some accounts, the DEW Line, the 
northernmost extension of a continental air defense system, was the largest and most 
ambitious peacetime military project in history. It was a key component in the new 
nuclear security policy colloquially known as MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction. For 
industry, the DEW Line was part of the new Cold War business in which corporations 
grew large and powerful on defense contracts. For geopolitical defense strategists, the 
radars transformed the remote frontier of North American into the frontline of defense for 
the continent.
1 The military is, according to recent polls, approximately three times as trusted as the president and five 
times as trusted as Congress (Astore 2008).
6Figure 5: The DEW Line sites in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland2
Building and maintaining the DEW Line constituted a veritable transformation of 
the arctic landscape. In Canada, contractors with little practical experience in the unique 
engineering demands of arctic terrain encountered a logistics nightmare in deploying new 
technology in the unfamiliar environment. In Alaska, federal oil exploration in the Naval 
Petroleum Reserve Four (PET 4) had preceded the DEW Line and construction for the 
western sector was run out of Barrow by sourdough cat skinners for Puget Sound &
Drake and the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory and exploration camps.
In addition to importing thousands of southern workers and bringing other aspects 
of western culture to the indigenous inhabitants of the Arctic, the sites created jobs, 
excitement, building materials, and new infrastructure that supported further industrial 
development and facilitated northern science and technology. However, the military often 
commandeered previously occupied land for the bases, resulting in forced relocations. 
DEW Line planners did not simply put a site every 50 miles -  their selection was made 
the same way Inuit living in the Arctic had chosen their campsites for hundreds of years:
2
This map used a digitized version of a 1975 American Geographical Society map of the ‘Arctic Region’ and is 
a photoshopped approximation of the DEW Line sites’ locations based largely on information from Google Earth 
which has a DEW Line placemark kml file.
7strategically. Ideally located on prominent points and spits with plenty of beach and 
gravel, the exact location for radar bases had to meet certain requirements, including 
adequate accessibility and a good fresh water source. As a result, the sites often 
overlapped particularly valuable and traditionally used land. The bases also deformed the 
landscape around the sites and created a legacy of toxic waste and contamination.
Technological advances consistently required fewer sites and fewer technicians to 
maintain the radar system. Moreover, the strategic advantage of the DEW Line was 
significantly diminished by the USSR’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles 
in 1957, the same year the DEW Line was completed. Due in part to the high cost of 
closing the stations and the continued desire to monitor air traffic over the Arctic, the 
sites remained active into the early 1990s when most were replaced with an upgraded and 
almost entirely automated system of ‘North Warning’ radars. Many of the more modem 
North Warning radars are currently being deactivated. Old or new, active or not, the sites 
are still widely known as the DEW Line and no local residents interviewed for this 
project were aware of the name change.
The materials used to build and maintain the bases were not removed and 
extensive landfills accompany each site. Many sites, in particular all 28 intermediate (gap 
filler) sites that closed in 1963, were left to decay for decades. Defense Construction 
Canada has characterized the DEW Line as “the biggest environmental cleanup in North 
America...in one of the world’s most fragile ecosystems” (Barrera 2007). The radar sites 
have led directly to local knowledge of contaminants and subsequent efforts to enforce 
environmental laws in the Arctic.
By dint of their numbers, power, wealth, equipment, and technology, the DEW 
Liners and the radar sites became the central representatives of governmental authority 
for surrounding areas and their presence altered the cultural and physical reality of life for 
indigenous peoples. In effect, the DEW Line sites created a strong source for what French 
philosopher Michel Foucault termed ‘govemmentality,’ which can be understood as the 
practices of government and their affects on the people who are governed. As this 
dissertation describes in detail in chapters 3 and 4, indigenous residents were inculcated
8as never before with new notions of Canadian and U.S. citizenship when the DEW Line 
and steady wage employment arrived. Ideas of personal responsibility that emanated from 
the military bases focused on consistent dependability as an employee, and the tendency 
of Inuit employees to leave work to hunt was a major problem for station managers.
Some government officials envisioned employment at the DEW Line and the training 
received for it as golden opportunities to increase self-worth, personal discipline, and an 
individual’s usefulness. During construction, the radar project employed at least 25% of 
the native population in certain areas of the North, and the introduction of an indoor, 
wage-based employment represented significant change even for those individuals 
familiar with a cash-based economy (Ferguson 1957a). Combined with an increased 
desire for and access to western goods, the high wages transformed the living conditions 
of many people and partly dismantled traditional relationships within Native 
communities.
In addition to jobs, the sites were also sources of steady and very powerful 
cultural practices and perspectives. Standard fare at the DEW sites consisted of movies, 
alcohol, poker, and unique DEW-Line societies. Across the Arctic, the arrival of military 
industry meant a supply of waste materials that were used to build framed wooden houses 
-  the first in several regions -  that contributed to the physical transformations brought by 
the bases.
Other noteworthy social impacts of the DEW Line include the numerous 
airstrips that have played a considerable role in determining the survival of certain 
communities; relationships and marriages between local women and DEW Liners; 
emergency medical attention (both from doctors at sites in the past and via phone at 
automated sites now); and a market for native art and crafts.
This project examined both abrupt and long-term effects brought by the Cold War 
strategic defense industry in Inuit communities of the western Arctic. Descriptive 
analyses of the stories of the Inupiaq of northern Alaska and the Inuvialuit of the 
Mackenzie River Delta area of Canada’s western Arctic regarding their histories with the
9DEW Line contributes a specific example of processes by which militarism penetrates 
small, indigenous communities and the resulting localized forms of militarism. While 
gathering personal experiences, opinions, and stories about the cultural and 
environmental history of the western DEW Line, the project was specifically designed to 
elicit the sharing of knowledge on how the processes of modem militarization shape 
small communities and impact indigenous peoples’ lives around the world. Interviews 
were also meant to discover whether militaristic values have influenced traditional 
cultural norms in the western Arctic and, if so, whether this has resulted from the local 
impact of the DEW Line. Another area of interest concerned whether WWII-era activity 
in Alaska resulted in such fear among the Inuit that they later welcomed the DEW Line 
and accepted the military definition of security, whether that has changed over time, and 
why.
Exploring these processes in particular communities and through the subjective 
experiences of individuals was a way to discover alternative conceptions of rationality 
and security. Environmental security, in particular, is a common theme among the 
peoples of the western Arctic, who are increasingly confronted with sensational threats to 
the health of the land and the ocean. Ethnography is one method of exploring the 
environmental legacies of the DEW Line and explicating locally perceived environmental 
problems caused by military industrialization.
These and other questions, based on theoretical framework provided by the 
burgeoning discourse on militarism, were formulated to provide information about 
how a society that is undergoing rapid change is influenced and shaped by the 
particular form of colonialism, imperialism, or industrialism it encounters. They were 
also designed to explore the theory that the more society has been shaped by a foreign 
impact, the more difficult it becomes to gain perspective on the foreign elements 
because those influences do not remain foreign. The once-foreign elements become 
natural, unquestioned, and eventually set the parameters within which people think, 
according to scholars of militarization and other forms of colonialism (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1992).
10
It could be seen as problematic to interpret qualitative social data under the 
premise that something has occurred (i.e. militarization) even if people do not realize 
it. Both scholars and indigenous peoples encounter associated paradoxes in describing 
the impacts of militarization on societies because their social structures, institutions, 
and epistemologies are largely dominated by that very paradigm (Simon 1992). While 
not wanting to oversimplify an inherently complex issue, an interviewee of this 
particular research project might say that he or she does not think that the western 
Arctic has been militarized. According to this general militarization theory, such a 
statement could be evidence that the Arctic has been militarized -  so militarized that 
people do not recognize it because their worldviews are already too changed. Or, it 
could be evidence that the Arctic has not been militarized. Since the theory is a 
condition (if people are militarized, they may not be able to say so), the theory would 
be impossible to falsify by superficial ethnographic inquiry. Although an unfalsifiable 
premise is not a valid theory in the strict sense, this does not mean that it is not true or 
useful.
This project gambled on another related assumption, which is that the degree of 
hindsight gained by distance from the Cold War would render the social and 
environmental legacies of the DEW Line and arctic militarization easier to discern and 
would permit people to feel more comfortable speaking about these issues. Elsewhere, 
scholars have found that indigenous communities are expressing independent 
identities, self-determinism, and security priorities that were subsumed or invisible 
under the “Cold War dialectics of the nuclear age” (Masco 1999: 204). The evidence 
compiled during this research has convinced this researcher that this is the case in the 
western Arctic: I had no difficulty finding people who spoke openly (and often 
disparagingly) about the military. My belief is that naturally outspoken and 
opinionated individuals increasingly feel no qualms about speaking their minds about 
the government in general, while people who are shy or not particularly interested in 
such issues still have little to say about it today. Those people were interviewed more 
rarely, as there was nothing random about the selection of interviewees: it was largely
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people who were genuinely interested in the subject or those who had no particular 
interest in it but could stand talking about it if there were benefits to doing so .
In studying the effects of DEW Line construction in 1956, anthropologist Jack 
Ferguson stated, “The actual effect of DEW line employment is becoming clearer to 
my eyes but it is not a simple effect but a multitude of effects. And it affects the 
Eskimos differently in not only geographical areas but in age groups and even, 
possibly, in different “personality groups” (Ferguson 1956). I did not anticipate finding 
consensus on the DEW Line or national security priorities in general among arctic 
residents. Almost no one has completely positive or negative views on these subjects 
because they are inherently complex with widely varying positive and negative 
impacts. It is precisely in this countering of advantages and disadvantages that 
underlying and changing assumptions and values may be articulated. I likewise 
hypothesized that most differences in opinion about arctic military activities among 
arctic residents would be due to individual outlooks and experience, but considered 
that generational and gender differences could play a significant role. Moreover, I 
anticipated that there would be observable and enlightening differences in general 
opinion depending on the resident country, and that Canadian arctic residents would 
have distinctly divergent opinions from the American residents on both the legacies of 
the DEW Line and on the advantages and disadvantages of militarization. Although 
the evidence gathered did support both of these theories, a more extensive survey 
would be required to firmly substantiate it. More useful than such statistics are the 
stories illustrated by a plurality of voices that demonstrate the various experiences 
people had and a description of the spectrum of attitudes and opinions.
My approach was inspired by another central theory of militarization, which is 
that simply tracking the historic course of military projects leaves an incomplete 
picture. Militarization is not found only in simple and obvious places, but can 
transform the meanings and uses of people, things, and ideas distant from the military. 
By uncovering, documenting, and examining the multilayered processes by which
For formal recorded interviews, informants were compensated $50.
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militarism gains legitimacy and popular acceptance or creates opposition on an 
individual and local level, one reaches a more realistic understanding of how 
militarization works, how ethnicity becomes converted to accommodate a nationalist 
consciousness, and how foreign values and assumptions become natural and 
unquestioned (Enloe 2004).
Anthropological inquiry into remote military bases and the use of ethnographic 
methods to gather information on ecological degradation at overseas and remote bases 
is an important potential for this field of research. Often, the military itself does not 
have records of environmental issues, is unwilling to completely disclose the 
information they have, and releases environmental data in formats that are difficult to 
decipher and make relevant to specific places. Military clean up programs are required 
by CERCLA (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability ACT, commonly known as Superfund) stipulations to rely on local 
knowledge. Air Force engineers (civilian contractors) in Kaktovik have had locals 
indicate to them the locations of many Barter Island DEW Line outbuildings and other 
sites where contamination is a problem. Nevertheless, few people feel that the clean up 
projects have respected their input or been adequate. The ongoing clean up of the 
DEW Line clean up in recent years is, especially for younger people, as significant a 
chapter in this history as the construction and operation of the radar bases were for 
previous generations.
In addition to analyzing the variation in arctic residents’ experience of and 
attitudes toward the DEW Line and the militarization of their landscape, this project 
includes photographic documentation of the physical status of many of the sites across 
the western half of the radar line from Point Lay, Alaska to Shingle Point, NWT.
Framing the Study o f Arctic Militarization
Anthropological explorations of militarization, ranging from theories of 
conflict and collective violence to studies of remote bases and American Cold War 
culture, provide this project’s broad framework and are explored in detail in the second 
chapter. Although only a handful of scholars have studied the DEW Line itself and
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most of that work has a Canadian focus, their excellent research has clearly been 
crucial to this project and their encouragement has been equally vital. These historical 
backgrounds and ethnographic analyses on the DEW Line were complimented by 
particularly rich memoirs, contractor publications, and DEW Line-inspired works of 
fiction. The study also drew its empirical and theoretical background from several 
other areas of literature, including ethnographical and historical studies of the Inuit of 
Alaska and western Canada, particularly those focusing on contact, modernization, and 
cultural resilience in the face of change. Contemporary arctic militarization issues are 
increasingly appearing in the media as the contentious race for resources and 
sovereignty heats up, and the discourse of circumpolar security and policy scholars 
provides a framework for interpreting the role of the DEW Line and future military 
activities.
Definitions: Militarism and Militarization
The terms militarism and militarization are sometimes used synonymously, but
militarism is usually much narrower in scope. Militarism as a political doctrine presumes 
that society is best served or is more efficient when it is governed by concepts embodied 
in the military or necessitated by military demands. Militarists contend that security is the 
highest social priority and claim that developing and maintaining the military is the only 
way to ensure that security. Militarism also includes the effort to expand military cultures 
and ideals to areas outside the military, especially business, government policy, 
education, and entertainment -  this is where militarism becomes militarization.
In A History o f Militarism: Civilian and Military (originally published in 1939), 
Alfred Vagts outlined the distinctions between “the military way” and militarism, or “the 
militaristic way.” The military way specifically refers to armies concentrating men and 
materials to gain power efficiently and with the least bloodshed. This includes armies 
preparing for wars decided upon by civilians but refraining from perpetuating wars 
themselves. Vagts contended that the military way is “limited in scope, confined to one 
function, and scientific in its essential qualities” (1959: 13). Militarism, on the other 
hand, involves an array of customs, actions and thinking associated with war but that
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transcend true military purposes -  and which may defeat the purpose of the military way. 
Vagts, who also used the terms “militarization” and “militarizing” to describe the active 
spread of militarism, warns that militarism’s influence is “unlimited in scope. It may 
permeate all society and become dominant over all industry and arts...displaying] the 
qualities of cast and cult, authority and belief’ (1959: 13).
Chalmers Johnson (2005: 10) claims that militarism is the inseparable companion 
of imperialism, and that it “refers not to the defense of the country, but to the vested 
interests of the military as a way of life, in the expansion of the military establishment at 
the expense of civilian sectors of government.”
In Britain’s World War I-era feminist peace movement, women’s leader 
Catherine Marshall defined a militarist as “one who believes in the supremacy of force, 
who justifies the use of power to compel submission to the desires of its possessor, 
without any further sanction than his own conviction that his desires be reasonable” 
(Kamaster 1987: 45).
Militarism, according to Cynthia Enloe, can be a dependence on the military for a 
sense of pride and security. It is an ideology characterized by several distinct core values 
and beliefs which are embraced by a person, institution, or community and which come 
to define for them how the world works. According to Enloe, these core, distinctively 
militaristic beliefs include: a) armed force is the ultimate resolver of tensions b) human 
nature is prone to conflict c) having enemies is a natural condition d) hierarchical 
relations produce effective action and e) a state without a military is naive, scarcely 
modem, and barely legitimate (Enloe 2004).
Anthropologist Catherine Lutz defines militarization as “the contradictory and 
tense social process in which society organizes itself for the production of war” -  tense 
because it can create conflict between social sectors -  particularly between those who 
benefit from militarization and those who do not, but who may also bear some of the 
costs (2002: 723). The process of militarization, according to Lutz, involves increasing 
the labor and resources dedicated to military purposes and the shaping of other 
institutions to be in line with military goals. Lutz also sees militarization as a discursive
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process with societal beliefs and values shifting as needed to legitimate “the use of force, 
the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or 
tributes used to pay for them.” It is not just an increase in visible “militant nationalism 
and militant fundamentalisms” but also increasing stratification of race, class, gender, and 
sexuality (Lutz 2002: 723). Social institutions that seem to have little connection to war, 
particularly knowledge fields such as physics and psychology, are shaped by military 
funding and goals.
The long process of U.S. militarization and empire building over the course of the 
20th century has reshaped almost every aspect of global social life. Lutz sees two 
questions central to the study of militarization:
(1) What is the 20th century history of militarization, and how is it related to the 
notion of militarism, to the nation-state, to changing modes of warfare, and to 
broader social changes?
(2) How can we connect global and national histories with specific 
ethnographically understood places and people involved in the militarization 
process? (2002: 725)
Enloe (2004) describes militarization as the multi-tracked, sociopolitical 
processes by which the roots of military culture and social practices are ingrained in a 
society, involving cultural as well as institutional, ideological, and economic 
transformations. She has also described it as a step-by-step process by which a person or 
a thing gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend for its well­
being on militaristic ideas (Enloe 2000: 3).
Enloe accepts that the concept of militarization may seem vague, but notes that its 
diffuseness can also be a strength since analyses must consider a convergence of cultural, 
economic, and political processes. While many studies focus narrowly on militarization’s 
technological, diplomatic, or economic processes, Enloe contends that studying 
militarization encourages cross-cultural dialogue and permits the evaluation of 
ideological change. Theories of militarization are particularly relevant now since the
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current historical era may be the most militarized in human history, with more people in 
more societies dependent on or controlled by the military and military priorities than 
during any other period in time (Enloe 1993).
Enloe (1993) outlines two of the central theories on militarization, one being that 
it is the logical consequence of capitalism and the other that it is inevitable because states 
by their nature are inclined to coercion. The capitalism theory is convincing: government 
officials enhance the status, resources, and authority of the military in order to protect the 
interests of private enterprise at home and overseas. This notion conflates the interests of 
business with the interests of the nation, and its supporters argue that it is in the 
boardroom, not the war room, that we should look to find the origins of war. 
Consequently, major business firms with overseas investments are seen at the root of 
military intervention and the political economy of arms manufacturing is a primary 
concern. In sum, this theory purports that profits drive military doctrine, not the reverse, 
and that a capitalistic economy creates a political life that feeds on militarization (Enloe 
1993).
The second theory, that militarization is inevitable once political power is 
organized into a state, holds that once public power is hierarchically structured, those 
who control the state will use state-sanctioned force to enforce compliance. Enloe finds 
both of these theories powerful, plausible, and persuasive, but she faults them for 
focusing almost exclusively on economic relations as the most serious of all the relations 
sustaining militarism and for paying too little attention to the cultural politics that may be 
at play. Enloe believes that femininst approaches, which ask harder questions and explore 
other root causes of militarization, will reveal more precisely how power works and the 
fuel that perpetuates it.
As stated above, militarization is the process by which the roots of militarism are 
implanted into the foundation of a society. However, Enloe contends that there is nothing 
automatic or inevitable about the process and that it can be stalled, resisted at an early 
stage, and occasionally reversed. Although it can be difficult to avoid (even the leaders of 
movements opposed to military regimes often become militarized), there is nothing
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inherently simple or easy about militarization. It is traceable, moreover, since 
militarization usually moves forward due to particular decisions made by specific people 
(2000). Both Enloe and Lutz point out that most militarizing processes occur during what 
is “misleadingly labeled ‘peacetime’” (Enloe 2004: 220).
The story of the DEW Line corroborates several of these themes. The Cold War 
was not “wartime” per se, but an era that included decades of military buildup and 
imperial expansion. The reason for the radars was security. Security was not particularly 
comforting when it was presented as merely knowing when the enemy was striking, but 
fear was also an important ingredient in the national security state. The sites expanded 
military culture and ideals to the communities around them via their policies, their 
business aspects, the entertainment they provided, and education (i.e. in how to speak 
English and profit from the military industrial complex). Some people benefited, while 
many did not but bore many of the associated social and environmental costs. It resulted 
in increased stratification of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and many communities 
developed a modem economy that was dependent on the military.
The Coldest War: DEW Line Literature
This project builds on the historic and recent research on the DEW Line itself 
and contributes a specifically Alaskan/American-based and comparative study to the 
largely Canadian body of work. A critical source for all DEW Line research is the 
correspondence and final report (unpublished) of Canadian anthropologist Jack 
Ferguson who, in 1957, was sent by Canada’s Department of Northern Affairs to study 
the impact of DEW Line construction on the Inuit of Canada’s western Arctic from 
Tuktoyaktuk to Cambridge Bay and determine if the activity was subjecting natives to 
disruption of their hunting economy (Ferguson 1956; Ferguson 1957a; Ferguson 
1957b; Ferguson 1961).
Canadian writer and filmmaker Kevin McMahon authored another key 
ethnographic work on the impact of the DEW Line and subsequent military installations 
on the Inuit of arctic Canada: Arctic Twilight: Reflections on the Destiny o f Canada’s 
Northern Land and People (1988). McMahon also produced a documentary film on the
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same subject, the title of which, In the Realm o f Twilight (1994), paid even greater tribute 
to Diamond Jenness’s People o f  the Twilight (Jenness 1928). McMahon was also 
significantly influenced by Ferguson’s report and the work of anthropologists Hugh 
Brody (Brody 1975) and Jean Briggs (1970), whose findings and interpretations are 
discussed throughout the book. He conducted numerous interviews with Inuit in the 
communities of Gjoa Haven, Hall Beach, and Resolute Bay. He also interviewed 
government officials and military personnel and he scoured memoirs of HBC employees 
to find perspectives on the Inuits’ reaction to the military and war.
An important perspective of McMahon’s book is its timing: as modem as possible 
while still from the Cold War era. Arctic Twilight focused predominantly on the impact 
of the original DEW Line, but also covered the Reagan-era deployment of the North 
Warning System alongside the older installment. McMahon did not know that the Cold 
War was soon to end and described in detail the future weapons programs that analysts 
predicted would follow -  a circular cycle of developments that the analysts knew would 
be obsolete, like the DEW Line, by the time of completion. In explaining its military 
infrastructure, McMahon described the circumpolar North from Polaris: “if you could see 
across the electromagnetic spectrum, the entire Arctic would appear wrapped in a dense 
smog of radar energy” (McMahon 1988: 164).
In interpretation and analysis, McMahon was not adhering to academic notions of 
objectivity. Disappointed that political scientists and other analysts have seen the issue 
solely in terms of physical obstacles to be overcome, McMahon asked “why develop the 
North at all?” He found it incredible and absurd that the weight of a forty year old 
undeclared and intransigent war between two feuding empires thousands of miles away 
should ultimately land on children in Resolute Bay, whose drunken, abusive parents had 
“a shit-tide of violence” begin to back up into their lives when the military arrived (ibid: 
103).
Neither did McMahon make a discussion of “social pathologies” in contemporary 
arctic communities a central theme of his work. At the core of his writing, instead, is an 
exploration of Western civilization’s modem scientific paradigm and, among other
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characteristics, its similarity to the story of Dr. Frankenstein. Large sections of 
McMahons work are devoted to a philosophical exploration of the nuclear age and 
questions of global survival. “Few places,” he wrote of the Arctic, “do we confront a 
culture that has not yet completely undergone the spiritual and physical fracturing which 
has become the engine of our own” (1988: 185).
Canadians Matt Farish, a geographer, and Whitney Lackenbauer, a historian, have 
published an extensive DEW Line bibliography and resource list (Lackenbauer, et al. 
2005). The two have also undertaken ‘The DEW Line Project’ (Lackenbauer 2010), a 
collaborative effort to produce a comprehensive and interdisciplinary history of the DEW 
Line. Farrish and Lackenbauer are writing The DEW Line: A Spatial History, which will 
be a significant landmark in the history and geography of Canada, arctic studies, Cold 
War history, political geography, native studies, and environmental studies. These 
scholars are building on the support for a comprehensive DEW Line study that has been 
explicitly promoted by Canadian security expert Rob Huebert and by anthropologist 
Robert Williamson, who was conducting ethnography in the Arctic before and during 
DEW Line construction.
Yukon and Western Arctic Historian for Parks Canada David Neufeld and his 
detailed research on the DEW Line in the Inuvialuit area (Neufeld 1997a; Neufeld 
1997b; Neufeld 2002) have been critical to this research project. Neufeld’s generosity 
in steering this researcher during an internship and in sharing his copies of the 
Canadian government’s archival documents, including Ferguson’s correspondence and 
report, is beyond charitable. Neufeld has been in charge of an extensive Parks Canada 
cultural resource management program to preserve information on the two radar sites 
located in what is now Ivvavik National Park and is working on a history of the Line in 
Canada’s western Arctic.
In Melanie Gagnon’s documentation of Inuit recollections of the military in 
Iqaluit (Gagnon 2002), Gagnon noted that western documentation in general still 
describes the military presence in the Arctic as having negative impacts on Inuit (true 
of both McMahon’s and Ferguson’s accounts). Gagnon concluded that it is a
20
preoccupation with ‘keeping the natives native’ that leads people to see the 
construction of a military base and employment of Inuit men as a threat. Gagnon 
learned from the Inuit elders in Iqaluit that the Americans are remembered quite 
positively there. The U.S. troops helped the people significantly and were fun and 
upbeat, particularly compared to the stiff Canadian bureaucrats that followed. The 
elders interviewed saw environmental degradation as an unfortunate but unintended 
consequence of the military’s presence (Gagnon and elders 2002). Gagnon defined 
militarism as “an ethic of paternalistic nationalism, or the ideal of protecting the 
civilian public of a sovereign nation-state, through the application of physical and/or 
technological force” (Gagnon and elders 2002: 34 & 51). Compared to the definitions 
used by other scholars of militarization, this description suggests a decidedly kinder 
and gentler (perhaps more wholesome, socialist and Canadian) version of militarism. 
U.S. militarism, on the other hand, involves a ‘civilian public’ in that it acts to 
transform a civilian-oriented society to its opposite: a military-oriented society.
Indigenous arctic scholar and diplomat Mary Simon (1992) is unequivocal in 
her contention that militarization tends to undermine the self-determination of 
indigenous peoples, imposes costly and unwanted priorities and activities within their 
territories, and leads to loss of control over land and water. A 2008 report and 
annotated bibliography on the DEW Line contracted by the U.S. Air Force 611th Civil 
Engineer Squadron out of Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, found that, for the most 
part, “the presence of DEW Line sites adversely affected indigenous populations” 
(Metcalf 2008: 9).
From Lavalle, Quebec, Maxime Begin’s anthropology thesis, Des Radares and 
Des Hommes (2002), explores Inuit memories of the construction and early years of 
the DEW Line in Hall Beach. Begin and I share similar interests: through a theoretical 
focus on the social construction of memory, he explored how the locals qualified the 
relations they had with the DEW Liners and how these Canadian Inuit interpreted the 
U.S.- and Russian-led Cold War. Also in Canada, Heather Ducharme’s dissertation, 
‘Here We Fight the Coldest War,’ is written in the style of an opera or stageplay based
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on diary entries and focused on environmental science and feminist autobiography on 
the DEW Line (2002). Other works that were particularly useful for this research 
include the archived papers of Alaskan sourdough and arctic cat skinner Bob Pittenger 
(2000); the memoirs of a young medical doctor who spent a year on the DEW Line in 
Canada’s eastern Arctic (Howerd 1960); industry publications and promotional videos; 
and the small but compelling genre of DEW Line fictional thrillers (Griffin 1980; 
Holliday 1957).
Inuit cultural change and adaptation
The wealth of information on the cultures of Inuit peoples, including their 
adaptations to the arctic environment, cultural resilience, and opportunistic responses 
in the face of modernization, has shaped this project in many ways. The works of 
Canadian anthropologist Diamond Jenness on the economy and administration of the 
Inuit (Jenness 1948; Jenness 1962; Jenness 1968) has been an invaluable resource for 
information and perspective, particularly on the impacts of World War II and the 
Korean War on the Yupik and Inupiat of Alaska. Charles Hughes (1965) described 
culture change among the Inuit from the early 1940s to mid-1960s (including the DEW 
Line) and, while achieving a broad view, also emphasized regional diversity among 
indigenous arctic residents. The investigation by Frank Tester and Peter Kulchyski 
(1994) on Inuit relocation in the eastern Arctic gives an excellent overview of the 
problems posed by modernization in the period 1939-1963 and of Canada’s northern 
policies that came to a head with construction of the DEW Line. Ernest (Tiger)
Burch’s (1975) explorations of northwest Alaskan Inuit kinship relations and modem 
periods of transition that occurred with contact, disease, and sedenterization provide a 
basis for his recent research into the traditional Inupiaq system of alliance and conflict 
(Burch 2005). In-depth reports on particular arctic communities are equally helpful; 
Frederick Milan’s (1962) work on Wainwright is considered a fundamental resource 
for subsequent social science of Inupiaq culture and James VanStone’s (1962) study of 
Point Hope gives insight into a northwest community that, though it had no radar site, 
was to be profoundly affected by the military. Oral history collections such as the
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Yukon North Slope Inuvialuit narratives include elders’ recollections of DEW sites in 
the Mackenzie River area (Nagy 1994).
The North Slope Borough and Bureau of Land Management’s comprehensive 
reports on land use detail Native dependence and livelihood, historic values, and 
Native recreation (North Slope Borough Staff 1979). The volumes on the Wainwright, 
Barrow-Atqasuk, Point Lay, and Kaktovik areas are key contextual resources for a 
DEW Line history, particularly the for-the-public editions by William Schneider and 
Ivie on Wainwright (1988) and by David Libbey on Kaktovik (1982).
Norman Chance’s work on the impact of modernization and the DEW Line in 
Barter Island/Kaktovik, The Inupiat and Arctic Alaska: An Ethnography o f Development 
(Chance 1967; Chance 1984; Chance 1990a) is a key historical and ethnographic 
resource. The book was based on Chance’s own fieldwork (sporadically from 1958-1989) 
and the research of other anthropologists. Chance is a retired Professor of Anthropology 
at the University of Connecticut who remains active and keenly interested in Alaskan 
militarization. Throughout the book, Chance criticized colonialism, promoted the natural 
rights of indigenous peoples, and commented on the tendency of anthropologists to 
support the ideology of their era (and their government funders). Chance disparaged the 
ideological blinders that he felt had limited his own early ethnographic work with the 
people of Kaktovik.
Chance, who was initially interested in going to Kaktovik to explore the dramatic 
changes that had taken place after World War II, expressed some skepticism about 
missionaries but was openly critical of the treatment of the indigenous inhabitants by the 
military. He wrote that the Inupiat in the Alaskan Arctic had become somewhat familiar 
with the U.S. military as a result of Lt. Col. Marvin “Muktuk” Marstons’s “Tundra 
Army” (the Alaska Territorial Guard organized during WWII), but that they were “hardly 
prepared” for the events that followed. Chance tried to reconcile and make a synthesis out 
of the two pictures of life in the Arctic he had seen: “One emphasized the intimate 
relationship with the land and the importance of sharing.. .in the other, the land and its 
people were simply a means to the end of winning the Cold War” (1990b: 83-84).
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The impact of the military on the Inuit has been documented in part by 
anthropologists John J. and Irma Honigmann in their studies of Frobisher Bay (1965) 
and the western Canadian Arctic (1970). Nancy Fogel Chance’s work (1988) on 
gender and culture among Inupiat women throughout history is another significant 
study that can enrich an exploration of the gendered aspects of arctic militarization.
Josh Wisniewski’s master’s thesis on the impact of Federal Aviation Administration 
field stations in rural Alaska (2005) employs a framework that explores militarization 
via institutions that re-created the state’s hegemonic themes in new settings.
Pakaking into the DEW Line: Fieldwork4
This project was based primarily on discussions with people who have lived near 
DEW Line sites and visits to the radar bases themselves. A pilot study was conducted in 
the village of Kaktovik (Barter Island)5 in August of 2005 in order to meet people, to 
gauge general community response to the proposal to study the cultural and 
environmental impacts of the DEW Line in the western Arctic, and to discuss logistical 
details of traveling through the area. Logistical details were crucial because it was 
determined that in order to explore how modem militarization processes have shaped the 
land, communities and the lives of individual indigenous people in the Arctic, the 
fieldwork must include travel along the DEW Line itself.
To collect the evidence and achieve a broad sense of the DEW Line, the fieldwork 
included traveling the western section of the line (from the Mackenzie River Delta in 
Canada to Point Lay, Alaska) by sailing canoe over the course of two summer/fall 
seasons. There were several research-related and logistical reasons that boating was 
determined to be the best travel method for this project. To visit as many DEW Line sites 
and communities as possible, a boat provided the only realistic access. There are 22 sites 
from Shingle Point to Point Lay (fig. 6), and although it was impossible to reach a few of
4
In introducing me, a Barrow friend introduced me as “the one that pakaks into the DEW Line.” Pakak can 
be translated as ‘get into,’ ‘poke around,’ or ‘mess with’ and is often used for things children do but should 
not.
5 The Barter Island radar site (BAR-MAIN) was the prototype DEW Line station for the Arctic, built in 
1953.
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them during the trip, visiting the majority by water offered a critical perspective on their 
real geographical consequences. A continuous and sequential voyage along the line 
provided a far more holistic understanding of its geographical significance than 
piecemeal trips would have allowed.
Figure 6: DEW Sites in Alaska and Canadian western Arctic6
This approach to studying the DEW Line was far more engaging both for residents 
and for myself as a researcher than it would have been had I flown in, conducted 
interviews, and returned to Fairbanks. Residents were significantly interested in the 
project because we traveled through their homeland experiencing the arctic environment. 
This situation elicited incredible hospitality, local travel advice, the sharing of landscape 
knowledge, and opportunities for participating in hunting, fishing, and other activities on 
the land with local residents. Local residents were also engaged as guides on visits to 
radar sites on several occasions.
The fieldwork began in early July, 2008, in Gwich’in Athabascan territory on the 
Peel River at Fort McPherson in Canada’s Northwest Territory. After several days in Fort
This map used a digitized version of a 1975 American Geographical Society map of the ‘Arctic Region’ and is 
a photoshopped approximation of the DEW Line sites’ locations based largely on information from Google Earth 
which has a DEW Line placemark kml file.
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McPherson, we embarked on the Peel River and traveled downriver to Aklavik. After a 
brief sojourn there, we continued north, the Peel River having become the western 
channel of the Mackenzie River Delta, to Shallow Bay on the Beaufort Sea. On the far 
west side of the delta are both the Shingle Point DEW Line station and Shingle Point, a 
spit and lagoon which has long been an important location for the Inuvialuit of the Delta 
and is currently a summer fishing camp for many families from Aklavik and Inuvik.
After a week there, we canoed west to Herschel Island and the other DEW Line sites in 
the western Canadian Arctic: Stokes Point and Komakuk Beach. After crossing the 
border into Alaska, we made it to Barter Island by late July -  just one day before a 
memorable west-wind storm blew in, creating massive erosion of the bluff and covering 
half of the island’s runway with water. After nearly two weeks in Kaktovik, we continued 
west along the coast, visiting the remains of Collinson Point and Brownlow Point in 
Camden Bay and the recently closed Bullen Point DEW Auxiliary site. After Bullen, we 
found ourselves in the territory of major oil development for over 150 miles of coastline, 
which in itself provides unique insight into the modem industrialization of the western 
Arctic. We investigated the still-manned and operational DEW Line Auxiliary site at 
Oliktok, which lies within the oil industry network. Near Teshekpuk Lake, we explored 
the remains of the Kogru Intermediate Site before heading northwest to round Cape 
Halkett and arriving at Point Lonely, an Auxiliary site currently undergoing a large-scale 
clean up. We were thwarted in our efforts to visit the next site, Cape Simpson, by a polar 
bear swimming near shore, and we subsequently sailed into Barrow on the 6th of 
September. Fortunately, we were promptly ‘adopted’ by a prominent Barrow family (Roy 
and Flossie Nageak) who let us stay in their hunting cabin at Pignik (fig. 7), which is 
about six miles north of town. We stayed in Barrow until mid-October, participating in 
hunting, beach combing, family events and daily life with the Nageaks and their extended 
network of family and friends.
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Figure 7: The Nageak’s cabin at Pignik, October, 2008.
In spring 2009,1 flew back to Kaktovik for two weeks to conduct several 
interviews in conjunction with Beth Mikow, an anthropology student at the University of 
Alaska Fairbanks whose master’s degree research focuses on forced relocations in Alaska 
as part of the BOREAS ‘Moved by the State’ project. That thesis now constitutes the 
definitive investigation of the three moves undertaken by the Kaktovikmiut due to 
military activities on Barter Island (Mikow 2010).
The fieldwork trip continued in mid-August 2009, when we returned to Barrow 
for a week before continuing down the coast. We stayed two weeks at Peard Bay (site of 
the LIZ-C I-site) with Barrow families that have cabins there before continuing to the 
community of Wainwright. After two weeks in Wainwright, it was too late in the season 
to continue by canoe (the lagoon was frozen) and we traveled to Point Lay for a short 
visit by plane before returning to Barrow for another several weeks.
Methodology
This manner of regional exploration, known as multi-sited ethnography, is 
considered particularly well suited for studying aspects of globalization because it 
maintains a focus on local concerns while facilitating the comparison of various local 
responses to and affects of global social phenomena (Marcus 1999). The global
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phenomenon of militarization has, like marketization or missionized religion, reached the 
far comers of the earth. There, while maintaining much of its fundamental nature, 
militarization is transformed locally according to its very specific history in that place and 
by the activities of members of that community. Researching the history of the DEW Line 
at a number of sites allowed an understanding of the commonalities and divergences of 
experiences in relation to military authority, political power and economic influence. This 
project also relied on the principal methods of traditional ethnographic fieldwork: time 
spent at the research sites, with people in their home environments, and numerous, in­
depth, semi-structured interviews that explored both social circumstances and life 
trajectories. The opinions and stories of anyone whose community or personal life has 
been affected by the DEW Line were welcome.
Other aspects of the research plan, including public presentations about the 
research and a project website, were integrated with the multi-sited and sequential 
fieldwork. Public presentations were given in several communities, including Kaktovik 
(fig. 8), Barrow, Wainwright, and Point Lay. The presentations were announced and 
advertised through several media: personal invitations, contact with tribal council 
members and town officials, announcements on the local closed-circuit television channel 
(in Kaktovik), flyers at public locations, and VHF radio. The promotions explained the 
basic goals of the research project, emphasized that all were welcome, and mentioned that 
individual interviewees were being sought.
The presentations were both relevant to casual attendees and gave more interested 
community members the chance to assess the project while considering whether to 
participate as informants. In addition to explaining the research plan and questions, the 
presentation incorporated a collection of themes and pictures from the trip, i.e. from 
adjacent communities and relatives. Viewing local history as a part of an event that 
spanned the Arctic and as part of the global issue of military bases on indigenous lands 
elicited fresh perspectives on the DEW Line. Attendees were encouraged to critique the 
plan, suggest directions it should take and explain what aspect could be most useful to 
them. The presentations were also used to describe the interview consent process and
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extend invitations to all interested in participating. The presentations were effective 
methods of community outreach and achieved an immediate return of knowledge. Several 
people mentioned that they learned a great deal from both the public discussion and the 
interviews.
Figure 8: Public meeting in Kaktovik, May 2009
In an effort to make information on the project available, a website was created 
that provided updates and pictures from the fieldwork trip (www.tundradaisy.org).
Insights into the legacies of the DEW Line, pictures of people we met, details on low- 
impact modes of travel in the changing environment and current observations on climate 
are all subjects that are of interest to people across the North and other parts of the world. 
The website was designed to provide perspectives on recent Arctic development that are 
not usually included in either military reports or industry promotions. The website was 
advertised on flyers, at meetings, in interviewees, and other forums and some of its pages 
have been collaborative efforts created with Inupiaq participants. The website has also 
resulted in contacts with a number of researchers, military personnel, and other 
individuals who have a particular interest in this aspect of Arctic history.
Open-ended interviews guided by a detailed but flexible list of central questions 
(Appendix B) were the central method of gathering socioeconomic information. Although 
there were several yes/no questions, interviews were primarily designed to facilitate 
discussibns, evoke stories, and to discuss the particular interviewee’s knowledge and 
experiences. The list of questions did help disprove many of the ideas that were proposed
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in the research design, and questions about other topics were added as the project 
progressed. The slideshow prepared for the public presentations proved just as invaluable 
when shared more informally during interviews at the homes of informants who had not 
attended a public meeting.
This project’s methodological design was based on the idea that detailed 
ethnography of persons who are not normally the primary subjects of military histories 
results in a deeper and more useful understanding of the military’s various impacts on 
indigenous peoples and their land around the globe. For example, traditional military 
histories and contemporary military reporting largely ignore the roles of women entirely 
or they portray women’s roles as a human interest story, thereby underestimating the 
impacts of militarization on women’s lives (Enloe 2000). For this project, female and 
male residents were equally sought out and encouraged to share their thoughts and 
memories. There was no special emphasis on women; they constituted about half of the 
informants and a few offered opinions on whether and how the presence of the DEW 
Line changed the roles of women or manipulated ideas about gender. Although this 
project explores and analyses the impacts to women more than a traditional military 
history does, it could not be considered a feminist ethnography. Nevertheless, I was 
mindful of the problematic assumption in many feminist works that all women share the 
priorities of white, western women (Ong 1995; Smith 1999; Trask 1996).
In an effort to discover local histories and changing opinions on the military, 
questions about traditional Inupiaq conflicts, the Alaska Territorial Guard, WWII, Project 
Chariot, the Alaska Aeromedical Laboratory’s activities in the Arctic, military service, 
and feelings about patriotism were included in interviews. The goal was to explore 
different understanding of wartime service and patriotism, peacetime defense industry, 
and other military activities. Certain questions were designed to discover whether and 
how arctic residents delineate between a military impact versus the various other impacts 
of the past century’s rapid industrialization and globalization. These questions were 
designed to explore theories that military development, with its use of fear, hierarchy, and 
appeals to patriotism, is distinct from industrial development and to test the hypothesis of
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certain militarization scholars that most militarizing processes occur during “peacetime” 
(Enloe 2004; Lutz 2002).
Preliminary discussions with residents led to the conclusion that, from a local 
perspective, the primary legacy of the DEW line is the environmental impact of the sites. 
Questions concerning contamination and pollution explored residents’ feelings about 
contamination issues and the adequacy of clean up projects. In studying the organization 
by local communities to force the military to clean up toxic pollution on and around 
military bases, geographer Joni Seager (1993) found that the leaders are most often 
women, and I was curious if this pattern had appeared in the Arctic. The project also 
incorporated the findings of arctic contaminants researchers regarding how arctic 
residents understand contamination, including whether any traditional food was avoided 
due to fear of contamination and whether it was believed that the contamination came 
from the DEW Line. A 2005 survey and study in Canada found that many arctic residents 
relate the concept of contamination to rusted metals, garbage, old batteries, and old DEW 
Line or military sites, while fewer related the concept to air pollution, mercury, PCBs, 
and nuclear waste. Many, however, related the word to food and health in some way 
(Myers 2006).
During project design, it was anticipated that the military could be a sensitive 
topic for people and that people might be reluctant to speak about DEW Line legacies 
if they had negative feelings. As mentioned above, I had no problem finding outspoken 
people who shared their opinions freely. However, there are other, more complex 
issues regarding why some people are reluctant to discuss many subjects. Silence, in 
oral history surveys, should be considered as its own type of response with meaning 
behind it. One reason that was anticipated is that native people feel great frustration for 
the way their histories have been collected, managed, and used; the writing of oral 
histories often does them injustice and at a minimum removes them from their 
individual context of place, time, and audience (Mather 1995). In using oral history to 
explore how people talk about the DEW Line, this project is creating knowledge -  not 
just reporting it (Morrow 1995). Particularly when studying ongoing and shifting
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issues like militarization, I concur with Cohen (1994), who proposed that we see 
history as a continuous process of formulating and looking for the different ways 
people express their understandings. UAF’s oral historian William Schneider advised 
that “our task as scholars of the North is to leam how to listen” (2006). This includes 
knowing when and how people convey important information, realizing that a story 
may not be explicit while still conveying a sentiment, and recognizing that stories in 
that form are often used to talk about intercultural relations.
Analysis
All but a few of the interviews were recorded and then transcribed. Approximately 
half were videotaped, only the audio was recorded for many others, and notes were kept 
during interviews that were not recorded. Among the most important aspects of personal 
education this researcher received during fieldwork was that preconceived notions of oral 
history standards can be very disadvantageous in the field and that the best method of 
recording an interview is completely specific to the interviewee. I incorrectly assumed 
that modem ethnographies require recorded interviews and that written notes on 
“unofficial” discussions would be less acceptable as data. Had I not misguided myself 
with this notion from the beginning of the fieldwork, I would have collected more 
interesting information from more people. Another common assumption is that people are 
more likely to be apprehensive about being videotaped than simply having their audio 
recorded. In fact, video is a widespread and appreciated medium in arctic communities 
and many people are quite keen to participate in any project that might evolve into 
documentary film, while an audio recording is more abstract and less likely to be 
something the person or community can feel like they own or enjoy.
Regardless of how it was recorded, each narrative has been interpreted on an 
individual basis, considering the context, the interviewee’s age, gender, social standing 
and the nature of his/her relationship to the DEW Line. Because a central goal of this 
project was to document the environmental history of the DEW Line system from the 
perspective of the people living in that environment, research was guided by an interest in 
local knowledge and the legacy of the DEW line in terms of perceptions of contamination
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and other environmental effects. A brief summary of (western) scientific environmental 
data is included, but it was not the aim of this project to undertake technical observations 
or conduct environmental tests. This aspect of the project is informed by the body of 
research on contaminants in the Arctic, cultural understandings of risk, and 
communication of scientific research with indigenous communities (Cone 2005; Cote et 
al. 2005; Dewailly and Furgal 2003; Di Gangi 2000; Downie and Fenge 2003; Elias and 
O’Neil 1995; Fenge 2003; Furgal 2005a; Furgal 2005b; Furgal et al. 2005; Holz 1986; 
Huntington and Sparck 2003; ISER/ANSC 2000; Kuhnlein et al. 2003; Larson 2005; 
Myers 2006; Northern Contaminants Program 2003; Nuttal 1998; Reiersen et al. 2003; 
Watt-Cloutier 2003).
Although the methodology for this project is grounded in the belief that each 
community and each DEW Line site has its own specific history, systematically treating 
each DEW Line site individually is not an ideal way to convey those histories. Therefore, 
while it was important that the fieldwork be organized geographically, this dissertation is 
organized thematically and allows individual stories to illustrate specific place histories 
within that framework. Moreover, although there are important differences between the 
legacies of the DEW Line in Alaska versus in Canada’s western Arctic addressed in this 
research, it quickly became clear during fieldwork that framing the entire dissertation 
around that broad comparison was inappropriate. For the local people, far greater 
differences exist depending on the size of the community and the distance to the DEW 
Line site. Moreover, an individual’s personality had greater influence on their opinions 
about the DEW Line than their nationality. Therefore, the differences observed between 
genders, generations, and nationalities are analyzed, but comparisons between individuals 
and communities truly allow this study to identify the variation in notions about security 
priorities and perspectives on the social and physical legacies of the DEW Line.
Organization
The second chapter of this dissertation discusses the anthropological study of 
militarization, including a discussion of anthropology’s historical relationship with the 
military, the various aspects of conflict and violence investigated by scholars, and the
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U.S.’s ‘empire of bases’ (Lutz 2009b) around the world. Subsequently, the historical 
context for the DEW Line is described through a brief exploration of the military build up 
in Alaska and governmental policies in Canada during the decades leading up to the Cold 
War. The fourth chapter presents research findings and ethnohistorical information on the 
construction of the DEW Line, the unique society of DEW Liners and their relations with 
indigenous residents. The investigation then turns to the land and the DEW Line’s 
permeation of the arctic environment, including how useful features of the infrastructure 
were incorporated and how the legacy of contamination and dumps shapes the land now. 
The conclusion brings the discussion to the psychological impacts of arctic militarization, 
an analysis of several of the main impacts of the DEW Line, the future of Arctic security, 
issues of Inuit cultural resilience and Inuit control over the future of their land.
Goals o f research
I hope that this research project can in some way benefit the people of the Arctic. 
Perhaps by describing some of the impacts of militarization in that region to date, this 
dissertation will contribute towards efforts to move towards international cooperation, 
environmental protection, and economic and social security in the North.
Many people are under the impression that the Arctic is a remote and pristine 
untouched wilderness. In their passion to protect arctic lands, some environmentalists fail 
to fully consider the experiences and the economies of the people who live there. The 
modem (and ancient) history of the Inupiaq people is inextricably tied to that land, and an 
understanding that people do not want their homeland commandeered for any cause may 
be furthered by this research.
This research could also be significant for people who have never considered the 
militarization of the Arctic, because it is critical that U.S. citizens recognize the extent of 
their global military empire and the many local impacts of military bases. Perhaps stories 
like those surrounding the DEW Line will make people more curious about the fate of 
indigenous peoples around the world whose land has also been commandeered by the 
U.S. military, but who enjoy few of the environmental or individual protections afforded 
to citizens of the U.S.
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The subsequent chapter in this dissertation describes anthropology’s history with 
the military and, as expressed by many scholars, the desperate need for analyses of U.S. 
bases and the ways Americans are propagandized. By studying the DEW Line and its 
impacts on communities of the western Arctic, I hope to contribute both to critically 
informed ethnography of the North and the detailed, on the ground study of militarism.
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Chapter Two:
Colluding & Deconstructing. Embedding & Confronting:
The Anthropological Study of Militarization
Anthropology has had a long and controversial relationship with the military; one 
that has at times threatened to permanently harm the discipline, and which has caused 
anthropologists to debate and define their roles as scholars and to codify the disciplines’ 
ethical standards. The current incarnation of this relationship is as critical a battle as ever 
and comes at a time when a growing and outspoken group of anthropologists is turning 
their sites on the military and global militarization as research subjects. Ethnographic 
studies of militarization are providing crucial insights into the local effects of this key 
globalizing process, and anthropology is particularly well suited for holistic 
investigations of issues that have been largely restricted to the domain of political science 
and history. Anthropologists are investigating every aspect of militarization, from 
individual experiences to global political and economic systems. An ethnographical study 
of arctic militarization draws from and contributes to two of these burgeoning and 
interconnected discourses within anthropology: ethnographic investigations of indigenous 
land and people around the world that have been affected by U.S. military bases and 
repatriated critiques of western culture and U.S. militarism.
Anthropology’s Dysfunctional Relationship with the Military
Originally situated within the wider field of the study of conflict, anthropological 
studies of military conflict increased after World War II, especially in the late 1950s and 
1960s as the world experienced an increase in internecine and Cold War 
counterinsurgency warfare, national liberation struggles, and decolonization in 
developing countries (Green 1994; Sluka 1992). In tracing the field’s sharp rise over the 
past few decades, Sluka sees it reflecting the worldwide historical trend of increasing 
violence and war. He notes that anthropological research into conflict was also inspired
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by the Cold War threat of nuclear holocaust and, especially in the U.S., the war in 
Vietnam. He perceives a shift in focus of anthropology’s primary interest, complete by 
the late 1960s, away from social order in relatively stable societies toward social conflict 
in societies undergoing rapid change (Sluka 1992). Sluka and anthropologist Linda Green 
(1994) concur that, in the past, the field’s perspective was divorced from historical reality 
and emphasized taxonomy over process. Practical reasons have also distracted 
anthropologists from digging into the pervasive effects of violence; post-World War I 
funding favored functionalist approaches which labored under the belief that conflict was 
not the norm and thus not as worthy of study.
Anthropological theories, then, have examined violence but have not had a strong 
focus on the lived experience of those who suffer from it (Kleinman, et al. 1997). As 
outsiders, ethnographers have traditionally had a degree of distance from war and 
conflict. Even with blatant repression and state terrorism in many of the countries in 
which anthropologists work, Green (1994) points out that there have been no systematic 
inquiries of human rights abuse. Scholars neglected crucial questions about the armed 
forces and conflict, according to Carol Greenhouse (1989), because of a common premise 
within anthropology that war is pathological and because so many within the discipline 
are inclined to oppose it. Catherine Lutz’s criticism is that after Vietnam and 
decolonization, “anthropological thoughts turned on how to write less imperial 
ethnographies, but not ethnographies of imperialism” (2002: 732). According to Green 
(1994), however, early works that focused on colonialization were marginalized, further 
disincentivizing scholars from the field.
There are certainly other important reasons behind anthropological resistance to 
the study of modem wars and those who wield force. Anna Simons, in her comprehensive 
review of the study of war in the social sciences (1999), notes that the history and 
rationale behind the military being a taboo subject among anthropologists center on 
suspicions of anthropologists assisting the military. The suspicions are well grounded, 
and anthropologists have long recognized and wrestled with the colonial origins of their 
discipline. Few, however, have seriously examined its contributions to warfare even
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though recurring episodes of anthropological collusion with the military have created the 
strongest rebuttals from anthropological organizations and, especially in the decades 
following World War II, cast dark shadows of suspicion over the entire discipline.
A well-known affair that foreshadowed the debates of subsequent anthropologists 
occurred during World War I, when Franz Boas condemned four colleagues for using 
anthropological research as a cover for spying, an action for which Boas was censured by 
the AAA7 Boas was openly opposed to American involvement in World War I, 
criticized the U.S. education system’s promotion of nationalism, and bemoaned the rapid 
militarization of the public. In reaction to intense public and academic pressure for 
academics to either support the war or remain silent, Boas promoted the view that 
scholars’ first duties were to humanity as a whole and that one’s obligations to humanity 
were higher than those toward one’s country. Boas was deeply disappointed when it 
became clear to him that individual freedom no longer existed in the U.S., while many 
other social scientists who did support the war began to take advantage of new job 
opportunities with the military or intelligence networks (Price 2008). However, it wasn’t 
until World War II that the applications of anthropology to warfare became widespread.
In his recent exploration of the field’s contributions to World War II, 
anthropologist David Price (2008) makes it clear that he does not mean to criticize those 
anthropologists who, during a war much nobler than subsequent conflicts, made choices 
to work for the military within a historical context that should be considered on its own 
terms. He does, however, wish to employ a presentist perspective in studying this past so 
that contemporary and future anthropologists can learn from it and better understand 
anthropology’s current situation. One result of disregarding the range of anthropological 
contributions to 20th century warfare was the removal in the 1990s of the AAA ethics 
code prohibiting covert research. Another result is that this ignorance facilitates current 
CIA and Pentagon recruitment campaigns (Price 2008).
Price found that the applications of anthropology during World War II had 
intended and unintended outcomes, and that much of the best work was directed at the
The censure was overturned by an overwhelming vote o f the AAA membership in 2005.
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practices of the military policy makers. American anthropologists joined new wartime 
military and intelligence agencies - many out of a sense of patriotic duty and a feeling 
that using anthropology to fight such a war was a natural response. By 1943, the AAA 
Secretary Fred Eggan reported that over a half of the professional anthropologists in the 
country were directly involved in the war, and most of the rest were doing part-time war 
work. The ethical questioning and objections of a minority of scholars were ignored. The 
anthropologists doing war work designed new techniques of quantitative social science to 
explore why most American soldiers did not seem to know who or why they were 
fighting, and why it did not matter. Some anthropologists worked on domestic 
propaganda projects that indoctrinated soldiers and the public about the evils of 
totalitarian governments. Most applied their knowledge and skills to fighting the war 
abroad, while some worked their way into institutional employment that led to post-war 
positions at newly created agencies like the CIA. While some felt that they had brought 
about positive changes in military decision-making, their advice was frequently ignored 
(Price 2002; Price 2008). The following quote from Froelich Rainey, the founder of the 
Department of Anthropology at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, describes the 
position in which some anthropologists found themselves:
War propaganda o f the period meant nothing to me, but in a global war it was impossible 
to avoid some part in it. I f  I  took a commission in the Army, as urged by so many army 
friends employed with the Alaskan supply routes, I  would obviously end up in the cul-de- 
sac o f the Aleutians, where the Army was desperate for men who knew the Arctic. An 
alternative was the Board o f Economic Warfare, where I  could serve the country and yet 
not have to kill men with whom I  personally had no quarrel. Looking back at the war 
years and remembering all the troops I  served with as a civilian, I  think now that war is 
fo r most men the ultimate sport. Bored with the routine o f conventional jobs and eager 
fo r the excitement o f risking their lives, few  can resist the appeal o f war. -  Froelich 
Rainey, founder o f the Department o f Anthropology at the University o f  Alaska Fairbanks 
(1992).
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Price maintains that although there is no guarantee that anthropologists’ 
recommendations to the military and government will be heard, anthropologists still have 
a “fundamental duty as scholars and citizens to counter the limited view of American and 
allied policy makers.” The evidence suggests that these efforts are most effective if “we 
operate as citizen-scholars outside of governmental agencies” (Price 2002: 20). Price 
echoes the cautionary advice of others anthropologists who are opposed to collaboration 
with the military: “If anthropologists will not take action to limit the wartime applications 
of their discipline, then we do not deserve the trust of those we study in the field” (Price 
2002: 20).
A disciplinary isolation that arose after World War II was further strengthened by 
anthropologists’ secret involvement in Vietnam. As part of the CORDS program in 
Vietnam (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support), ethnographers 
involved with Project Phoenix mapped ‘human terrain’ (in this case, knowledge of 
village life in Thailand and the highlands of Vietnam) that was used by the Special 
Forces to identify suspected individuals and groups that the military believed were 
sympathizing with the Viet Cong. Those people and groups were then targeted for 
assassination, and over 26,000 suspected Viet Cong were killed as part of CORDS. The 
disclosure of CORDS in 1971 was met with public outrage. The American 
Anthropological Association erupted into dissension and the new Rules of Professional 
Responsibility condemning secret research were accepted. Following the CORDS 
episode, the Pentagon showed no further interest in social science for several decades.
Human Terrain System
In 2007, however, the American Anthropological Association executive board 
was back at the table to revisit the ethics code in response to the modem controversy -  
the Human Terrain System, which has been described by military analysts8 as a CORDS 
for the 21st century. The United States military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
g
(Jacob Kipp, historian at the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office [FMSO] at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas)
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other government agencies and military contractors have been recruiting anthropologists 
and other social scientists to work with the Human Terrain System since 2006. With $200 
million in funding (according to one report, $250 million has already been spent), Human 
Terrain may be the largest social science-based project in history. Despite ongoing 
controversy, it was recently reported that Human Terrain is slated for at least a $40 
million dollar expansion. Furthermore, the program has plans to move up from the 
brigade to the corps level, and is set to become a pivotal element in many other U.S. 
combat commands. This means that in addition to being part of Central Command 
(CENTCOM), Human Terrain would be also integrated into commands for Africa 
(AFRICOM), Asia, and the Pacific. Within the military leadership, a group of “warrior 
intellectuals” are enchanted with the Human Terrain program and see it as the key to the 
military’s long-term success. Many now refer to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as “the 
social scientists wars” because they will rely upon strategic advantage supplied by social 
scientists. As one former U.S. Army War College commander and deputy chief of staff 
for doctrine wrote: “We are in fo r  decades ofpsycho-social warfare. We must begin now 
to harness the potential o f the social sciences in a manner not dissimilar to the 
Manhattan Project or the Apollo Project” (Scales 2006).
To this end, five-member Human Terrain Teams are assigned to combat brigades 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and they include a uniformed (and usually armed) social scientist 
who is tasked with providing “operationally relevant cultural knowledge” to the brigade 
commander. The idea is that the anthropologists are able to advise commanders to 
prevent them from misreading local actions, help the troops understand who is not their 
enemy, and help the Army “influence the population through non-lethal means” (Stamets 
2008). Human Terrain is designed to “win hearts and minds” by emphasizing 
humanitarian efforts such as building clinics, remodeling schools, or repairing mosques. 
David Kilcullen, a policy-planning advisor in the State Department, special advisor to 
General Petraeus, and an social science PhD who specializes in counterinsurgency, refers 
to the Human Terrain System as “armed social work” (Gusterson 2008). Although some 
promoters deny that Human Terrain Teams are collecting human intelligence (HUMENT)
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or identifying enemies, there is a good deal of evidence (including several statements by 
military leaders) indicating that the system was created primarily as a tool for espionage, 
that Human Terrain Teams are gathering HUMINT, and that the information will be used 
to target suspected militant Islamic infrastructure and to pursue alliances with key power 
figures. Moreover, the information will eventually be turned over to the new governments 
of Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Human Terrain program was met with largely enthusiastic support from most 
mainstream media, the public and some anthropologists. On the face of it, it seems like a 
positive thing to ameliorate cultural misunderstandings between U.S. troops and the 
populations of the countries the U.S. occupies, and no one disagrees that general 
anthropological understandings could improve the military. It is very appealing and 
seductive to think that anthropological perspectives might be used to benefit everyone. 
The reasons that the American Anthropological Association and other groups do not 
support such work are not immediately obvious to everyone but deserve careful 
consideration.
This uproar in anthropology, similar in many ways to previous episodes of 
military collusion, is due to the fact that participating in Human Terrain violates the 
American Anthropological Association’s code of ethics in several ways and, in doing so, 
could harm the entire discipline of anthropology. In response to significantly increased 
funding for the Human Terrain program, eleven anthropologists founded ‘The Network 
of Concerned Anthropologists’ in September of 2007 to create and circulate a Pledge of 
Non-participation in Counter-insurgency. Its members also run a website and publish 
articles and books on aspects of this issue. The pledge is based on the belief that 
anthropologists should not engage in research and other activities that contribute to 
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or related theaters and that anthropologists should 
refrain from directly assisting the US military in combat. The members of this network 
and other anthropologists raised concerns about the Human Terrain program to the 
American Anthropological Association, and, at the annual AAA meeting in November 
2007, anthropologist Terrence Turner sponsored a motion at the business meeting calling
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for a restoration of language that condemns secret research. The Executive Board decided 
to review the issue and rewrite the ethics code, and they also released a statement 
expressing their disapproval and conclusion that the Human Terrain Program was “ an 
unacceptable application of anthropological expertise.” In 2008, the AAA executive 
board released a new draft of the ethics code that clarifies, among other things, that 
clandestine research is never acceptable. The Board of the Society for Applied 
Anthropology also issued a resolution expressing grave concern about the Human Terrain 
program. The AAA Executive Board also tasked a Commission to thoroughly review the 
Human Terrain System program and the implications it might have for anthropology and 
anthropologists.
The primary problems with Human Terrain concern the longstanding ethical code 
which states that anthropological research should never be used to inflict harm, that 
anthropologists must seek the consent of the population being studied, and that the work 
must not be done in secret. It is important to note that all professional ethics codes are 
derived from the Nuremberg Code, which was created to discourage scientists from doing 
work that puts human research participants in harm’s way. Embedded anthropologists 
cannot obtain free consent from Iraqi and Afghani interlocutors, especially when the 
anthropologists are in uniform, armed, and traveling with U.S. soldiers. Not allowing 
Iraqis and Afghanis to grant informed consent is a violation of the Nuremberg code. 
Anthropologists are supposed to spend time with the people they study, earn their trust, 
and hopefully get them to share their worldviews. The AAA code of ethics makes it clear 
that an anthropologist’s obligations to those he/she studies outweigh any other 
obligations they have, no matter what conflict of interest the anthropologist may have.
The AAA code states: “Anthropologists must do everything in their power to protect the 
physical, social, and psychological welfare and to honor the dignity and privacy o f  those 
studied. ” Participating in such work also violates ethical standards because it can be 
covert or secretive: the anthropologists will not be able to identify themselves or 
distinguish themselves from military personnel. Human Terrain work furthermore 
violates the ethics code because embedded anthropologists will also not be able to control
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the use of the information they collect and ensure that it isn’t used to harm the 
communities they study.
The Human Terrain program also presents an issue of disciplinary self-interest 
for anthropologists. Anthropologists can only do research if people are willing to talk to 
them, and serious problems can be created for the discipline because collaborating with 
the military creates suspicion of anthropologists everywhere, as people will not know if 
visiting ethnographers are actually spies or military operatives. Consequently, in the 
future people may not be willing to talk to anthropologists.
The problems discussed above constite the clear ethical violations of Human 
Terrain, but the program raises several other profound issues. Critics have noted that the 
term ‘human terrain” itself has a dehumanizing and objectifying effect, and in fact it was 
voted the most euphemistic word of the year in 2007 by the American Dialect Society. 
Brigade leaders are to understand human terrain just like a map analyst understands 
bridges and rivers, so the term portrays human beings as geographic space or territory to 
be conquered. Interestingly, the term was first used decades ago for domestic insurgency 
groups like Students for a Democratic Society and the Black Panthers.
The senior social science adviser to the Human Terrain program is controversial 
anthropologist and insurgency specialist Montgomery McFate, who claims that “[t]he 
national security structure in the U.S. needs to be infused with anthropology, a discipline 
invented to support warfighting in the tribal zone” (McFate 2005: 43). Although McFate 
was unemployed in 2001 (after stints of employment as a spy helping her mother-in-law 
infiltrate gun control groups on behalf of the NRA), she began a quest to make 
anthropology relevant to the military. By 2004 she was a researcher at Rand and soon had 
outlined a strategy for integrating the social sciences into national defense.
McFate is one author of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps’ new 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM-3-24. The Manual was a popular government 
document that was republished by the University of Chicago Press and received a great 
deal of media attention, much of it praising it as a rare work of applied scholarship. Sold 
as a “paradigm-shattering” and “revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military
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doctrine,” critics claim that the manual simply explains how to pacify an occupied 
country so that its people will willingly support U.S. strategic interests. Moreover, it 
proposes the oldest imperial tactics known. David Price, in addition to compiling 
evidence that the Field Manual is replete with unacknowledged passages, argues that 
McFate presents only anthropological knowledge that supports the military, instead of 
illuminating it. Her “selective” use of anthropology, says Price, “ignores anthropological 
critiques of colonialism, power, militarization, hegemony, warfare, cultural domination 
and globalization” (Price 2007). The Manual has been criticized for de-emphasizing 
combat and ignoring politics while presenting a calming depiction of counterinsurgency 
as if it were a global project of applied anthropology. Furthermore, it presents 
counterinsurgency as an advanced and enlightened form of warfare that respects the 
people under occupation and it depicts colonialism as the natural course of history.
Counterinsurgency is the term currently used to describe the types of conflicts that 
have previously been described as small wars; counter-guerilla wars; imperial policing; 
counter-revolutionary wars; or low-intensity wars. Critics see these as euphemisms for 
occupation that specifically refer to the elimination of an uprising against a government -  
to the suppression of revolutionary movements in occupied territories.
The members of the Network of Concerned Anthropologists point out that 
counterinsurgency wars have always been fought on two fronts -  one with the insurgents 
and one with the general public will in the home country. Anthropologist David Vine 
writes that Human Terrain Teams are part of a strategy to “rebrand” the wars abroad and 
at home. The teams are supposed to be creating goodwill in Iraq and Afghanistan, while 
changing the image of the wars in the United States with “feel-good stories and the softer, 
scholarly visage of culturally sensitive ‘warrior-intellectuals,’” (Vine 2007: B9). Reports 
covering the Human Terrain System have appealed to the emotions, portraying social 
scientists as selfless humanitarians who are working miracles. The Network of Concerned 
Anthropologists members point out that this public relations campaign is expertly run by 
Human Terrain Strategic Communication Advisor, Laurie Adler, who was previously
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employed by the strategic communications firm Lincoln Group, which gained notoriety 
in 2005 for paying Iraqi journalists to plant pro-U.S. stories in the Iraqi press.
In the preface to the Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual by the Network of 
Concerned Anthropologists, anthropologist Marshal Sahlins wrote:
“.. .the applied anthropology o f the US military may be described something as follows: 
a planetary strategy o f research and destroy, involving the deployment o f armed and 
largely culturally illiterate American forces from among the thousand or so garrisons 
now distributed on foreign soil, sometimes complemented by second rate mercenary 
academics, all charged with an investigation o f the cultures o f the local peoples sufficient 
to determine i f  and how they can be subjugated or, failing that, taken out. ”
Human Terrain is understood by critics as a key to the old colonial tactic of divide 
and conquer: information about local political hierarchies facilitates the process of co­
opting regional strongmen (tribal sheiks, warlords). This is the first step in “indirect rule,” 
the form of colonial control where the natives and native institutions are incorporated into 
the empire’s framework, turning people against their countrymen.
In spite of the impressive salaries and opportunity for adventure, the Human 
Terrain Program is having a very difficult time recruiting social scientists to work for 
them. Reasons for this include the intense and widespread opposition to the program 
among academics. A second reason is the danger of the job: three have died so far, and 
one was charged with murder. The program has been investigated for death threats 
against female employees of teams made by male members of the same team. Former 
Human Terrain employees have filed official complaints regarding serious problems with 
the program’s training, retention, contracting practices and oversight.
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Minerva
In spring 2008, the Pentagon announced a second large social science program: 
the Minerva Consortia9. With $50 million in funding over five years, Minerva is designed 
to mobilize social scientists to conduct open research related to the war on terror. U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed hope that anthropologists will apply to 
work on research projects such as translating and analyzing captured Iraqi documents, 
helping collate open-source documents pertaining to Chinese military policy, researching 
the relationship between Islam and terror, and producing new experimental fields that 
might be as important as game theory and Kremlinology were in the Cold War (Gates 
2008). Secretary Gates would also like to see universities relax admissions for military 
veterans and to fast-track military students by giving them academic credit for their 
military experiences (Gates 2008). Overnight, the Minerva Initiative has established the 
Pentagon as one of the largest funders of anthropological research in the U.S. today.
The Network of Concerned Anthropologists (NCA) concedes that Minerva does 
not involve the obvious ethical liabilities for scholars that Human Terrain does and they 
appreciate that the Pentagon is trying to make the program as open as possible. The 
serious problem they see with the program is that the Department of Defense does not 
have a well-established track record for funding social sciences and is not skilled at doing 
peer review of such research. Therefore, they feel that if the federal government wants to 
fund free and open scholarly research on these subjects, it should do so through its 
normal institutions for inviting and adjudicating research (Gusterson 2008). The Network 
of Concerned Anthropologists also argues that the U.S. university system is already 
highly militarized, that universities with defense funding become instruments rather than 
critics of war-making, and that this support introduces subtle but powerful biases into 
research and distorts the focus of fields that depend on it:
“Whole fields o f study hypertrophy and others shrink or are never developed as 
researchers are drawn from one field  into the other, Pentagon-desired onesf] [TJheory,
Q
Warriors and wisdom are two specialties of Minerva, a virgin Roman goddess.
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methodology, and research goals in such fields as physics, computer science, and 
engineering after decades o f military funding now operate on assumptions that 
knowledge about force is paramount” (Network of Concerned Anthropologists 2008).
The members of the Network of Concerned Anthropologists argue that 
anthropology is one discipline that has remained largely demilitarized, but that a new 
generation of anthropologists will now have to decide whether they will be “washed 
along with the tide of U.S. militarism” or they will maintain their discipline’s status. If 
anthropologists take a military turn, they know what to expect based on the history of 
other disciplines:
■ there would be a large infusion of money while at the same time a 
narrowing of research subjects and points of view
■ we would have separate conferences and journals for anthropologists who 
do security work
■ we will experience a widening gap between those with access to the 
security state & those without
■ we will see curricular changes in anthropology, including new masters 
programs tailored to the production of analysts for the national security 
state
■ anthropologists in the field will experience increasing problems of access 
because they will be seen as agents of a foreign hegemony
■ we will see a progressive marginalization of those scholars who were 
formerly at the core of discipline, who refuse to undertake this kind of 
work (ibid)
Anthropologist Hugh Gusterson has described how during the Cold War, physics 
departments narrowed their focus and became more pragmatic and less philosophical. 
Gusterson thinks that we can imagine that anthropology funded by the military would be
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less interested in new international theories, less literary, less reflexive, less radical, and 
less engaged with cultural critique. Also, it would be geographically clustered around the 
Middle East, Latin America, and Africa.
Advocating ethnographies o f militarization
A decade ago, Hugh Gusterson contended that the Vietnam CORDS “fiasco” 
resulted in an “allergic” response to security issues among many anthropologists (1999b). 
He lamented that anthropology’s subsequent tendency to study the underdog and the 
promote marginalized leaves the study of elites and the mainstream, including the 
military, to psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists (Gusterson 1993). 
Contemporary authors note that the emergent literature on global processes and structures 
in anthropology has largely ignored military institutions and the social effects of 
militarization (Simons 1999). Even as many now accept that the local and the global are 
interpenetrating and mutually constructive forces, war-zone ethnographers like Carolyn 
Nordstrom find that while conflict occurs in the midst of global political systems, 
people’s actual experiences in a war zone are largely invisible. Catherine Lutz argues that 
the larger picture of militarization and its history is connected to particular communities 
and individual lives (2002), and Hugh Gusterson (1999b) thinks that until anthropologists 
make modem military institutions and ideologies “integral to their narratives of 
globalization, they are not getting the whole story.” Peabody (2000: 170) notes that 
despite the immense scale of global grids and systems, modem ethnographies on violence 
reveal “often surprising perspectives” which “illustrate that the global only exists through 
the local, and that ethnographic inquiry must remain central to this project.”
Gusterson believes that anthropology has a special contribution to make to policy 
debates surrounding globalization and militarization issues. Gusterson sees his work at 
the confluence of the anthropology of the global system and the anthropology of science, 
showing the new types of questions anthropologists could investigate. Gusterson’s work 
on nuclear weapons labs, Nuclear Rites (1998) and People o f the Bomb (2004), are 
examples of his many recent publications exploring the military-industrial complex and 
how it has transformed public culture. Leaving the study of security (including weapons,
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wars, armies, and military ideologies) to other disciplines, he argues, has had negative 
impacts on both anthropology and security discussions. Gusterson is familiar with the 
claim that the power of nation-states is withering in the face of new transnational flows 
and that national allegiances are overwhelmed and undermined by many new 
postnational forms of identity. This might appear true, concedes Gusterson, if we were 
restricted to studying migrant flows and electronic capital. However, the nation-state 
looks less fragile from the point of view of the militarization of scientific institutions, the 
accumulation of weapons, and the widespread increase in nationalist and militarist 
ideologies (Gusterson 1999b). He proposes that “militarism is all around us -  in our 
politics, in our economy, and in our culture -  and it is in danger of becoming so large and 
so much a part of our common sense that we lose the ability to see it in its entirety and 
with the kind of critical perspective that might enable us to take control of it rather than 
unconsciously inhabit it” (Gusterson 2004: xxvi).
Nordstrom questions whether academics have avoided the subject because the 
public simply does not want to know the true nature of war and militarism, and she asks 
what has become of the academy’s claim to pursue knowledge. She describes the 
difficulty in exploring “the true story of ourselves” (Nordstrom 2004: 32) since there are 
reasons to fear it could lead to utter alienation; people are offended by the telling of the 
truth. Nonetheless, Nordstrom (1995) urges anthropologists to a holism that does not 
isolate zones of violence from the full richness of the human experience and she suggests 
that “[ejthnography must be able to follow the question” (2004: 13).
Beyond the call for militarization research, a chorus of scholars encourage 
advocacy in this line of work. In his work on violence and terror in Sri Lanka, E. 
Valentine Daniel (1997) notes that violence is horrible and dehumanizing, but that there 
is very little sustained research exploring how this is so. Richards believes that a crucially 
important potential of this kind of work is to counter the journalistic cliches surrounding, 
and unwittingly supporting, wars. Anthropologists are well-positioned, with their cross- 
cultural, comparative and holistic approach, to research political violence victims and act 
as scribes and intermediaries for them, yet few have (Green 1994). Lynn Stephen
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concurs; anthropological insights are key in clarifying the reality of political violence, 
and anthropologists have a responsibility to use those insights for the sake of the people 
they study. Anthropological works on political violence provide ways of understanding 
the “underlying culture wars being waged to redefine nations” and lift the veil on the 
cultural processes that are taken for granted within militarization (Stephen 2000: 822). 
Stephen states that her work is in the spirit of the call made by Arthur Kleinman, Veena 
Das, and Margaret Lock in their book, Social Suffering (1997); anthropologists should 
move past the old dichotomies that “separate individual from social levels of analysis, 
health from social problems, representation from experience, suffering from 
intervention.” These authors suggest that anthropology should convey the experience of 
suffering by using language of dismay, disappointment, bereavement, and alarm (1997).
Nancy Sheper-Hughes has put forth even stronger views: for anthropologists not 
to act as champions for their oppressed subjects is a hostile act of indifference. 
Monographs, according to Sheper-Hughes, can themselves become sites of resistance and 
solidarity through which anthropologists can be agents of social change (1992). Katherine 
T. McCaffrey’s account of the anti-military movement on Vieques, Puerto Rico, is 
explicitly motivated by the hope that the islanders would one day achieve a “long 
overdue measure of justice” (2002a: xi).
Catherine Lutz believes that anthropology students are trained to deconstruct the 
myth of modernity and progress and that they have learned about violence, genocides, 
and inequalities. However, too few of them have been confronted with graphic realities; 
they were still shocked by September 11. Lutz’s opinion is that ideas of the “U.S. 
imperium,” of global militarization, and the cultural politics that make war seem like a 
requirement are “missing pieces of anthropological knowledge [that] have only now 
come home to roost” (2002: 732). She suggests that ethnographic understanding of how 
militarization shapes places seems an urgent project for anthropology, as it will allow the 
patterns, weak spots, and costs to be seen in the “otherwise seemingly monolithic and 
beneficent face of state-corporate-media war making” (Lutz 2002: 730-731). 
Understanding the particular situations of America’s militarized communities, for
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example, can provide insights that transfer to other places and illuminate the context of 
contemporary U.S. society. Nothing less than our future, she argues, depends on our 
examination of what militarization has wrought at home and abroad (Lutz 2002).
Eyal Ben-Ari (2004) agrees that U.S. militarization and the worldwide reach of 
U.S. armed forces are phenomena that have yet to receive much attention by 
anthropologists. He concurs with Lutz (2002) that anthropologists need to link the global 
and national histories of militarization to local ethnographic locations and people despite 
(and because of) the fact that it is one of the most politically charged issues.
Moreover, recent ethnographies that have traced the impacts of war and political 
violence are widening the appeal of anthropology outside its own field. Writing for the 
“Journal of Peace Research,” anthropologist Christian Krohn-Hansen states that these 
works illustrate how some of anthropology’s most constitutive insights, which were 
largely developed to understand small-scale societies and largely ignored the cultural 
construction of political violence, “can, and should, be used in order to study 
ethnographically the making of state power, nationalism, and political violence across the 
world” (Krohn-Hansen 1997: 237).
Anna Tsing reported in 2005 that, for the first time in many years, scholars across 
disciplines were leaping into the public eye to address the general public, and 
anthropologists were playing prominent roles in these new experiments. Impenetrable 
language and claims to exclusive expertise in collections are gone, Tsing contends 
(2005), in recent publications such as Shock and Awe: War on Words (van Eekelen, et al. 
2005), written in response to U.S. militarization.
Anthropological analyses of contemporary U.S. propaganda and militarization 
fulfill what George Marcus and Michael Fischer (1999) described as one of the founding 
promises of anthropology: to provide worthwhile and interesting critiques of our own 
society. Marcus and Fischer’s call for “experimental” ethnographies recounted that 
during the 1920s, anthropology presented itself as the comparative study of cultures and 
societies that would enlighten western society about other human possibilities and make 
accessible our own unexamined assumptions. It proposed to salvage distinct cultural
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forms of life from the processes of global westernization and to use knowledge of other 
cultural patterns to reflect self-critically on our own ways. In this manner, they claimed, 
anthropology could disrupt our common sense and cause us to reexamine our taken-for- 
granted views. Catherine Lutz wrote that Gusterson’s work on nuclear weapons 
laboratories in the U.S., for example, “makes strange what we have taken for granted 
about living with bombs” (quoted in Gusterson 2004: back cover)
Marcus and Fischer felt that the number of representations of other cultures has 
been significant, but that anthropologists have paid less attention to the second goal of 
cultural critique (1999). Critique here does not mean criticism, but is instead drawn from 
the Enlightenment idea of clarifying concepts and evaluating the relation between their 
logical grounds and their degree of validity. In anthropology, critique does imply 
exploring conditions for the validity of knowledge, but it also refers to anthropological 
methods of inquiry that are directed at evaluating cultural and social practices. These 
authors envisioned a modem form of cultural critique that would occur between distinct 
disciplines and would be broader than any one sphere of expertise, increasingly emerging 
from collaborative projects rather than individual studies. It is no longer new worlds or 
the exotic that require ethnological exploration, but “the discovery of worlds that are 
familiar or fully understood by no one,” but which all are in search of understanding 
(Marcus and Fischer 1999: xvii).
In the first edition of their book, Marcus and Fischer wrote that anthropology 
needs to repatriate itself and study its home societies with a rigor equal to that it applied 
elsewhere. In the second edition, that notion had proven to be too simple and binary, as 
increasingly it became clear that many interesting social and cultural processes are 
translocal -  they are operating across distinct cultural boundaries and across “hybrids, 
borders, diasporas, and incommensurate sites spanning institutions, domiciles, towns, 
cities, and now even cyberspace” (Marcus and Fischer 1999: xxix). For this reason, 
contemporary ethnographies must also be multilocal (multisited) and must encompass 
more than the study of cultural variations. Fieldwork should be seen as a “complex web 
of interactions” in which anthropologists collaborate with people in various, contrasting
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settings to “track connections amid networks, mutations, influence of cultural forces and 
changing social pressures” (Marcus and Fischer 1999: xix).
What was experimental in the 1980s was, by the late 1990s, the mainstream of 
ethnography: an organizing focus on questions of identity. Explorations of the person, 
self, and emotions of people traditionally studied by ethnography have increased 
alongside new ways of contextualizing studies in terms of history and political economy, 
which Marcus and Fischer saw as precursors to the now-proliferating work exploring 
globalization through its local and regional impacts (1999). New subjects, with questions 
of modernity at their core, are investigating the transnational processes that are changing 
culture. Studies of the local effects of globalizing processes are an example of this kind of 
research.
Chalmers Johnson (2005) asked what contributions anthropologists can make to 
keep citizens informed despite the increasing secrecy of contemporary U.S. militarism.
He wrote that there is a “desperate need” for more studies about the effects U.S. military 
bases are having on the countries that harbor them. Anthropologists are well suited to 
illustrate the environmental degradation, the exploitation of women, and the social and 
economic impacts that accompany what Johnson sees as imperial outposts. Moreover, he 
calls on anthropologists in the U.S. itself to provide many more analyses of the ways in 
which Americans are propagandized.
According to conservative scholars including Johnson (2004; Johnson 2008) and 
Andrew Bacevich (2009), the war-based economy and empire, combined with American 
profligacy and political apathy, is soon to collapse and bankrupt the country or worse if 
left unchecked. These and other scholars believe that in order to begin unraveling six 
decades of U.S.-led nuclearism and imperialism requires an international and 
interdisciplinary demilitarization effort. Research by anthropologists on militarization to 
date has outlined the scale and shape of the problem.
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The Bases o f Empire10
In recent years, this growing field within anthropology has been investigating, 
deconstructing, exposing and actively countering U.S. militarism on many of the fronts 
introduced above. Studies focusing on the experiences of indigenous and other local 
residents at U.S overseas bases play a key role in this field that informs research on the 
DEW Line in several ways. Most of the DEW sites are in Canada and four are in 
Greenland. In military terms, these sites are ‘overseas’ in what are euphemistically 
referred to as ‘host countries.’ Research on overseas bases is also relevant for the DEW 
Line sites in Alaska because, although the Alaskan sites are domestic bases affecting 
American communities, they have at least as much in common with U.S. overseas bases 
as they do with the average domestic U.S. base. The military does designate Alaska and 
Hawaii as OCONUS: Outside the Continental United States, which allows some 
personnel to receive certain compensating benefits. Alaska’s DEW Line and other 
military bases are in many ways managed more like overseas bases. They and other 
military bases on indigenous land in the United States constitute a category of their own, 
one that is neither wholly colonial nor wholly domestic. For this discussion, 
‘colonial/domestic’ will serve to describe bases on indigenous lands within the U.S. As 
colonial/domestic bases, these locations experience more complex militarization 
processes than either overseas or regular domestic bases do.
In many significant ways, the indigenous peoples in the States of Alaska and 
Hawaii have shared modem militarization histories. Although Hawaii’s strategic 
significance was recognized much earlier (the U.S.-supported overthrow of the monarchy 
was in 1894 and U.S. annexation of Hawaii was in 1989), both states are considered 
“Cold War states.” Both rose greatly in strategic importance during WWII and 
subsequently experienced a considerable Cold War construction boom, then achieved 
statehood largely due to the military’s presence. Militarism manages to make the 
military’s extensive presence in Hawaii, as in Alaska, seems natural and inevitable. In
10 While this term is the title o f  the recent edited book (Lutz 2009b), it has also emerged as the common 
term for the global complex o f U.S. military facilities.
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militarily saturated states, militarism produces one kind of order and mobilizes an array 
of narrative and institutional devices to naturalize that order (Ferguson and Turnbull 
1999). The successes in government of both long-time Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens and 
Hawaiian Senator Daniel Inouye are closely connected to militarized practices of politics. 
In both states, the military has dismissed environmental problems and popular protests by 
invoking the self-justifying incantation of national security concerns. Current and recent 
U.S. protectorates with significant military presence also have much in common with 
Alaska and Hawaii. The primary militarized protectorates are Puerto Rico, Guam, and the 
Marshall Islands. Diego Garcia is similar although the U.K. is the official protectorate. 
Categorizing them together here in no way negates the fact that each location is unique, 
has a distinctive history with the military, and merits its own focused exploration. That 
said, whether bases are domestic, overseas, or ‘colonial/domestic,’ they share a history as 
part of the global U.S. military empire.
Those ethnographers who have turned their attention to the United States’ 
complex of bases suffer from no dearth of subject areas (fig.s 9 and 10). Although the 
U.S. did have bases outside its territory prior to World War II, by the end of the war it 
had more than 30,000 installations at over 2,000 base sites globally. Today, the U.S. 
military has what is likely the largest collection of military bases in world history. 
According to official accounts, the U.S. manages approximately 4,300 installations 
within its own boundaries and has approximately 1,000 military facilities outside the 
country. Stationed at the overseas sites are over 190,000 troops and approximately
115,000 civilian employees. At these bases, the U.S. either owns or rents 795,000 acres 
of land and has 26,000 buildings valued at $146 billion. These figures, with slight 
variations, have become either the main focus of or a standard introduction to most recent 
works on modem U.S. militarization, including the work of Chalmers Johnson discussed 
above, David Vine’s Island o f Shame: the secret history o f the U.S. military base on 
Diego Garcia (2009), several articles by Catherine Lutz (i.e. 2007) as well as the recent
U.S. Military Batas
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Figure 9: The Global U.S. Military Base Network (1 of 2)
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Figure 10: The Global U.S. Military Base Network (2 of 2)
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anthology edited by her, Empire o f Bases (2009a), and publications by Hugh Gusterson, 
Roberto Gonzales, David Price and others including their contributions to The Counter­
Counterinsurgency Manual (Network of Concerned Anthropologists 2009). These figures 
exclude the massive build ups in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as secret or 
unacknowledged facilities in Pakistan, Israel, Kuwait, the Philippines, etc. Lutz described 
the many roles the sites fill:
“While the bases are literally barracks and weapons depots and staging areas for war- 
making and ship repair facilities and golf courses and basketball courts, they are also 
political claims, spoils o f war, arms sales showrooms, toxic industrial sites, laboratories 
fo r cultural (mis)communication, and collections o f customers fo r  local bars, shops, and 
prostitution ” (2009a: 4) .
Vine’s ethnography about the militarization of the island of Diego Garcia, part of 
the Chagos Archipelago in the isolated center of the Indian Ocean, locates that story 
within the larger historical context of the global Cold War build up of U.S. military bases. 
Unlike older European empires that relied on a series of colonies and direct rule over 
other peoples, the U.S used bases to exert control, influence, and economic domination 
over weaker nations and build global political and economic power. Although this empire 
of bases grew rapidly during the Cold War and many scholars focus on militarization of 
the modem national security state, Vine makes a compelling argument for taking a 
broader view of U.S. history. He traces the first imperialistic bases back to the forts that 
allowed the westward expansion of the thirteen North American colonies and the 
dissolution of Native American societies. By 1853, the U.S. had conquered large parts of 
Mexico, annexed Texas, the southwest, and Oregon. Next, coaling stations for steamship 
travel were established on several small pacific islands, Alaska was purchased, and 
Midway Island, Samoa, and Wake Island were added to the list. After the Spanish- 
American war, the U.S. claimed the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Cuba (as a 
protectorate). Before World War II, the U.S. intervened in and sometimes occupied
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Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic and purchased the Virgin Islands from Denmark (Vine 2009: 47-9).
In 1940, the U.S. arranged to provide Britain with fifty World War I-era 
destroyers in exchange for U.S. control over a string of air and naval bases in Britain’s 
colonies. The Destroyers for Bases Agreement (followed in 1941 by the expanded Lend- 
Lease program) allowed the U.S. to acquire 99-year leases and almost complete 
sovereignty over British bases in the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Thomas, Antigua, 
Aruba-Curacao, Trinidad, and British Guiana and temporary access to bases in Bermuda 
and Newfoundland (Vine 2009). Deals followed for bases in Greenland, Iceland, the 
Azores, Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, Suriname, and the Galapagos as well as other small islands 
in the Pacific and Atlantic. The war saw particularly rapid base construction in the 
Pacific, as the military conquered and built bases on strings of small islands to battle 
Japan, devastating the lives of the local peoples living on them. The occupation of the 
Marshall Islands were part of this process, with Kwajalein becoming the U.S.’s main base 
in Micronesia during the war and later a major missile-testing site. By the end of the war, 
the U.S. had built or occupied thousands of bases in the Pacific and was building base 
facilities globally at an average rate of 112 a month (Vine 2009: 50-1).
Reluctant to give up the hard-won bases after the war, the military wanted to turn 
the Pacific Basin into an ‘American Lake’ with an offshore island perimeter that would 
stretch from the Aleutians, through Japan, and down to the Philippines. The U.S. 
administration, however, was in the process of breaking up the British and French 
empires and was sensitive to appearances of colonialism. It opposed outright sovereignty 
in the Pacific Basin but compromised by turning most of Micronesia and many other 
Pacific islands into a UN-administered trust (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) which 
allowed the U.S. to establish bases and govern the islands as part of the U.S. Eventually, 
the military was forced to abandon its ambitious, pan-Pacific ‘American Lake’ plan and 
rely on key bases in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii with continued control over the Trust 
Territory. Globally, the U.S. returned about half of its foreign bases with the end of the 
war, keeping rights of occupation as a victor in Germany, Italy, Japan, and France and
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securing long-term contracts for bases in Greenland, Iceland, and the Azores. Most of the 
lend-lease bases were kept as well as access to British and French bases in those 
countries’ former colonies (Vine 2009: 51-4).
The U.S. had framed the war as an anticolonial struggle and pledged to assist with 
decolonization afterward, and the newly formed United Nations enshrined the 
decolonization process and the right of self-determination. Anthropologist Carole 
McGranahan wrote that empires did not actually go away in the 1950s era of 
decolonization, “but went underground, surfacing in guises ranging from socialist empire 
in the Soviet Union to various forms of neo-imperialist aggressive democracy as in the 
case of the United States” (quoted in Vine 2009: 54). Despite the fact that both countries 
soundly rejected accusations of imperialism, the U.S. increasingly used its unchallenged 
military authority after the war to exert its power through economic markets, 
international agreements, and foreign bases -  all without any official colonies.
After the Soviet Union tested an atomic weapon in 1949, a new version of the 
containment policy, articulated in National Security Council Report 68, emphasized a 
militarily offensive position that recommended defending the U.S. and the West at every 
point on its perimeter. This ‘forward strategy’ held that offensive military forces should 
be maintained as close as possible to the USSR, creating a line of defense against 
expansion and allowing rapid military deployment (Vine 2009: 56-8). The DEW Line 
was one result of this policy as well being an early iteration of another core Cold War 
strategy: Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).
Research into the sociocultural impacts of bases has identified several commonly 
shared characteristics of militarization. In host countries, bases often lead to the erosion 
of the sovereignty of the allied state. For example, Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic 
was a very delicate subject and that country’s primary concern when it agreed to 
construction of the DEW Line. Canada’s participation in the DEW Line and other aspects 
of postwar defense of North America was not a foregone conclusion in the late 1940s.11
11 Canada had largely ignored financially insolvent Newfoundland until WWII resulted in U.S. bases there 
and the distinct possibility that Newfoundland would come under American control. This became more 
likely toward the end o f the war when the strategic importance o f Newfoundland with respect to an over-
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To maintain what control it could, Canada insisted on assuming its share of the 
construction debt and taking control of the sites once they were built. Realistically, there 
was little opportunity for Canada to refuse the bases. The bases of empire today are 
presented, as they have always been, as having rational strategic purposes and providing 
“forward defense for the homeland” -  in the case of the DEW Line, forward defense for 
the entire North American continent.
Just as the U.S. military looked at Alaskan and Canadian indigenous peoples as a 
potential cheap labor force in the 1950s, the U.S. also saves money today by training
100,000 soldiers annually in 180 different countries. These U.S.-trained troops further 
U.S. interests in local conflicts, but they also spare the U.S. from casualties and from bad 
publicity when human rights abuses occur. These training programs, which may include 
assassination and torture techniques, can strengthen the power of military forces in 
relation to other sectors within those countries. From national policy levels to the 
experiences of individual people, bases in disparate regions around the world create 
similar scenarios for the inhabitants in countries that live with them.
Bases and Environmental Degradation
If there is one overarching issue that unites people living near military bases 
globally, it is the military’s degradation of the environment. There are several reasons 
that environmental degradation is often presented as the worst impact of bases and 
becomes the main focus of protest. Debris and contamination are relatively obvious and 
tangible impacts that are universally accepted as negative - even the military sometimes 
acknowledges the problem and undertakes remediation. Other aspects of modernization, 
security, defense, and economics, however, are more complex and often portrayed as 
positive impacts of globalization. It is not necessarily unpatriotic or anti-military to
the-pole Soviet attack became apparent. Wartime agreements provided for a thorough evacuation o f U.S. 
defense facilities on Canadian territory at the end o f the war, but the U.S. still had bases on Newfoundland 
in 1949 when the territory became the 10th province o f  Canada. Canada wanted to cooperate with the U.S. 
on continental defense while protecting its sovereignty, while the U.S. was using its leased bases and 
sovereign powers that had been negotiated with Great Britain to force Canada’s hand. Canadian officials 
were strong supporters o f NATO since they thought it would reduce American hegemony. Guarantees o f  
territorial sovereignty were included in the 1955 DEW Line treaty, made easier by this “semi-fiction” that 
Canada was participating in the context o f NATO (Caldwell Jr., 1990).
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complain about environmental degradation, which makes it (particularly for domestic or 
colonial/domestic bases) the safest and most comfortable aspect of militarization to 
protest or discuss in general. Contamination assessments and remediation are addressed 
through chemistry and environmental science: cold hard data is obtained on which to 
base complaints. This is largely unlike other, social impacts such as the abuse of women, 
which is physical, but also psychological and more difficult to quantify. Furthermore, 
environmental degradation is seen as an impact that can, ideally, be undone or 
ameliorated. For these reasons, environmental impacts are often the primary focus of 
protests and often seem to overshadow or trivialize other consequences. Along the DEW 
Line, the initial understanding of ‘impact’ is immediately understood as environmental 
and a moment of reflection usually occurs when the issue of other, social impacts arises. 
To a great degree, however, an initial focus on environmental degradation legitimates and 
facilitates the discussion of other impacts: an irrefutable, scientifically proven impact 
builds a strong platform for and can lend credence to other complaints. This is, of course, 
only possible in locations where the residents are enfranchised enough to demand 
environmental tests.
In the years following the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military was restructured 
and a wave of base closures led to scrutiny of the material damage done to the land, while 
several U.S. federal departments were forced through the Freedom of Information Act to 
reveal past records of environmental degradation that had previously been classified for 
national security reasons. The Department of Defense is decidedly the worst offender of 
all the federal departments facing this dilemma (Seigel and Center for Public 
Environmental Oversight 2009; Shulman 1992). Cleanup of the past decades’ war by­
products and waste is complicated by the fact that the Pentagon, by its own estimates, 
produced (in the early 1990s) 500,000 tons of toxic waste per year (roughly one ton every 
minute) (Shulman 1992).
Scientists have discovered significant environmental contamination caused by the 
most routine military activity, which raises questions about the potential scope of 
contamination on firing ranges or other testing grounds. Many of those areas have been
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written off as ‘national sacrifice zones.’ For example, Congress agreed to finance a $400 
million cleanup for the forty-five square Hawaiian island of Kaho’olawe, long used as a 
testing ground and bombing range, but the project was abandoned eight years in with 
only one-tenth of the island cleaned up (McCaffrey 2002b: 178). Incomplete records kept 
during the decades of the Cold War, the military’s lack of civilian oversight, its penchant 
for secrecy, and the overarching priority of its ‘national security’ mission exacerbate 
these environmental problems. Shulman reported that the common military rebuttal to 
complaints of environmental abuses was: “We’re in the business of protecting the nation, 
not protecting the environment” (Shulman 1992: 13).
Hazardous wastes are suspected of contaminating more than 20,000 military sites 
within the U.S., where millions of tons of toxins have fouled hundreds of square miles of 
soil and polluted air and groundwater in communities (Shulman 1993: 27). The same is 
undoubtedly true at hundreds of overseas bases, but the extent of overseas military 
contamination will never be known: Shulman refers to it as a “black box” (1993: 30). A 
few indications exist: the Air Force has acknowledged contaminating the soil and 
groundwater at every one of its European airfields. Even before formal investigations, the 
Army had identified 300 contaminated sites in West Germany. Notwithstanding the 
military’s acknowledgements of environmental contamination abroad, it usually does not 
contribute anything towards land remediation. When the U.S. left Clark Air Base in the 
Philippines, it removed waste containers but refused to disclose information on toxic 
dumping. Twenty thousand families left homeless by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo were 
subsequently relocated to the former installation, only to discover dangerously 
contaminated land and water. The families have suffered from increasing serious health 
conditions and premature deaths that experts attribute to the military pollution 
(McCaffrey 2002a). As is the case with arctic DEW Lines, information the military is 
missing on the “black box” of contamination can sometimes be obtained from the people 
who live in the environment. Engineers charged with identifying potential contamination 
‘hot spots’ at DEW Line sites have relied in part on the cooperation of Inupiaq men who 
worked there.
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The U.S. is extremely averse to cleaning up overseas bases for fear that it will set 
a legal precedent (Shulman 1992), which would open the floodgates to calls for 
remediation from tens of thousands of sites used by the military since World War II. 
Despite the fact that the original DEW Line treaty between the U.S. and Canada specified 
that the U.S. would be responsible for cleanup, the U.S. was largely unwilling to pay for 
it. After years of negotiations by various departments, the Americans made a financial 
offer of $100 million payable over ten years, which Canada eventually accepted despite 
the fact that the cleanup was going to cost at least $300 million. However, the Americans 
insisted that their share of the payments would take the form of annual deposits into the 
Canadian Foreign Military Sales Trust Account, rather than a direct cash payment. The 
account is used by the Canadian armed forces to pay for military equipment purchased 
through the Pentagon.
With her investigation of a local, grassroots protest movement against the U.S. 
Navy’s occupation of large parts of the Puerto Rican island of Vieques, Kathleen 
McCaffrey put the issue of overseas U.S. military ecological degradation at the center of 
the study (2002b). In trying to gain an historical sense of Vieques in relation to other 
military bases, McCaffrey outlines the aftermath ofpost-Cold War U.S. base closures 
around the world. In analyzing the conflict between the military and the local residents of 
Vieques from the latter’s point of view, she tells the stories of the Navy’s activities on the 
island since 1940 and of the island’s residents making a life for themselves while wedged 
between a weapons depot and a firing range. As with military bases in Okinawa, South 
Korea, the Phillipines and other locations, the presence of the Navy depot on Vieques 
created severe tensions between U.S. security demands and Puerto Rican cultural 
identity. Vieques locals have challenged U.S. military policy abroad and tens of 
thousands of residents protested when a stray bomb killed a local civilian employee of the 
base.
Puerto Ricans are technically American citizens, but by placing the story of 
Vieques in the global context of militarization McCaffrey sees a “colonial dilemma” 
brought on by U.S. military subordination of non-U.S. citizens and by extreme
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environmental racism. The similarities to the DEW Line are striking: unlike the protocol 
within the U.S. or with allied countries, the military paid no rent or “permission cost” to 
access land in Vieques. Neither did the military pay taxes or contribute to the local 
economy in Vieques that, McCaffrey claims, it impoverished by expropriating its land. 
Yet the Navy made money off of Vieques, as it rented out the land for practice bombing 
to foreign militaries.
In Vieques, the Navy advertised the availability of the target range for a wide 
array of non-conventional and experimental weapons, which traditionally means nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons. More recently, it was revealed that the Navy fired 
depleted uranium munitions on the Vieques range, which is in violation of federal law 
and naval policy. Environmental officials have long recognized that the bombing was 
contaminating Vieques’s coastal and drinking water, but, as mentioned, the U.S. military 
operates on much looser standards “overseas.” By comparison, the Environmental 
Protection Agency ordered a halt to live and dummy ammunition firing on military land 
in Cape Cod, Massachusetts when contamination was discovered in the drinking water in 
1997. No such action has been taken on Vieques, even though Vieques is in a better 
political situation regarding cleanup than are most overseas bases because the island 
exists within the purview of U.S. law. However, because the EPA lacks enforcement 
power and the military has been granted far-reaching exemptions from environmental 
standards, it has been increasingly difficult to enforce environmental laws within the U.S. 
After years of mounting protest that eventually drew wide attention and support from a 
large continental U.S. Puerto Rican community (including Hollywood stars), the people 
of Vieques forced the U.S. Navy to stop bombing practice on the island in 2003.
Activists from Vieques are currently working with and advising militarization 
protesters from Guam, where the U.S. military has had a long presence with 28 facilities 
covering a third of the island’s land. According to a General Accounting Office report, 
workers on Guam’s bases dumped toxic chemicals into the island’s principal aquifers. 
Representatives of the Guam Landowners Association have presented maps at 
conferences, one showing the locations of the island’s best fishing grounds, its best
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agricultural land, and its best drinking water and another showing identical locations of 
U.S. bases, installations, and exercises. The military is now planning for a massive 
expansion of its bases on Guam, increasing its troop numbers there to a level (50,000) 
that is equal with Guam’s indigenous population, the Chamorros.
The Gift Economy of Bases
One of the primary ways that military bases are “normalized” and accepted is 
through a “commonly circulating rhetoric that suggests their presence is natural and even 
gift-like” (Lutz 2009a: 21). The military itself often promotes this aspect (especially 
when it is proposing to build bases), but many people living next to bases accept as fact 
the economic benefits. In documenting Inuit recollections of the military in Iqaluit, 
Melanie Gagnon noted that academic writing in general describes the military presence in 
the Arctic as having negative impacts on the Inuit. Gagnon believes that this is because 
researchers’ are preoccupied with ‘keeping the natives native,’ and that the construction 
of a military base and employment of Inuit men threatens that. The Inuit elders with 
whom Gagnon talked remembered the Americans in Iqaluit positively. The Americans 
reportedly helped the people significantly and were fun and upbeat (in stark contrast the 
to the Canadian bureaucrats that followed), and environmental degradation is seen as an 
unfortunate but unintended consequence of their presence (Gagnon and elders 2002).
This is a widespread attitude and many Arctic residents, especially elders, do not have 
anything negative to say about the military. It did become apparent during this research 
that many people feel ambivalent when explaining problems with the military, if they 
have any, because they liked and accepted most of the individual people who came to live 
next to their community due to military activity. Many men worked with, hunted with, 
and were friends with DEW Liners, from whom many learned English. Women dated 
DEW liners and DEW Liners married local women.
Resistance against the U.S. military by people who live adjacent to 
domestic/colonial bases is a complex issue. A principle concern in the historical and 
anthropological study of resistance is the distortion of authentic experience that may 
occur when authors are too eager to find aspects of human agency in oppressed peoples.
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Common criticisms are that scholars are over-romanticizing resistance, simplifying and 
sanitizing political relationships and dismissing the role of culture. Further criticisms 
focus on the question of what is occurring within academia and anthropology that may be 
the actual inspiration for such studies. These well-founded criticisms should be 
continuously considered in such research but should not dissuade critical Western 
investigations into the negative impacts of Western power around the globe. Although 
scholars may periodically err and become guilty of such tendencies, ignoring issues such 
as the militarization of indigenous land constitutes a much more serious problem in 
academia.
The culture of militarism penetrates societies near bases more easily than those at 
a distance from military installations, and the higher rate of enlistment among the 
populations near bases can limit the range of perceptions about the military. This reflects 
how economic and social opportunities provided by the military figure prominently in 
rural social life. The pressure to appear patriotic is high -  even if, as along Alaska’s arctic 
Coast, it is often expressed by variations on the theme: ‘We are lucky -  at least we are 
not Russian, then we would be poor.’ Although specifics of resistance to the DEW Line 
will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, an aspect that must be at the 
forefront of consideration is that, during periods of militarization, local populations have 
often not been in an appropriate situation to resist anything. Nothing, in fact, about 
indigenous societies in the Arctic and the impacts of militarization can be understood if 
the historical context of disease and population decline is ignored. The DEW Line, for 
example, was constructed in the final stage of a long era -  beginning in the mid-1880s 
when whalers and traders had arrived - in which diseases and alcohol had decimated 
coastal populations. In the 1950s, the principle disease was tuberculosis, but earlier it had 
been syphilis, small pox, influenza, measles, et cetera. Many settlements had been 
abandoned, and entire regions were emptied of all their inhabitants. Scholars using the 
crude figures available have estimated that population of Alaska’s coastal populations 
had declined at least 50 percent between 1828 and 1890 (eg Jenness 1962: 7). Wendell 
Oswalt theorized that the personal trauma caused by inconceivably high tuberculosis
68
rates among the Kuskokwim Eskimos “may well have contributed to the reputation of 
riverine Eskimos as a docile and phlegmatic people by the 1950s. Reports in earlier years 
of the century suggest that they had been more assertive and self-confident in the past” 
(Oswalt 1990: 146).
Among myriad other social issues, a central ‘gift-like’ notion also effectively 
mutes dissent of military bases. Resistance to the DEW Line, for example, was negated 
by the fact that the base provided much-needed jobs, a market for native art, and a 
generally larger economy. Base jobs almost always create an economically driven fear of 
base closure. The public relations arms of the military purposefully exaggerate the 
economic benefits of the bases as much more significant and positive then they in fact 
are, while not exploring or calculating the benefits of alternative uses of the sites (Lutz 
2009a). Some military/industry documents concerning the DEW Line present the view 
that the Inupiat and Inuvialuit were enriched by the bases. While it is true that in some 
ways they were, this viewpoint ignores the fact that their traditional land was 
appropriated away from them to build the bases. As mentioned above, Lutz describes that 
it is critical that bases are “naturalized or normalized, meaning that they are thought of as 
unremarkable, inevitable, and legitimate.” (Lutz 2009a: 20-21). As distinctly as DEW 
Line sites physically stand out along the arctic coast, another feature of bases rings true 
for them: long-standing bases can “disappear into a normalized background” (Lutz 
2009a: 32).
In exploring how the American public supports these U.S. bases, it cannot be 
assumed that Americans are aware of the bases in the first place. The general public is 
vaguely informed about arrangements with allied countries such as Japan, Germany, 
South Korea, and Guam, but is not aware of the extent of the empire of bases. Cynthia 
Enloe (2009) argues that this information is not necessarily hidden from the public, but 
that the American public has very little knowledge of or curiosity about U.S. military 
activity. The public is incurious about the military empire and the military empire 
depends on people remaining incurious, wrote Enloe. Many Americans hold a few 
prevalent assumptions and attitudes that allow them to remain uncurious, the primary one
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being the widespread belief that any U.S. base is of material value to people who live 
around it - the gift-like perception described above. Many communities and their 
congressional representatives mount massive campaigns to retain local bases, assuming 
that the bases’ economic benefits outweigh whatever social or environmental damage 
they may cause (Enloe 2009).
In February 2007, then-President Bush announced that the U.S. was creating a 
new military command for Africa, to be known as AFRICOM (Africa Command). The 
Pentagon had originally intended to establish a headquarters on the African continent, but 
strong protests from both African governments and civil society (with the exception of 
Liberia) have forced the U.S. to keep Africa Command center in Germany. Anti- 
AFRICOM activists are concerned that the new command is actually designed to secure 
oil resources, roll back Chinese economic influences, and fight the war on terror. 
AFRICOM would place many civilian duties under the jurisdiction of U.S. soldiers and 
allow the U.S. to continue training and equipping African militaries. An active Ghanaian 
writer and blogger who goes by the alias Nana Akyea Mensah is a prominent critic of 
AFRICOM developments. He summarized his perspective on this ‘gift’:
“It looks as though, they want to tell us that in addition to the revenue to be accrued from  
the oil industry, we are also to benefit from the installation o f US military bases...this 
national call fo r  discussions over the economic benefits o f  a foreign military occupation 
is no different from a discussion about the economic benefits o f slavery to a slave. Yet 
this is what the US military industrial complex and their local agents are obliging us to 
engage in, without any shame” (Mensah 2009) .
“Mensah” proposes that Africans should be realistic and view themselves as 
nothing more than “glorified pawns” in this relationship: “The real question ought to be 
‘What are the benefits of imperialist global domination to your local economy?”’ (ibid).
Reflecting the increasing use of researchers in all aspects of the military, a social 
science research center is under development at AFRICOM headquarters and researchers
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are being recruited to help map the complicated human terrain on the African continent 
(Vandiver 2009). Environmental anthropologist David Hughes from Rutgers University’s 
Center for African Studies participated in an interview for a position on the AFRICOM 
team -  not because he wanted the job, but because he wanted to leam more about it. 
Contending that this type of research might immediately endanger his subjects, Hughes 
and his department have issued a statement vowing that they would not collaborate with 
the military’s efforts in Africa (ibid).
The Many Forms of Violence
An anthropological focus on violence, another fundamental aspect of war and 
militaries, has been increasing since the mid-1980s and has often evolved into larger 
militarization research. Researchers have explored how violence is both constituted by 
and itself constituting cultural and political processes. Many of the recent works on 
violence can be considered a collective anthropology project that now studies modem 
political violence as the rule, not the exception, and therefore places it within a cultural, 
political, social logic.
The definition of violence, however, is misleading because it implies only 
physical damage. As Nordstrom witnessed, violence of all sorts can set in to motion 
ongoing cycles of instability and cultural trauma that reconfigure victims and society, 
shaping reality as people know it (2004). This correlates with the consequences of fear, 
one of the central aspects of violence. Ethnographies of people who have been subject to 
chronic fear (i.e. Green 1994) have found that it undermines one’s confidence in 
interpreting the world, that it penetrates social memory, destabilizes social relations, and 
divides communities. Green called fear “the arbiter of power -  invisible, indeterminate, 
and silent” (Green 1994: 227) and found that a “culture of fear” could be traced back to 
traumatic colonial invasions. The results of fear, then, are psychological and individual, 
but they are social and collective as well.
The DEW Line was not itself a war zone and did not result in war’s typical 
‘casualties,’ and some may be inclined to conclude that no real violence was involved. 
Taking broader views of what constitutes political and social violence allows one to
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explore more nuanced aspects of violence associated with the DEW Line. Just as 
psychologists have determined that verbal and emotional abuse can be far more insidious 
and hurtful than physical abuse, in large part because the victim does not identify the 
abuse as such, the social and psychological aspects of militarization are more difficult to 
recognize and define as violence but may have as significant an impact. The Cold War in 
particular was predicated on the notion that the battlefield was everywhere; each home 
and family was a defense unit and preparedness for war at all times was critical. This was 
far more acute on the DEW Line, commonly referred to as the ‘frontline of defense’ and 
a place where the burden of playing one’s role in the protection of the continent was 
paramount. This is not meant to imply that little violence existed in the Arctic before 
modem militarization, but merely to argue that limiting the scope of what is considered 
violence limits our understandings of events and lives.
Part of the difficulty in this area of research may stem from the paradox, 
identified by Nordstrom, that even as the study of collective violence increases, there is a 
paucity of theories on its causes and effects. For example, scholars have hardly discussed 
whether all violence shares fundamental characteristics. The choices of fieldwork 
locations for researchers who choose to study conflict are shaped by the researcher’s 
notion of what constitutes political violence, and traditionally the focus has been on 
soldiers and the battle. Historically, battlegrounds were separate from civilian life and 
researchers documented the events on the site. The focus has not been on the rest of the 
soldiers’ lives, their emotions, their wives and families, nor on the war profiteering that 
shapes the conflicts in which they are involved. War violence is still widely understood 
as battles and soldier-on-soldier (or soldier-on-insurgent) violence. Rape and civilian 
deaths are seen as anomalies despite the fact that ninety percent of the casualties in 
modem conflicts are civilian. Nordstrom argues that the battleground is now everywhere, 
but no one is recording the details.
Anthropologist Valentine Daniel used the term ‘anthropography’ instead of 
ethnography to describe his work in war-torn Sri Lanka. He felt that calling his work 
‘ethnography of violence’ would parochialize violence and limit it to a particular people
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and place. Not only would limiting the effects of his work to Sri Lanka exculpate people 
in other places in similar situations of collective violence, but it could lull or “tranquilize” 
those of us who live “self-congratulatory lives” in places apparently free of such 
violence. Daniel’s goal was to counter the largely Western conceit, assumed in 
journalism, government, and academia, which holds that violence is essentially outside 
the scope of Western civilization (Daniel 1997: 7-9).
Structural Violence and Soft Colonialism
Joseph Gerson of the American Friends Service Committee argues that “military 
colonialism brings structural violence” (Gerson 2009):
‘‘Bases bring insecurity: the loss o f  self-determination, human rights, and sovereignty. 
They degrade the culture, values, health, and environment o f host nations -  and o f the 
United States ” (Gerson 2009) .
Gerson explores what he terms the ‘soft’ side of military colonialism, which can be seen 
as changes in diet, cultural tastes, and markets. The plentiful and inexpensive food on and 
around the military bases on Okinawa, for example, has changed the health of 
Okinawans, who used to be the longest living Japanese. The tiny islands of Okinawa 
arguably rank among the most militarized places on earth, with at least 145 U.S. bases at 
the height of the Cold War -  and 130 military brothels (Enloe 2000). Currently, 38 of 
Japan’s 105 American military bases are located in Okinawa, where they occupy 11% of 
the land. Okinawa constitutes only 0.6% of the land area of Japan, but 75% of Japanese 
land occupied by the U.S. military is in Okinawa prefecture. Okinawans identify 
themselves as a subjugated indigenous minority and believe that Japan’s refusal to 
recognize them as such is linked to the imposition of the military’s presence (Akibayashi 
and Takazato 2009; Yamakawa 2009).
In reflecting on the impacts of the DEW Line, there is plenty of evidence of soft 
colonialism. However, in regards to food, this is a complex subject. It is not news that 
processed food is not good for one’s health, and the DEW Lines certainly exacerbated
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this form of ‘soft’ colonialism. However, informants for this research project were 
unanimously positive about the food that came with the DEW Line -  in fact it was cited 
several times as one of the best things about the bases. Families of men who worked at 
the sites had more food than their neighbors: one informant related that he had so many 
pork chops in his youth that he can not even eat them anymore. Despite the dubious 
nutritional qualities of processed food, the Inupiat are not ones to snub shared tanik food. 
Any displeasure with DEW Line food seems to stem only from the inability to obtain as 
much of it as one wanted. One woman said that her entire perception of the DEW Line 
was positive due to childhood memories concerning her stepfather, who was a DEW Line 
cook and a nice guy. The significance of this is that, as a child, she was able to regularly 
obtain ice cream. While recognizing the many negative aspects inherent in the colonial 
context, it is difficult to construe ice cream for children as a negative impact.
Anthropology graduate student Jack Ferguson, studying the impacts of DEW Line 
construction in the Mackenzie River region in 1957, expressed particular displeasure at 
the soft side of colonialism. “The description of this type of employment as ‘imposed’ is 
not too strong” Ferguson wrote. “The European has created desires for material goods 
among these people, and these desires can only be resolved by the Eskimo taking every 
opportunity to earn money” (Ferguson 1957a: 3). Ferguson was quite candid in his 
correspondence, and wrote that the succession to a wage economy and the dominance of 
western culture “would be quite satisfactory if the new filled the gap left by the 
disappearance of the old, but the plain fact is that the Eskimos are offered only a fraction 
of the incredible volume of European civilization” (Ferguson 1956). He lamented that 
although the abundance of comic books, cowboy music, and junk jewelry was a sign of a 
healthy economy, the basic culture was impoverished. “This is the way that ‘hill billies’ 
are created,” Ferguson complained (ibid).
Aestheticization of the Military
While materialism and junk food are the ‘soft’ hallmarks of colonialism in 
general, militarization includes its own distinct set of physical and psychological methods 
for entrenching itself in the psyche of populations. When compared to the situation in the
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U.S. today, the fact that Green (1994) was shocked by the “insidious forms of daily 
life’s militarization” in her study of fear and political violence in Guatemala seems 
quaint. She noted that camouflage clothing and war toys became seemingly mundane as 
they circulated throughout society, which normalized the extent to which civilian and 
military lives were commingled. She did not imagine that camouflage would be 
ubiquitous in the U.S. and popular with a wide and diverse spectrum of people -  no 
longer just veterans, punk rockers, and peace activists making ironic statements on war. 
Today, camo wedding cakes and wedding dresses are available, the bride’s dress can be 
concealing some pink camo lingerie that she could reveal in the couple’s camo-themed 
bedroom, and the little future soldier can snuggle up in his three-piece camo crib set with 
a tank-shaped pillow wearing his camo onesie underneath a camo ceiling fan. Military- 
themed place settings complete with dog tags are among the best selling for children’s 
birthday parties (fig. 11).
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Green cited psychologist Ignacio Martin-Baro’s work on “militarization of the 
mind” in El Salvador (1989; Martin-Barro 1990), which included interviews of 203 
children in his analysis of the subjective internalization of war and militarization to 
understand to what extent they had assimilated the usefulness of violence in solving
12 Army-shaped cupcake topper candles and plates from http://www.orientaltrading.com; Bullet Hole Peel 
N Place Stickers from http://www.birthdaydirect.com.
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problems. The study found that the majority thought that the best way to make peace was 
to eliminate the enemy through violence. Jackie Orr has called this “the militarization of 
the inner space,” the result of being everywhere surrounded by and thus internalizing 
what Lutz calls “a permanent state of war readiness”(Gonzales et al. 2009; Lutz 2009a).
Camo chic is in part an example of a method of militarizing the masses known as 
the aestheticization of the military. This method has been deployed by a number of 
totalitarian states and goes beyond the militarization of everyday civilian life. 
Anthropologist Emiko Ohnuki-Tiemey research on kamikaze pilots in Japan included an 
exploration of how culturally powerful images of cherry blossoms were used to 
overwhelm the pilots’ philosophical opposition to the war. Ohnuki-Tiemey began 
actively collecting theories that seek to explain how regimes succeed at coercing people 
to go along with them, even when the regimes are less than cohesive in their militarist 
agenda and the people do not articulate the state agenda in their minds. Aestheticization, 
with its vague connotations, is a powerful weapon that leads people to misrecognize the 
motives behind state strategies and can be cmcial in mobilizing people. Textbooks, 
songs, and theater constituted the Japanese state’s militarization toolkit, but it was a 
complex, non-uniform, and nonlinear process and these processes are not simply a 
Japanese problem (Ohnuki-Tiemey 2002). A modem correlation exists among the 
anthropologists working today in the Human Terrain System, many of who are anti-war 
and for whom the themes of helping people, decreasing casualties, and improving living 
conditions for Iraqis are common. These themes are very appealing and are explicitly 
designed to be so. These arguments appeal to a moral sense of justice and convince 
people to set aside their political objections to the military and the war. Guilt is assuaged 
and moral outrage is thus co-opted and used as a recruitment tool (Lin 2009).
The Language o f Militarization and the Militarization of Discourse
In 1915, feminist pacifist leader Catherine Marshall argued that applying the 
woman’s point of view to politics would introduce a new and much needed valuation. 
Everyone was becoming very accustomed to what she perceived as dehumanizing
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euphemisms of the day: men as ‘hands’ in a factory, ‘heads’ to be polled in an election, 
or -  most shocking of all -  ‘casualties’ by which to measure military success.
Language reifies the abstract and should be examined, but traditional histories 
have usually failed to take language seriously as empirical data. McEnaney (1996) 
suggests that defense discourse framed the Cold War as a menace thrust upon American 
families and civil defense as a necessary reaction to it, rather than framing it as a product 
of American interests and a phenomenon of a militaristic citizenry. Language and 
symbols are also used to normalize the continued presence of the military -  i.e. the army
is good, it’s here to protect you, and if you don’t cooperate you’ll end up like________
(location-appropriate example such as Nicaragua, Russia, etc.). This is an example of the 
military using what has been termed “official lies:” simplistic schemes that dichotomize 
complex social issues into black or white terms (Green 1994: 232-234).
Feminist scholar Carol Cohn spent a year immersed in the world of defense 
intellectuals after becoming fixated with the question of how people could think that way; 
that is to say, how do defense analyst rationalize and normalize the world of nuclear 
strategy and defense. Defense intellectuals are usually civilians who formulate plans to 
deal with the problem of nuclear weapons, including managing the arms race, deterring 
nuclear war, and planning how to fight a nuclear war. Cohn found an extraordinarily 
level of abstraction and removal from what she considered reality in the specialized 
language of nuclear strategic thinking. She learned their language in an attempt to 
understand what and how they thought, but soon found that her own thinking was 
changing so that she soon began to wonder how she, or any of us, could think this way. It 
was impossible not to notice the gendering of both the social relations and language of 
that community -  principally because it was entirely male with the exception of 
secretaries. Cohn’s own terminology for their language is “technostrategic” to reflect the 
intertwining of technological and nuclear strategic thinking, and she believes that the 
“language both reflects and shapes the nature of the American nuclear strategic project” 
and plays a central role in allowing defense intellectuals to think and act as they do (Cohn 
1987: 690).
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Cohn found it bizarre that these often nice, likeable men could spend their days 
calmly discussing all aspects of nuclear war with absolutely no sense of horror or moral 
outrage. The words they used had no graphic reality behind them: first strikes, re-entry 
vehicles, counterforce exchange, limited nuclear war, minimum deterrent posture, etc.
The language was so bland that the speaker or listener was never forced to voice the 
realities of nuclear holocaust that they were actually speaking about.
Catherine Marshall had been shocked by the language used to describe death and 
injury in World War I, yet “casualties” seems like direct terminology compared to 
today’s common parlance: “collateral damage” (or, as recognized by the American 
Dialect Society as the most euphemistic phrase for 2007, “human terrain team”). 
According to Cohn, it was not the words of the defense intellectuals themselves, but more 
importantly how the language hints at the terrifying way in which the existence of nuclear 
weapons has distorted our perceptions and redefined the world.
Cohn began her analysis familiar with the aspect of feminist anti-militaristic and, 
in particular, anti-nuclear criticism that sees much of the arms race as phallic worship and 
“missile envy.” Cohn was never comfortable with this simplistic interpretation and 
expected that her analysis would be more complex. She was naturally still curious about 
any sexual subtext in the technostrategic discourse, imagining that these men would have 
been made sensitive to feminist criticism of their overtly sexual language and might 
refrain from using it in public, but she found that no feminist critiques had ever caught 
their attention. Upon diving into that world and language -  even while familiar with and 
actively seeking to move beyond the easy sexual analysis -  she was not prepared for what 
she found. Though shocked and in disbelief at how graphically sexual the language was, 
Cohn concluded that the significance of that language is less obvious but more important 
than its transparent imagery. The language and imagery originate in a broader cultural 
context that suffuses the defense industry with overtones of masculine sexuality, but it 
also functions within the nuclear industry to minimize the seriousness of their work by 
making it intimate. Pat the missile, Cohn wrote, and its lethality disappears (1987).
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I perused a 1957 publication on the Distant Early Warning Line (Morenus 1957) 
with casual interest in whether much there would stand out to a feminist-curious analysis. 
The first few pages described a nuclear attack scenario and, if  summarized by selecting a 
few words, a technostrategic and homoerotic poem leaped from the pages with lines such 
as: “Insured -  direct contact -  tensely alert -  swallowed -  sense o f vital expectancy 
dominated" (see appendix # for complete poem).
The Militarization o f Gender
The research of militarized language indicates that gender and sexuality are ripe 
areas for anthropological research on U.S. militarism. The numerous and diverse issues 
surrounding gender and militarization are highly complex, global in nature, and largely 
ignored. The range of issues is impressive: at one end of the spectrum there is widespread 
rape as a weapon or by-product of war, while at the other end one encounters ‘feminist 
militarism.’ Most military histories are written as though women are invisible, or they 
portray women’s roles as human interest stories. However, militaries certainly need 
women (as prostitutes, as faithful and patriotic military wives, as employees of defense 
contractors, as patriotic mothers, as feminist civilians lobbying for the rights of women to 
serve in the military, as embedded social scientists, as troops and officers, etc.) and they 
also need to inculcate certain ideas about femininity. Moreover, women and ideas of 
femininity are not alone in being manipulated by militarization: the extent to which 
common images of masculinity have been manufactured by militarization is significant 
(1993; Enloe 2000).
Anthropologists, feminists, and anti-militarists have made use of each other’s 
work over the past century to such an extent that each discipline has shaped and been 
shaped by the others in turn. Scholars and movements have merged anthropological 
methods or findings into feminist anti-militarist works or have used feminist critiques to 
inform anthropological studies on U.S. militarism. The intersection of these fields has 
created what can be seen as a new genre of research; one that not only scrutinizes and 
exposes the sociopolitical processes and consequences of modem militarization but also
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actively seeks to direct those findings towards critiquing and deconstructing dominant 
western ideas of rationality and concepts of reason.
This genre has an established foundation -  in addition to the work by feminist 
pacifists such as Catherine Marshall, the writings of Virginia Woolf have been very 
influential. In particular, in her 1938 work, Three Guineas, Woolf wrote that the 
institutions and cultural centers of democracy have the causal roots of war insinuated in 
them. She described the masculinization of civilian services and warned that women in 
higher education, law and medicine could serve to make women complicit in 
militarization if they were uncritical of masculine norms of hierarchy and 
competitiveness (Woolf 1952).
The militarization of masculinity is not a new phenomenon: it has been driven for 
several centuries by both domestic and international processes. As an example, many 
men are uncomfortable admitting that they want to avoid military service as they fear it 
will be perceived as a lack of masculinity. For recruiters to keep their numbers up, 
military policy makers must control notions of gender, and states invest a great deal more 
energy and money into developing ideas of masculinity and femininity than most people 
realize (Enloe 2000: 235-236). Recruitment is aimed at marginalized groups and 
emphasis is put on ‘manliness’ and ‘first class citizenship.” How the men of colonized 
societies experienced militarized standards of manhood or how their experiences shaped 
later political movements are issues that merit further research.
According to Enloe, feminists have discovered that if they do not explicitly 
examine the role of militarism in a number of various issues and conflicts, then not only 
are issues of masculine privilege left untouched, but a holistic understanding of the 
situation is missed. Enloe found that many feminists in developing countries are 
convinced that militarization is the concept that best shows how power is used to distort 
gender relations (Enloe 1993: 68). This is not just the domain of female feminists, as 
evidenced by British peace activist and male feminist C.K. Ogden who co-wrote a 
pamphlet (and manuscript) at the height of World War I entitled Militarism vs Feminism: 
an enquiry and a policy demonstrating that militarism involves the subjugation o f
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women. Ogden’s later book, Fecundity and Militarization, was a “protest against the view 
of women as breeding machines,” a phenomenon that Ogden claimed made an inevitable 
appearance under wartime conditions. Emiko Ohnuki-Tiemey (2002) explored this same 
trend in World War II in Japan, noting that femininity was defined as a woman’s capacity 
to “reproduce and multiply” and raise sons to be good soldiers. Ogden, a great early 
champion of birth control, wrote that war and the fear of war had kept women in 
“perpetual subjection, making her chief duty to exhaust all her faculties in the ceaseless 
production of children that nations might have the warriors needed for aggression or 
defense” (quoted in Kamaster 1987: 57).
Ogden took on the role of an active armchair anthropologist, using ethnographies 
and other colonial reports to explore militarism throughout history, the conditions of 
women in numerous unindustrialized societies, and the assumptions within which 
western ethnographers and colonial administrators framed their analyses. He consistently 
found more evidence for his main thesis: the more militaristic the society, the lower the 
status of women. “Militarism has been the curse of women, as women, from the first 
dawn of social life,” he wrote, and “in war man alone rules: when war is over man does 
not surrender his privileges” (quoted in Kamaster 1987: 56).
A different example of the gendered aspects of militarization is what Gusterson 
(1999c) labels ‘feminist militarism:’ women viewing female success in the military and 
national security agencies from a pro-feminist, pro-militarist standpoint. Gusterson feels 
that this trend has the potential to reshape feminism as much as the military. Feminist 
militarism poses a dilemma for feminists, among whom essentialists (as described above) 
have traditionally viewed the military as associated with masculinity and violence.
Despite the issues of masculinity and patriarchy, women have become indispensable to 
the military. The argument that there is an equation between full-status citizenship and 
service, traditionally used to describe ethnic minorities in the military, has been extended 
to women; if they are to become fully equal citizens, they must participate as equals in 
the military. Pro-military feminists promote this view but Gusterson cites feminist 
Francine D’Amico to counter it. D’Amico argued that we should see “the expanded
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participation of women as a symptom of the militarization of society, not as evidence of 
women’s achievement of ‘equality,’” (Gusterson 1999c). Although women in the military 
first appeared to pose a setback to male military culture, Gusterson found that the modem 
national security state has parlayed it into a further strengthening of military institutions.
The effort to repeal ‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’ is a similar phenomenon, as the 
proponents of rescinding it base their arguments on the notion that the military would be 
strengthened. Despite the disproportional number of discharges for enlisted lesbians 
versus homosexual men, a pro-military lesbian feminist movement is evidenced in part 
by the “Great Military Themed Lesbian Books” list on Amazon.
Femininity is being redefined elsewhere by woman who actively resist 
militarization. In Chiapas, indigenous women who have repelled military invasions have 
put themselves at greater risk, but they are also part of a coordinated effort of indigenous 
organizations in Mexico that involves local cultural forms to contest top-down 
nationalism and the militarization of their homeland. Lynn Stephen (2000) claims that 
these women are redefining indigenous femininity by providing an important counter­
trope to the inherited colonial image and that this further strengthens them. Orin Stam 
(1999) noted that for a brief moment in Peru, women’s participation in the village 
‘rondas’ (defense teams) seemed to have the potential to transform gender relations. 
Feminist geographer Joni Seager (1993), studying the organization by local communities 
to expose and then force the military to clean up toxic pollution on and around military 
bases, has found that the leaders are most often women. The women, many of whom refer 
to themselves as “just ordinary housewives,” have also managed to avoid the common 
tendency towards centralization in their organizations, thus resisting the common 
militarizing temptation to which many groups confronting the military succumb. Seager 
charted their organizing and found that these women-led groups have persisted and 
sustained authentically grassroots connections, despite the fact that they are often held in 
contempt by local military base commanders for their alleged naivete and “hysteria” 
(ibid).
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At the other end of the spectrum from empowered clean up groups and feminist 
militarists is a much larger group of women: military prostitutes. Unlike women in the 
military, military prostitutes appear to be as old as militaries and have been seen by 
military leaders at times as a resource and at times as a threat. Calculations about 
prostitution have shaped foreign policies and international alliances: colonization 
required guns and the militarization of women’s relationships to men. Different policies 
have dealt with sexually transmitted diseases and class and race (i.e. different brothels for 
white and black male soldiers in Vietnam), but Enloe sees the constant issue as how to 
keep soldiers satisfied while not jeopardizing military efficiency (Enloe 2000).
Prostitution had become a significant industry in Vietnam by 1972, before the 
U.S. military withdrawal. Between 300,000 and 500,000 Vietnamese women worked in 
the sex trade, and an estimated four-fifths had venereal disease (Enloe 2000: 67). In 
Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand, as in many parts of the world, brothels for the 
military laid the foundations for the development of brothels for male tourists. Research 
done by anthropologist Katherine H.S. Moon (1997) investigated the ‘GI towns’ that 
accompany most of the U.S.’s 106 military bases in South Korea. The GI towns have 
been controlled by both the Korean and U.S. militaries, each for their own reasons. At 
some, each prostitute had a number and was required to have weekly examinations. 
Addressing racial tensions between U.S. soldiers, U.S. and South Korean policy makers 
focused on another part of the system they could control: stricter regulation of prostitutes 
to ensure equal distribution between black and white soldiers. The ramifications of 
overseas military prostitution can be seen in the U.S. as well: many Korean women marry 
G.I.s, but they have a 70% divorce rate once they are in the U.S. In the red light districts 
of U.S. military towns and in entrepreneurial brothels in suburban areas, many divorced 
Korean woman are working as prostitutes (Enloe 2000).
In South Korea, large, nationwide and numerous ongoing campaigns to protest the 
106 U.S. bases in that country have focused on holding the military accountable for 
violence against women and other crimes, environmental cleanup, and on resisting the 
construction of new bases. A new focus of attention is on South Korea’s treasured and
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famous Jeju Island, known as “Island of Peace” or “Island of the Gods.” The island is at 
the crossroads for the Malaka Straight where 80% of China’s oil from the Middle East is 
transported. The base, scheduled to begin construction in late 2009 but experiencing 
delays in part due to domestic and international opposition, is officially a Korean naval 
base but is largely seen as a U.S.-instigated project and would include U.S.-manufactured 
missile defense systems. In the past, Jeju Island’s deep-sea pearl diving women have 
played a large role in the island’s reputation. Now, protestors are claiming that 
construction of the naval base will endanger the marine environment surrounding the 
island, meaning that former and potential pearl divers may end up looking to the military 
base for employment.
Economies and Myths of War
Anthropologists have also put their holistic methods to work investigating how 
economies actually function, and recent anthropological research into the economic 
aspects of war has contributed significantly to our understandings of global processes. In 
particular, Carolyn Nordstrom has used her extensive fieldwork experiences to examine 
the frontline intersections of war in the midst of vast political systems and to outline the 
economic realities behind conflict. The terms Nordstrom uses to describe the global 
processes of trade that pass across boundaries of legality and illegality are “shadow 
networks” and “extra-state” exchange systems -  terms that she invented herself since 
these perspectives are ignored by traditional economists. Any movement to expose the 
significance of the shadow networks is risky since these economies rival those of certain 
states and popular conceptions of power and autonomy could be damaged. Nonetheless, it 
is clearly impossible to understand the true nature of economic and political reality if 
only formal economic and political tools are used to assess the world (Nordstrom 2004: 
225-233, 237).
Nordstrom found that the modem state is acutely dependent on warzone profits. 
Those profit systems may be officially invisible and under-reported, but they are in no 
way accidental. The shadow networks have several core features: they are governed by 
social principles and codes and can constitute cultures, besides creating economic
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possibilities and brokering political power; they are by definition international and are 
formalized, integrated, and rule-bound; and they are non-formal, which differs from the 
reference to small-scale, low-income and low-tech that is implied by ‘informal.’ 
Nordstom’s research led to the conclusion that the non-formal, grass-roots war economy 
that connects small-scale survival economies can produce large fortunes and direct the 
fate of wars (Nordstrom 2004: 106-109).
If and when analysts, policy makers and the general public address these shadow 
economies, they posit them as peripheral to the world’s economy. The popular core­
periphery theory leads to assumptions that the ‘core’ occurs in cosmopolitan centers. In 
fact, shadow economies are central to the world’s economy -  they are supported by 
governing institutions when it is politically or militarily expedient to do so and are 
eventually embedded into everyday functioning. The money made in ‘peripheral’ wars is 
critical and even central to the economic system that supports the core (Nordstrom 2004: 
114-117, 236).
Even when these non-formal, extra-state networks comprise 90% of a country’s 
economy (as Nordstrom discovered was the case in war-torn Angola), economists gather 
very little data about them and general fail to discuss them. This is largely due to the fact 
that classical economic theory does not have the capacity to deal with systems that do not 
translate into formal organizational structures. Ethnographic studies of economists and 
development professionals reveal that there is no terminology for “shadow economies” 
and no empirical methodology for researching them, thus there is no mention of them in 
most major economic texts. This practicality means that trillions of dollars are omitted 
from what economists study and that many development policies fail because they are 
constructed on faulty data assumptions (ibid). The formal texts of the military and the 
economy deal only tangentially if at all with the extra-state networks that are central to 
war.
Though this type of shadow economy was not a significant factor in Cold War 
arctic militarization, the benefit of employing this type of analysis is that it makes it clear 
that using only political and economic tools would not provide a realistic assessment of
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the DEW Line’s political and economic impacts, much less its social and environmental 
legacies. Data that illustrates the larger issue of the U.S.’s permanent war-based 
economy is, unlike shadow economies, official, largely available, and quantifiable. 
Scholars have estimated that the U.S. spends more than $100 billion each year on foreign 
bases (Bennis 2008). The country spends more than 58 percent ($1.2 trillion) of its 
discretionary budget on the military - more than it spends on education, environmental 
protection, transportation, veterans benefits, housing, job training, agriculture, energy and 
economic development combined (Gonzales, et al. 2009; Lutz 2009a).
A common assumption, perpetuated by diplomacy and military science, is that 
war and peace are brokered at the formal level by state leaders. This perception 
perpetuates notions of the primacy of the state and the powerlessness of the masses. If 
the public sees itself as incapable of waging war or making peace by themselves, the 
state is seen as essential to survival and people believe they would be worse off without 
it no matter the extent of the atrocities. Ethnographic observation, however, has proved 
otherwise: people with arms do destroy societies, but it is people without arms who can 
rebuild it (Nordstrom 2004: 177-178).
Nordstrom’s research indicates that power is far more contested than is generally 
acknowledged. Theories of power would not hold up on the front lines of a war, based as 
they are on direct links between the source and the implementation of power. Human 
actors insert chaos into power equations, and power is reformulated on the ground level 
before it moves into action. The theories do not explain why individual soldiers pull the 
trigger nor are they complex enough to account for the entangled roles in people’s lives. 
Academic theories aren’t the only oversimplified ones; as he strapped on his pistol 
before crossing into Kuwait, a Marine Corps lieutenant told war correspondent Chris 
Hedges: “Just remember that none of these boys is fighting for home, for the flag, for all 
that crap the politicians feed the public. They are fighting for each other, just for each 
other” (Hedges 2002: 38).
The ultimate irony of power is that politicians and military leaders either accept 
responsibility for whatever happens on the ground or risk the appearance that they are
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not in control and don’t actually represent power (Nordstrom 2004). A third option, that 
cannot be ignored, is that they falsify information about what happens on the ground so 
that it does not appear that things are out of control. Vagts (1959) recounted that after the 
Austrian campaign of 1849, officers admitted that the General Staff history caused 
accidental engagements to appear well planned in advance and that many great battle 
plans had been written after the battles. After his ‘anthropography’ in Sir Lanka, Daniel 
(1997) concluded that especially during periods of violence and conflict, the politically 
dominant institution does not have full control of the master narrative. More recently, 
U.S. military leaders falsified reports to hide the fact that football star and Army Ranger 
Pat Tillman was killed by friendly fire in Afghanistan.
The truths of war have little in common with the myths that sustain war, 
Nordstrom found, and she argues that the truth violates our sensibilities. The offense is 
not in the truth as much as it is the speaking of things that people cannot accept, which is 
why images of war conveyed by mainstream media and some literature are largely 
devoid of unacceptable truths. Patrick Regan (1994) argues that there is no identifiable 
group ‘out there’ manipulating myths to control us, but that U.S. society itself creates, 
advocates, and perpetuates myths that are necessary components of the militarization of 
society.
Vagts found that “in the process of militarizing minds, no small role has been 
played by writers of military history” (1959). In a 1958 postscript to his 1939 history of 
militarism, he noted that both British and U.S. generals largely renounced their role as 
history writers after World War II and instead agreed to let civilian professional 
historians author the histories of the war. He found that this did not result in a 
civilianization of war history, but in a militarization of civilian writers who were more 
cautious about including every battle detail than showing the war in a larger context of 
general history.
War correspondent and author Chris Hedges spent most of his adult life amid 
violent conflicts around the world and offers important insights into the culture of war. 
The central premise of War is a Force that Gives Us Meaning (Hedges 2002) is that war
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forms its own lethally addictive culture. Hedges claims that in wartime a country’s 
authentic and humane culture is subversive, and the warring state first destroys its own 
culture -  largely through the media and schools -  before destroying the opponent’s. The 
cultivation of victimhood is essential to the warring state, and the goal of nationalist 
rhetoric is to make pity their own and perceive that what they hold sacred is threatened. 
Most societies, he asserts, never recover (Hedges 2002).
Hedges credits combat with provided feelings like love and fulfillment to people 
who have suffered from loneliness and isolation. Myths, however, are harder to maintain 
on the frontline of war. Hedges uses psychologist Lawrence Leshan’s ideas of “mythic 
reality” versus “sensory reality” to describe life in combat. In sensory reality we see 
things for what they really are, and in combat most people soon find it impossible to 
maintain any mythic perception of war. Nor, Hedges notes, would they live long if they 
did. When the mask of war slips away and the myth is exposed as fraud, people 
commonly sink into despair so deep that they welcome death (Hedges 2002).
Hedges also maintains that once a war has lost its mythic stature for the public, it 
is doomed to failure. In mythic wars, events are imbued with meanings they do not have: 
defeats are seen as steps to victory, the enemy is dehumanized, and we view ourselves as 
the embodiment of ultimate goodness (Hedges 2002). Force is the only solution when 
mythic reality is allowed to rule, the press and the state are the chief disseminators of the 
myth (mythic war reporting boosts sales), and the power of the myth is that “it allows us 
to make sense of violence and death.” By mythologizing history we see random events as 
a preordained chain of events leading to greatness (Hedges 2002).
Hedges (2002) recounts that nationalist triumphalism is a phenomenon that he 
encountered in every country he has worked in. There is little that logic, fact, or truth can 
do to change it, and only after the myth implodes (though it is never truly conquered) can 
the motives and actions of the state be questioned. Meantime, daily wartime episodes are 
central to the myth, blending into entertainment and rendering the trivial and 
commonplace into high moral drama. At first, according to Hedges, war feels like love 
and fulfillment to many people who have suffered from loneliness and isolation: an
88
attraction we must acknowledge to combat. Myths, however, are harder to maintain on 
the frontline of war. Hedges (2002) uses psychologist Lawrence Leshan’s ideas of 
“mythic reality” versus “sensory reality” to describe life in combat. In sensory reality we 
see things for what they really are, and in combat most people soon find it impossible to 
maintain any mythic perception of war. Nor, Hedges notes, would they live long if they 
did. When the mask of war slips away and the myth is exposed as fraud, people 
commonly sink into despair so deep that they welcome death (Hedges 2002).
Going to the source: anthropology of the military
As part of understanding the larger effects of militarization, several significant 
anthropological investigations have elucidated the culture of security institutions 
themselves and their effects on society in the U.S. and elsewhere (Ben-Ari 1997; Ben-Ari 
1998; Ben-Ari and Fruhstuck2003; Katz 1990; Simons 1997; Winslow 1997). Studies of 
military wives seem particularly popular. Pamela Frese and Margaret Harrell co-edited 
Anthropology and the United States Military: Coming o f Age in the Twenty-first Century 
(2003) with the goal of augmenting the dearth of ethnographies examining military units 
or military communities. Frese’s contribution (2003) gave a detailed cultural analysis of 
home, family, kinship, and community based on her participant observation in a military 
retirement community and the life histories of wives of high-ranking officers living there. 
Frese found that diversity in terms of race, ethnicity, and class were subsumed under the 
creation of Active, kinship-like relationships. The wives were active guardians for these 
complicated kinship ties that, according to Frese, underlie the “reproduction of a 
gendered hegemonic structure wherever the U.S. military can be found” (Frese 2003: 65).
John P. Hawkins (2001) discovered that an orientation to violent combat pervaded 
the entire army, despite the fact that a minority of soldiers were actually combat troops. 
Focusing on an enclave military community in Germany, Hawkins found that under the 
circumstances of constant preparation for armed conflict, the martial values of conflict
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were generalized to the whole military institution.13 Hawkins explained that many 
soldiers lived on post with their families and expected community and domestic lives 
consistent with civilian U.S. values, yet found the military intruding into their personal 
lives in the name of military readiness. The soldiers and families were under constant 
surveillance and scrutiny by military personnel (Hawkins 2001).
These findings may not be particularly surprising, but they are interesting in 
relation to the experiences of many small communities dominated by a military presence. 
In southern Mexico, social work conducted by the army results in small indigenous 
communities adjusting to large numbers of young military men in their midst on a daily 
basis. This “social work” approach is emphasized at the School of the Americas14 in Fort 
Benning, Georgia, where a significant number of South American army commanders are 
trained. The indigenous populations internalize the surveillance as a constant violation, 
silence and self-censorship are integrated into people’s lives, and the fear of far worse 
abuse at the hands of the military is ever-present (Green 1994).
Anna Simons (2003) describes the predicaments of successful and unsuccessful 
military advisors, comparing the temptation to envision oneself as a warrior-king or to 
“go native” with that of anthropologists in the field. Military advisors spend long periods 
of time in the field, have to figure out how to establish rapport, and are confronted by a 
host of cross-cultural communication challenges. They have a relationship with the locals 
predicated on asymmetry and thus live with a dualism between ambiguity and power. 
Their advisory relationship is like any other exchange: members on both sides must feel 
they are benefiting. The more culturally and politically aware advisors are entering a 
situation; the better they are able to react. Simons did find that military advisors working 
with people who actually shared the same goals had far greater success, but, as with T. E. 
Lawrence, this is not a requirement. Lawrence and other successful advisors did steep 
themselves in local politics and tried to see things through the natives’ eyes, instead of
13 In my opinion, Hawkins was either cautious or limiting his scope, because those martial values are
regularly broadcast to the general public, not just to the military institution where one would expect them.
14 The name o f the School o f the Americas was changed in 2001 as part o f  the National Defense 
Authorization Act. It is now the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.
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simply assessing the situation militarily. Successful advisors were able to develop 
empathy without developing sympathy, and they engaged with people at the grassroots.
Robert Rubenstein (2003) is one anthropologist who criticizes anthropology’s 
distrust of military institutions and argues that failing to engage armies from the inside is 
a significant loss for the discipline. Rubenstein, an academic political anthropologist, was 
invited by the military to help determine what cultural sensitivities could be involved 
with new peacekeeping missions. Not only do national militaries vary, but different 
organizational cultures are represented within the military of a single nation, and of 
course individuals have a broad range of motivations for choosing to join (in countries 
without obligatory military service). Anthropologists have faced several special 
challenges when studying defense communities, including stark funding limitations, 
having to adapt traditional methods in order to research a diverse, dispersed, and transient 
population, and dealing with stigmatization and restrictions due to the suspicion with 
which anthropologists view the defense community. Rubinstein argues that there is far 
more variation in military communities than most people realize, and that critical 
commentaries on them that seem uninformed or unconnected are easily dismissed by the 
defense community.
Nuclearism and the National Security State
Nuclear technology has shaped overall modem militarization to a large extent, 
and research into the cultural aspects of the nuclear age illuminates the world views that 
gave birth to the strategy of mutually assured destruction and its components, including 
the DEW Line. Lutz uses the notion of an era’s “mode of warfare” to draw attention 
beyond the weapons and strategies to the wider social features related to a type of war 
making, and ‘nuclearism’ is the mode that emerged with the end of World War II. Mass 
industrial warfare, by contrast, emerged with industrial capitalism in the 19th century and 
involved large armies and many workers producing tens of thousands of relatively simple 
weapons. This mode of warfare, used in World Wars I and II, helped shape labor 
geographies and gender/race/class structures in the warring societies. Nuclearism 
involved a transformation of the perception of danger and new social relations related to
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the weapons’ manufacture. Nuclearism meant smaller armies and fewer workers, an 
increase in the importance of predominantly white and male scientific end engineering 
labor, and a tendency for military jobs to move away from unionized areas and African 
American populations. Expanded codes of secrecy, Lutz found, fundamentally deformed 
norms of democratic citizenship. Nuclearism also destroyed the practical distinction 
between soldiers and civilians. Tilly (1985) made the point that the power of a 
government with nuclear weapons is greatly strengthened against its own people, who 
are forced into a more uneven bargain with their states since they must trust them with 
their own future as well as that of the human race. Under nuclearism, sometimes called 
“imaginary war” as it is more scenario than battle, the nation’s survival depends on 
subsuming internal conflicts to the demands of national unity. Although Cold War 
nuclearism resulted in environmental damage from testing and bases and led to hundreds 
of proxy wars in which approximately ten million people died, historical depictions often 
extol the “blessings” of nuclear weapons since they were never exchanged (Lutz 2002: 
728).
The Cold War also fostered the common perception that nuclear weapons are 
most dangerous in the hands of third world countries. Almost all the nuclear weapons 
designers Gusterson (1999a) interviewed thought that it was more likely that a ‘third 
world’ country, rather than the U.S. or Russia, would use a nuclear weapon. In Nuclear 
Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination, Gusterson describes that, as 
institutions, the labs used distinctly colonial terminology to argue for post-Cold War 
weapons research. The widespread perception is that nuclear weapons are fine among the 
five official nuclear nations but that proliferation, especially to Islamic countries, would 
be enormously dangerous. Gusterson understands this as Geertz saw other orthodoxies: 
as so much a part of our common sense that can usually be stated as fact without fear of 
contradiction. Anthropological studies on risk have found that shared fears often reveal 
as much about the identities of the fearful as about any actual dangers.
This entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation, Gusterson claims, has played 
an important role in structuring the developing world, and our relation to it, in the
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western imagination. India, Israel, and Pakistan have refused to sign the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) because it enshrines a system of global “nuclear 
apartheid.” Since the end of the Cold War and the various conflicts with ‘rogue states,” 
the NPT has been increasingly legitimated in racialized terms. Horizontal nuclear 
proliferation to other countries is viewed negatively, while vertical proliferation and the 
development of new and improved weapons is not seen as a problem. “The dominant 
discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a 
specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that 
takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from 
Western countries” (Gusterson 1999a: 114). The blatantly racist orientalism of 
colonialism has been replaced by more subtle orientalist ideologies apparent in economic 
discourse, in the imagery of popular magazines like National Geographic, and, as 
Gusterson describes, in U.S. national security discourse. This discourse fits the four 
characteristics that define an ideology: it makes the political structures of dominant 
groups appear natural; it presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; 
it obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to 
inhibit massive binary situation (by effacing continuity between poor countries’ nuclear 
deprivation and their other systematic patterns of deprivation to inhibit a massive north- 
south confrontation); and it legitimates domination. Gusterson also examines four 
Western arguments against horizontal proliferation and demonstrates that each one is 
ideological, orientalist, and could as easily be reversed to delegitimate Western nuclear 
weapons; the Third World is too poor; their nuclear deterrence will be destabilizing; they 
lack technical maturity; they lack political maturity.
Edward Said noted that the fear of a Muslim holy war was one cornerstone of 
orientalist ideology; Islamic countries would only seek the bomb out of despotic vanity 
or religious fanaticism -  never for security. Said also found that once a group had been 
orientalized, virtually anything could be written or said about them without being 
challenged. Gusterson cites Western commentators who distrust India with the bomb 
since India was purported to name its bombs after gods and war heroes. This was not true
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of India, but the U.S. has nuclear weapons named Thor, Poseidon, Jupiter, Pershing, 
Polaris, and Minuteman. Gusterson deems that the western proliferation discourse’s use 
of images and metaphors that represent Third World nations as criminals, women, and 
children may be read as hints about our own psychology: “troubling parts of ourselves 
that have mysteriously surfaced in our distorted representations of the Other” (1999a: 
129). These metaphors also assimilate the relationship between the West and the Third 
World to other hierarchies of dominance within Western culture: police over criminals, 
men over women, adults over children -  the Third World nations, according to this 
scheme, have their proper place at the bottom of a global order.
The cultural “fallout” during the five years following the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki - the early years of nuclearism which shaped the entire era - is 
the focus of historian Paul Boyer’s By the Bomb’s Early Light (1985). Boyer suggests 
that we have seriously underestimated how profoundly the nuclear reality has affected 
American thought and culture. So fully has the Bomb pervaded our consciousness, he 
claims, that it is as though it is built into the very structure of our mind, giving shape and 
meaning to all our perceptions.
The weeks and months after the bombings were a time of ‘cultural crisis’ when 
Americans confronted a new reality of almost unfathomable proportion. The immediate 
response was confusion and disorientation. The subsequent world-govemment 
movement was one manifestation of the new fear, as was an interlude when atomic 
scientists were looked to as gurus who would lead the world out of darkness. Nuclear 
testing in the Pacific led to the gradual realization of the extent of the seriousness of the 
ecological damage and potential impacts on futures generations, while fantasies of a 
“techno-atomic utopia” became common (Boyer 1985: 109). As mentioned above, the 
bomb led to claims of a tragic one-sidedness of man’s knowledge and calls for the social 
sciences to receive the same level of attention as physics had been given in order to guide 
society. By 1950, however, familiarity and a dull acquiescence had set in: the bomb had 
come to stay, the potential of the peaceful atom provided great hope, and responsibilities 
for guiding us could be left to the church and State. The era of civil defense was ushered
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in by all manners of experts who tried to convince the American public that the atomic 
threat was not as bad as it had been presented and hysteria was uncalled for (Boyer 1985: 
319-333). Although virtually accepting the inevitability of a nuclear conflict, the 
American conscience was pacified into accepting that war had been converted to 
genocide.
Several recent social histories that investigate American society during the Cold 
War illustrate the ramifications of nuclearism and the particulars of fighting against a 
political philosophy that could infiltrate any institution and undermine the “American 
way of life.” Stephen J. Whitfield (1996) focused on the anti-Communism movement’s 
super-patriotism, intolerance, and suspicion and Elaine Tyler May (1988) drew 
connections between sexism and the internal dynamics of the American home whose 
distinction from the battlefield, as noted by Lutz, was increasingly blurred by the 
physical and psychological effects of militarism. The postwar citizen was a civilian- 
soldier whose most important relationship was with his family.
In her urban anthropological history, Homefront: A military city and the 
American 20th century (2001), Lutz relates the larger chronicle of American twentieth 
century war and peace and tries to explain the experiences of Fayetteville, North 
Carolina, in light of those national processes. Adjacent to and largely overshadowed by 
Fort Bragg, the story of Fayetteville addresses how people live with what becomes 
battle’s other -  “the home front” -  and war’s shadow -  “readiness” (Lutz 2001). Lutz 
explains the use of anthropological methods to expose these processes since much of the 
history and reality of war has been made invisible to people inside and outside the 
military by simplified histories and propaganda, secrecy laws, or the difficulty assessing 
many consequences of war because so many of them are not obviously war-related.
These reasons alone, Lutz argues, aptly demonstrate why we have not fully evaluated the 
true costs of being a country ever ready for battle. Neither is there a universal set of 
measurable ‘military values’ since cultural forms have intersected with and remade 
society’s military institutions. Beyond employing anthropological methods to understand 
how culture and political economies come to shape people’s view of war and employing
95
history to show how things have not always been as we see them now, Lutz engages in 
cultural critique to ask whether we are not all military dependents, what America would 
be like today if the elites who opt for war had made other choices, and whether it is truly 
possible for us to now imagine another way.
The efforts that have succeeded in building a massive peacetime army in the U.S. 
began gaining power before World War I, but Lutz argues that the wealthy elites were 
threatened as much by social forces at home as by the battle in Europe. The 
“preparedness movement” was usually framed as a response to the war in Europe, but the 
upper classes and industrial capitalists were intimidated but the labor movement as well 
as the racial tensions amid the massive influx of immigrant societies in American cities. 
Business elites desired a more docile labor force at home as well as new markets 
overseas, and a larger military would help create both. But while the national myths 
would lead us to believe that wars overseas were thrust upon the U.S. and that it was 
only our patriotism that motivated us to play a part, Lutz explains how the American city 
and homes were transformed into home fronts by war much earlier -  namely by the 
massive war of the European colonists claiming the New World and subjugating the 
Native Americans, and by racial violence that experienced its most famous outbreak with 
the Civil War but in truth has occupied our nation for most of its history.
A solid foundation had been laid, then, by the time that World War I prompted a 
conscription crusade led by the nation’s wealthiest men, who claimed that the country 
was dangerously isolationist and materially unprepared for a new international military 
role. Lutz’s scrutiny of that movement shows that conscription was designed to 
“revitalize and protect America through the inculcation of military values” (2001: 33) 
and that those benefits were seen more in domestic than military terms. Military 
conscription would, its proponents argued, restore harmony and order to society, solve 
the problem of American manhood gone soft, and “Americanize” the mass of new 
immigrants. President Wilson said that the draft was not “a conscription of the 
unwilling” but “rather, a selection from a nation that has volunteered in mass” (Lutz 
2001: 34).
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Traditional representations have largely overlooked and distorted movements in 
the U.S. against militarism and the military. Lutz points out that simply by referring to 
the years of peace and demilitarization from 1919 to 1939 as the “inter-war” years, the 
past has been labeled in ways that make certain outcomes seem inevitable. In fact, forces 
that wanted to avoid foreign conflicts aligned with those who wanted a fiscally 
conservative central government after the war, and Congress had public backing to reject 
the Army’s proposed half-million-man peacetime force. Lutz argues that the public was 
no longer convinced they needed a great army to be a great nation, and those who had 
actually fought in the war were also less enamored by militarism. Anti-war literature and 
art were exceptionally popular during this era and they were inspired in large part by a 
strong feminist movement, but demilitarization owed as much to conservatives worrying 
about domestic issues and unilateralists who wanted to avoid alliances.
The Great Depression only reinforced America’s disillusionment with war and 
military institutions. Many people saw their economic problems directly related to the 
war debt and economic disturbance, and congressional hearings in the 1930s investigated 
ties between the military, the War Department, and major arms manufactures. This 
occurred in the atmosphere of larger questioning about the militarization of American 
society that was happening in churches, on college campuses, and among socialists and 
labor organizers as well as conservatives. Despite this widespread awareness that 
collusion between the arms industry and the state was undesirable, people also realized 
that preventing it was unlikely. Militarization did soon return, largely via the projects and 
demands of New Deal programs (Lutz 2001).
The strong anti-militarist sentiments did not die with World War II but were 
successfully “reinterpreted” in its historical rewriting (Lutz 2001: 44). In fact, most 
Americans passionately wanted massive demobilization when the war ended and, 
especially with the horrors of the Holocaust and atomic bombing of Japan, came to see 
war itself -  not other nations -  as the enemy. Demobilization and demilitarization was 
reversed with the beginning of the Cold War, arms race, and above all the National 
Security Act of 1947. Lutz refers to the National Security Act as a “revolutionary rupture
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in the American form of government” because it eroded the rule of law in deciding 
whether to go to war, but the national security state also had the significant social impact 
of installing a “military definition of the situation” (2001: 84-85).
The civil defense establishment, as described by Laura McEnaney in Civil 
Defense Begins at Home: militarization meets everyday life in the fifties (2000), had 
effectively privatized nuclear protection and formulated a national policy that demanded 
individuals take personal responsibility and patriotically build their own nuclear fallout 
shelters. Private families making a consumer purchase could safeguard the values of 
family and home and be doing the cultural work of the Cold War. Most Americans failed 
to heed the government’s demands, implying a resistance to militarism. The more 
complex truth reached by McEnaney is that Americans did support the government’s 
militaristic policies but repudiated a level of militarism that required them to finance their 
own security, and that they refused to have a constant physical reminder of nuclear war at 
home.
The private institution of the family had to be shaped to fit the military demands 
of the national security state, ideally complete with a non-employed mother-homemaker 
as second in command, fulfilling their tasks for others’ sakes under the dynamic 
leadership of the decision-maker husband. Thus defense planners promoted policies that 
domesticated civil defense programs by constructing them as home and family issues, 
but they further feminized it by including voluntary women’s organizations into its 
planning and depicting as “women’s work” the myriad post-attack services such as first- 
aid, mass feeding, family reunification, and psychological support of frightened kin 
(McEnaney 1996). This process was facilitated by the fact that it depended on 
conventional gender role arrangements and not on the radical notions of independent 
women workers that labor shortages during World War II had required.
Returning to the aestheticization of the military, examples of militarism in 
American entertainment are innumerable (the films An Officer and A Gentleman, the 
Rambo series, Top Gun, and Tom Clancy techno-thrillers are among the most discussed), 
but some are more noteworthy than others. Robert Heinlein’s famous work of science
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fiction, Starship Troopers (1982 [1959]) won the Hugo Award for Best Novel in 1960, 
helped create a new genre of literature known as military science fiction, is required 
reading in the U.S. Marine Corps, and provides crucial insights into modem U.S. 
militarism.
Heinlein wrote Starship Troopers to drum up support for the U.S. nuclear testing 
program and the book outlines a marine-like boot camp experience, criticizes 
communism, and enshrines militaristic values (Heinlein 1982; Panshin 1968). The novel 
is set in our future world after the current geopolitical system has collapsed due to its 
naive civilian leadership that, among other lapses, had outlawed corporal punishment. 
The future world can solve any moral problem since it operates on a “scientifically 
verifiable theory of morals” rooted in the individual instinct to survive, extolling “self­
interest, love of family, duty to country, [and] responsibility towards the human race.” 
The future world’s great heroes pledged to buy liberty with their lives: “Liberty is never 
unalienable; it must be redeemed regularly with the blood of patriots or it always 
vanishes” (Heinlein 1982: 96).
Veterans mn Heinlein’s imaginary future world, in which they have banned 
“bleedin’, profiteering, black-market, double-time-for-overtime, army-dodging, 
unprintable civilians” from governance. War and moral perfection derive from the same 
genetic inheritance. Laced throughout with quotes from the Bible, Starship Troopers 
dismisses typical anti-violence arguments by “heap[ing] scorn” on an “inexcusably silly 
idea...the historically untrue - and thoroughly immoral doctrine - that violence never 
settles anything.” Readers leam the moral difference between soldier and citizen: the 
soldier accepts personal responsibility for the safety of his nation, while the citizen does 
not (Heinlein 1982: 24). The protagonist will never know what he is made of unless he 
joins, and after he swears in he “at least” realizes that he is no longer a civilian, with his 
“shirttail out and nothing on [his] mind” (Heinlein 1982: 28-30). When he is eventually 
out on leave he is shocked by how complex and “unbelievably untidy” civilian life is, 
“filled with all manner of unnecessary things (and not a weapon among them)” (Heinlein
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1982: 99). Of young civilian men, the recruit finds them “long-haired and sloppy and 
kind of dirty-looking” (Heinlein 1982: 101).
Only the combat corps were worthy - all other assignments were “booby prizes” 
for “button pushers or professors” (ibid: 32, 35). Conveniently, the enemies in Heinlein’s 
novel aren’t human (they’re big alien bugs), making it a simple matter to objectify them 
as pure evil. Death, since it is an expected part of their trade, is exalted and ceremonious.
By the end of the book, the battle-tested infantryman has decided to go career. 
“The M.I. was mine and I was theirs...my gang, I belonged. They were all the family I 
had left; they were the brothers I had never had... If I left them, I’d be lost” (ibid: 129). 
His father, who had strongly resisted his son joining the military, finally joined himself, 
admitting that civilian life was meaningless and that “at least half of my anger at you was 
sheer resentment...that you had actually done something that I knew, buried deep in my 
heart, I should have done.” A woman, of course, had held him back; his wife’s death 
“released” him for what he had to do and prove that he was a man.
Many of the same issues exalted in Starship Troopers are treated in The New 
American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, by West Point graduate, 
Vietnam veteran, and historian Andrew Bacevich (2005). A self-described political and 
social conservative, Bacevich argued that misleading and dangerous conceptions of war, 
soldiers, and military institutions have come to pervade the American consciousness and 
have perverted U.S. national security policy. His history traces the roots of the new 
American militarism and “military metaphysics” -  a tendency to see international 
problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding solutions except 
through force -  as a reaction to the 1960s and especially Vietnam (Bacevich 2005: 2-6).
One of the many manifestations of the new American militarism Bacevich 
described is the boost in status of military institutions and soldiers, involving public 
enthusiasm for high-tech weaponry that encourages people to see war as something to be 
experienced vicariously. Since the end of the Cold War, public opinion polls have found 
ever-increasing confidence in the military alongside decreasing confidence in the 
executive branch, Congress, the media, and organized religion. This confidence has
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found further expression in a tendency to elevate the soldier to the status of national icon, 
the “apotheosis of all that is great and good about contemporary America” (ibid: 23). A 
most unfortunate phenomenon, according to Bacevich, is that soldiers tend to concur with 
this evaluation of their moral superiority. A 2003 survey of military personnel found that 
two-thirds of those surveyed think that military members have higher moral standards 
than the nation they serve. Bacevich quoted senior officers who are uncomfortable with 
the fact that “the armed forces are no longer representative of the people they serve” and 
that “more and more enlisted as well as officers are beginning to feel that they are 
special, better than the society they serve” (ibid: 24).
Bacevich contends that despite the widespread public esteem, the U.S. military 
does not actually wield more influence in policy; their imagined supremacy merely 
results in higher expectations and miscalculations. Bacevich noted that members of the 
Bush administration professed to hold soldiers in high regard, but they had little patience 
with those who advice caution or restraint. He quoted Michael Mann’s observation: “the 
notion of civilian control of the military became meaningless, since civilians were the 
leading militarists” (ibid: 63). In my opinion, Bacevich on this point ignores that the 
combined influence of the military industrial complex has long been recognized as the 
true nexus of control, not the military by itself.
An important chapter in Bacevich’s work traces in great detail the ideologies and 
leading minds behind neoconservatism: a “counterrevolution” or “insurgency” mounted 
by “contrarian intellectuals” against the New Leftists and national anti-military sentiment 
at the end of the Vietnam War. “What rules the world is ideas, because ideas define the 
way reality is perceived” observed Irving Kristol, an early neocon leader who also thinks 
that neoconsevatism is best understood not as a political movement or school of thought 
but as a “persuasion” (ibid: 70). Bacevich saw the essence of neoconservative aspirations 
as simple: “to fuse American power to American principles, ensuring the survival of 
those principles and subsequently their propagation to the benefit of all humanity” (ibid: 
71). He also saw its legacy as fostering the climate necessary for the emergence of the 
new American militarism. The drastic ramifications of overextending the U.S. military,
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combined with American profligacy and political apathy, is the subject treated by 
Bacevich in his most recent work: The Limits o f Power: the End ofAmerican 
Exceptionalism (Bacevich 2009).
Chalmers Johnson is a retired professor of political science and economics, a 
former “Cold Warrior,” and a historian of American militarism. He is the husband of 
anthropologist Sheila K. Johnson, and the two are, respectively, president and editor of 
the Japan Policy Research Institute. Johnson has published a trilogy on American 
militarism and its ramifications: Blowback: The Costs and Consequences o f  American 
Empire 2000, The Sorrows o f Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End o f the Republic 
(2004); and Nemesis: The Last Days o f the American Republic (2008). Nemesis, Johnson 
points out, was the Greek goddess of vengeance who went after people who had become 
too arrogant and lost all prudence. Johnson traces the histories of military dictatorships 
and imperialist empires, concluding that in order for the U.S. to maintain democracy it 
must forego its empire. Defining U.S. military hegemony as an empire is important, 
according to Johnson; military enclaves in lieu of actual colonies simply constitute a new 
form of empire. He sees it as denial or hypocrisy to not think of the U.S. as imperialistic 
since, other than referring to our overseas holdings as ‘forward bases,’ we fulfill all the 
definitions of imperialism. Johnson reports that U.S. militarism is state-sponsored 
socialism that is costing the country three-quarters of a trillion dollars every year, 
contributing to the U.S.’s deficit -  the largest in modem economic history -  and 
threatening the country with bankruptcy. He claims that “[o]ur militarism is turning the 
U.S. into a pariah nation” (2005: 13) and putting an end to globalization.
Another important aspect of U.S. militarism is the increasing influence of 
conservative evangelical Christianity in the military. Hugh Gusterson has found a kind of 
counterpart to Islamic fundamentalism among many nuclear weapons scientists, many of 
whom believe that Christ would have bombed Hiroshima and that nuclear weapons are 
part of God’s plan to end the world before the Day of Judgement (Gusterson 2004). 
Bacevich reports that conservative evangelicals abandoned their skepticism about the 
morality of force after the 1960s and, largely inspired by devotion to Israel, have
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articulated a “highly permissive interpretation of the just war tradition” (2005: 123). 
Beyond supporting the use of force, many evangelicals looked to the military as an 
important player in saving America from what they perceive as internal moral collapse 
and perdition. Militant evangelicals gave religious sanction to the militarization of U.S. 
policy and imbued military activism with an aura of moral legitimacy. Especially during 
the Cold War fight against atheist communism, evangelical leaders like Billy Graham led 
evangelical Christians to engage with and try to transform the world. Evangelical 
scholars have outlined a “crusade theory of warfare” for a world engaged in a “death 
straggle” in which preventative war has biblical precedents (Bacevich 2005: 132). While 
much of this seemed radical pre-9/11, Bacevich notes these evangelical militants were 
simply ahead of their time.
Evangelical militants see U.S. national security needs dovetailing with or 
indistinguishable from the accomplishment of Christ’s saving mission at the end of time, 
and Israel is at the point of convergence as both nation-state and fulfillment of biblical 
prophesy. Underlying millions of conservative Christians’ obsession with Israel is the 
doctrine of premillennial dispensationalism, a theology that interprets scripture as 
foretelling the horrific sequence of events leading to the last days, when the Antichrist 
rises but is destroyed at Armegeddon, and Christ returns to ring in a thousand years of 
peace. The overt alliance between evangelicals and the GOP finds its truest expression in 
strong support for Star Wars -  by evangelical thinking the only moral nuclear policy and 
a powerful symbol of deliverance by which the nation will reclaim and reshape its 
destiny. Paralleling that overt alliance is the tacit alliance between evangelicals and the 
armed services, facilitated by the Vietnam War and welcomed by the military due to 
evangelicals’ unfaltering support. Evangelicals see the military as an enclave of virtue 
and members of the armed forces, feeling themselves to be prime targets in the culture 
war, saw the evangelicals as allies. After Vietnam, politics in the officer corps swung to 
the right and transformed its religious stance; now evangelicals enjoy a privileged place 
at U.S. military posts and many officers see Christian fundamentalism as the hidden hand 
that changed the military for the better (Bacevich 2005). Bacevich concludes that were it
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not for the support of tens of millions of evangelicals, militarism in the U.S. becomes 
inconceivable.
Countering this movement, Mikey Weinstein, an Air Force veteran and former 
White House lawyer who defended Ronald Reagan during the Iran-Contra affair, created 
the Military Religious Freedom Foundation (Cooperman 2006) and is suing the Air Force 
in federal court demanding permanent injunction against alleged religious favoritism and 
proselytizing in the service. Weinstein contends that there is a concerted effort by 
evangelical Christian organizations to treat the armed forces as a mission field, ripe for 
conversions. Muslims, Jews, and other religious minorities (including non-fundamentalist 
Christians) in the armed forces are regularly mocked and subject to taunts and derisions 
because they are not Christian or the correct type of Christian. One of the groups his 
accusations target is the Officers’ Christian Fellowship, a private organization with 
14,000 active duty members on more than 200 U.S. military bases. The Officers’ 
Christian Fellowship mission statement describes the group’s goal as “a spiritually 
transformed military, with ambassadors for Christ in uniform, empowered by the Holy 
Spirit” (Cooperman 2006: FI). The foundation has 18 active cases at Fort Hood, site of 
the recent mass murder by a Muslim army psychologist, involving soldiers who allege 
they have been subjected to non-stop fundamentalist Christian proselytization. The 
foundation has over 15,000 cases worldwide, including lawsuits against the Air Force, 
the Pentagon, and the Department of Defense.
Globalized Resistance to U.S. Militarization
The U.S. military has been welcomed by local populations in many parts of the 
world and has served to increase security in some locations. However, as the military 
predicted, the struggles of indigenous and other suppressed peoples against militarization 
has gone global. Though this resistance has usually been met head on with increased U.S. 
militarism, technology is allowing more people in more places to connect and share 
resources and in recent years an organized international movement has taken shape. 
Initially, local resistance movements, many already active for years, began gaining
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greater support within their regions at various conferences and forums. The Okinawan 
Women Against Military Violence, for example, was an outgrowth of the participation of 
71 Okinawan women at the United Nation’s Fourth World Conference on Women 
convened in Beijing, China, in 1995. The Okinawa Women’s group based their position 
on a section of the Platform for Action, approved at the UN conference, which states: 
“Rape that takes place in a situation of armed conflict constitutes both a war crime and a 
crime against humanity.” The group has conducted a signature campaign, engaged in a 
12-day sit-in demonstration, issued their appeals to Japanese leaders, and received wide 
support from women throughout Japan.
Another organization resisting the U.S. military is the Chamoru Cultural 
Development and Research Institute, which promotes and provides assistance to native 
Chamoru cultural programs that empower Guam’s indigenous people15. As mentioned 
above, an extensive military build up ($15 billion increase, bringing as many as 50,000 
people) is currently planned to further transform the tiny island of Guam into a major hub 
for U.S. military operations in the Pacific. Whereas bases cover 29 percent of the island’s 
total land now, that amount may grow to or surpass 40 percent after the build up. The 
build up is due to the fact that the U.S. made a bilateral agreement with Japan, in large 
part due to mass protests in Okinawa against the military presence there, to transfer U.S. 
marines from Okinawa to Guam.
Anti-globalization and anti-militarization organizations have emerged on every 
continent. The idea for an international group first took flight at the 2004 World Social 
Forum in India and grew to include hundreds of campaigners in dozens of countries. In 
2007, some 400 activists from 40 countries came together for a conference in Ecuador to 
officially launch the International Network for the Abolition of Foreign Military Bases, 
which goes by ‘No-Bases Network.’ Despite the inclusive nature of the organization’s 
title, 95 percent of foreign bases in the world are U.S. and thus comprise the main focus
15 Chamoru civil rights attorney Julian Aguon is a key leader o f  this resistance. Aguon has three books 
detailing the colonial history and present o f Guam and Micronesia: Just Left o f  the Setting Sun (2006a), The 
Fire this Time: Essays on Life Under US Occupation (2006b); and What We Bury at Night: Disposable 
Humanity (2008).
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of the Network, although the approximately 200 European military facilities around the 
globe are seen as equally destructive. Also significant is that Hawaiian organizations 
participate in resisting the “foreign” U.S. bases on their homeland. The No-Bases 
Network exists to share information, act in solidarity with front lines campaigns that are 
currently struggling to prevent new bases or close existing ones, collaborate in 
strategizing to abolish foreign military bases and support local and regional struggles for 
justice and reparations. Besides an active email list, one sign of the movement’s 
exploitation of modem communication systems is a No-Bases Youtube channel with 
about 60 videos on campaigns against foreign military bases.
The American Friends Service Committee and 16 co-sponsoring organizations 
(including the No-Bases Network) have spearheaded a ‘National Project on Foreign 
Military Bases.’ In 2008, the Project organized a “Security Without Empire: U.S.
National Organizing Conference on Military Bases” conference, which was co-sponsored 
and hosted by American University’s Anthropology Department. Participants, many from 
host nations, requested that the event be held on native people’s land, and Eastern 
Shawnee elders accepted. The participants brought water from their homelands and held 
a ceremony in which they spoke of the violent events in their communities and poured 
the water into one bowl as a symbol of shared opposition to militarism and visions of a 
sustainable future based on everyday security.
The Resist AFRICOM movement is another significant organization that is 
largely based in the U.S. and is focused on educating U.S. citizens on why and how to 
protest AFRICOM. Its main supporters are the Africa Faith and Justice Network, the 
Institute for Policy Studies, Friends of the Congo, Africa Action, TransAfrica Forum, and 
the American Friends Service Committee.
Significance for Arctic Militarization Studies
The discussion in this chapter has illustrated both the larger historical context in 
which arctic militarization occurred and the anthropological and related research that 
informs this current study on the DEW Line. With these wide views established, the 
focus can be narrowed down to the specific manifestations of the Cold War in the
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western Arctic -  a focus that includes not only the build up of bases in Alaska but an 
exploration of the distinct relationship between Alaskan anthropology and the military.
With the extensive spread of military activities and impacts on untold numbers of 
indigenous peoples around the globe, the significance of any small region’s story can 
appear minimal. This is not unrelated to the way the people whose lives are affected have 
often seen the situation. George Agnasagga from the North Slope explained the 
circumstances the following way, though people from any number of militarized sites 
worldwide could have said the same thing: “No one has complained, I guess they just 
don’t know who to complain to.” “.. .[T]he only ones who would be complaining would 
be us villagers and who is going to listen to us? What voice do we have?” (Agnasagga, 
Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
As societies -  and particularly the United States -  debate questions of the ultimate 
value of a military empire, an initial step will be the widespread recognition that each of 
these stories is of great significance, and that the narrative that construes them as nothing 
more than necessary damage done in the name of national security does so, via one of its 
fundamental official lies, out of interest in the survival of its own hegemony. As Eric 
Wolf described, this narrative has denied the existence of the histories of people caught 
up in its global whitewash. Furthermore, the profligate history of the enfranchised few 
has been directly proportional to and dependent on the suppression of those that the 
military industrial complex deemed expendable or beneficial as laborers. Now, the world 
is dependent on them for histories and perspectives that could inform and guide a 
demilitarization process.
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Chapter Three: From Hinterland to Defense State: 
Pre-DEW Line Machinations in Alaska Territory 
and Canada’s western Arctic 
Introduction
As Arctic military activity must be seen within the context of the global empire of 
bases, the DEW Line in the western Arctic must also be understood in light of the 
particular regional and historical circumstances that surrounded it and shaped its impacts 
on local populations. The major socioeconomic and political forces affecting the region 
dining the decades leading up to the DEW Line include the collapse of the fur market 
(and other impacts associated with the Great Depression), World War II and the early 
Cold War build up. In Alaska Territory, exploration of the Naval Petroleum Reserve 
Number Four was a significant event that led to the constmction of the Naval Arctic 
Research Laboratory and economic opportunities with the military that lured the last 
Barrow-area reindeer herders into town.
Ethnographies, particularly those focusing on acculturation, are the obvious 
sources for details and insights into the social situation of the indigenous peoples during 
this time of transition. An interesting inconsistency exists among those works: several of 
the anthropologists researching and writing in Alaska during the period from the late 
1930s through the 1960s described grave impacts for indigenous northerners from the 
war and military bases, which caused fundamental shifts in economies and social 
relations. However, several other important works in Alaskan anthropology from that era 
barely mention the military. Several potential reasons for these differences include 
personal research interests and long-standing connections between anthropologists and 
the military in Alaska.
In Canada’s western Arctic, the arrival of military industrialization coincided with 
a major shift in governmental attention on the North and a concerted effort to 
Canadianize the Inuvialuit. Government reports from the Mackenzie River delta area,
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including Ferguson’s on the DEW Line, illustrate how the construction of the DEW Line 
forced northern officials to attempt implementation of its new philosophies while 
working with U.S.-led corporations and entrenched racism within their own institutions.
Indigenous Militarism
Although they have often been portrayed as such (e.g. Oswalt [1979] 1999 ), pre­
contact Inupiat and Inuvialuit were not ignorant of war. Ernest Burch (2005) investigated 
traditional Inupiaq organization in Northwest Alaskan nunagatigiitch (nations) and the 
patterns of war and trade between these separate socioterritorial units. Members of the 
different nations identified themselves and associated with their own nations, which had 
differing taboos. People saw themselves as distinct and superior to their neighbors, and 
though intra-national murder (inuaq) was bad, the killing of a foreigner (tuqut) whether 
for avenge or during war was accepted (Burch 2005).
On the North Slope, the Tikirarmiut of Point Hope are recognized as the most 
warrior-like group in the region. VanStone recounts that Point Hope once controlled the 
territory from Kotzebue Sound north to Icy Cape and eastward as far as Deviation Peak, 
slightly northwest of Kiana on the Kobuk River. In the latter part of the 18th century, 
Noatak people began encroaching and soon occupied the southern part of the Point Hope 
domain as far north as Kivalina. A great land and sea battle between the two groups is 
said to have taken place one summer about the year 1880, just below Cape Seppings. The 
Point Hope people were badly defeated, forced to withdraw from that entire part of the 
country, lost most of their good hunters and subsequently suffered from famine. 
VanStone found that such wars have assumed an almost legendary character in the minds 
of Point Hopers (1961: 16-17).
An elder in Wainwright informed me that if I really wanted to see some war 
debris, that there was a spot south of Icy Cape on the spit near an old sod house where 
there is a pile of skulls with holes in them from the spears of Point Hopers. Another story 
relates that, in about 1880, a group of Point Hope warriors traveled all the way to Barter 
Island with the plan to cut the people living there off from the mainland and starve them 
out. The Point Hopers occupied the mainland across the narrow gap from the island, and
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they waited and waited. The people relating this story took obvious pleasure in the 
outcome -  the Point Hopers did not know that the Kaktovik people had nets and were 
fishing on the ocean side (the meaning of Qaaqtugvik is “seining place”), so while the 
peaceful Kaktovik people ate well the Point Hope warriors starved to death. The elders 
recounting this story indicated that they had no idea if it was true, but that it sure was a 
good one.
Sammy Lennie of Inuvik also described the Mackenzie River delta region as 
historically “militarized” in a particularly gruesome fashion. A large battle between the 
Inuvialuit and the Gwich’in took place during winter on the frozen Mackenzie near 
Kittigaaryuit, and the Inuvialuit victors decided to dissuade further intruders by standing 
the frozen bodies of slain Gwich’in in a line across the river. Sammy Lennie recalls 
finding skulls and broken bones in the bushes around this area (April 3, 2009).
Most accounts of the Inuit, however, have ignored raids and conflicts that 
occurred between regional groups and have emphasized the people’s cooperative nature. 
In Never in Anger (1970), Jean Briggs noted aspects of Inuit culture that are relevant to 
possible reactions to militarization. Briggs found that although power struggles and 
interpersonal conflicts were common, the Inuit placed high value on non-confrontational 
behavior and sacrifice for the sake of harmonious community relations. Robert Spencer 
(1959) similarly noted this tendency toward cooperation rather than competition in 
Inupiaq society. Military scientists also recognized and took advantage of the cooperative 
nature of Inupiaq culture, as described below in connection with the Arctic Aeromedical 
Laboratory.
European and U.S. military activity in the Arctic is not a recent phenomenon. 
Naval interest in arctic Alaska goes back as far as the history of the U.S. Navy, and much 
of the exploration of the Arctic slope was conducted by U.S. Navy officers and explorers 
supported by the Navy. Still earlier, ships and men of the British Navy explored the coast 
and environment. Historical accounts of Alaska usually emphasize the close civilian- 
military bond in Alaska and describe the population as a frontier community growing up 
around a military outpost, each dependent on the other. Promoting the purchase of the
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territory, Secretary of State William Seward argued: "If we would provide an adequate 
defense for the United States, we must have...Alaska to dominate the North Pacific."
After the U.S. purchase of Alaska in 1867, the Army occupied and administered six posts 
in the territory for a decade before withdrawing and leaving all governance in the hands 
of U.S. Navy and U.S. Revenue Service. The Organic Act of 1884 provided Alaska with 
district status, a civil and judicial system, and a civilian governor. With the gold rush of 
1898, the military returned to the territory and erected a dozen garrisons, five of which 
lasted through World War I. By 1924, only one garrison remained: Chilkoot Barracks in 
Haines. At the Navy’s request, the Geological Survey carried out exploratory geologic 
studies in PET 4 for four years, 1923-1926, but from 1926 to the start of World War II 
there was very little military interest in Alaska. Arctic exploration, on the other hand, 
continued after the decline of commercial whaling and the region was undergoing 
significant transformations due to the increasing influences of missionaries, the fur trade, 
and territorial schools.
World War II and the Cold War build up
Richard Gordon wondered what it must have been like for his granddad when he 
was growing up and someone came to his door, handed him a rifle and told him to put his 
seal oil light out at night so as not to attract spies. He thinks his grandfather must have 
been totally confused and a bit fearful. Gordon is emphatic that nothing was known about 
war in the aboriginal lifestyle: “We knew nothing about what w-a-r meant. [] Somebody 
tells you a bushman is coming for you.. .We didn’t know we had a part in this whole 
thing.” But then, he imagined, there you are, sitting in the dark worrying about some big 
sasquatch out there. “Spy!” he whispered, “Watch out for the bushman, like the boogie 
man, going to get you” (R. Gordon, July 24, 2008, Herschel Island, Yukon Territory).
The impacts of World War II were experienced even in some of the most remote 
areas of the world. Due to the war, Alaska Territory was no longer remote, especially 
once the Japanese bombed Dutch Harbor invaded and occupied the Aleutian islands of 
Attu and Kiska. The battle for the Aleutians, the fear of another Japanese invasion, and 
the realization that the Nazi army was just over the North Pole transformed Alaska. Bases
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were constructed at breakneck speed, but the head of the Alaska Defense Command 
wanted a full-time and paid territorial guard to defend airports, military radio and weather 
posts and other assets across the region. Governor Ernest Gruening eventually got 
authorization to establish the 761st Military Police Battalion, an all-volunteer territotial 
militia volunteer limited to ‘home defense:’ preventing enemy espionage and sabotage in 
areas without combat troops. Major Marvin Marston, after visiting St. Lawrence Island 
and learning of a pre-war Japanese naval landing and reconnaissance mission there, had 
been working on his own to organize an Eskimo guerilla force to defend the Bering Sea 
coast. In 1942, Gruening and Marston visited western Alaska Yupik and Inupiaq villages, 
where almost every single man enlisted to join the Alaska Territorial Guard (Hendricks 
1985) (fig.s 12, 13, 14, and 15).
General ‘Muktuk’16 Marston’s account of the Alaska Territorial Guard (ATG) 
indicates that in many Native villages, many female residents and even octogenarians 
also volunteered for the “Tundra Army” to defend the entire Alaskan coastline from 
Japanese attack. Marston (1972) believed that the organization of Alaska Natives into 
Territorial Guard Units began to breakdown the control that exploiters had long held over 
them. He contended that the ATG in Alaska resulted in challenges to institutionalized 
racism in the state. Not only was it the first time a governor had visited the “Eskimo 
Empire,’ but “indeed, it was the first time in history that these natives were regarded as 
bona fide citizens” (Marston 1972: 58). Marston credited the ATG’s influence in the 
passage of the Nondiscrimination Act of 1945, the creation of the Alaska Federation of 
Natives, and eventual land claims. “As a result of the War, the natives were organized 
and aware of all local and national affairs. Many were for the first time exercising their 
right of franchise” (Marston 1972: 140).
16 Marvin Marston earned this nickname via his tendency to eat more maktak than anyone else.
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Figure 12: Alaska Territorial Guard Patch and ATG Soldier at Barrow, Alaska
Figure 13: Major Muktuk Marston Signs up Soldiers"
17 Images courtesy o f http://www.alaskool.org/projects/ak_military/paintinglist.htm
18 Painting by Henry Vamum Poor depicting recruitment for the ATG on Little Diomede Island. Image 
courtesy o f  http://www.alaskool.org/projects/ak_military/paintinglist.htm
Figure 14: ATG poster by ATG lieutenant and painter Rusty Heurlin19
19 Image courtesy o f  http://www.alaskool.org/projects/ak_military/paintinglist.htm
20
Image courtesy o f  http://www.alaskool.org/projects/ak_military/paintinglist.htm
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Themselves very pleased with Marston’s distribution of free 1917 Enston rifles 
and ammunition, Inupiat and Yupik skills as marksmen became legendary during their 
service in the ATG and other military services in the territory21. Draftee and cat skinner 
Bob Pittenger remembered a typical story: a sergeant performed a simple manual of arms 
then handed the rifle to Riley, an Inupiaq man from Nome who had already served in the 
ATG, to see if he could try it. “Riley deftly took the rifle and performed a flawless Queen 
Ann Salute, a very complicated and fancy maneuver. Riley handed the rifle back to the 
sergeant and said, “you try it” (ibid: 43).
Serving in Alaska’s World War II militia was a largely rewarding and 
empowering experience for Native Alaskans. It was also strategically valuable to the 
nation: the Eskimo scouts alerted officials to the presence of submarines off the Alaskan
coast three times. The ATG proved so successful that regional scout battalions were later
22organized along the coast during the Korean War .In  addition to those in the ATG, at 
least 400 Inupiaq and Yupik Eskimos served in World War II, and many more worked on 
paramilitary tasks such as the maintenance of airfields, the laying of fuel pipelines, and 
the operation of machinery.
As Vine’s history of the U.S.’s global empire of bases illustrates, the expansion of 
U.S. militarism has been a continual process since the founding of the country (2009). 
Other scholars note that a fundamental transformation occurred after World War II with 
the onset of nuclearism and the national security state, marking a distinctly different type 
of militarization. Regarding militarization in the Arctic, this distinction cannot be 
ignored: the U.S. was arguably militaristic and imperialistic for the first century and half 
of its existence, and then it acquired an ultimate weapon and emerged from a world war
21 “If you were drafted in Alaska, you were trained in Alaska and you spent your entire time in 
Alaska,’’(Pittenger: 43)
21 “They are obviously the only military personnel who could, in time o f  emergency, live off the land and 
exist in this barren, frozen, territory. They have had considerable military training in camps and are 
considered a most valuable adjunct to the security o f  this entire area. ” -  Letter from Sec. o f Defense 
Charles Wilson to the Department o f Health, Education, and Welfare, 1954 (quoted in Jenness 1962).
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as the sole global super power. The history of Arctic militarization undeniably reflects 
this significant difference in pre- and post-World War II impacts.
The impacts of World War II on the territory of Alaska were transformative, and 
the experiences of the Inupiat and other Natives (especially coastal) were proportionate. 
The war turned the isolated and disconnected territory into a battleground, and historian 
John Whitehead argued that Alaska later became a state because it had evolved into “an 
integral part of the extension of a permanent military defense perimeter thousands of 
miles into the far north” (Whitehead 1989: 192). In the years before World War II, 
Washington was not convinced that the nation’s sparsely populated hinterland was 
worthy of any attention, much less enormous military expenditures. Military activity had 
declined in the territory since the initial tum-of-the-century federal investments in 
exploration, communication systems (WAMCATS), and gold-rush law and order. At the 
outbreak of war in 1939, the population of Alaska was a mere 72,500, the only garrison 
in the territory was an immobile 250-man installation in Haines (Naske and Slotnik 
1987), and annual defense expenditures amounted to less than $1 million (Whitehead 
1989).
Despite Alaska’s undefended position, the new era of aviation promised to change 
life drastically in the territory. As early as 1935, air power advocates such as General 
Billy Mitchell prophesied: "in the future he who holds Alaska holds the world, and it is 
the most important strategic place in the world” (Nielson 1988: 95). In the age of 
airplanes, Alaskan territorial delegate Tony Dimond wanted to be prepared for a war in 
the Pacific Ocean, where Alaska’s Aleutian Island chain claims distinction as the midway 
point on the shortest air route from Tokyo to Seattle. He relentlessly warned Congress of 
the threat of a Japanese attack. To no avail, he requested that bases be constructed in 
Anchorage, Fairbanks, and in the Aleutians.
An increase in federal funds supported some military construction in 1940, but 
not for the defense Dimond wanted. Four million dollars for a cold-weather testing 
laboratory in Fairbanks was approved, but Congress denied further appropriations mere 
days before Hitler's armies occupied Norway and Denmark. Suddenly, the prospect of
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Nazi bombers flying over the pole helped restore increased spending for new airfields. 
Alaska’s military construction boom began in earnest, but the territory was still far from 
prepared for war in December of 1941 when the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor. The 
Pacific arena about which Dimond had warned was exploding. “For the first time since 
its purchase by the U.S. Government, thousands of Americans were shocked into the 
realization that Alaska was a part of America and the full awareness of their northern 
possession’s strategic proximity to Asia and Japan” (Mills 1971: 57). Six months later, on 
June 3, 1942, Japanese forces attacked Dutch Harbor, Alaska, in the Aleutian Chain and 
occupied two of the most distant Aleutian Islands—Attu and Kiska.
World War II had a particularly interesting impact on people living around Barter 
Island. Residents of the area were told to be ready to go east to Canada at a moment’s 
notice in case the Japanese should invade. Dog teams and sleds were kept packed and at 
the ready, pointing east. Several families did leave during this time, many of them 
relocating to Herschel Island where their families may have lived earlier during the 
height of whaling in the western Arctic (1889-1907). Like several other families, Ben 
Linn’s left Kaktovik and Ben was bom on Herschel Island. His family soon returned to 
Kaktovik, and Ben characterized the WWII alert as a “hullabaloo” that used fear to chase 
people away (Linn, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik). However, Kaktovik resident Robert 
Thompson believes that everybody felt a real fear that the U.S. would get taken over.
Canadian anthropologist Diamond Jenness found that both WWII and the Korean 
War had provoked a “grave upheaval” in Native settlements. The new military facilities 
along the coasts and in the interior restricted people’s movements and activities while 
immediately opening up almost unlimited opportunities for wage employment. Around 
Nome, reindeer herds were placed out of bounds to their owners by military activities, 
while suddenly hundreds of thousands of dollars could be made selling carvings and fur 
clothing to military personnel. Opportunities for year round wage labor inspired waves of 
migration from communities outside military activity hubs. Although Native Alaskans 
had been tending to settle around missions, schools, and trading posts since those
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institutions had been introduced, local ecological conditions still rigidly restricted the 
number of inhabitants any community could sustain23. It was only when the military 
provided unprecedented opportunities for employment and trade that “Eskimos 
irresistibly fluttered toward them like moths to a candle” (Jenness 1962: 40-1).
“Numbers o f natives left their reindeer herds, abandoned their trap-lines, and moved 
with their families to army and air force establishment within their own region, or to 
bases farther away in the Gulf o f Alaska, Fairbanks, and other places. Only a few, and 
these mainly single men, reached the more distant bases; the majority settled around the 
military establishments at Barrow, Kotzebue, and half a dozen villages within the Bering 
Sea, where they swelled the local Eskimo population, but left the neighbouring coastlines 
denuded o f a notable percentage o f their inhabitants ” (Jenness 1962: 40).
Barrow, for example, had a population of approximately 330 in 1930 and had 
grown to 1,274 by 1957. From 1944 to 1953, Barrow served as the base for naval oil 
exploration operations that employed 50-100 Inupiat24. In Barrow, the Navy established 
the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory (NARL) to gather data on Arctic conditions and 
the northern military environment.
Working for the Smithsonian Institution’s Bureau of American Ethnology, Robert 
Spencer’s The North Alaskan Eskimo (1959) was based on fieldwork that he did in 
Barrow in 1952 and 1953. Spencer reported that the influx of cash was having a 
significant negative impact on native arts and crafts (ibid: 363). The economic stress that 
had previously been brought about by the crash of the fur industry and the Depression 
necessitated renewed cooperation and sharing in the communities, and though there were
23 In 1931 the mean population o f all villages north o f  the Bering Strait was 165; in 1940 only 20 out o f  
more than 200 Eskimo communities in northern Alaska contained more than 200 people, none as many as
500 (Jenness 1962).
24 President Warren G. Harding had established the Naval Petroleum Reserve Number Four (PET 4) in 
1923, the reserve was transferred to the Department o f the Interior in 1976 and renamed the National 
Petroleum Reserve in Alaska (NPR-A). In 1984, Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation took over the facility and 
continues to promote and support Arctic science at the facility, which now includes Ilisagvik community 
college hotel, a restaurant, offices, lab space, and residential units (Brewster 2004).
118
hardships, strong social institutions unified and balanced individuals throughout the 
community. PET IV was introduced into this setting, and, though worried about high 
tuberculosis rates, the Navy encouraged Native employment. Spencer found that the cash 
economy and new material wealth affected every family.
Barrow’s prominent location at the “top of the world” and its position as the hub 
for all of northern Alaska seem to indicate that its emergence as the cosmopolitan center 
of the North Slope was inevitable. In fact, it is almost a complete fluke that Barrow 
became the military job center (and thus later the bureaucratic capital) of the Alaskan 
Arctic. In 1944, the ships of the first support expedition charged with constructing the 
PET 4 exploration base camp originally left Barrow 50 miles behind them. They tried to 
land near the oil seepages at Cape Simpson, waiting in fog, rough weather, and floating 
ice to find an adequate stretch of beach. Fortunately for PET 4 construction, the ships 
eventually abandoned hope of making an initial landing at Cape Simpson and 
backtracked to the vicinity of Point Barrow, where a long and wide beach of coarse sand 
formed the shore. The main camp and supply base was built on that sand, avoiding all the 
structural problems that buildings built on the tundra experienced (Reed n.d.).
Barrow, then, had PET IV and NARL to provide wage-employment throughout 
the 1940s and 1950s. Several of the Alaskan bases built during the war created regional 
hubs that managed to continue growing even after the war ended and the bases were 
closed. Certain bases and adjacent communities, however, lost most of their population 
when the soldiers, airmen, and Native employees were left without work.
Life at the wartime bases held serious advantages and drawbacks for Inupiat and 
Yupik Eskimos. The locals were good laborers, faced hardships cheerfully, and many 
acquired new skills such as plumbing and carpentry, engine repair and machinery 
operation. Having regular work and good pay raised their economic status vis-a-vis the 
Taniks, the health of many improved with the abundant diet, and medical care checked 
the spread of tuberculosis and other diseases.
Writing in the early 1960s, Diamond Jenness characterized the worst aspect of the 
wartime bases as the availability of alcohol and the lack of restraint with which the
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Native employees drank it. In the home villages many had left, barter operated largely 
without money and liquor had been available rarely and in small quantities, but “in the 
military bases it flowed like water” (Jenness 1962: 41). Jenness found that drinking 
caused the hard-eamed wages to disappear, weakened the drinker’s resistance to 
tuberculosis, largely nullified the benefits of the food and medical attention, and was the 
most destructive factor in the welfare of the Natives in Alaska. He also noted that 
“drunkenness and prostitution go hand in hand the world over, especially at military 
encampments.” Just as the young soldiers had been uprooted from their homes and 
responsibilities, the indigenous inhabitants of northern Alaska had also been uprooted and 
their moral code “underwent as grave debasement as the soldiers” (ibid: 41). While men 
drank in bars, their wives and daughters surrendered to prostitution. With none of the 
political correctness of subsequent eras (or perhaps none of the constraints felt by 
American anthropologists), Jenness wrote:
“ ...so these hardy Eskimos, but recently emerged from the stone age, strayed and bogged 
down in the fens o f United States military bases, and a people that hadfought and 
survived the rigours o f the Arctic fo r  5,000 years threatened to dissolve into a horde o f  
degenerates” (1962: 42).
By 1946, Native Alaskans, along with the rest of the territory, were experiencing 
the massive post-war demobilization and the inevitable bust that follows frontier booms. 
The military bases were dismantled and most people returned home, the good wages 
gone. Alaska’s salmon industry hit a twenty-year low. Gold mines, closed since 1942 by 
a federal emergency order, reopened in 1946 with little promise of creating an economic 
foundation for the territory. Residents hoped that federal legislation granting homesteads 
to Alaska’s veterans would tempt many of them to stay on, but the population plummeted 
to 99,000 (Whitehead, 1989). A referendum held that year showed support for statehood, 
but the possibility that Alaska could financially support itself seemed farther away than 
ever.
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Statehood was likely not the top priority for the demobilized and unemployed 
Native Alaskans, who returned home, but could not return to their previous lifestyles. 
Welfare became customary, and Barrow was the only town with a significant demand for 
wage labor. In some areas, the caribou had disappeared after being driven away or shot at 
by soldiers, or massacred by ATG members with their government-supplied weapons and 
abundant ammunition. Even with new government incentives, very few returned to 
reindeer herding (Jenness 1962).
Alaska’s territorial leaders fought the inevitable post-war recession and cutbacks 
by aggressively promoting a new Pacific and global strategy. As territorial governor, 
Ernest Gruening warned: "it would be utter folly for us not to make Alaska an 
impregnable bastion [and] to make it a great base for both defense and offense for the 
protection not merely of the U.S. but the Continent, and indeed, for the Western World" 
(Ross 1968: 140). From the first years of tension between the U.S. and USSR, The U.S. 
Department of Defense was acutely aware of the increasing significance of Alaska’s 
strategic location. By early 1947, it decided to create the first unified army, air force, and 
navy command in the nation, headquartering it in Anchorage. The Alaska Command, 
ALCOM, assured the future of Alaska’s largest city (Whitehead 1989) and, as one 
military bulletin described it, “guard[ed] the polar gateway to the heartland of the USA” 
(Denfeld 1988: 12).
A “heartland” concept shaped the new military strategy for Alaska, which entailed 
a virtual abandonment of installations in the Aleutian Islands and a massive strengthening 
of the military bases in and around Fairbanks and Anchorage. Despite the significant 
wartime construction boom, Alaska was still a fairly primitive frontier. The military 
realized that vast expenditures would be needed to overcome the territory’s totally 
inadequate transportation, communication, and housing facilities. A postwar defense 
construction boom caused the territory’s population to rebound to 120,000 by 1948, and 
by 1949 Congress appropriated almost $100 million for military expenditures for Alaska 
(Naske and Slotnik 1987: 132-133). The emerging Cold War assured that Alaska, only 
fifty-four miles away from the USSR, would remain strategically important as
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“America’s Achilles heel” (Nielson 1988: 188) and deeply symbolic to the nation as a 
whole. This image empowered promoters of statehood to push for the full American 
rights due Alaska's residents. Air power, the nuclear age, the Cold War, and the National 
Security Act of 1947 created an enduring asset for Alaska with which no natural 
resources, however rich, could compete.
Military planners after the war based the direction of U.S. defenses on the events 
of the 1940’s; the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, refinements in both air warfare and air 
defenses, and Soviet aggression. Many Americans believed that the Japanese surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor resulted from a lack of strategic vigilance, and one result was 
popular support for all military efforts to prevent a similar occurrence. The Soviets began 
building airfields in northern Siberia in 1945, which were 1,000 miles closer to the U.S. 
heartland than any other Soviet bases. Chinese and Soviet backing of North Korea in the 
Korean War, 1950-’53, showed that “the Communist menace gripped a large part of the 
Northern Hemisphere” (Moeller 1995: 9). This cemented Alaska’s critical position in the 
North Pacific during the Cold War and provided the impetus for investment in the 
territory’s air defenses.
The U.S. national strategy envisioned the Army, Air Force, and Navy cooperating 
in the air defense of the continent by building a massive system to detect, identify, attack, 
and destroy strategic Soviet bomber forces. Deployment of an effective system became 
more critical in 1949, when the Soviet Union developed the atomic bomb and military 
planners realized that it took only one aircraft breaking through our air defenses to 
threaten a large area.
Alaska’s 19 DEW Line radar sites, as immense as they were, represent only a 
small fraction of the massive radar and communication system that spread over the 
territory. Radar sites built in the Aleutians during the war to detect Japanese planes were 
relocated to the mainland immediately after the war as the focus moved to defense of 
Alaska and all of North America. In 1949, Congress approved funding for the Aircraft 
Control and Warning (AC&W) network, which was to consist of 12 radar stations using 
newer technology. The outbreak of the Korean War accelerated funding and the system
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was expanded to include six additional sites. Beginning in 1956, the White Alice 
Communication System, which eventually consisted of 71 separate facilities spanning the 
entire state, was constructed to provide the radars with contact to the control centers.
The total military investment in Alaska between 1940 and the late fifties came 
close to $3 billion. The territory’s population steadied at 220,000, and over half of total 
employment was supported in some way by the defense industry (Whitehead 1989). 
Reflecting on the Alaska statehood convention forty years later, delegate and later two- 
term lieutenant governor Jack Coghill explained that the military buildup helped meet the 
requirements for statehood. Coghill considered that the territory’s military influx 
produced an Alaskan population of “free people” instead of residents who had previously 
been “under the thumb of the fishing and mining industries” (quoted in Whitehead 1989: 
127). Many sourdoughs were vehemently opposed to statehood and blamed the passage 
of the statehood initiative on the fact that the transient military greenhorns were allowed 
to vote. Dissent over the value of Alaska’s entry into the Union continues, but the reason 
it entered is clear: World War II had created a new balance of power and the Cold War 
created America’s first “defense state.”
Alaskan Anthropology and the Military
If northern indigenous residents experiences with the Cold War defense state were 
similar to Diamond Jenness’s descriptions of World War II and the Korean War, then the 
subject of Cold War militarism should have provoked significant discourse among 
Alaskan anthropologists. In fact, very little mention is made of the military in several 
studies of the era. One reason for this could be that by the late 1950s, militarization in the 
U.S. went without saying - it was the norm and there was no perceived need to examine it
25 Aircraft Control and Warning System sites are in most ways similar to and sometimes referred to as 
DEW Line sites, the more so the further north in the state the site is located. From 1951 -  1958, 19 AC&W 
stations were constructed throughout Alaska: at Fire Island near Anchorage; Murphy Dome outside o f  
Fairbanks; King Salmon near Naknek; Wales (Tin City); Newenham near Goodnews Bay; Romanzof near 
Igiak and Scammon Bay; Cape Lisbume near Point Hope; Galena; St. Lawrence Island; Tatalina near 
McGrath; Elmendorf; Ladd (Fort Wainwright); Indian Mountain near Hughes; Sparrevohn near Lime 
Village; Kotzebue; Ohlson Mountain near Homer; Fort Yukon; Unalakleet; and Middleton Island in the 
Gulf o f  Alaska near Cordova.
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as a powerful force that changed and manipulated social and cultural values. Perhaps, as 
described in the previous chapter, anthropologists in general were disinclined to discuss 
war and conflict since these activities were still understood as exceptions to the norm in 
the societies anthropologists studied.
During the fieldwork for this DEW Line research, many people assumed that this 
author was affiliated with the military in some way. Given the subject of the research, 
this is hardly surprising, and the DEW Line sites have been the focus of increased 
attention in recent years. Since 1996 when remediation actions (project “Clean Sweep”) 
began, these communities have seen scores of Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) 
meetings with employees of the US Air Force’s 611th Civil Engineer Squadron, which is 
in charge of many of the remaining sites in Alaska. There have been large clean up crews 
working at the sites, usually staying at hotels in town. The environmental clean up 
program undertaken by the Air Force to remediate and demolish DEW Line sites is 
considered a federal undertaking under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation 
Act. Because of this, the Air Force implemented plans to identify, evaluate, and, if need 
be, mitigate the cultural resources of the former DEW Line prior to conducting “Clean 
Sweep” (Metcalf 2008). People may have been aware of historical preservation studies 
conducted by anthropologist Karlene Leeper, who works for the 611th Civil Engineer 
Squadron. As part of these studies, Leeper led an oral history project through the Inupiaq 
Heritage and Language Center to conduct approximately 60 oral interviews of former 
DEW Line employees and their wives.
When the subject of my affiliation came up, most people seemed to accept that I 
was “working on my own” -  that is, on a project of my own design albeit as a UAF 
anthropology graduate student with federal funding and other grants, but not with 
military funding. Some people did not see much difference between these alternatives. 
Arctic residents have a clear understanding that in the recent past, many, perhaps most 
ethnographic and scientific studies in the Arctic were done with the logistical and 
financial support of the military. For decades, almost all research on the North Slope had 
at least the logistical support of the Naval Arctic Research Lab in Barrow as well as use
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of the structures NARL owned in other villages. As anthropologist Margaret Lantis wrote 
in 1965, . .one must congratulate the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy
Commission for having done as much as they have for cultural anthropology and human 
geography in Alaska” (Lantis 1965).
When anthropologist James VanStone settled down in Point Hope for a year to 
conduct an ethnographic study in 1955, many community members associated the writer 
with the military. VanStone reported that this was because several years previously, the 
Army had stationed an observer in the village for nearly a year. Needless to say, Dr. 
VanStone, a professor in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Alaska 
Fairbanks (1951-1958) whose contribution to Arctic anthropology cannot be overstated, 
did not self-identify as an associate of the military. However, his fieldwork in Point Hope 
was funded by the U.S. Air Force and he was the senior investigator of the Air Force- 
Eskimo Contact Study, a significant ethnographical study undertaken by the U.S. Air 
Force’s Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory.
The Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory (AAL) was an institute based at Ladd Air 
Force Base in Fairbanks (later Fort Wainwright) that included approximately 60 military 
and civilian researchers who worked on a wide range of subjects related to Arctic 
warfare. From the late 1940s through 1967, the U.S. Air Force supported hundreds of 
studies on the Arctic via the Arctic Aeromedical Lab. Most of the studies were 
physiological (largely concentrating on metabolism and cold exposure), biochemical 
(cold, nutrition in the Arctic), and environmental or biological, but quite a few were 
psychological or sociocultural. Almost all of the Lab’s studies were contracted to 
university departments. In 1964, for example, the Lab had about $300,000 worth of 
research contracts with around 19 institutions, including about 17 universities (Drury 
1964). A ‘human factor’ laboratory charged with Arctic problems of the Alaskan Air 
Command, its social research projects, like VanStone’s study, involved several of the 
foundational studies in modem Alaskan ethnography.
This subject of funding for Alaskan ethnographies prompted anthropologist
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Norman Chance to discuss briefly the extent to which logistic and financial support 
offered by the military influenced the selection of topic for study:
“The basic task o f the military assigned to the Arctic was defense. And that defense 
included the need to determine the status o f Alaska Native populations living within the 
military’s perimeter o f interest -  including the Native’s economic, social, and political 
relations with one another and the outside world. Those anthropologists interested in 
undertaking such acculturation studies were welcome to apply for support. Those wishing 
to explore other topics pertaining to art, mythology, religion, or similar ethnographic 
subject usually had to fin d  their funding elsewhere” (Chance 1990b: xvi).
Anthropologist Charles Hughes also addressed the subject in 1984:
For a variety o f  reasons best illustrated by a sociology o f knowledge perspective on the 
ways World War II affected the academic community, much research by 
anthropologists...began to take on a form that had implications fo r  the problems o f  
contemporary life. A great deal o f the research...was designed explicitly to be o f use to 
the administrator, the policy maker, and the economic developer (Hughes: 24).
Chance’s goal in choosing Kaktovik as a community was specifically to study 
how the people there were adapting to the dramatic transformation that occurred because 
of DEW Line construction. He was detailed and critical in his description of the 
militaristic worldview, which saw the land and its people as simply means to the end of 
winning the Cold War. However, in spite of the fact that military construction was 
recognized as having significant impacts across the entire North Slope and on other 
indigenous lands in Alaska, very few other acculturation studies have focused on it and 
many have failed to mention it entirely.
The Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory’s Air Force-Eskimo Contact Study’s original 
intention was to describe a cultural base level among ‘typical’ Alaskan Eskimo 
communities, to which would be compared later two other communities strongly affected 
by military installations. The first phase of the study consisted of VanStone’s research in
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Point Hope (Point Hope; an Eskimo community in northwest Alaska, 1961) and Wendell 
H. Oswalt’s concurrent fieldwork in the Kuskokwim community of Napaskiak 
(Napaskiak, an Eskimo village in western Alaska, 1961). Unfortunately, the second phase 
of the study was dropped, perhaps due to Air Force change of personnel, and the Arctic 
Aeromedical Laboratory reports on the first two parts of the study are not available.
VanStone and Oswalt were not undertaking these acculturation studies because 
they were the only subjects for which they could obtain funding -  these areas and 
subjects had long been main interests of theirs. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
working for the military had absolutely been the norm for anthropologists. VanStone and 
Oswalt’s predecessor at UAF, Froelich Rainey, had left his position during the war to 
work for the Board of Economic Warfare and had run a mission in Ecuador to highjack 
quinine bark from the Germans before working as a State Department consultant at the 
end of the war. During the early years of the Cold War, Rainey was engaged by the 
C.I.A. to recruit and plant spies abroad under the cover of museum research, an activity 
that he later regretted.26
In VanStone and Oswalt’s relatively minor association with the military, it is clear 
that the goals of the sponsoring agency helped direct the particular location of research, 
but whether military funding limited the ethnographers in what they felt comfortable 
reporting is not as clear. A number of criteria were chosen to help select communities that 
were typical of a group of villages, but the first consideration “was the desire of the of the 
sponsoring organization, the U.S. Air Force, that this study provide background 
information on Eskimo culture to facilitate more harmonious contacts between armed 
forces personnel and the Alaskan Eskimo. A second consideration was that the U.S. Air 
Force was willing to support one year-long study within each of the two major Eskimo
26 “Looking back, I wonder at my own stupidity. Of course, many of us then were exceedingly 
concerned about the developing cold war, and few of us could know just how that branch of the 
C.I.A. would emerge. But I was well aware of the association in the popular mind of 
archaeologists with spying, and should have known that any link between our research and 
intelligence agents was not only silly but badly damaging” (Rainey 1992).
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language groups in Alaska” (Oswalt 1963: 164).
VanStone’s selection of a suitable village was simplified by the criteria that it be a 
relatively conservative northern coastal village, without extensive or unusual contact, that 
was located north of Kotzebue Sound. Thus, he had to choose between Kivalina, Point 
Hope, Point Lay, Wainwright, and Barrow. Barrow was a cosmopolitan trading center 
with a large tanik community, and Kivalina was deemed too small with a population that 
had not been particularly stable over the preceding 20 to 30 years. Point Lay, with 
construction of Auxiliary DEW Line site LIZ 2, was already “the site of extensive 
military construction and is, therefore, subject to influences that are by no means typical 
of Alaskan coastal villages” (VanStone 1961: 5). Point Hope was ideal: it had been 
continuously occupied for many hundreds of years; it was a village “without extensive 
current Western European contacts in the form of military construction” and, more than 
any other village in the northwest coast of Alaska, was “a close knit community with 
considerable community spirit” (ibid).
VanStone and Oswalt’s original abstracts contain an identical paragraph:
“It is recommended that any movement o f armed services personnel into the vicinity o f a 
northwest Alaskan Eskimo village be preceded by a careful consideration o f the village 
social system, as defined and described in the body o f this report, so that a satisfactory 
relationship with the indigenous population can be established and maintained” (Oswalt 
1961; VanStone 1961).
While Oswalt’s abstract ends there, VanStone’s continues:
“This report concerns contemporary life in a relatively isolated village in northwest 
Alaska. It is fo r  the use o f  intelligence officers, individuals concerned with Arctic 
survival, and others requiring first-hand information on life in a contemporary Eskimo 
village. The application for the Air Force is to serve as a pilot study to guide 
investigations o f contact between Eskimos and armed services personnel” (VanStone 
1961).
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VanStone’s report contains several references to the impact that the military had 
already had in Point Hope, including the significance of the Alaska National Guard 
building as one of the largest in town. The detachment at Point Hope consisted of 
approximately 40 locally recruited men ranging in age from 17 to over 50 years of age. 
National Guardsmen participated in annual two-week encampments in Anchorage, which 
both VanStone and Oswalt believed was the primary recruitment attraction. VanStone 
found that the cash payments were a negligible factor in village economies, but that men 
were also attracted by the clothing and rifles issued. Many Point Hopers used the Model 
1917 Springfield 30/06 that had been issued to them in the Alaska Territorial Guard 
during World War II for seal hunting, despite the fact that these guns were more powerful 
than necessary and the ammunition was expensive. In 1955-56, an Army veteran with six 
years of service and the rank of master sergeant in the Guard commanded the Point Hope 
Guard unit, and VanStone found it curious that this individual, highly respected as a 
noncommissioned officer in the Guard, was “completely devoid of the leadership 
qualities that are respected in the village. He is without authority or prestige outside of his 
position with the National Guard” (VanStone 1961: 107).
Although very few Point Hopers had been drafted into World War II due to high 
tuberculosis rates, VanStone reported that Army experience seemed to have had a 
broadening effect on those who did serve, as they spoke better English and were, for the 
most part, more acculturated generally. VanStone detailed other contact between Point 
Hope and the military:
“In spite o f the extensive military construction going on in northwest Alaska at the 
present time, Point Hope has had little direct connection with military and construction 
personnel. A radar site is located 50 miles north o f the village at Cape Lisburne, and a 
large number o f  Point Hope men were employed there during its construction. In 1953, 
the Army established a small camp about 1 mile east o f the village which was mannedfor 
2 years and then shut down, presumably because it was difficult to supply. The 
commanding officers at this camp seemed to have been strongly impressed with the 
desirability o f getting along with the villagers, and men were shipped out who became
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involved with village girls. One informant told the writer that “unmarried girls sure had 
a good time, ” but this is probably an exaggeration” (1961: 108).
Interestingly, VanStone contradicted his own report on relations between village 
girls and Army men in writing about the Army detachment earlier in his report, where he 
noted: “A number of local girls became friendly with the soldiers and several children 
resulted. Local young men were annoyed with this situation, and viewed with 
considerable disfavor any girl who appeared to prefer soldiers to men from her own 
village” (1961: 83).
VanStone reported that the Army was particularly sensitive about being taken 
advantage of by the villagers. At one point, when they thought they were being 
overcharged for mukluks and other native products, the commanding officer threatened to 
stop the free movies and other services the military were providing for the villagers. “All 
in all,” VanStone concluded, “the people seemed to have liked the Army men and one 
hears many regrets that they are gone” (ibid: 108).
VanStone’s description of the Army camp outside Point Hope is in line with 
Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory documents describing Air Force strategies for obtaining 
cooperation from Arctic village populations:
It would seem to have been the experience o f military detachments in the past to 
find  that Eskimo villages were anxious to welcome them and cooperate with them in 
every possible way ...Military men should work closely with the village council in 
determining such things as employment o f local people and use o f local and military 
facilities. Commanding officers o f  military detachments should keep in mind that all 
aspects o f  interactions between villagers and military personnel can be potent causes o f  
friction and breakdown o f cordial relations. Military groups will usually find  that it is 
advisable to share some o f their special advantages with the people o f the village. Free 
movies to which villages are invited andjoint entertainment o f various kinds will do 
much to cement relationships between the two groups...(Birch et al. 1997: 23)
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Further strategies employed by the AAL include working through the military 
representative in the village as well as through Whites in positions of authority who could 
be utilized to obtain village cooperation.
Conducting the second investigation for the Air Force-Eskimo Contact Study, 
Wendell Oswalt arrived in the Kuskokwim community of Napaskiak in 1955 via similar 
selection criteria and with similar goals as VanStone. Oswalt did not report that people 
there associated him with the military, but some did think at first that he was an 
undercover agent for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife service, or a secret missionary, or hoped 
that he was there to open a liquor store. Oswalt, who received his undergraduate degree 
from the Department of Anthropology at UAF and is another significant figure in 
northern anthropology, also took his 1961 report for the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory 
and turned it into a book {Napaskiak, An Alaskan Eskimo Community, 1963). Although it 
is not obvious whether differences in the two texts are due to the different funding 
agencies, Oswalt did share a great deal more of his thoughts concerning the impact of the 
military on the people of Napaskiak in the book than he had in the earlier AAL report.
In the 1963 book, Oswalt explained that the recognition during World War II of 
Alaska’s strategic location had effectively drawn the Napaskiak Eskimos into the struggle 
of ideologies. He found them to be thoroughly confused about international relationships 
and the reversal in them, since they had been told a few years previously that the 
Japanese were our enemies and the Russians our great allies. They had a poor 
understanding of these changes and “may ask why the Russians are now bad and why it is 
that gussuks always want to fight and kill one another” (Oswalt 1963: 75). Their reaction, 
he found, was to participate in military organizations because they recognize distinct 
advantages on the local level, without giving much, if any, thought to broader national 
and international implications.
Much like VanStone’s report, Oswalt’s 1961 account described very matter-of- 
factly the workings of the National Guard (the timing of the drills, the significance of the 
cash income, the two-week encampment in Anchorage, etc.). A total of three paragraphs 
described the subject in the 1961 report, with one describing that declining enlistment
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was due to the changes that accompanied the transition from the Alaska Territorial Guard 
to the National Guard. Foremost among these changes were restrictions on the issuing of 
clothing and equipment, but also, as in Point Hope, the new leader of the unit was “an 
aggressive young villager who is acquainted with Army discipline, protocol, et cetera, 
and who attempts to use Army techniques in his management of the unit” (Oswalt 1961: 
41).
By contrast, two complete pages are dedicated to describing this situation in the 
1963 book where Oswalt also provided greater historical context. When the ATG was 
formed during the rush to prepare Alaska for a possible all-out invasion, older men with 
standing were usually made officers and other villagers were enrolled as enlisted men. 
The urgency of wartime also meant that there was little of the discipline usually 
associated with a military organization. Oswalt stated that the ATG officials on the 
Territorial level had a very paternalistic attitude toward the village units, but that the men 
enjoyed the material advantages in the form of great quantities of military equipment.
After the war, U.S. National Guard officers took charge of local headquarters in 
Bethel and introduced startling policy changes. Members were only permitted to use the 
military equipment during drill and lesson periods. Oswalt argued that the next and even 
more radical change was to drop elder villagers as leaders within the local units and 
consistently replace them with young, aggressive men who spoke good English and who 
were flown to the National Guard headquarters in Anchorage for intensive training. The 
results were significant:
After the new leaders had returned to their communities, there was a remarkable change 
in the local military atmosphere. The sergeants at Napaskiak drilled their men on the 
slough ice in front o f the village during the winter. The men marched back andforth to 
the shrill counting o f cadence. There were frequent breaks in the drills during which the 
men stood at strict attention and individuals were yelled at in typical military fashion fo r  
some flaw in marching technique. Villagers watching these scenes from the riverbank 
would stare in amazement, hardly able to believe that the government was teaching 
young men to reprove their elders and even to ridicule them in the presence o f other
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persons (Oswalt 1963: 76).
Older members dropped out due to physical complaints, younger men planned to 
do so as soon as their terms of enlistment were completed. The new sergeant was strict 
about the required forty-eight drill and training sessions per year, and men found that 
participation was making real demands on their time. Most of the men considered the 
local sergeant to be responsible for the changes and disliked him. Oswalt found that these 
feelings of hostility were normally expressed when the men had been drinking: “While in 
this condition, one man said that he hated the sergeant, and another gave the sergeant a 
black eye. Still others bide their time but do not forget their humiliation at his hands” 
(ibid: 77). Oswalt concluded that the form of aggressive behavior encouraged by the 
National Guard made a very unstable and fluid situation for unit members and villagers 
alike: “The final results of having such a permanent military organization in the 
community can only be speculated upon at present. However, it seems likely that the 
National Guard is currently the most disorganizing influence in community life” (ibid: 
77).
Oswalt revisited this subject again in his 1979 book, Eskimos and Explorers, 
briefly mentioning that no study on the continuing impact of the Guard on village life had 
been done, but that his impression was that “the military hierarchy of the guard and its 
rigidity represent a negative influence on the essentially egalitarian structure of village 
life. At the same time, the guard appears to have been an important institution in the 
acculturation process” (Oswalt [1979] 1999 : 291).
Again taking a broader regional view, Oswalt returned to this subject in his 1990 
book, Bashful No Longer: An Alaskan Eskimo Ethnohistory, 1778-1988. Here, Oswalt 
described the ATG members as “trained in guerilla warfare,” explained that until 1973 
villagers typically served in the Alaska National Guard to avoid being drafted, and again 
contended that although no study had been made on the impact membership in U.S. 
military organizations has had on Eskimo life, “one would suspect that is has been deep 
and lasting on most of the persons involved” (ibid: 166-167). In describing how statehood
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had resulted in the replacement of U.S. commissioners with state magistrates, Oswalt 
suggested that this new legal system undermined the power of village councils in Eskimo 
communities by moving decision-making power from a local consensus leader to a tanik 
law enforcement agency. Oswalt continued: “Another political change occurring within 
the same time frame was far more rapid and disruptive” (Oswalt 1990: 165). A similar 
description of the transformation of the ATG to the National Guard followed, and Oswalt 
wrote: “In the mid-1950s, Oswalt observed the ANG unit in the village of Napaskiak and 
found it to be the American institution with the most negative influence on traditional 
community life” (ibid: 166). In the notes for this section, Oswalt wrote that there was 
every reason to believe that the same patterning prevailed in other Eskimo villages in the 
region.
In the acknowledgements for his 1961 report, James VanStone wrote of the 
support he had received: “ .. .the most important of which was provided by personnel of 
the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory at Ladd Air Force Base, Alaska. This organization 
initiated and financed the entire program and, although not primarily concerned with the 
social sciences, was extremely helpful and encouraging on many occasions” (VanStone 
1961: 163). Oswalt, by contrast, first acknowledged Ivar Skarland (head of the 
Anthropology Department at UAF), then VanStone, and lastly the Arctic Aeromedical 
Lab for generously supporting the study. In contrast to VanStone’s depiction, Oswalt 
wrote that “the personnel have, through their stimulating interest in social science, 
contributed immensely to its success, (Oswalt 1961) (emphasis added in both quotes).
The irony in the historical context of these reports cannot be ignored. “It should 
always be kept in mind that any great changes which the future holds for Point Hope will 
come from outside the village and will represent situations over which the villagers have 
little or no control” VanStone wrote (1961: 160). VanStone selected Point Hope in 1955 
precisely because it had not been subject to intensive military construction, but by the 
time his report was published in 1961, the village was at the center of a critical statewide 
and national debate over the Atomic Energy Commission’s plan, Project Chariot, to 
construct a harbor at nearby Cape Thompson using thermonuclear bombs. VanStone had
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also chosen Point Hope because it had “considerable community spirit” and “the people 
seem to possess a sense of cohesiveness as a village. That is, they consider themselves 
tied as members of a community who have had their roots in one place for a long time” 
(1961: 5,15). In his history of Project Chariot, author Dan O’Neill argued that it was 
precisely this tradition of cohesiveness and sovereignty that saved the Tikirarmiut in their 
“brush with extinction in the atomic age” (1994: 8). A further irony is the same 
anthropological research was also used to thwart the designs of the Atomic Energy 
Commission. When geographer Don Foote’s findings were ignored or contradicted by 
promoters of Project Chariot, Foote used VanStone’s findings and those of Froelich 
Rainey, who lived at Point Hope in the late thirties and early forties, to corroborate his 
argument that the Cape Thompson area had been a hunting ground of the Point Hope 
people for at least 2,000 years (O’Neill 1994: 172).
During the same time period, the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory also sponsored 
Frederick Milan’s monograph of Wainwright (1958) and several of Milan’s subsequent 
studies into human thermoregulation, including A study o f the maintenance o f the thermal 
balance in the Eskimo, (1960) (fig. 16), which was the basis for his doctoral dissertation. 
In addition to receiving his undergraduate degree at UAF in 1952, Milan was a 
University of Alaska Fairbanks professor (1971-1987) of human ecology and 
anthropology.
135
In the interim, Milan did his graduate studies and worked as the Project Officer 
and Chief of the Environmental Protection Section of the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory, 
which was responsible for the development and evaluation of clothing, protective and 
survival equipment, and survival procedures designed for use in the Arctic. Milan also 
submitted reports on the dwellings of Swedish Mountain Lapps and evaluated U.S. Air 
Force winter survival shelters. Milan’s Observations on the Contemporary Eskimo o f  
Wainwright (1958) (later released as The Acculturation o f the Contemporary Eskimo o f  
Wainwright, Alaska, Milan, 1962) was based on data gathered in support of an Arctic 
Aeromedical Laboratory sponsored study of cardiovascular disease: “It was thought at 
the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory that a descriptive survey of a contemporary Eskimo 
village might serve a dual purpose, providing information of interest to the patho­
physiologist concerned with the cardiovascular studies and to the Air Force in general.”
In some aspects this report seems like it could be the second, ‘militarized’ half of the Air 
Force-Eskimo Contact Study, but it is far less detailed (based on 10 weeks fieldwork as 
opposed to the year each that VanStone and Oswald had spent) and is not officially 
presented as such. However, Milan explained that since the increasing strategic
27 Contract scientists using bath calorimeter to measure thermal insulation o f body tissues o f  Point Barrow 
Eskimos (Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory, 1961: cover).
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importance of the Arctic Coast of Alaska made it a location for Air Force installations, it 
“behooves the Air Force to inquire into the present status of their Eskimo allies with a 
view toward maintaining amicable relations between Air Force personnel and the native 
people” (Milan 1958: 2).
Milan’s subsequent statement also reflects goals similar to those of the Air Force- 
Eskimo Contact Study:
“The ability to predict the amount o f assistance or resistance that an Eskimo community 
would offer to a potential invader may offer substantial assistance to the Air Force 
agencies concerned with operational planning. Though resistance might be motivated by 
extreme patriotism and an identification with the aims and ideals o f  the United States, 
assistance given to an invader would not necessarily be motivated by a lack o f patriotism. 
Non-aggressive tendencies as part o f a basic personality complex, a history o f grievances 
in dealing with the United States Government and its agencies, matters o f expediency o f  
the moment, andfear, might act as strong motivating factors. ” (Milan 1958: 2).
As Project Officer and Chief of the Environmental Protection Section of the 
Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory, Milan initiated and acted as contract manager for 
Richard Nelson’s studies Literature review o f Eskimo knowledge o f the sea ice 
environment (1966a), Arctic Eskimo Exploitation o f the Sea Ice Environment (1966b), 
and Arctic Eskimo Exploitation o f the Summer Sea Ice Environment (1968). Milan was 
also the lead for G. Ray Bane’s Environmental Exploitation by the Eskimos o f  
Wainwright (1966). Bane and Nelson worked together in Wainwright and have 
collaborated since then as part of each scholar’s immense and ongoing contribution to the 
anthropology of Alaska. Bane and Nelson barely mentioned the military in their reports: 
Nelson noted that he spent a briefing period before the field study with Milan and others 
at the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory and wrote that the information could be of great 
value in the development of survival training programs by groups such as the Armed 
Forces. Bane pointed out that studies of Arctic inhabitants had previously been 
considered for their intrinsic rather than their practical value, but that the Arctic had
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changed and “[accompanying this understanding of the commercial potential of the 
Arctic has been a growing realization of its strategic military significance, resulting in the 
establishment of permanently manned radar sites and regular air patrols” (1966 1-1).
Another important aspect of the funding for and timing of this valuable 
ethnographic research is that during the same period, the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory 
performed thyroid function experiments using radioactive Iodine-131 on people in 
Wainwright, Point Lay and other Alaskan Native communities without their knowledge 
or informed consent (Birch et al. 1997). The experimentation was revealed to the public 
in the early 1990s and a suit resulted in compensation (around $68 thousand) for each 
person that could prove they had been tested. The importance of the Iodine-131 tests in 
shaping local residents’ current feelings about the military cannot be understated. 
Fieldwork for this research revealed that the Iodine-131 incident is considered by many 
people on the North Slope to be by far the most destructive and invasive military activity 
in recent history. A relevant question for anthropology is whether VanStone, Oswalt, 
Milan, Nelson, and Bane would have been able to conduct any anthropological research 
in these communities if the people had been aware at the time that the same agency 
funding the anthropologists was the one experimenting on them with a radioactive 
element.
This limited case of Alaskan anthropology during the Cold War represents just the 
first of many ironies that emerge during an investigation of Arctic militarization. While 
Margaret Lantis wished to acknowledge the military’s contribution to Alaskan 
anthropology, it seems preferable to acknowledge the anthropologists themselves, who, 
despite possible restrictions on their work due to their funding source, produced excellent 
ethnographies.
A prominent example is Ray Bane’s military-funded research in Wainwright, 
which led directly to unprecedented federal subsistence rights for Native Alaskans and 
other indigenous peoples. Bane’s project there was his first formal introduction to a 
subsistence lifestyle the critical importance of it for the Inupiat. Spending much of his
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time in Wainwright under the tutelage of Wesley Ekak28, Bane became what he called ‘a 
convert’ and ‘an advocate’ for subsistence rights. During a long dog trip that covered 
much of northwest and arctic Alaska, Bane took in the fact that the federal government 
was actually going to set aside large areas of land in Alaska when an “Alaskan lands” bill 
passed Congress. Bane saw the importance of having the native reality and the role of 
subsistence in native culture being a factor shaping that act. He advocated the National 
Park Service to fund subsistence research and worked as part of the team that was formed 
for a full-scale, year-long project in Shungnak. Bane’s conviction that any new National 
Park had to incorporate the Native’s perspective guided him as he helped craft research 
for what became ANILC A, the first land law that reflected the value of cultural interests 
and continuity.
The conclusion that it is better to have militarized anthropological studies than 
none at all is itself an example of militarization. It illustrates a phenomenon at the heart 
of militarization, related to the ‘gift economy’ of bases, which is often used to stifle 
dissent. The issue is the belief and acceptance that without military funding and research, 
the public would not have ethnographies, airplanes, computers, mechanical pencils, etc. 
This case also illustrates the overarching militarization of Arctic science and technology 
during the Cold War, a subject which the DEW Line brings up repeatedly.
Creating Cold War Arctic citizens in Canada’s western Arctic
The Inuvialuit people of Canada’s western Arctic were also affected by World 
War II and buffeted by the economic boom and bust cycle that had gripped their region 
since the heyday of Yankee whaling on Herschel Island. Suffering acutely from the crash 
of the fur industry, the tide of change that swept through the McKenzie River Delta 
region during World War II and the early years of the Cold War transformed their 
environment and their fundamental way of life. In the Delta, the balance of power that 
existed in the early 1940s between traders, missionaries, the government, and Natives
28 The night we arrived in Wainwright in the fall o f  2009, we met Charles (Chuck) Ekak, W esley’s son. 
Chuck, now in his 60s, and is the leader o f the local search and rescue operations. He remembers fondly his 
father spending time with Ray Bane and ‘Dick’ Nelson when they were there. Chuck put us up in his cabin 
while we were in town and we became friends.
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was dismantled due to several factors: a collapsing fur trade, the secularization of social 
services, and the defense requirements of the Cold War. These central northern actors 
struggled to direct not only the future of the Arctic but the identities of its inhabitants, 
and as the traditional socioeconomic connections between Inuvialuit and Taniks eroded, 
new relationships with the national government emerged. At the height of this 
transformative period and long before a consistent government vision had been reached, 
the sudden arrival of the DEW Line was an event that in many respects acted as catalyst 
for change. For the Inuvialuit, but the rapid construction of the DEW Line resulted in 
dramatic adaptation within a few short years to a very specific type of contact. It also 
forced federal bureaucracies to quickly adapt their visions of what kind of Canadian 
citizen a modem Inuvialuit should be.
Whalers, Fur Traders, and Missionaries
Unlike more remote Inuit in the central Arctic, the Inuvialuit along the Alaska-
Yukon North Slope were already familiar with Euro-American culture and economies by 
the early 1950s. As early as 1880, whalers had expanded their industry to the Beaufort 
Sea and transformed Herschel Island into a major whaling station. In addition to trading 
for fresh meat during their over-wintering, the whalers employed Inuit crews on a 
seasonal basis and introduced disease and liquor to the local culture. Although earlier 
forms of barter had existed, the whaling industry established trade as a fundamental part 
of the local economy.
Whaling led to another factor unique to the western Arctic: a small detachment of 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police had been in the area since the 1900s. Established on 
Herschel Island during the height of the whaling industry, the detachment had been sent 
in response to requests from missionaries. Numerous sensationalized reports of 
debauchery and depravity that had befallen the locals at the hands of the whalers were 
sent in by the chinch men, who warned the government to provide justice and order.
By the 1920s, commercial whaling had ended but the economic connection to the 
south was maintained through the growing fur trade. The Hudson Bay Company and its 
less powerful competitors were pushing up the McKenzie River Delta and securing their
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profits by imposing the trapping/trading system on the region. Traders then began 
requesting governmental regulation in the Beaufort Sea area, claiming that justice and 
order could be provided in the region by allowing the Hudson Bay Company to establish 
a monopoly. The Hudson Bay Company (HBC) dominated the economy of the western 
Arctic for the next three decades, and the company’s influence extended far beyond 
business. For the HBC, interest in the lives of the Inuvialuit was motivated by the goal of 
streamlining the fur trade market. The construction of trading posts created the first phase 
of relocation and settlement for the local people, who previously moved semi- 
nomadically according to the season and game. Entire communities uprooted from their 
traditional regions to settle in areas where the trapping was plentiful, or often to areas 
where the non-natives had easier access to the South. Even when the government began 
to extend its influences in the area in the mid-1940s, official policies were often guided 
by what was profitable for the Hudson Bay Company.
Success and failure in the fur trade created new kinds of classes and social 
mobility within Inuvialuit society. Although these classes were similar to the status of the 
best hunters before the fur trade, now the best hunters were often the best trappers. This 
earned them a measure of respect from the white men and allowed them to purchase more 
and better trapping equipment to increase their chances. The HBC introduced a credit and 
debt system for local residents to increase the traffic of furs and profit. To ensure a good 
annual harvest, the HBC would grubstake trappers before the season began, extending an 
average of $800 in credit (RCMP 1939-1951). After creating the credit and debt system, 
the responsibility of issuing relief to destitute native became a subject of contention 
between the Inuit, the traders, the missionaries, and the government for decades to come.
Conflicts between fur traders and governmental authorities were not the only 
disputes in which the Inuvialuit found themselves during these decades, as competition 
over their souls was a source for feuding (often violent) between the Roman Catholic and 
Anglican missions in the area. Further complicating matters, missions often engaged in 
bitter competition with HBC stores by establishing their own supply depots and 
underselling the fur traders. Some of the church-run hospitals in the North saved Inuit
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tuberculosis patients from being sent to southern sanatoriums for treatment, and missions 
often extended into areas rich with possible converts, if not abundant fur animals, and 
became the sole source for goods and other services.
Thus, the fur traders were coercing Inuvialuit to move near trading posts in areas 
rich in game while many churches were coercing people to move to settlements around 
missions to attend mass and church school. At the same time, the RCMP and many other 
forces within the northern administration were trying to persuade the Inuvialuit to return 
to the land and subsist independently.
Up to the mid-1940s, Canadian policy of laissez-faire economics was used to 
justify a ‘hands-off policy in the North. Administers for the North allowed missionaries 
and trading posts to provide goods and services, including medical help and education, 
for local inhabitants. Apart from the small RCMP detachment and a few reindeer herding 
projects, the government had as little involvement with governing the Inuit and Inuvialuit 
as possible before the 1950s.
The policy of noninterference was an explicit and deliberate one, and the right to 
not be held accountable for the Inuit was itself a calculated and researched stance. 
Canada’s federal government, in fact, did not want to acknowledge the Inuit as citizens. 
Before the watershed 1939 Supreme Court decision, Re: Eskimos, found that the 
Canadian federal government was responsible for the Inuit, there was no constitutional 
definition of Inuit status and no corresponding delineation of authority. Even at this low 
level of participation, northern administration was contradictory, unsystematic, and 
incoherent. Problems for the administration arose as much from differing philosophies 
within the government as from issues in the field. In several places in the North, 
starvation was a real and increasingly common occurrence, and the government soon 
found it impossible not to interfere. It established a rudimentary relief distribution system 
when trading posts and missions failed. However, it was against many leaders’ wishes 
that the government found itself in the position of distributing relief. The ramifications of 
a relief system that was not supported by its own authorities were widespread, not the 
least of which was a pervasive attitude of disapproving paternalism which saw relief as a
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shameful thing that was detrimental for people and only to be administered when 
starvation was imminent.
The confusing responsibilities for issuing relief prompted some northern policy 
advisors to advocate a complete, government-sanctioned monopoly by the HBC to 
streamline the procedure. Others reacted by suggesting that the government should not 
only take over all relief responsibilities, but should take over control of the trading 
companies and peg the price of fur. The geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic, 
moreover, soon made it clear that the practice of officially delivering aid to the Inuit 
could be used as evidence of legitimate sovereignty. Government documents from the 
1920s reported that relief was originally distributed to establish the principle that the 
indigenous residents were under Canadian control (Tester and Kulchyski 1994).
In the 1940s, the War and the drastic collapse in fur prices were the first link in a 
chain of significant events that affected all areas of northern affairs. As the bottom fell 
out of the fur market and drastically increasing numbers of indebted trappers fell on hard 
times, they turned to the trading posts to provide relief. The traders refused to provide 
relief or extend credit to people with outstanding debts, and they passed on the effects of 
their activities to the government. The price collapse occurred soon after the 1939 
Supreme Court decision on federal responsibility and just as the state was extending its 
control over White/Native contact in the North. As mentioned, government officials 
began certifying trading posts as official credit allocation centers. This changed the 
majority of HBC’s profit structure, as its intake of furs declined and the amount of 
government money it allocated increased, until the fur trade credit system was largely 
transformed into a welfare system. HBC collected most of the money back from locals in 
exchange for goods, leading to factionalism within the population as several HBC posts 
threatened to withhold relief if people patronized any other company. As the authorized 
distributor of family allowances, it was up to the trader to decide when scarcity required 
the allowance. It also meant that HBC began importing a much wider range of luxury 
items to its posts in order to keep their profits up.
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As the price of fur was collapsing, a great transformation of social and federal 
civil service began and welfare soon became a universal social program administered by 
the government. The end of World War II brought about a widespread public sentiment 
of social consciousness that broke the dominance of laissez-faire economic policies in 
Canada and led the country to support a short-lived, pro-socialist leadership. Since the 
war had dramatically increased the strategic significance of the Arctic region, the 
government also began to see its northerly holdings as a key to prosperity and a dominant 
force of Canadian psyche.
Compassionate Interference
A new Department of National Health and Welfare was given responsibility for
Indians and Inuit in 1945, but much of the bureaucracy held on to older Tory beliefs and 
conflicts within the administration between reform-minded officials and these 
conservatives created especially hard fallout for the Inuvialuit. A large segment of the 
population had been dramatically destabilized by the collapse of the fur trade. Some 
Inuvialuit maintained their limited requirements for western goods by staking claims and 
mining the placer gold deposits of the Firth River. Further removed from the trading 
posts were pockets of people who still relied principally on hunting and were less 
affected, but most of the Inuit west of the Mackenzie had a well-incorporated cash 
component in their lives and the collapse of the economy ushered a deep depression into 
the region.
Having slowly accepted full responsibility for the welfare of the Arctic’s 
indigenous residents after the long period of noninterference, the Canadian government 
experimented with a variety of programs and policies in an effort to help the Inuit adapt 
to full citizenship. While the old method proposed to avoid dependence by practicing 
‘enlightened neglect,’ the new liberal ideology was infused with humanitarian intent and 
proposed to help the Inuit readjust and eventually regain independence by espousing 
‘compassionate interference.’ The interventionist policies called for a massive expansion 
of departmental personnel, especially welfare officers and the new Northern Service
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Officers (NSOs).
As during the previous era, government agencies were faced with similar 
difficulties in applying any policy uniformly. Northern administrators still needed to hire 
men with experience in the Arctic for many positions, but the main source of old ‘Arctic 
Hands’ was predominantly former HBC company employees. These men tended to 
promote monopolistic control by the company in such business as the distribution of 
family allowances and authority over savings accounts, among other affairs - activities 
that liberal government officials and the public increasingly viewed as exploitative. In 
contrast, the HBC men and others saw suggestions that the government should control 
these activities as evidence of a dangerous “creeping socialism” (Tester 1994: 108-109).
In 1953, the Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources was created 
in an attempt to address the entirety of problems created by neglect and other previous 
policies. All aspects of the north were to be studied and regulated, a practice that 
provided a significant amount of information as well as a great deal of archival 
documentation of inner-governmental activity. One warden’s report reflected 
modernized Canadian standards for citizenship:
“The Department o f Resources and Development is by no means satisfied that this group 
o f Canadian peoples should remain at their present standard o f economy. An active and 
continuing study o f ways and means o f improving the Eskimo’s welfare and economy is 
well in hand and all practices and projects which are considered to be o f  value in raising 
the standard o f the Eskimo economy are given a high priority” (Burton 1955).
Northern Affairs was particularly sensitive to public criticism of the living 
conditions of Canadian Inuit after international media relayed a sensationalized story 
about a group of Inuit starving to death due to government policies in the mid-1950s, and 
the agency began dedicating considerable time and attention to ensuring that the public 
image of Inuit was of happy, healthy people who prospered under fair governmental 
policies. Northern Affairs also created an Eskimo Research Section to conduct
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investigations into the best means of educating the Inuit and helping them adapt to 
changing economic conditions by improving hunting and fishing techniques, encouraging 
greater use of local food resources, and projects such as handicraft manufacturing, 
whaling, codfishing, eiderdown gathering, and boat building. The Eskimo Research 
Section also planned the transfers of inhabitants from overpopulated and depleted areas to 
regions where game was more plentiful and/or where employment could be found. 
Relocation projects were also used as strategic sovereignty movements to cement 
Canadian ownership of the High Arctic.
1953: A line through the Western Arctic
While the actual locations of the DEW Line sites were under consideration, the 
government was weighing which aspects of Inuvialuit culture they wanted to preserve 
and what changes they hoped industrialization would bring to the North and its people. 
The central goal was clear as ever: avoiding Inuit dependency by guiding them to self­
sufficiency. The industrial camps created new outposts and compelled significant 
numbers of locals to relocate while the government was still in the process of 
experimenting to determine whether they should focus on Inuit relocation to regions 
where there were more traditional resources so they could subsist or locations where they 
could find employment. The construction of the DEW Line, for many regions of the 
Arctic, made the decision for them.
In October of 1954, R. G. Robertson as Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and 
National Resources penned a memorandum detailing the advantages of having all 
northern construction projects use as much local employment as possible. The most 
important reason was the steadily increasing population and the concurrent crash of the 
fur market. Moreover, Robertson argued, using local labor cut costs for government 
projects and contractors and employing local Inuit would reduce the number of relief 
payments that had to be made (Ferguson 1956).
As chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, Robertson 
said at a December 1954 meeting that the Department would prefer the more northern
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option as a route for the DEW line. “The more southern route would pass through an area 
where there were many Eskimo who were not adjusted to contact with modem 
civilization” (Robertson 1954). Robertson dissuaded the planners from considering those 
areas by explaining the need to protect the wild game resources of the local Inuit and take 
their vulnerable immune systems into account, and also by noting that there would have 
to be many more limitations for the men building and maintaining the radar stations if 
they were adjacent to traditional villages.
These two different goals from the same man within months of each other are 
accurate reflections of official policy:
Long Term Plans: Eskimos Affairs: Where primitive Eskimos in remote areas are 
relatively free from contact with white civilization, it is planned to leave their present 
economy as undisturbed as possible. In those areas where there is already permanent 
contact, integration with the white economy will be encouraged. Between these two 
extremes employment o f Eskimo will be encouraged provided it does not interfere unduly 
with their normal life. It is also planned to diversify the Eskimo economy and to transfer 
families from unproductive areas to regions where game is more abundant or 
employment is available (Robertson 1954).
Officially, the Inuit were not to be troubled by the military or construction 
companies. The DEW Line agreement, which Canada and the United States signed in 
1954, was explicit: “The Eskimos of Canada are in a primitive state of social 
development. It is important that these people be not subjected unduly to disruption of 
their hunting economy.. .or other effects of the presence of white men which might be 
injurious to them” (Canadian and U.S. Federal Governments 1955). In reality, to succeed 
in building the entire DEW Line within the time frame desired, construction firms across 
the entire Arctic coast hired virtually any Inuit who asked for work. Six comprehensive 
conditions to govern the character of the contact with the Inuit were established in the 
treaty, and under these conditions the Canadian government accepted responsibility for
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the management of all aspects of relations between the Inuit and the DEW Line (ibid).
The five-station prototype system in the western Arctic was successfully tested 
before the treaty was written, and the Canadian government presumably did not have the 
Mackenzie River Delta area in mind when they negotiated its protective aspects. 
Government representatives were well aware of the long and relatively sophisticated 
employment history of the region’s Inuvialuit. As the collapse of the fur trade had clearly 
been harder on those more integrated into the cash economy, the government was 
especially concerned with alternative employment opportunities for them.
The path of the DEW Line did miss the settlements of Herschel Island, Aklavik, 
Holman Island, Read Island and others entirely -  thus avoiding the majority of the 
Inuvialuit population in the western Arctic. This geographic distance was not, at least in 
the short-term, less disruptive to those nearby communities than having the radar station 
right in town may have been. Men from nearby settlements were recruited by the 
construction companies and flown to DEW Line sites (Ferguson 1957a). In Canada, few 
of the radar sites were built in traditional hunting and camping locations. Instead of jobs 
coming to the people where they lived, the people left their families and followed the 
work. In other cases, especially towards the eastern side of the Delta, men brought their 
families to the radar sites, set up camp, and found themselves in inhospitable areas that 
were often characterized by inclement weather and scarce wildlife, firewood, and other 
resources.
DEW Lining National Identity
The arrival of industrial labor in the north forced a transformation of 
governmental responsibilities. Having accepted that a traditional lifestyle was out of the 
question in the areas affected by the DEW Line, Canadian officials turned their attention 
to the welfare of both employed and unemployed Inuit, their families, and the smooth 
operation of the mixed economy.
Relations between the northern administration and the Federal Electric 
Corporation appear to have been diplomatic, but on certain subjects the Canadian 
government was forthright and explicit as to their policies and priorities for Inuit
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Canadians. This issue was exacerbated by the top DEW Line official with whom the 
Canadian northern administrators dealt with: Admiral Cruzen, Vice President of the 
Federal Electric Corporation. After Northern Affairs officials first met with Cruzen in 
1956, Director F. J. G. Cunningham reported that “we had an interesting general talk on 
segregation,” when the subject of treatment of Inuit employees came up. “Admiral 
Cruzen told us frankly he is from the Southern United States and holds quite strong views 
for segregation.” Cunningham reported to Robertson: “We made it clear that we hold 
equally strong views against segregation and that what we said represented government 
policy...We made it quite clear to Admiral Cruzen that.. .we would not supply Eskimos 
unless they were treated in exactly the same fashion as the single white men..."
(Canadian Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources 1956-57).
To fulfill their daunting new obligations, the Department of Northern Affairs 
created Northern Service Officers (NSO) to facilitate communications between 
construction crews, government agencies, and native people. The first six officers were 
appointed in early 1955 and it was generally understood that Northern Service Officers 
were to protect the interests of Natives and prevent any local difficulties from slowing the 
pace of construction. By frequent visits to DEW sites, the Northern Service Officers were 
to stay informed of local concerns as expressed by DEW operators.
Flired to represent the best interests of the Inuit and to encourage their 
participation in local government, the NSOs were also expected to maintain tight control 
over native/non-native relations. While practicable at the more remote DEW stations, 
these restrictions were unmanageable at the larger stations. Nevertheless, the NSOs 
attempted to minimize disruptions of Inuit life, and their primary responsibility was to 
secure the old way of life for those able and interested in pursuing it while providing 
alternative work for those incapable of a leading a subsistence lifestyle. To this end, the 
NSO was to be aware of threats to game, especially due to construction or DEW 
operations (hunting was prohibited for DEW Line employees), and make Inuit aware of 
the need to protect game.
Leery that Inuit would be exploited as a floating labor pool for northern
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contractors, the Canadian government’s ideal was to ensure that Inuit gained only full­
time jobs at the stations. At the same time, individuals who were selected for employment 
-  single young men being the best candidates -  were sent to distant sites where they 
could not have escaped without some difficulty. Their wages were deposited directly into 
trust funds managed by the local NSO until their job was completed, when their wages 
were deposited into a bank account available to the individual through the mail. More 
common was the transferal of the account directly to the appropriate local trading post, 
but the NSO often attached a semi-compulsory saving component. This system had 
several problems and quickly proved unsatisfactory when Inuit who wanted to spend the 
money they had earned put pressure on post managers.
The remote and vast field of operations had always made it difficult for Northern 
Affairs to ensure that every individual newcomer to the North was making the correct 
impressions on the Inuit. Guidelines for proper Canadianism were designed to provide 
the desired example for the country’s northerly residents, and one requirement was a type 
of progressive industrialism. The Northern Affairs department went to the extent of 
proposing training for Federal Electric Company personnel in how to instruct Inuit for 
employment on the DEW Line.
The Department organized educational courses for Inuit so they could return to 
the North as a valuable labor source for the DEW Line and future industry. Much more 
than mechanical training, the courses were originally held outside of Edmonton, Alberta 
and were designed specifically to integrate the Inuit into standard white society.
The class descriptions make it clear what type of Arctic citizen the government 
wanted to mold. The Department of Northern Affairs remarked that the purpose of the 
courses, with emphasis on widely applicable skills and “doing” rather than abstractions, 
was to render the student immediately and generally “useful.” Other stated objectives 
included “foster(ing) an understanding of the need for, and hence an appreciation of good 
workmanship” and “promot(ing) as much as possible a feeling of satisfaction and 
achievement that comes from the ability to perform jobs to recognized standards of 
efficiency and workmanship” (Canadian Department of Northern Affairs and Natural
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Resources 1957b). These courses were, the Department explained, “the means for 
assisting Eskimos and others in the NWT to make the transition from their own relatively 
primitive cultures to a more complex one” (ibid).
The socialization aspect of the courses included a number of field trips to show 
the trainees as many aspects of the modem southern community as possible (Canadian 
Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources 1956-57). Aspects of “normal” 
white society that Administrative Officer R.A. Gould felt any Canadian citizen should 
appreciate included the fire department, the flour mill, the laundry, the frozen food 
lockers, the brewery, and the police station. The course instructors considered inviting 
social work students from the university to observe, to participate, and to bring the Inuit 
into contact with campus social activities. Trainees were allotted a sum of money to buy 
clothes in the city -  at the Hudson Bay Store under the direction of their Northern Service 
Officer. Dealing with the publicity that the course was sure to attract was a central 
concern, and whether to allow English-speaking Inuit to be interviewed for TV and radio 
was dictated by demands that the interview be outlined beforehand and the NOS 
accompany the trainee. Ensuring communication between trainees and their families 
required absurdly paternalistic instructions: “Someone should be responsible for seeing 
that all Eskimo trainees write their families at specified regular intervals” (ibid). It was 
also policy to immediately check on those families who did not write back and encourage 
them to do so every week. One NSO was determined that the Inuit not be left alone and 
believed they would need instructions on basic aspects of southern civilization (e.g. 
operation of traffic lights) if the administration was to avoid “embarrassing or even 
unpleasant situations” (ibid).
The coordinator of the classes felt strongly that accommodating the students in 
boarding houses where they could “associate with whites in their normal way of life” 
(Taylor 1957) was a critical aspect of the training program. Special efforts were made to 
teach English to the Inuit trainees, “which will have far-reaching effects of the gradual 
integration of the Eskimo... [and] into the wage earning economy of the Northwest 
Territories” (ibid). This type of vocational training, it was thought, would provide a
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source of ‘lead hands’ and foremen for future industrial and defense development in the 
North. Similar arguments defended the high cost of vocational training for potential Inuit 
DEW Line employees by emphasizing that while the cost of such training was high, it 
would be “self liquidating as the high earning power of equipment operators will result in 
substantial recovery through income tax payments” (Taylor 1957).
Delta resident Sammy Lennie’s father attended one of the training courses outside 
of Edmonton and, by Sammy’s account, is evidence of the long-term financial benefits to 
industry and government. The elder Lennie worked on the DEW Line sites around the 
Delta for twenty years with almost zero absenteeism, yet in retirement has never been 
able to collect a pension from that work. If the elder Lennie opted out a pension plan 
when he started employment in the mid-fifties, he was not aware of it. Sammy himself 
put a great deal of effort into trying to sort out his father’s pension and found that one 
issue was whether it was the U.S. or Canada that would pay it.
For guidance, Canadian northern administrators carefully studied the situation of 
Inuit employees on the North Slope of Alaska Territory, where the U.S. Navy had 
employed them in the large PET 4 oil exploration projects for several years. The 
Canadian officials circulated American military reports on the subject which described 
how, with time and patience, policies that promoted “maximum utilization of Eskimos” 
were officially determined to provide a “potential source of man-power that will be 
invaluable to our future military efforts... which, if utilized to the full extent, will result 
in material savings to the Government” (Roberts 1952).
In western culture, if anything defines an individual’s identity and values more 
than their occupation, it is their house. The issue of constructing housing for Inuvialuit 
DEW Line employees created a logistical and ideological quandary for the northern 
administration -  much of it revealing evolving notions about Canadianism. To complicate 
matters, the company in charge of building the radar sites, the American-based Federal 
Electric Company, was often at odds with the Northern Service Officers and the Northern 
Affairs administrators regarding housing responsibilities. The construction companies,
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although they did not want their Inuit employees living with white employees, did want 
the Inuit to make camp near the site. A principle reason was that the Inuit would be 
available to unload planes during off hours if they lived adjacent to the site. If they lived 
several miles away in a Native camp, an extra hour was required for an employee to 
transport the Inuit back and forth. The government, on the other hand, was concerned that 
the children of Inuit DEW employees would fail to attend school if they had to make the 
commute from the radar sites, and also that if Inuit employees were taken out of their 
town sites they would experience difficulty taking part in the social life of their 
community. Head of the Arctic Division Ben Sivertz attempted to convince DEW 
construction officials that moving Inuit families near the radar sites would result in 
disruptive non-Inuit visitors and require restrictions, and that even worse trouble may 
result if women were living close to the station (Sivertz 1958a).
The Northern Affairs department eventually ordered several hundred 
‘StructofoanT and similar prefabricated units for DEW Line employees, but not before 
engaging in serious debates over the quality of the structures and the long-term 
implications for Inuit identity. Ben Sivertz, chief of the Arctic Division, objected strongly 
to raising the overall standard of living incrementally by building more but less expensive 
homes. He clarified the reform agenda by opposing this seemingly generous policy:
Would we be wise to house Eskimos and their families in such sharply inferior 
accommodations... ? What would be the effect on (a) the Eskimos (b) other DEW line 
employees? We have always gone on the assumption that it is essential to provide 
housing that accords with livelihood. - and not based on what the Eskimos might be 
willing to accept in light o f  his background...The most serious and inimical effects on the 
whole concept o f  Eskimo development, acculturation, protection and emancipation could 
flow from this ready acceptance o f the idea that Eskimos can be made to accept any 
standard however low...- never mind putting the wage-earner onto a plane where he can 
hold his head as high as the white man... Pulling down the standards o f housing for  
wage-employed Eskimos is dangerous to our most important objectives ” (Sivertz 1958b).
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The central issues of Inuit/Canadian identity dominated the first Arctic 
Conference of Northern Service Officers and other members of the Arctic Division in 
1957. The northern administrators and NSO discussed “how Eskimos can be made to feel 
that they are really a part of the modem communities in which many of them now live,” 
and how they could be made to feel a part of the national community (Canadian 
Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources 1957a). Other questions included:
• What can be done to encourage the Eskimo to take part in managing his own 
affairs?
• What does the Eskimo want out of life and is he being helped to achieve his aims?
• Is Eskimo culture being undermined?
• What is the future of the Eskimos and of the land in which they live?
• What do they think of us, the invaders from the south?
Writing to Admiral Cruzen of the Federal Electric Corporation in 1958 after 
construction of the line was finished, Deputy Minister Robertson noted very politely that 
the terms for Inuit employees were being met, morale on the line was high, and the 
government of Canada was gratified by the efficient operation. Robertson admitted that 
it would be impossible to avoid minor incidents in such a pioneering operation, but he 
diplomatically reminded Admiral Cruzen that “the Government of Canada [was] 
determined that Eskimo people should have full opportunity in common with all other 
Canadian citizens to develop their talents” (Robertson 1958). Robertson was writing to 
delicately address two matters where the corporation was not acting according to the 
agreement: Inuit were to have the same holidays as other Federal Electric employees 
(two weeks per year) and the dependents of the FEC’s Inuit employees would be 
provided with lateral transportation by the F.E.C. when switching sites, for annual leave, 
or to visit the nursing station. In referring to these issues, Robertson stressed that “there 
is in this country a wide and keen public interest in DEW line activities as they affect
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Canadians and a similar interest in Eskimo affairs.. .From previous experience we know 
this project for Eskimo wage employment can be successful. The consequences of it 
turning out otherwise would be catastrophic for the Eskimo people concerned and I wish 
to leave nothing to chance in arranging what is necessary” (Robertson 1958).
Although the Department of Northern Affairs had not sought out researchers to 
analyze the impact of the DEW Line, in 1956 they accepted Jack Ferguson’s proposal to 
do so. By all appearances, the administrators who oversaw his work directly were keenly 
interested in the young anthropology student’s observations and recommended his letters 
and reports to their superiors. The department funded Ferguson to return to Tuktoyaktuk 
in 1957 to observe how the community was adapting to the radar station. Northern 
Affairs, however, failed to publish Ferguson’s final report. Writing decades later on the 
militarization of the eastern Arctic, Kevin McMahon noted wryly that Ferguson’s 
account, the only report ever done on the DEW line’s impact, was kept in the rare 
documents section of a library in Ottawa (1988: 63).
The same year they placed Ferguson’s unpublished DEW Line report on the back 
shelf to gather dust, Northern Affairs attempted to mitigate widespread negative 
impressions that southerners tended to have about the Inuit with a small publication 
intended for visitors and workers coming to the North entitled This is the Arctic. The 
small book’s cartoon cover depicts happy Inuit with Quonset huts in the background. The 
people of the Arctic are depicted wearing parkas and mukluks, chasing wolves with 
pistols while sporting sunglasses and holding fashion magazines as they take pictures of a 
confused white man debarking from an airplane. The government maintained the positive 
‘creating initiative’ motto: "None of this means that the Eskimos are being pampered,” 
the book cautioned. “Spoon-feeding is definitely out; they are simply being helped to 
help themselves. The Eskimos are not wards of the state and they are not being treated as 
wards. They are full Canadian citizens, and as citizens the day may come when Eskimo 
administrators will direct Arctic affairs and when an Eskimo will sit in Parliament at 
Ottawa” (Phillips et al. 1958).
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In the publication, the government struggled through concepts of cultural 
relativity: "Make no mistake about it, in some ways the Eskimos are more civilized than 
we are, and always have been." It also disregarded the intricacies and depth of Inuit 
culture, fallaciously described pre-contact Inuit as “too preoccupied with finding food to 
develop anything but the simplest social or religious life” (Phillips et al. 1958) and 
glossed over and euphemized the profound impacts of the DEW Line and other 
industrialization of Inuit homelands.
By 1960, official Canadian government policy was evolving away from 
compassionate intervention and towards a system in which the Inuit would have a greater 
say in decisions about their lives and homeland. This new principle was referred to as 
‘guided self-determination’ and included the development of Inuit community councils 
and related initiatives, all directed to integration within the dominant liberal democratic 
structures of Canadian society. Education was envisioned as having an enormous role in 
the new approach, and the DEW Line played a significant part as well. Government 
officials believed that long-term employment could create a secure middle or elite class 
in Inuit communities, especially if people were educated as to how to manage their 
money according to western ideas of investment. Inuit community councils were 
designed with the idea that they would give people real control over how their lives were 
managed.
Conclusion
On either side of the border, unprecedented governmental intrusions into the lives 
of Inuit were undertaken during the early years of the Cold War. While emerging from 
divergent ideologies, scientific and humanitarian policies alike were justified by the new 
strategic significance of the Arctic. In Canada, the legacies of neglect and non­
interference had been largely discredited and replaced by policies that had other unique 
implications for the Inuvialuit of the western Arctic. In the U.S., the government was 
concerned with the physical and psychological health of Inuit as far as such matters 
affected defense.
In Alaska, anthropologists working for the military barely discussed the military’s
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impact - despite evidence that the military’s impact was significant. Nonetheless, their 
books are beloved and invaluable additions to northern ethnography. Ferguson, on the 
other hand, received funding and extraordinary support from a government agency for his 
study. While he was free to report candidly on his negative impressions of the military 
industry and his report was certainly read by some policy makers, it was never made 
available to the public. Northern Affairs did opt to supply men heading north with copies 
of “This is the Arctic.” Both situations highlight the value of the work by anthropologists 
who were both able to comment on the military and have their work published, including 
Norman Chance and Diamond Jenness (the latter’s status, by that point, was such that no 
one would have been able to repress his writing).
Canadian geographer Matt Farish’s detailed investigation into the Cold War 
projects that actively engineered Arctic terrain found that Canadian and American 
interests and presence in the Arctic during the Cold War “reveal far more continuities 
than disparities because of consensus or a resigned, acquiescent Canadian proxy” (Farish 
2006). While certain disparities have emerged in subsequent decades, the exploration of 
the how the DEW Line shaped local communities to which this discussion now turns 
corroborates the theory that most differences were due to communities and individuals, 
rather than nations.
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Chapter Four: DEW Line Infiltration of Arctic Society
Introduction
Catherine Lutz, in her history of Fayatteville’s militarization, found that 
information on the social change experienced by the previous inhabitants of the land that 
became Fort Bragg is absent from most accounts of homefront mobilization. By her 
estimation, the creation of the base eventually transformed the entire surrounding region 
of South Carolina. There is, Lutz says, “little accounting of the human Reconstruction the 
preparations and war itself involved” (Lutz 2001).
Despite the fact that it occurred on the other side of the country, the social change 
wrought by the construction of the DEW Line had much in common with that wrought by 
Fort Bragg. These bases entailed: a mass migration into the country, a reorientation of 
race relations, new ideas about the roles of women, an unmaking and reshaping of work 
lives, and a new sense of what it meant to be part of the United States in the international 
scheme of things. However, in isolated arctic communities, the interactions and 
relationships between individuals constituted a large part of the basis for social legacies. 
Despite similarities with Cold War bases elsewhere, defensive radar installations in the 
Arctic, staffed mainly by civilian contractors, resulted in their own particular brand of 
social relations. This section of the dissertation explores the social change created by the 
DEW Line by tracing some of the attitudes both groups held towards one another and the 
relationships that evolved between DEW Liners and Natives.
As described in the previous section, people in the western Arctic were familiar 
with the military and keenly aware o f World War II. Their understandings of the DEW 
Line, however, were shaped far more by the bases’ immediate local consequences than 
by any knowledge of the geopolitics of the Cold War. Furthermore, even though people 
are now intimately familiar with the sites in their own regions, they were never presented 
with information regarding the much larger system of which their communities were a 
part. Knowing what they do now about the impact one site can have, understandings of
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the entire project are still primarily shaped by the localized impacts those bases must 
have. However, as with almost every aspect of this exploration, an individual’s attitude 
on the extent of the radar system and other subjects is largely based on his or her own 
experiences and personality.
There are a few critical and widely held attitudes that have shaped relations and 
attitudes among Inuit and DEW Liners. Inuit respect for and knowledge of the land is a 
central aspect of their world, while disrespect for the environment and ignorance of how 
to live with it have been normal for many newcomers to the North. The situation 
presented by the Cold War and the propaganda of the era created disrespect of the Arctic 
environment at unprecedented levels. Preconditioning DEW Liners to battle an enemy 
environment while reinforcing notions of arctic isolation, remoteness, desolation, and 
hardship did not bode well for interracial relations. As articulated by one modem Inupiaq 
writer (Higbee 2010), disparagement of the land by outsiders is particularly insulting and 
hurtful to Inupiat and insidiously damaging to the self esteem of young people.
Associated with tanik ignorance is delight in tales of the comeuppance of DEW 
Liners who were particularly disrespectful of the land or local knowledge. The situation 
also led to complicated feelings that the Inupiat helped the military men survive, and to 
an increased sense of bitterness and betrayal at subsequent military exploitation and 
abuse of the land and people.
Some taniks believed that the money brought by the DEW Line was a panacea 
that more than compensated for any inconvenience and that raised the Inuit out of their 
desperate subsistence lifestyles. At the other extreme, there were taniks who saw the 
influx of money and employment leading to significant social disruption in the 
communities and bringing about the death of native culture. In complete contradiction to 
either of these totalizing ideologies, the Inuit do not recognize the DEW Line as having 
had a significant economic impact or of having fundamentally changed their culture.
This research found that the DEW Line seems to have had had short-term economic 
impacts on many individuals during construction, long-term economic impacts on a few 
individuals for the decades it operated, and appears to have directly affected the
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economic and logistical viability and possibly the survival of both Kaktovik and Point 
Lay as communities. However, a central understanding that emerged from this research is 
that while it might seem economically important in these ways, many Inuit barely 
acknowledge it, appear rarely to think about it, and in general do not ascribe any special 
importance to financial causation and their own recent economic history.
Local economies and society have been more influenced by individual DEW 
Liners and relations than by the military jobs themselves. Of course, it was those jobs that 
brought the people. However, in contrast to the oversimplifying discourses of nationalism 
or black and white ‘official lies’, most Inuit do not conflate individuals with the 
institution for which they work. In ways both obvious and subtle, individual DEW Liners 
and the society imported by the bases have infiltrated the socioeconomic and political 
histories of communities adjacent to the sites. By fathering children with and/or marrying 
local women, DEW Liners have even infiltrated the gene pool in Arctic communities.
This can be considered militarization according to some understandings of the term, but a 
more detailed investigation avoids using ‘militarization’ as yet another totalizing 
ideology that ignores the details and reality of people’s lives.
Although it is not as satisfying as the story of the racist station chief who was 
saved, another DEW Line tale tells us about the association between the DEW Line and 
alcohol. The background information for this story is the Inupiaq word for one of the 
most common ducks on the North Slope (translated as ‘old squaw duck’ in English ): 
aahaalic. Like many Inupiaq animal names, the name is based on the sound of the duck’s 
call. As the story goes, a heavy drinking DEW Liner had consumed so much alcohol that 
he passed out alone in the tundra. He was aroused out of his stupor by someone 
screaming at him, but he could see no one else around. He reeled about the tussocks, 
covering his ears, thinking he was losing his mind. Still, the screechy and otherworldly 
voice continued to berate him for his addiction: “Alcoholic! Alcoholic!” Some versions 
of the story end here, but other versions include a postscript: the DEW Liner had a
29 Clangula hyemalis
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breakdown and an enormous epiphany out there on the tundra, and when he returned he 
never drank again.
This is clearly a less enjoyable story, and not because it may not be true -  a good 
joke can be very gratifying. The story hits too close to home to be a favorite with many 
people. When people laugh about the amount of alcohol brought into Arctic communities 
by the DEW Line, it is a more bitter and ironic humor that is at play.
Most of the Inuit interviewed for this research did not think very highly of the 
social legacies of the DEW Line, despite the gift economy and benefits to surrounding 
peoples military industrialization is largely assumed to bring. The direct economic 
benefits have been discussed: short term for many, long term for few, and considered 
overall unimportant. A supposed side benefit of the employment was that it would 
provide skills and knowledge that would prepare Inuit for other work. Although Etok30 
concurred with this, no other interviewee believed that valuable skills were a notable 
social legacy of the DEW Line. The DEW Line was also seen as beneficial because of the 
health care it made available to local people. Again, no interviewees had considered the 
emergency medical attention at the sites as especially valuable health care, and some 
considered it ironic that health benefits would be associated with the DEW Line.
The DEW Line imported an example of male-dominated society and provided dance 
partners, boyfriends, and husbands for young women in adjacent communities. The DEW 
Line had other impacts on women whose husbands were absent to work at the sites and 
who were left to care for their families without a hunter (or firewood gatherer/childcare 
provider/emotional support/etc.). Women in Kaktovik are proud of the liberated women 
who hunted on land and sea and provided for their families while their husbands were 
gone.
Construction/Invasion
Several waves of military development swept up on the shores of the western 
Arctic during the Second World War and subsequent decade. In Barrow, people
30 Etok (Charlie Edwardsen) is a well known Inupiaq political activist from Barrow. His radicalism and 
struggle against land claims is depicted in “Etok: A Story o f  Eskimo Power” by Hugh Gallagher (1974).
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remember feeling as though they were being invaded with the arrival in August of 1944 
of crews and construction equipment to build the base camp for PET 4 operations. In 
1947, the Office of Naval Research prevailed upon the Office of Naval Petroleum 
Reserves to provide logistics to establish NARL in Barrow. The same year, the 
Kaktovikmiut living on and around Barter Island experienced an event similar to 
Barrow’s when the Army arrived to construct an airstrip on the spit where the village was 
located. Kaktovik elder Daniel Akootchook’s short term memory is failing, but his long 
term memory is strong: “We were attacked. Yeah, all the equipment, all the tractors...” 
(May 5, 2009).
MaryAnn Warden was four years old in 1947 when the imposing World War II 
LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank) pulled up to the spit at Kaktovik and dropped their ramps. 
Numerous Caterpillar bulldozers, other heavy equipment and supply trucks rumbled out 
onto the spit in front of the astonished villagers. The military communicated to village 
leader Andrew Akootchook, the only resident who spoke English, that the village had one 
day to move. The Kaktovikmiut at that time consisted of the extended, 50-member 
Akootchook family who lived on the spit in efficient and warm semi-subterranean sod 
and driftwood houses that could not be relocated. Many other families lived and traveled 
in the immediate environs of Barter Island, a historic gathering and camping location. In 
addition to their homes, the residents’ food was stored in valuable ice cellars. It is not 
uncommon for several members of a family to work on digging an ice cellar for a year 
before it is the right size. Large enough to hold as much meat as a family could catch and 
eat; a sigluraq also requires significant annual maintenance. Obviously, these could not 
be moved and there was nowhere to put the food that was stored in them. The 
Kaktovikmiut took all their moveable possessions and moved into tents up on the bluff 
where the military directed them and then built new wooden frame houses out of the 
dunnage, packing crates, and other material brought by the military. The old village was
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bulldozed, the airstrip was built, and a few years later a large hangar was built right over 
the village site.31
In was the winter of 1952-53 when the elements of a prototype radar system were 
shipped to Barter Island, Alaska. The first two test sites were to be Barter and Komakuk 
Beach, in the Yukon Territory not far from the Alaskan border. Canadian cooperation on 
the project was needed, and the Canadians agreed to the construction of the test system 
once the U.S. offered to provide the financial support. Both Herschel Island and Aklavik 
were considered as locations for a Canadian site, but the more remote Komakuk Beach 
(BAR-1) was finally selected (Neufeld 2002). BAR-Main, the largest DEW Line site in 
the entire western sector of the DEW Line, was constructed on a higher area roughly in 
the middle of the small island, directly in front of the fresh water lake. Cat trains hauling 
construction equipment, supplies, and a mobile camp with 50 workers headed east from 
Barter Island towards Demarcation (Pattaktuq) and Komakuk. Ground preparation 
involved hauling large quantities of gravel from Pattaktuq to Komakuk (50 miles), and a 
road that is still visible today was cut into the tundra. Once sites had also been built at 
Demarcation (BAR-A), Stokes Point (BAR-B), and Shingle Point (BAR-2), this first 
integrated unit was tested (Neufeld 2002). After the Air Force evaluated the prototype, 
the draft DEW Line agreement was signed with Canada in the spring of 1954.
In Point Lay and Wainwright, therefore, the “invasion” was delayed until 
construction began on the rest of the DEW Line in the summer of 1954:
“We didn’t know anything about it until the ships landed at Point Lay. 1954. For some 
reason that year never left my mind. Because that’s when all the big changes came, and 
the people started to be trampled down. All we could do was watch them. With all these 
big landing craft and them tractors all over town. Like what you call Normandy 
invasion. (Agnasagga, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright) (fig.17).
31 University o f  Alaska Fairbanks Anthropology MA student Beth Mikow’s thesis treats the three forced 
relocations o f the Kaktovikmiut in great detail as the case study for her research on relocations in Alaska, 
which in turn is part o f a circumpolar BOREAS project entitled, “Moved by the State.” Fritz and Mikow 
collaborated on fieldwork and interviews in Kaktovik in May 2009.
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Sammy Lennie’s parents, originally from Tuktoyaktuk, traveled to Banks Island 
in 1954. When they returned to Tuk the following year to the site where Sammy’s uncle 
and auntie and other families had lived, they found that the houses were completely gone 
and their family had moved to the main village site nearby. As in Kaktovik, a village site 
had been subsumed by construction of BAR-3, the Tuktoyaktuk Auxiliary DEW Line 
site. “They just bulldozed their house and everything that they owned” Sammy explained. 
“Get out of the way” (Lennie April 3, 2009).
Karen Brewster’s conversations with Harry Brower (2004) trace life in Barrow 
when PET 4 exploration was shut down in 1953 and the camp was used for the 
construction of the DEW Line. Buildings were constructed in Barrow and dragged to 
their final locations around the north Alaska coastline as far as Cape Lisbume and Barter 
Island. Harry Brower and other Inupiat helped build these pre-fabricated shacks on sleds, 
called wannigans, and worked on the Cat trains - Caterpillar tractors hauling giant sleds — 
to move them to their remote sites. The BAR-Main site on Barter Island, for example,
32 George Agnasagga was bom in Point Lay and now lives in Wainwright. His brother, Amos 
Agnasagga returned to Point Lay when the community was re-established in the early 1970s.
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originally consisted of three large trains of buildings: one was the residential hall which 
included the rec hall and the mess hall, another was the radar and other technical 
equipment building, and the third contained the power plant.
Despite their familiarity with the military, the suddenness of the DEW Line’s 
arrival, the incredible rapid pace of the work (the entire line was completed in three 
years), the large scale of the camps and the many modem, technical products was 
astonishing to most local people. It was an event that would have astonished most people 
in non-indigenous communities in locations far less remote than the Arctic. Inuit were 
more than concerned as they saw camps, houses, and graveyards destroyed or damaged 
by the newcomers. The lack of local consultation and the consequent failure to attend to 
issues of local importance affected people deeply.
This absence of notification, much less consultation, permission, and advice about 
the location of military bases, is a key factor in the militarization on the land of small, 
indigenous or marginalized populations both within U.S. borders and globally. These 
cases, and many other aspects of modem militarism, are made possible by adherence to 
what sociologist C. Wright Mills called ‘a military definition of the situation”(Mills 
1956). Under that paradigm, everything the government does is justified in terms of its 
contribution to the military defense of the nation and its interests. Not only do the 
military’s needs take precedence over all others, there is not even a perceived duty among 
military policy makers to inform local residents of military activities. The projected 
notion is that it (military activity) goes without saying, because no one would ever 
question it. For the most part, it appears that this strategy usually works.
When construction on the DEW Line began, many people on the Arctic coast did 
not know what the purpose of the buildings and towers was and, according to several 
informants, they simply did not care. Robert Alexie, Gwich’in elder from Aklavik who 
currently lives in and runs the cultural campground in Fort McPherson, worked building 
the site in Tuk and explained that neither he nor anyone in the community knew what it 
was about.33 Alexie explained that he was aware they were preparing for a war, but all he
33  -“Well they didn’t know! They didn’t know what it was about. [] No, they didn’t know, people didn’t
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knew is that buildings called the DEW Line were being constructed. He discovered later, 
after construction, that it was for defense. Nellie Arey of Shingle Point and Aklavik had a 
similar experience: she explained that all she knew was that her dad worked there, but it 
never occurred to her and the other children to ask him what they were building.
Richard Gordon (Herschel Island/Inuvik) said that people did not understand the 
premise of the Cold War and the purpose of the DEW Line in the beginning, but as time 
went on and they became more involved they began to understand, from the aboriginal 
standpoint, where they stood in the global scheme. In Wainwright, Betsy Tulugak 
recalled that she had been aware that the DEW Line sites were working there to “keep 
away enemies,” but she was not sure who the enemies were.
MaryAnn Iqilan Warden of Kaktovik does not remember much talk about “the 
wars” but said the community knew that the DEW Line sites at Barter and other places 
along the coast were being used in a conflict. “[I]t was the times, they were having 
problems with Russia and they never explained anything to us, they just came and 
invaded the place. And what can we do, we are part of the U.S., I guess” (Warden, May 
28, 2009, Kaktovik).
An Arctic environment that “feasts on lost men ”
The Inupiat were not the only people who viewed the construction of the DEW 
Line as an invasion. The physical environment played an important role in the shaping of 
DEW Line society since the Arctic was seen as a strange new danger that the military had 
to conquer for the mission. The land itself was personified, vilified, and referred to as ‘the 
enemy,” which was undoubtedly psychologically insidious for impressionable workers. 
The lack of appreciation for the environment was a difficulty in relations with the locals 
both because the extreme climate rendered the Inupiat more exotic in the minds of the 
southerners and because displays of distaste for the Arctic environment can be extremely 
insulting to Inupiat. Furthermore, while Inupiaq ability to survive in the Arctic instilled
know, nobody cared nothing about it.” -  Robert Alexie
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awe and admiration among many DEW Liners, reluctance to depend on Natives for their 
local knowledge cost some DEW Liners in efficiency and in respect from the locals.
The first sentence in physician Gareth Howerd’s memoirs referred to a journey 
from “the most desolate spot on earth that is inhabited by men today” (Howerd 1960: ii). 
Doctor Howerd described the regular occurrence of “Arctic cold heart attacks” (1960:
84), an alarming health problem that would prevent a man from ever being hired to work 
on the DEW Line again. The doctor’s characterization of the environment was kind 
compared to that of industry, for which the climate was a veritable Cold War villain.
A few of the main contracting corporations (Western Electric Company, Bell 
Telephone Laboratories, and Federal Electric) made promotional films for the DEW Line 
during those heady early days of the Cold War (fig. 18). When and if the industry films 
depicted Inuit, they were clad in fur, riding dog sleds, and were summarized in a 
sentence: “The Eskimos too were recruited, and they did a good job” (Western Electric 
Company 2009). Western Electric’s depiction of the environment, if ever taken seriously, 
would have had a negative influence on morale and relations with indigenous inhabitants: 
“The Arctic: desolate, savage, remote... [] Not too bad for caribou or polar bears, but no 
place for human beings.” The films justified the mission with animated red arrows racing 
over the Arctic Ocean and exploding into massive mushroom clouds covering the U.S: 
“This roof of the world holds a stark menace to our country, to our very existence” 
(Western Electric Company 2009). They also described the courageous men who had 
overcome great environmental difficulties to build the line: “Men had to conquer that 
unknown frozen wasteland and transform it into a vital outpost of western civilization” 
(ibid).
Figure 18: Film scenes from DEW Line Story (Western Electric).
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Mack Truck Company (1955) stated that its film, Bulldog Convoy to the Arctic,34 
was “a record attesting to the heart and spirit of man and a testament to his machinery.” 
The route to the Arctic was full of raging rivers that “clutched hungrily” at men as the 
vehicles broke through the ice and churned through riverbeds. The Mack trucks had 
tractors 12.5 feet wide with 65 foot-long trailers and 600-horsepower diesel engines. 
Loaded with supplies for the DEW Line, the trucks weighed 330,000 pounds each. 
Caterpillar tractors formed an advance trail crew that “carved” and “gouged” the route 
out of mountain ranges that still, at least for white men, had no names. With the cold 
winter conditions, the diesel trucks were simply left running 24 hours a day, and some 
trucks ran for months at a time without being turned off. The convoy traveled amid 
“grotesque statues” formed by snow on trees, and when it finally reached the Arctic, the 
narrator announced, “this was a place where man is closer to his God” (ibid). The 
convoy rolled out onto the Arctic Ocean, which “cracks and all but gobbles you up.” 
There, the “seal-hunting Eskimo” investigated the trucks and “agreeably” remarked 
“many dogs, many dogs.” Mack Truck (1955) interpreted for the viewer: “that’s tops 
from an Eskimo!”
Robert Alexie remembers that the road carved out of the mountains by the Mack 
Truck convoy was his first introduction to the DEW Line in the mid-fifties. Traveling the 
traditional river route from Aklavik to Dawson, Robert and his father were portaging 
from the Head River to Blackstone and came across a large new road transecting their 
traditional path. They were further surprised to find what Robert called a very big sleigh 
with bars on the road, and he later saw the same kind at the DEW Line35 (Alexie, July 6, 
2008, Fort McPherson, NWT).
34 The Mack trucks were designed specially for this mission. They were shipped to Valdez, driven to Circle 
on the Yukon, then blazed a trail across the sub-Arctic and Arctic mountain ranges and McKenzie Valley 
Delta to the Arctic Coast.
35 The truck and tractor convoys to supply the DEW Line have left “long-lasting scars through Vuntut 
National Park and the Old Crow Special Management Area.” For more information on the environmental 
legacies o f  the convoy, see: http://vukon.taiga.net/vuntutrda/historv/explor.htm
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DEW Line Recipe
The men who were imported from the States, southern Canada or other parts of 
Alaska constituted the human side of the bases and created the distinct society that was 
created by the DEW Line. It was a unique society due to the DEW Line’s improbable 
mixture of people: local Natives; white-collar civilian radar technicians; non-radician site 
personnel (including college students enjoying high-paying summer jobs); rowdy 
sourdough Cat skinners and construction workers; and a few inconsequential military 
personnel.
Most previous newcomers to the Arctic -  whalers, traders, missionaries, and 
police or other government officials -came with agendas that directly involved the Inuit. 
The DEW Line’s importation of numerous tanik DEW Line workers, however, created 
novel situations of cultural contact. In the early years of the Line, many sites were very 
strict and tried to prohibit contact between DEW Liners and villagers although this varied 
greatly by site depending on the station chiefs prerogatives. Tanik workers were not 
significantly involved with the Inuit community other than maintaining acquaintances 
with fellow Inuit employees. Other than as reliable labor (and in many cases for their 
local knowledge), the DEW Liners did not seek anything from the Inuit. Compared to 
whalers, traders, and missionaries, these friendly but impersonal and professional 
relationships constituted some of the most neutral relationships the Inuit had ever had 
with taniks.
Reflecting on the differences between DEW Liners and other Taniks who have 
come north, Etok (Charlie Edwardsen) of Barrow showed his very soft spot for DEW 
Liners (and NARL scientists with whom he worked a great deal). While the oil industry 
brought “rednecks” for whom he has intense scorn, Etok described the people who came 
up with the military with a shrug: “They were Taniks. They were white people” 
(Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks). This sentiment, which will be discussed at 
greater detail in subsequent sections, seems to extend to the early, military-led 
exploration of PET 4. Those operations depended extensively on local knowledge and 
local labor. The sentiment is largely due to an understanding that military personnel were
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assigned to their positions in the Arctic and did not come there by choice to profit off of 
the land by removing resources perceived by many to belong to the Inuit. This is in sharp 
contrast to understandings about more recent oil development.
The tanik DEW Liners and the attitudes they projected towards Natives are to 
some extent indicative of mainstream American and Canadian worldviews at the time, 
but more importantly they illustrate the specific DEW Line society that was imported and 
was itself shaped by the Inuit people and the arctic environment. Unsurprisingly, 
information created for public consumption by the military and its industrial partners 
differed starkly from memoirs or other DEW Line documents that were less concerned 
with public relations and defending the mission. Significantly different perspectives are 
also observed depending on the class or job of the individual: the memoirs of a 
sourdough heavy equipment operator convey attitudes and knowledge about the Natives 
and the radar project that differ markedly from those of radar technicians, college-aged 
employees, or a DEW Line physician. Fortunately, the DEW Line cultural context 
included a higher percentage of characters than mainstream U.S. or Canadian society and 
there was no general attitude emitting from the radar sites.
At just 19 years old, Hal Phillips was the youngest man on the entire crew when 
he was hired by Federal Electric and went up to work at Point Lay and surrounding sites 
in 1954 (fig. 19). Hal was a radar technician (a “radician” as they were commonly known 
on the DEW Line) who specialized in lateral communication. He was there while the 
sites were being constructed and in the earliest years of operation (until 1959). Hal has a 
radician’s way of describing just how long ago he was there: he explained that transistors 
were not even in use on the DEW Line yet when he was there -  they hadn’t been invented 
yet. “Everything was vacuum tubes!” Hal considered his years on the DEW Line as some 
of the best of his life -  he loved the job and he was thrilled to work and socialize with 
Inupiat. He took every opportunity to go hunting with them, attend community dances, 
and, whenever he was in Barrow, attend Sunday service at the Presbyterian church. In the 
days before the Marine Mammal Protection Act or other restrictions (“I don’t even know 
if we were allowed to hunt”), Hal was able to go beluga hunting with his co-worker
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Warren Neakok in a 16 foot skin boat or help out when the Inupiaq men shot 12-15 
caribou at a time (Phillips, Dec. 13, 2006, Texas City, Texas).
Figure 19: Hal Phillips working on the DEW Line in the mid-1950s.36
The way Hal characterized it, there were three main types of people that ended up 
working as DEW Liners and from his vantage point there was a fair amount of corporate 
cultural differences at play as well as the Cat skinners and the military. Western Electric 
and Federal Electric were the two main contractors for construction and maintenance of 
all the technical aspects of the sites. According to Hal, the employees of Western Electric 
were almost exclusively long-time company men who had been with Western Electric for 
years and were thoroughly invested in that corporation. Hal did not know of any Western 
Electric person that wasn’t married, and most of them had children. The Arctic was not 
the job location they were hoping for and they probably could have refused it, but they 
were loyal to the corporation. “It was almost like they were assigned to go up there and 
do this job -  in other words, with a couple of exceptions, they didn’t enjoy it much.” 
Federal Electric had a very different culture: it was newly formed and made up 
largely of much younger men like Hal, who had gone straight from a technical institute to 
the DEW Line training institute in Streeter, Illinois, before being sent up north. Hal 
estimates that only half of the Federal Electric men had family. Anthropologist Jack 
Ferguson had his own take on employees of Federal Electric:
36 This photo is courtesy o f  Hal Phillips, who took thousands o f  pictures and reels o f  film during his years 
on the DEW Line. Tragically, all the film and most o f  the pictures were destroyed in a house fire.
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"I don't know how to describe the Federal Electric personnel. I'll start by saying that they 
are strictly indoor types and end by saying that they have been selected on the basis o f  
lack o f personality. Evidently the personnel mangr o f this co. seems to think that the 
colourless types are less likely to become "bushed” (sic) (Ferguson 1956).
The third group was the Cat skinners, who, as Hal described them, “were guys 
that go out and work hard and make a lot of money and spend it.” Cat skinners and 
construction workers were the classic sourdough Alaskan camp worker, and many had 
been working for years in PET 4 and knew the lay of the land.
Bob Pittenger hitch-hiked up to the Territory of Alaska in 1946, started off as a 
cook for the Naval oil exploration teams in Barrow, and worked his way up from cat 
skinner to equipment superintendent (the highest paid man on the project). Pittenger 
traveled between and worked at all of the DEW Line sites on the north slope of Alaska 
until 1964. Pittenger’s memoirs contain almost no commentary on any of the larger 
events and issues of the day (i.e. statehood), but plenty of information on the 
transformation of the Arctic environment by tractor-drawn trailers (cat trains) and the 
significant role of alcohol in the everyday lives of the working men on the North Slope.
Under intense pressure to get the main camp at Barter Island ready for several 
hundred men by the first of the year, Pittenger was sent to work with a very small crew of 
equipment operators and construction workers. “For some reason, only a few people 
could be hired until the first of the year” Pittenger wrote. “They could hire all the 
Eskimos who lived at the village they wanted to ... [] We never could have accomplished 
it without the Eskimos” (Pittenger 2000: 108).
Bob Pittenger relied on Inuit for both their technical ingenuity and their local 
knowledge. He remembered hiring a “full-blooded Eskimo” as his first choice for lead 
man on a cat train despite what anyone else thought. “He never let me down. I was the 
only foreman to always have at least one Eskimo with me” (Pittenger 2000: 116). Since 
the Air Force was the responsible agency for the entire radar system, it was to military 
auditors that Pittenger had to defend his work methods and extra Inuit employees. The 
auditor demanded to know why Pittenger’s water wagon crews needed an Inuit guide
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every time they went to get water. “You don’t send men out in sub-zero weather by 
themselves!” was Pittenger’s reply. “Any accident and they’ll die” (2000: 141).
Saving the military
Stacey Fritz: So, do you think that people in Kaktovik felt safer having the DEW line 
here?
Nora Jane Burns: Ummmm, I  think they were safe 'cause we were here (laughs) (Bums, 
July 31, 2008, Kaktovik).
Pittenger asserts what industry would never admit and most Inupiat are too 
humble to say: the DEW Line never could have built on schedule without them. 
Pittenger’s understanding of the environment and respect and need for local expertise 
likely earned him a measure of respect from his Inupiaq co-workers. An important trope 
among Inupiat about the military is that the Inupiat were extremely helpful to the military 
whenever missions took place in the Arctic, while the military men were ignorant and 
would never have survived without the local wisdom of the people. Of course this was 
the case with all newcomers, but it is particularly ironic when it concerns exploratory 
expeditions (usually military) or other military activities. This trope is well justified and 
is corroborated in many early exploration descriptions and accounts of stranded whalers.
While most people refrain from directly stating it, Etok expressed the essence of 
this feeling in describing the history of the modem military’s early activities on the Arctic 
slope: “It was just like we hold them by the hand. You know, they are completely -  there 
were lots of suicides, military suicides due to darkness, and then they found it in their 
wisdom to hire local people...” (Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks).
Others, less direct, share an example or a story that illustrates these sentiments. 
One regionally famous Barter Island DEW Line story has been recounted by people for 
decades and combines all the key elements of this theme. The story is about the dramatic 
comeuppance of a particularly unfriendly and racist station chief at BAR-Main. This 
chief disliked Natives and had no use for them. He would not even sell them cigarettes or 
anything from the PX, and he would never consider that he or the base could benefit from 
local knowledge.
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One day, this chief went on a short errand in a weasel when a bad storm blew in 
quickly, resulting in a total whiteout. The chief did not return and the site employees 
could not find him. Recognizing that he was not prepared to wait out a storm and that he 
would almost certainly perish, a few employees came to the nearby village and explained 
the situation to Vincent Nageak, Danny and Isaac Akootchook and others. The villagers 
quickly formed a rescue group and gridded the land until they found the stuck weasel and 
the station chief, who was nearing hypothermia. After that, he had plenty of respect for 
the Natives, let them shop at the store and was completely friendly.
Residents of Kaktovik were relating this story (with much greater detail) when 
Norman Chance conducted fieldwork in there in 1958 and it was described in even 
greater detail at an Elder’s Conference held in Barrow in 1978 and everyone is still 
familiar with it. The story manages to include clear messages about racism and egotism 
(pride before a fall); a lesson about how underestimating the weather and being 
unprepared can be fatal; an example of the Inuit’s fundamental humanitarianism and ease 
with forgiveness; and a dramatic group rescue operation (search and rescue is a 
significant community focus and there is no one hero, just efficient group cohesion). 
Furthermore, it is a story of redemption, acceptance, and, finally, social harmony. For all 
these reasons, this is a particularly satisfying story that succinctly illustrates how the Inuit 
helped the military survive in the Arctic despite the fact that many Taniks did not respect 
the land or the people. It is striking that it is the only DEW Line story that is so satisfying 
and so popular -  no one has gotten a deserved comeuppance and there have been no such
^ 7satisfying endings for the seizure of the land or poisoning of the environment. It is also 
striking because direct statements about racism are rarely made (at least in conversations 
with Taniks), but the racist station chief story is common. As noted by oral historians, 
stories are often used to discuss important interracial issues. The heartening fact is that 
the chiefs comeuppance for his ignorance and racism wasn’t death -  that would not have
37  •A group o f people in Kaktovik did undertake a lawsuit seeking compensation for the military’s forced
relocation and the loss o f homes. The case never progressed, according to the few residents who mentioned
it, because the statute o f  limitations had expired and  because such claims were extinguished with the
passage o f ANCSA. This is not a popular story.
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made nearly as good and generous a story. He merely had a near death experience, then 
rejected his wrong-headed ways and experienced acceptance of and by the local people.
DEW Line discussions are replete with stories about individuals who did not 
adjust well to life in the Arctic. The first description that Doctor Gareth Howerd 
remembered hearing about the DEW Line was from a happy-looking fellow who had 
worked on the line for a few weeks. “Oh, everything was fine, except for one thing, the 
Arctic blues. There was nobody and nothing there and the place was enough to send any 
man round the bend” (Howerd 1960: 16). The fellow had made it a month before they 
had to fly him out to spend two weeks in the hospital. Once on the Line, Howerd felt 
strongly that monitoring and boosting morale at every site he visited was an important 
part of his work, and with this he had laid out no small task for himself. His memoir is 
replete with stories of deranged cooks going on rampages with cleavers and other 
employees dealing with serious depression.
Much of this depended on a person’s perspective. People who were happy and 
loved their job could not imagine that there were any problems involved with the 
position. It seemed to Hal Phillips as though Federal Electric was struggling a bit with 
managing the challenge of so many employees, and because of this they were more 
cautious than they would have been otherwise. Hal is of the opinion that this over­
cautious approach was the reason for the battery of psychological tests that candidates 
were subjected to while Federal Electric was considering them for hire. Hal thought the 
tests were unnecessary and pointed out that only one of his co-workers went “off the deep 
end” (Phillips, Dec. 13, 2006, Texas City, Texas). Later, Federal Electric did do away 
with the tests for a period of time, but the results of that were undesirable and the practice
38 Howerd’s experiences working on the DEW Line transformed him dramatically. By his own description, 
Gareth Howerd quickly went from a dapper young man about town, dressed in properly tailored English 
suits, to a dirty, unshaven, sweaty character dressed in freakish Arctic attire who found himself 
disappointed by the utter triviality o f sophisticated city life. Howerd spent one year in the early fifties in the 
Eastern Arctic as the DEW Line doctor responsible for a 600,000 square mile area, and he published a 
memoire about it, DEW Line Doctor (1960), for The Adventurer’s Club o f London.
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of psychological testing was reinstated.39 Etok’s understanding was that most military 
people were easy to get along with because, unlike the subsequent oil industry that let 
anyone up North, “the military had them checked out and anybody who was not 
deserving didn’t last very long” (Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks).
Hal recalled that his crew came up with a very effective method to deal with one 
unhappy DEW Liner, who did not hing but complain about how much he hated it up 
there and how he was going to go home as soon as possible. “And he just kept growling 
about everything, and there wasn’t anything to growl about! And finally somebody said 
‘I’ll tell you what, why don’t we take up a collection and send you home.’ We called his 
bluff, took up a collection, and he went home.”
Harry Merriman40 also remembered that people who thought of the DEW Line as 
a prison did not stay. There were a few people, he said, that flew up, walked down the 
airplane ramp, turned around and got back on the plane. But nobody was forcing them to 
stay and those that did not like it simply left. As Harry said, “[I]t kinda sorted itself out 
and you wound up with the type of personality that could endure that loneliness or that 
remoteness. We were certainly remote and isolated” (Merriman, March 3, 2009, 
Fairbanks).
Sammy Lennie’s eyebrows rose as he gravely explained that a lot of the DEW 
Line guys stayed twelve months at a time. He made circles with his finger by his head and 
said, “I remember a few of them going kinda... .flippin' out. And I remember the one guy 
- they took him out of there with a white sheet - wrapped up - so he don't harm anybody 
or harm himself. But he was right out to lunch” (Lennie, April 3, 2009, Fairbanks).
Harry Merriman made a number of good friends on the DEW Line over the years 
and considers that the job attracted particularly interesting people. While the image 
presented by National Geographic is one of suffering and loneliness, a different picture
39 Only radicians underwent the psychological tests, which were also designed to weed out homosexuals. 
“Back then, I didn’t even know what ‘gay’ meant. I thought that was just a guy who was really happy!” -  
Hal Phillips, Dec. 13, 2006.
40 Harry Merriman o f Fairbanks started working at Barter during the summers in 1964. When he finished 
college, he went permanent and worked on the supply ships, visiting all the sites in the western sector. He 
later went on to work for a few years on the Greenland Ice Cap sites.
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emerges from Hal, Harry, and other DEW Liners for whom the experience was a life- 
changing and very positive adventure. Harry recalls that some of his co-workers had to be 
almost forced to take any leave. DEW Liners were allowed 30 days every 9 months, and 
“some of those guys just wouldn’t do it. They’d just kept packing away money and they 
wouldn’t go. [I]t was a way of life a lot of them just really enjoyed” (Merriman, March 3, 
2009, Fairbanks). Although he was not a radician, Harry corroborates what Hal claimed -  
that although people thought it would be a boring job, the radar techs had a great time. 
Among other excitement, they had a lot of communication with international flights 
traveling over the poles.
Wage earners
Clearly, a significant part of people’s enthusiasm for the job was the money. 
Particularly in Canada, the number of young men who worked on the DEW Line and 
made enough money to set themselves up as home owners and middle class citizens was 
significant. The wages on the DEW Line were excellent. While they may not have been 
overly concerned about the radar sites’ roles in geopolitical nuclear strategy, the Inuit 
certainly knew and cared that the DEW Line was an opportunity for work and good 
money. In several areas across the Alaskan Arctic, many Inupiaq men had been 
previously employed by the federal government -  both during PET 4 exploration and as 
guides and assistants for the U.S. Coast and Geodesic Survey41 (USC&GS). Several 
Kaktovik men had worked for the USC&GS and George Agnasagga remembered that 
“everybody” in Point Lay was employed for USC&GS during the years before the DEW 
Line (Agnasagga, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright). Once construction on the DEW Line 
began, prospects for wage employment at the camps were soon known throughout the
41 “In 1807, President Thomas Jefferson signed a bill for the "Survey o f the Coast," thus establishing the 
United States Coast Survey. In its early decades, the Coast Survey was responsible for charting the 
coastlines. But its responsibilities grew with the acquisition o f  Alaska in 1867 and the 1871 law requiring 
the Coast Survey to carry geodetic surveys into the interior o f the country. Thus in 1878 the U.S. Coast 
Survey became the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (USC&GS). In 1965, the Coast and Geodetic Survey 
became a component o f  the Environmental Sciences Services Administation (ESSA). And then in 1970, 
ESSA expanded and was reorganized into the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA).” - http://www.lib.noaa.gov/noaainfo/heritage/coastandgeodeticsurvey/index.html
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region. Only two months after the arrival of the work crew at Komakuk Beach, the air 
was full of rumors in Aklavik, over 250 kilometers away. After the spring muskrat- 
trapping season, numerous Aklavik residents headed down to the coast to see what was 
available. At the sites, the immediate need for unskilled labor absorbed almost all who 
wanted to work.
Construction of the Line constituted what Robert Alexie of Aklavik and Ft. 
McPherson called “big news, lotsa money” (July 6, 2008, Fort McPherson, NWT). He 
still has the gun he bought with his DEW Line wages back in 1957. “Sixteen dollars a 
day!” he exclaimed. “Ten hours! Good money!” Alexie remembers exactly what people 
made during construction: electricians were making $2.85 per hour and as a carpenter’s 
helper he made $2.50. Despite the good money, he did not envy the few local people who 
went permanent on the DEW Line. “They just stuck at that job. That’s what they say: 
once people start working there they are not a hunter anymore.” Alexie, a Gwich’in 
Athabaskan, still laughs when he recalls the headline that appeared in the local paper: 
“Eskimos are joining the DEW Line, throwing their harpoons away” (July 6, 2008, Fort 
McPherson, NWT).
Payment for Native and Tanik employees was not always equal and varying 
degrees of corporate greed, condescension and racism were the cause of the disparity. 
When Norman Chance interviewed DEW Line managers on Barter Island during his 
fieldwork in the early 1960s, he asked them why their Inupiat employees were paid less 
than Whites for the same work. He received this typical “gift economy” of bases 
response:
"Do you know what Eskimos get in Canada for working on the DEW Line? Two 
hundred a month. We give them three times that amount. By comparison, the people here 
are making out really well. Sometimes I think we do too much for the Eskimos. 
Eventually, they become unappreciative." People in Kaktovik corroborate that the locals 
were not paid at the same rate as the imported white workers, but they needed the money 
at the time and were in no position to demand equal pay.
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H. L. Rees, a Canadian game warden in the delta region, reported on the impact of 
the new radar sites in the western Arctic in March of 1955: “the fact the natives at Tuk 
are showing more interest in the prospect of working on the Dew Line demonstrates they 
are well into the transitional stage between being straight hunters and casual labourers. It 
has always been difficult to get these people to work in the settlement but the DEW Line 
may prove the turning point” (Rees 1955).
Jack Ferguson, however, wrote that he was attempting to show that Inuit living in 
proximity to the DEW Line were “on the threshold of a radical change in both their 
means of livelihood and their basic culture” (Ferguson 1957a). While Game Warden 
Rees hoped it would be the “turning point,” Ferguson called the DEW Line “the last nail 
in the coffin.” Reluctant to accept the dynamic nature of culture, Ferguson wrote that 
with the possible exception of Tuktoyaktuk, “indeed it could not be said that there are any 
true Eskimo communities located in the.. .area. Eskimos working [in that area] have been 
recruited from the Mackenzie River Delta; they live in the construction camps without 
their families as do the Europeans” (Ferguson 1957a).
Ferguson emphasized that this radical change in livelihood and culture did not 
emerge from within Inuit society, but was ‘imposed’ by Whites. Suddenly, at least 25% 
of the Inuvialuit population of the western Arctic experienced a fundamentally different 
kind of living pattern with the introduction of steady wages. “The description of this type 
of employment as ‘imposed’ is not too strong’ Ferguson wrote. “The European has 
created desires for material goods among these people, and these desires can only be 
resolved by the Eskimo taking every opportunity to earn money” (Ferguson 1957a).
The significance of the economic transformation varied according to an 
individual’s experience, and people with experience trapping fur or mining gold were 
familiar with working for money. However, even people entirely comfortable with a 
cash-based economy usually worked outdoors by their own schedule. Steady, wage-based 
industrial labor made “severe demands” upon the Eskimos, Ferguson reported. He 
characterized the work as different and baffling, requiring none of the traditional skills of 
the hunter-trapper. A man’s time was, Ferguson observed, no longer his own, and he
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could no longer travel when and where he pleased. Inuvialuit communities had been 
fundamentally changed. Whether the men left the settlement to work at a nearby site or 
whether they brought their families and set up a new camp adjacent to the station, the 
communities were “split in two; the men working at the DEW Line site, the women and 
children trying to maintain a traditional life in an economy in which they ha[d] no part” 
(Ferguson 1957a).
In Canada’s western section, the Tanik employees on the Line were 95% 
Canadian but the supervisory staff was predominantly American. “In this area the 
problems of Eskimo employment were less well understood by the construction company 
than in the east and the results were less happy” Ferguson noted (1957a). At sites further 
east the men often stayed nearby but were periodically absent from work in order to hunt 
and be with their families, but in the Mackenzie Delta sector it was difficult to pinpoint 
what was real absenteeism and what was merely casual employment. “The Eskimos did 
not stay away from their jobs; they simply quit them, moved on to another site, or 
returned to their homes...” (Ferguson 1957a). Especially for Inuvialuit employees in the 
western sector who lived in bunkhouses on site, the obligation to support one’s family 
and relatives at another place required a significant portion of their earnings. The rest of 
their money was often spent on watches, jewelry, and clothing from the traders. Some 
money, Ferguson noted, changed hands through poker playing and illegal liquor 
purchases (ibid).
Only a few months after his initial assessment, Warden Rees was sorely 
disappointed that the Tuktoyaktuk Natives’ interest in unskilled wage labor appeared to 
be short-lived. His July 1956 report noted that the Natives there were “too keen on 
dancing all night and playing poker. At the time of our visit only two Eskimos were left 
on the payroll at this site. The others had quit or been fired” (Rees 1955). By September 
of the same year, the DEW Line had not become the ‘turning point’ Rees had hoped for 
in Letty Harbour either. “The DEW line project appears to be having no effect on these 
people,” Rees reported with disappointment. He explained that some of the men worked 
for a week or so but they did not like it and quit to return to their families. Rees
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recognized that forbidding Inuit to take their families with them to DEW Line sites left 
the men in a difficult situation: “On the bleak and inhospitable coast where even fuel 
wood is scarce a family without a man is in sore strait indeed,” and he sympathized that 
the men “cannot be blamed too much for wanting to quit and return to their families.” He 
understood that Whites at the radar sites did not want to live in the same camps as 
Natives, but he felt that officially establishing Native camps a few miles away would 
encourage the Inuit to work on a more permanent basis (Rees 1955).
In his correspondence, Jack Ferguson lamented that the succession to a wage 
economy and the dominance of western culture “would be quite satisfactory if the new 
filled the gap left by the disappearance of the old, but the plain fact is that the Eskimos 
are offered only a fraction of the incredible volume of European civilization” (Ferguson 
1956). He thought that although the abundance of comic books, cowboy music, and junk 
jewelry was a sign of a healthy economy, the basic culture was impoverished. He 
complained: “This is the way that ‘hill billies’ are created”.
Reporting from Tuktoyaktuk in November of 1955, Rees reversed his earlier 
appraisal and reported that the Natives there were “perhaps better off now than ever 
before in their history. About twenty of the Eskimos are now working on the DEW Line 
site and they have just completed building seven new log homes for themselves. They are 
also spending their money more wisely than in former years. This is something they have 
learned through bitter experience, not one but many times” (Rees 1955). By Christmas, 
Rees reported that, thanks to the DEW Line, the Natives in Tuktoyaktuk were particularly 
happy and danced every night until seven in the morning for two weeks that year -  a 
longer period than their finances would normally allow. He also reported that it looked 
like another poor season for white fox, but “generally speaking this should not bother the 
Eskimos too much this year as they can make infinitely more money on the Dew Line 
than on the Trapline” (Rees 1955).
By March of 1956, according to Rees, the basic economy of the Inuvialuit had 
been transformed. That winter, the Hudson Bay Company at Tuktoyaktuk had only one 
man doing serious trapping. “All the other Eskimos are employed on the Dewline and
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getting along quite well. The Eskimos seem to have settled down to the idea of steady 
employment now and are even spending their money more wisely.” He reported that 
absenteeism at the site was declining rapidly, and that the “Northern Construction Co. 
seems to be more satisfied now with the Eskimo labour than hitherto.” At the news that 
nine coastal vessels would be operating out of Tuktoyaktuk to supply all the DEW Line 
sites in the Western Sector, Rees noted that it “would have a profound effect on the way 
of life of the natives, many of whom have already lost all interest in trapping for a living” 
(Rees 1956).
At the same time, Ferguson did not find as much evidence as Rees that the 
Inuvialuit were accepting steady employment, and he was pleased to leam that the DEW 
site superintendent who was the most successful with Native employees shared his views. 
The superintendent mentioned that his Inuit employees were getting tired of employment 
and he expected them to vanish onto the ice any day. He could not see why they should 
bother to work anyway since it seemed to him that money was of no real importance to 
them. “I was rather surprised at [his] attitude of disillusionment towards Eskimo 
employment since the official one both on the part of [Northern Affairs and the Northern 
Construction Company] is that employment and money-making is ‘a good thing.’ In fact, 
that is just about the only justification that anyone can bring forward.. .the sum total of all 
this employment.. .is that some good hunters and trappers will be turned into indifferent 
wage-eamers” (Ferguson 1956).
That spring, Warden Rees started to notice a few side effects of the new economy: 
“The widows and aged people, who customarily get someone to assist them on their 
trapping areas are finding it very difficult to get help this year. There have been many 
young men hanging around town but they are not interested in trapping and when 
approached on the subject, a far away, dreamy look comes their eyes and they speak of 
getting jobs on the Dewline...someday” (Rees 1956).
By February of 1958, the chief game warden R. C. Timmins of Aklavik reported 
wasting significant time and having great difficulty attempting to contact trappers to 
renew their licences, as many were employed on DEW Lines sites away from town.
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Timmins reported that the trappers he did get to see reported that they had not abandoned 
trapping in favor of steady employment and higher wages. Instead, due to the extremely 
low prices for fur, trapping was simply no longer any kind of option. Working at the 
radar site did not seem to be a choice - it appeared to be the only choice. At Cambridge 
Bay, another region where the residents were long accustomed to Whites and the trapping 
and trading economy, Ferguson asked every Inuit employee at the DEW Line site 
whether he liked his new job. Almost all replied that they did, but when the older men 
were asked whether they would prefer to remain at wage employment or go back to their 
old lifestyle, “doubt was immediately apparent and most of them finally said that they 
would prefer to return to hunting and trapping” (Ferguson 1957a).
The work situation at many remote DEW Line sites was better suited for single 
young men. Without an accompanying family, it was much easier to accommodate 
young, single Inuvialuit men in bunkhouses just like, and sometimes alongside, Taniks. 
Since the young men lived in the construction camps, they learned their jobs, picked up 
English, and adopted the clothing and other habits of their co-workers more quickly. As 
the young men were less prone to miss work or quit their jobs entirely to be with and 
provide for their families, construction superintendents tended to prefer them and train 
them for more heavy equipment operating and other skilled labor jobs. Sometimes the 
men were stuck with kitchen jobs, which they resented as women’s work, but their 
employers appreciated the training in European sanitation standards that the Inuit learned 
cooking at the DEW Line sites.
Young Inuit DEW Liners earned a very high income for their age and experience 
compared to what they could have made trapping - even when trapping had been a 
lucrative venture. Ferguson observed that the young men saved about 50% of their 
earnings, and most of what they spent was on clothing, watches, guitars and violins. 
“None of them bought anything which might be regarded as hunting equipment and there 
is no intention among any of them to return to traditional life” Ferguson concluded 
(Ferguson 1957a: 36).
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Working continuously without families to support or trapping equipment to 
purchase, young men soon acquired enough wealth to put them in an income bracket 
above most established, mature men. Equally disturbing to the normal social hierarchy 
was the leveling of incomes between the different types of trappers. On the DEW Line, 
men who had simply gotten by or had been patently ineffective trappers and untalented 
hunters worked as equals alongside the most highly skilled and respected trappers. 
Sometimes these lower-ranked trappers ended up making more money on the DEW Line 
since they did not take time off to hunt and trap. Conflicts arose, Ferguson wrote, when 
“leaders of the community no longer had their status conferred through their superior 
performance of occupation” (Ferguson 1957a) 39.
Before the introduction of the industrial wage earners, the men whose successful 
trapping had earned them plenty of material goods and corresponding high status 
numbered perhaps one in ten. With the DEW Line, at least 50% of the employees were 
able to obtain similar goods and more. Ferguson also concluded that the very nature of an 
individual’s occupation determined one’s material needs. Trapping, for example, required 
very few luxury items or Tanik goods and did not, he argued, displace Inuit culture to any 
great degree. With wage employment, on the other hand, the need for goods that reflected 
Tanik values was intensified to such a degree that it affected the very fabric of Inuit 
culture.
McMahon claimed that the late fifties employment bust (following the DEW Line 
boom) created the first ideological dispute in Tuktoyaktuk. There were two main 
factions: one advocating a return to pure subsistence and the other demanding 
government jobs and subsidies to maintain their way of life. McMahon’s assessment was 
grim: the quandary that big development creates has intensified over the years but will 
not, by its nature, be able to go on forever. “The voices one hears in it are those of the 
Inuit mind wrestling with itself, trying to formulate a response to a danger to which there 
can only be a limited reply. A mind, as it were, headed out toward the sea” (McMahon 
1988). The choice that is supposedly given to Inuit to work or subsist is not a real choice,
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he wrote. Traditional life gets no support, and industry gets immense incentive. Then, the 
choice becomes whether to survive or not.
In combination with the DEW Line jobs, a revival in fur prices in the early 1950s 
significantly accelerated the adoption of southern goods to the Mackenzie Delta region. 
The HBC store in Tuktoyaktuk normally cleared about $55,000 annually. In 1955, the 
manager expected $150,000 and the store had made $24,000 in the first three weeks of 
August alone. At the same time, mail-order business increased from virtually nothing in 
the late 1940s to over $10,000 by the latter half of the 1950s. Most of the purchases were 
for boats, outboard motors and related capital goods. (Alexie said the DEW Line was big 
money, but that it was the arrival of oil companies in the Delta that led to such 
widespread wealth that many people bought boats and motors.)
Robert Alexie remembered that some people were duped into paying exorbitant 
prices ($80) for cheap watches or buying electric shavers that they could not use at home 
because they had no electricity. However, Alexie and others interviewed do not 
corroborate Ferguson’s conclusion regarding a widespread permanent departure from 
“traditional life.” Ferguson was conducting his study during the height of DEW Line 
construction and employment, but very few men became permanent employees. More 
importantly, the decision to hunt was usually a matter of individual preference.
Etok, whose father had steady and secure employment on the DEW Line while he 
was growing up, was emphatic that Inuit people were happy it was built (“They had 
work!”) and that the sites were overall beneficial (“They brought commerce, jobs!”) 
(Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks). Families with members who were permanently 
employed by the DEW Line did experience a higher standard of living. According to 
Etok, one of the biggest advantages of the DEW Line development was that the children 
of the employees were never in need of anything because their fathers were working. 
Nora Jane Bums (2008) remembers that community members with DEW Line jobs 
would help their family members when they had extra, and her grandfather was one of 
the ones making good money. Mary Ann Warden (2009) remembers that Isaac 
Akootchook and her biological father Nageak had a picture taken with the first dollar
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they earned. Nageak somehow managed to buy an accordion that he and Mary Ann 
learned how to play, while her uncle bought the first guitar in town. Despite Ferguson’s 
dire characterization of this demise of traditional culture, Mary Ann remembered how 
cool it was that around the same time, thanks to money made at the DEW Line, 
somebody got a mandolin and someone else got a violin. “Well, by that time, they needed 
a job to take care of their families. And by that time they were used to getting stuff with 
money. Before that we just lived off the animals that we caught” (Warden, May 28, 2009, 
Kaktovik).
Alice Agiak’s father worked at the Barter Island site and, at Christmastime, his 
children would have new clothes that he ordered out of the Sears and Roebuck catalog. 
Alice also remembers that even though their family had experienced times of severe 
hunger before he worked at the site, her father would send money to CARE and the 
March of Dimes every month. Kaktovik, adjacent to the largest site in the Western Sector 
(and perhaps with the greatest need to bolster community relations) fared better as far as 
local employment at the site: from all accounts it appears that if a man wanted to work, 
he could get a job there. Alice Agiak said, “They hired Isaac, my dad, Wilson -  just to 
keep them working. Making jobs” (Agiak, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
Betty Tulugak reported that there were about two families from Wainwright who 
worked at the site there and they were wealthier. She is pretty sure she considered them 
lucky: “At that time there was benefits because there was hardly any work -  nobody was 
in the Guard anymore” (Tulugak, Sep. 18, 2009, Wainwright).
Extra benefits ensued when Tanik DEW Liners became family members. Carla 
Sims Kayotuk of Kaktovik is certainly better off due to her father’s industrious and 
entrepreneurial character. Mark Sims was accepted into the tribe when Carla’s parents 
decided to marry. After he quit his job of many years as a supply clerk working at the 
DEW Line, Mark Sims worked in the post office and for the airlines before opening 
Kaktovik’s first store, which Carla inherited.
Gertrude Frankson from Point Lay experienced many benefits when her mother 
married a cook at the DEW Line site. Gertrude’s (step)father took her to vacation by RV
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in the Lower 48 every summer, usually in California. Gertrude had an overall extremely 
positive attitude about the DEW Line and considered that she had been particularly lucky 
because since her dad was a cook there, she could go visit anytime and have ice cream 
floats.
“Sometimes I felt like we had the advantage, we had all this stuff, more better 
fresher groceries,” said Sammy Lennie, who remembers eating beef for quaq (raw frozen 
meat) and, when his parents were away, lazily filling up buckets with cans of tuna or 
bricks of ham to feed the family dog team instead of catching, freezing, and thawing out 
fish (April 3, 2009, Fairbanks). Unlike other families, Sammy’s did not have to gather 
firewood because they had an oil stove and received free oil from the DEW Line.
However, there’s often not enough money to go around and money can make 
people unusually stingy. Evelyn Gordon remembered that her brother-in-law did get paid, 
but he would only loan it to family and friends. “He used to say -  only if you borrow I’ll 
let you have some. And when they got money they give it back to him” (E. Gordon, May 
25, 2009, Kaktovik). Reflecting on the economic benefits of the DEW Line, most people 
don’t remember the short boom that came with construction over 50 years ago. They 
remember the economy it provided for decades. George Agnasagga said about Point Lay, 
“It was good for one family only. Other than that no one else got employed” (Agnasagga, 
Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright). Bruce Iglangasak was equally skeptical about the long-term 
economic impact of DEW in Canada’s western Arctic: “Maybe one or two families out of 
the community” (May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
There were some disadvantages to being DEW Line employee families. When 
they lived at the site outside Tuktoyaktuk, Sammy often got in fights with kids who 
teased him about being a ‘DEW Line kid’ who should go back and be with his own kind. 
(Sammy defended himself well and had family in Tuk he could spend time with). A more 
serious disadvantage was that when their fathers worked at the remote sites (for Sammy, 
these were Tununuk and Shingle Point), school-age children of DEW Line employees 
were sent away to residential boarding schools from fall to spring every year. Sammy
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believes his father lost the connection to his children because they were away all their 
school lives.
Sammy’s dad worked on the Line for twenty years, had records showing that in 
twenty years he had missed two days of work without arranging it, and he never received 
a pension. Sammy, as an adult, tried in vain to sort this out. He was informed that local 
people hadn’t been interested in pensions at the time they worked and/or that fiscal 
responsibility for such expenses was unclear because of the joint Canadian/U.S. 
ownership of the Line.
By the time Robert Thompson moved to Kaktovik42 in the 1980s, only one man 
worked full time at the DEW Line and Robert could not see it being a large part of the 
economy. More importantly, the few people that did work there had only labor jobs and 
never received training for technical work. Aware of this issue, University of Alaska 
anthropologist Ivar Skarland explained in a 1955 letter that the Inupiat of Arctic Alaska 
should receive training near home and gainful employment at the DEW Line. Skarland 
explained that officials in Washington DC and Juneau had well-intentioned plans to do 
things fo r  the Natives, but that too often these top-down policies instead did things to the 
Natives. Most of the officials in DC, according to Skarland (1955), were not qualified to 
make policy recommendations on this issue. “Why not find out what the people 
themselves want before doing things for and to them?” he asked.
The reason for Skarland’s “tirade,” as he called it, was a recent discussion about 
bringing high-school age children from the Arctic and Bering Sea regions to high schools 
in Fairbanks and Anchorage. He wrote that while the people of the Arctic and other 
remote regions wanted an education like Whites received, they also wanted their children 
home or as near to home as possible. Skarland laid out some of the problems with Native 
employment: while hundreds of people were employed in remote areas, only a few 
employees were Native and those were usually employed in the lowest pay grades, as 
even lower-rung jobs required training equivalent to a high school education. It was, he
42 Robert Thompson’s mother was from Wainwright, he grew up in the Interior and was chief of 
Minchumina before moving to Kaktovik, his w ife’s hometown.
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argued, in the Native people and the nation’s best interest to have schools and training 
centers nearby:
For our defensive purposes we need a population in the Arctic, not only temporary 
garrisons. This means that there will be many more job openings than before, most o f  
which need some technical training: fo r  example, on the DEW line. Most people imported 
from the States, or even from the more southern parts o f Alaska, are generally miserable 
here. Some may remain a year or two and write a book on it. The Eskimos not only like it, 
but prefer to live in the Arctic.
Skills
Industry publications and other media concerning the DEW Line consistently 
argue that employment at the DEW Line was an excellent opportunity for Natives 
because they received a significant amount of training on the job and gained skills that 
would be valuable to them throughout their working lives. With two minor exceptions, 
this claim was not supported by the research. Several men did learn “cat skinning,” (how 
to operate a bulldozer), which was a skill that they were sometimes able to use in other 
aspects of their lives. Asked whether he acquired skills or a trade, Robert Alexie’s 
response was typical: “Nah. No. Labor, that’s all. Oh, I did a little cat skinning” (July 6, 
2008, Fort McPherson, NWT). However, this skill was not valuable to Robert later in life 
(“I seen and done with that!”) and in fact he warned young people about how hard it was 
on one’s body to run a dozer long-term. Isaac Akootchook worked at the site for 25 years 
and claimed he learned no valuable skills. However, he remembered making quite an 
impression on the youth of Kaktovik when the community started whaling and Isaac fired 
up a bulldozer to haul the first whale on shore.
Healthcare
From the Canadian government’s point of view, the most important responsibility 
of the DEW Line was the extension of modem health services to the Inuit. The stations 
included extensive medical facilities to treat sick or injured crew, and these services also 
applied to Inuit employees and their families. Continuing in the tradition of the Hudson
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Bay, construction companies on the DEW Line (Northern Construction Co., Western 
Electric, Federal Electric) fought against responsibility for nearby Inuit who were 
affected by the new industry. The lack of any alternative medical services left camp 
managers with little choice when faced with requests for help and thus, by default, the 
medical services were often extended to other community members.
In Canada, the government attempted to develop an agreement with the operators 
of the line to formally act as medical services for local Inuit. This opportunistic 
combination of services did offer immediate medical service, but a host of complications 
followed. Medical staff was often overwhelmed by the nature of the injuries or diseases 
needing treatment and were often unable to deliver effective treatment to women and 
children. By 1962, the fear of malpractice suits, the complex method of determining who 
should give permission and pay for what service, and the threat to the effective operation 
of DEW stations forced Federal Electric to end medical services to all but its own 
employees. For the regions where the DEW Line was built, however, the greatly 
increased contact that came with the radar stations and airports facilitated the transport of 
diseases and contagious sicknesses -  not to mention other sources for illness such as 
alcohol and unwanted pregnancies. Non-employees were therefore clearly affected by the 
DEW line but were deprived of medical services adequate to deal with those impacts.
Walt Audi thinks that the DEW Line was overall beneficial to people because of 
the jobs it created, but he did not think that it actually provided healthcare. He recalled 
that “they had a room that had medicine and stuff in it” and, upon reflection, that there 
was a doctor. “But he was a strange guy. I’m not sure I’d want him working on me. But 
he was there in emergencies” (Audi, Aug. 8, 2008, Kaktovik).
Harry Merriman remembered that the contractor always kept a doctor on at Barter 
Island while he was there. Laughing, he described that he was “always a little skeptical 
about the quality of the doctors they got.” He ascribed this to the fact that doctors on the 
DEW Line did not earn as much as they made elsewhere. While he was bartending at 
Barter, the doctor stationed there came in every day at the end of his shift, at 5:30 on the 
dot. “He’d come in and he’d want a glass of vodka. I mean a water glass. He would chug
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that, turn on his heel, and you wouldn’t see him again the rest of the night. I guess he was 
an okay doctor, but.. .1 don’t know if that is what he had to do to cope with staying there” 
(Merriman, March 3, 2009, Fairbanks).
Harry did think that the health care made available through the DEW Line was 
helpful to the indigenous people. “It’s health care that they would never have gotten any 
other way. So it was some benefit to them that way” (Merriman, March 3, 2009, 
Fairbanks).
Many local people, when asked, recalled going to the DEW Line doctor or taking 
someone else there once or twice. Nora Jane Bums remembered that, more so than 
Christmas parties or movies, it was a big advantage to have the emergency care (i.e. shots 
for streptococcus). Carla Sims Kayotuk remembered that everybody would see the dentist 
up at the DEW Line, but she was not sure if he actually worked for the military.
Robert Thompson could not think of any advantages of the DEW Line’s presence 
for Arctic residents and explained that the emergency services available at the site did not 
actually constitute health care. Although they did have a medic that people could go see, 
he remembered, it was in no way set up for standard health care and that was not 
something they did.
“[Y]ou almost fe lt like you were imposing on them ifpeople went there. It was sort o f like 
part o f what they had to do. I  don’t think it was the DEW Line’s responsibility fo r health 
care — it should have been taken care o f by the government. The DEW Line — it was 
mostly private contractors. They don’t feel an obligation to take care o f the native 
people” (Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
Race Relations
Bob Pittenger described his first trip to the DEW Line site near Wainwright, 
Alaska. He and a few others went to investigate the village and found that every home 
had large, unheated subterranean entryways. They went to the store and on the way down 
the passage they stepped over dead seals, caribou, and other unidentified objects. A 
Native man opened the door who had had half of his face blown off by a whale bomb.
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Pittenger found himself overwhelmed by the cold, the dark, the unfamiliar smells, and the 
sensation of being trapped in an earthen tunnel with these foreign people. “I don’t know 
how to describe my reaction. To say I was scared would be a gross understatement” 
(2000: 114)43. Pittenger quickly recovered and adapted: “The people were very nice. I 
think they were more curious about us than we were. The building of the DEW Line 
would affect them more than anything had for a long time” (ibid).
Hal Phillips thinks that questions of race relations on the DEW Line depend a 
great deal on the time frame being referenced. His impression is that the DEW Liners 
were a novelty when they first got there, and that both groups were very curious about 
each other. Phillips, who left in 1959, expects that things were very different as time went 
on. “I think we caused changes. We were right there in their backyard” (Phillips, Dec. 13, 
2006, Texas City, Texas).
As well as doctor and counselor to the DEW Liners, Gareth Howerd was also the 
only nearby physician for the indigenous population. Howerd’s education was poor 
preparation for interacting with the local residents, and he was shocked to realize that the 
Inuit ate seals. His first call on a sick resident of the Old Settlement near his base on 
Baffin Island was an eye-opening experience. He was not prepared for the “shacks” that 
he thought must have grown rather than been built - “of driftwood, odd scraps of timber, 
rags and any other white man’s jetsam which came the Eskimos’ way” (Howerd 1960: 
65). “No wonder,” he thought, “the Government are moving the Eskimos from these 
hovels to wooden houses...” (ibid). Recovering from the smell of the large seal on the 
floor, Howerd reasoned that the smell did not bother the Inupiat because they ate the meat 
and were like a Frenchman who does not notice that he smells of garlic. Applying this 
logic, Howerd adapted and began to eat raw seal meat himself before visiting patients in 
the Old Settlement, which worked very well.
Doctor Howerd was profoundly concerned that his first Inuit patient would not 
recover, that this would destroy the Inuit’s confidence in him right at the start and
43Arctic Tales and Arctic Tales, the unpublished manuscript in The Pittenger Papers Collection in the 
University o f Alaska Fairbanks Rasmuson archives, does not indicate the date it was written, although it 
appears to be sometime after the mid-seventies. The collection was given to the archives in 2000.
192
undermine the Government scheme for helping them (ibid: 68). He was relieved at the 
plan then underway to build the township at Frobisher Bay to encourage the Inuit to 
abandon their “precarious” way of life for stable jobs and permanent homes, especially as 
the seal population had been decreasing and the old ways were becoming even more 
difficult. Several times he asserted that no Inuit family would ever starve again, and that 
customs of infanticide and abandonment of the elderly were gone.
Reflected the faith in evolutionary progress that was prevalent in the fifties, 
Howerd commented on the tough job facing the RCMP: “Theirs was the difficult task of 
steering a primitive people from the Stone Age into the twentieth century” (ibid: 62). He 
credited the DEW Line for speeding the transformation of the Inuit to “a citizen of a 
prosperous nation of the Atomic Age” and praised the people for being so quick to leam 
and “exceedingly efficient,” despite this being their first paid work (ibid: 74). Howerd 
wrote that the Inuit absorbed the white man’s ways without showing much outward 
change, which seems to have been based on his observations that despite modem 
gadgetry and conveniences, Inuit mothers still snuggled their babies in their parka hoods 
and hunters parked their dog teams in front of their homes just like folks parked their cars 
in Montreal (ibid: 74).
Howerd proudly reported that “a colour bar was unknown here and the law was as 
impartial to Eskimos as to whites” (ibid). He was impressed by the careful and precise 
Canadian citizenship ceremony that took place while he was at Baffin Bay, when many 
whites and Inuit crowded into a room dominated by flags and a portrait of the Queen. 
“The presence of the Eskimos was regarded as important by the R.C.M.P.s for the 
occasion was a vital opportunity to show these people what it meant to belong to a great 
Dominion” (ibid: 63). Howerd laughed at the “ever-smiling Eskimos” as a new citizen 
took the oath and, after a drum roll, he played “God Save the Queen” on a portable 
gramophone while all the whites straightened up with their hands to their hearts. After 
repeating that the Inuit appeared to have little understanding of what was going on, he 
said: “I think we all learned something important that afternoon” (ibid: 63).
193
To Harry Merriman’s recollection and experience, the people in Arctic 
communities “showed no bias, no racism whatsoever, [they were] very friendly, very 
helpful, just made great friends and great workers, for the most part.” Harry does think 
that the culture has changed dramatically, but less due to the DEW Line than to ANCSA 
and oil development.
Howerd had an almost complete lack of skepticism about potential negative 
impacts the DEW Line might have on the native inhabitants and believed strongly in the 
inherent advantages of “progress.” The sensitive politics of the time constrained people’s 
criticism of any aspect of defense projects, and as a new citizen (he immigrated from 
England right before his DEW Line tour) Howerd was wary of criticizing Canadian 
policies. He knew that the previous influence of whites on the Inuit had been devastating, 
and he believed that “now we are making amends” and hoped that it was not too late to 
save them from extinction (Howerd 1960: 158). “Now the mineral wealth of the Arctic is 
on the verge of being extensively tapped. And once again the life of the Eskimo is going 
to be changed. Let’s hope it is for the better” (ibid).
Bob Pittenger, in charge of actually building the industrial future of the North 
alongside Inuit laborers, was not quite as confident about the positive impacts of western 
civilization. “These people made a living from one of the most hostile environments in 
the world. They were amazing people. I doubt their contact with white man has been 
beneficial” (Pittenger 2000: 116). Writing in the mid-to-late seventies, Pittenger reflected 
on the transformation that had taken place on the North Slope since he left:
I  am told around Prudhoe Bay it looks like a major city. I  wonder what will happen to the 
people and the land when the oil is gone. It might be possible to restore the land but the 
people can never go back to what they were. I  don't know i f  that is good or bad but I  
loved them as they were.
Reflecting on the nature of social contact between the White workers and the 
local Inuit, Pittenger recalled, “We didn’t go the native village much.” The main reasons
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for this seems to have been that it was extremely difficult to get a vehicle to go to the 
village and the consequences of getting in any kind of trouble there were serious: “The 
Commissioner tried to protect the Eskimos... [] In hindsight, what he did was to delay the 
introduction of many of the white man’s bad traits” (Pittenger 2000). Getting in trouble in 
the village would get a DEW Line employee sent to Fairbanks if he was lucky, Pittenger 
recalled.
Howerd found the Inuit to be very honest and “a most peaceable people” (Howerd 
1960: 136) and included an interesting description of an old Inuit method of settling 
disputes, wherein the two men involved were made to sit face to face and make up verses 
maligning the other. The loser was the one who first gave up “this battle of invective” 
(Howerd 1960: 136). More common was the custom of elders sending both disputants off 
in different directions for a predetermined set of time, after which they would come back, 
quarrel forgotten. Howerd reflected on the direction of his own society: “It is an idea 
which could be copied among people who claim to be more civilized than those of the 
north” (1960: 136).
Naturally, not all DEW Liners were as thoughtful or adventurous. There are 
several stories of men who did twelve months, barely went outside, and could not say 
which way was North if they did go out. One long-time Barter Island DEW Liner scoffed 
at the notion that he would have any reason to go to the village or have anything to do 
with locals. Amid disparaging remarks about the cleanliness of locals’ houses, he 
gratuitously explained that Inuit females body type did not appeal to him and, “I was 
never that desperate for sex.” The unfortunate truth is that one dislikeable and racist 
character can do much to harm relations between groups, but this type of ignorance was 
not the norm on the DEW Line. Moreover, the nature of a DEW Line site meant that 
individuals who were not interested in the local people or the environment were rarely in 
situations where they had to interact with the community. Unlike a military base with a 
mission of actively patrolling the area or doing business with locals where personnel are 
required to interact with local society whether they want to or not, DEW Liners with 
racist outlooks could largely keep those attitudes contained within the module trains.
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Thus, the DEW Line created a situation where interactions occurred more often with 
people who desired the interaction and this had a strong positive impact on race relations.
Robert Alexie remembered that relations were “okay, they were strict, that’s all. 
No drinking, no taking no liquor no nothing, going to town. I know Tuk, they were very 
strict” (July 6, 2008, Fort McPherson, NWT). Quite a few DEW Liners from the remote 
Shingle Point Auxiliary site used to walk down to the Native camps on Shingle Point spit 
and spend time with the people camping and hunting there before going back to the site. 
Nellie Arey remembers that they were totally friendly and that Natives were welcomed 
up at the site as well, where they had a little canteen.
Nora Jane Bums does not remember any racism on Barter Island either. “Because 
we had military here, and I just thought of them as regular people” (Bums, July 31, 2008, 
Kaktovik). However, when she moved to Barrow in the fifth grade, she realized that 
many people were “anti-White and stuff, 'cause I was told ‘go home, honky.’” When 
Nora Jane Bums found out from her father what ‘honky’ meant, he explained to her that 
her grandmother’s father was a Yankee whaler. Nora Jane was shocked, saying, “I 
thought I was Eskimo!” Nora Jane never saw that kind of racism on Barter Island, and the 
children whose fathers worked at the DEW Line were not bullied by other kids about it. 
After hearing about Sammy’s experience at Tuk, Nora Jane concluded that it was 
different on Barter Island because the village was so close to the site that it was a bit like 
the villagers were part of the DEW Liners’ social life and the children made the men less 
lonely. “’Cause when we were kids we used to go up in there even though they tell us not 
to (laughsj. We never listened, we just go up there.” She recalls that they went through 
everything and “there was some white guys that were decent” who would give the kids 
snacks and who befriended the village. “I think that's how it kind of started breaking 
down, they start making friends and whatnot, so” (Bums, July 31, 2008 and May 27,
2009, Kaktovik).
Amos Agnasagga, who attributes the decline of his home village of Point Lay to 
the alcohol introduced by the DEW Liners, did not have any issue with the individuals
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who worked there. “Oh yeah, they was pretty good people. I mean, they didn’t think they 
were doing wrong” (Agnasagga 1998).
In Wainwright, Isaac Panik was able to visit the base relatively often because his 
father was a friend of the station chief. Despite Isaac’s subsequent mistrust of the 
military, he was extremely fond of the DEW Line site and the people who worked there 
when he was a child. “I was not afraid of the site, I considered them as family, they were 
very good people, the individuals. [] The people there were very open, very kind. I liked 
them a lot. The people who gave me an impression were personable” (Panik, Sep. 13, 
2009, Wainwright).
Robert Thompson’s observation on relations with the DEW Liners was that 
people generally got along. “I don’t think there was any active hostility. But, to be 
realistic, white people generally didn’t respect Native people, but that’s just the way it 
was. It’s that way around the world” (Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
That lack of respect earned the same in many cases. Predictably, Mary Ann 
Warden did not want to divulge much, but she let on that the Inupiat who worked at the 
DEW Line had special nicknames for all the tanik DEW Liners they worked with. For 
example, one fellow who began every sentence with “Believe you me” became known by 
that phrase among locals for the duration of his employment at Barter. Mary Ann’s father 
became incensed at a taunting he received from Believe You Me, so he rolled up a piece 
of paper and hit him over the head with it and “that was the end of his violence.”
Polar Echoes
Clearly, many aspects of life on the DEW Line never made it into the heroic films 
and other publications produced by the industry contractors. Perhaps more realistic than 
Western Electric’s version, National Geographic painted its own style of life at the sites: 
“[LJoneliness.. .lends a dreamlike quality to existence in the north” (La Fay 1958: 144). 
Three quarters of the men on the DEW Line were married and “boredom and isolation 
are the chief enemies of the DEW Liners as they wait.. .for the ominous blip on a radar 
screen that could unleash a holocaust” (ibid). Neither industry nor media reported on the 
grittier aspects, such as stories of the men sent home when they were discovered with
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Inuit women in their rooms or, as Dr. Howerd saw on his way to the Arctic, the women 
who “worked the trains” to fleece the men hitting civilization after months on the DEW 
Line (Howerd 1960: 32).
Such concerns were certainly not raised in the pages of Dewline Polar Echoes, the 
radar system’s monthly magazine that was published from 1956-1959 by Federal Electric 
Company at its headquarters in Paramus, New Jersey. The purpose of the publication was 
to keep DEW Liners posted on news and activities of their fellow Liners, to give them 
some laughs, to supply information on company matters, and to bring news of the DEW 
Line to folks at home so that they could feel closer to and proud of their family members 
sacrifice, stationed for year-long duty at the remote sites. For the burgeoning military 
industrial complex, the monthly DEW Line fanzine was an opportunity to finesse its Cold 
War public relations schemes.
Despite the industry’s disregard for Natives, many DEW Liners were genuinely 
excited by the chance to work with Inuit and they were also very proud of them. 
References in the Dewline Polar Echoes to Inuit, almost always using the possessive 
‘ours’, relay information on local residents’ activities at the time: “Some personal 
messages from our Eskimos here at FOX-D were taped up and sent to Edmonton and 
Hamilton where relations and friends of our Eskimos are being treated” (Federal Electric 
Co. 1959b: 13); “Our regular Eskimo.. .is fast becoming our ‘Bumper’ pool champ” 
(Federal Electric Co. 1959c: 7); “Winter has set in; but in spite of his efforts to snow us 
in, Charlie Klengenberg, our new Eskimo, has made quick work of the snowfalls to date 
with the D8” (Federal Electric Co. 1959a: 5). When a rare female doctor was rumored to 
be arriving at FOX Two, a report from the station joked: “it appears that an attempt is 
being made to irradiate the ‘skimoes in the area, with a mysterious ray, X is the term 
used, and the lady is to perform the aforementioned irradiation” (Federal Electric Co. 
1959b: 14).
Some DEW Line employees took a special interest in Inuit language and culture, 
and part of this is reflected in the pages of Polar Echoes. Carrn Celentino of PIN Main 
(Cape Parry, NWT) reported that the entire station turned out to help give a Christmas
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party “for the Eskimo people and especially for their children’ (Federal Electric Co. 
1959a: 6). Celentino wrote that the festivities started with a blessing by a priest, then he 
(Celentino), acting as MC, gave a short explanation and welcoming address in both 
English and Inupiaq. Speeches followed, ending with one by “our Eskimo friend, Joe 
Thrasher, on behalf of the Eskimos” (ibid). Celentino’s report also reveals that he wrote 
poetry, enjoyed some good music by “Eric Lester and his Eskimo Hawaiians,” and that 
he assisted another group of “Eskimo musicians” on drums. He was delighted to report: 
“an impromptu dance was held, the Eskimos, both children and grown-ups, gave many of 
us our first view of an Eskimo bailie” (ibid).
Several of the stations reported on Christmas parties they had thrown for the 
children of Inupiat employees, and many reflected that the difficulty of being separated 
from their families during the holidays was lessened by how much joy it brought to give 
parties and presents to the kids. Forty-five children at FOX DLM received presents and 
had all the Coke, hamburgers, and French fries they could eat while they watched “Snow 
White and the Seven Dwarfs” for Christmas (Federal Electric Co. 1959b: 6).
The Thrilling Cold War
A key ingredient in the DEW Line’s social mixture was a pervasive Cold War 
ideology. Security was “something to think about,” as the DEW Line magazine reminded 
readers. All persons involved with the air defense system had to be aware at all times that 
these types of classified defense projects were “natural, logical targets for enemy agents” 
(Federal Electric Co. 1959d: 3). The magazine editors reminded workers that enemy 
agents had long-term strategic programs to subvert the public, but other prongs included 
direct infiltration of industries handling defense contracts. This infiltration was being 
carried on as never before, one warning continued, but it was difficult to recognize the 
real and active enemies whose design was to perpetrate espionage and sabotage.
Everyone was suspect, and the magazine informed the DEW Line population that, “the 
subversive tide directed from Moscow will leave no stone unturned, to attain communist 
objectives” (ibid).
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This was a curious message for local residents to absorb: trust us, but trust no one. 
Don’t be overly enthused, don’t let your good nature or need for recognition lead you to 
indiscriminately help those less fortunate than yourself, and do not speak to your families 
and Mends about classified information (it is not fair to burden them with the knowledge) 
(ibid). Residents were warned that “Saboteurs of the Atomic Age” were a far cry from 
previous traitors, and that nothing less than the survival of the planet and mankind was at 
stake (ibid).
Richard Gordon believed that the Cold War certainly did instill fear in people, 
commanding them to watch for spies and warning against talking to strangers. “They 
were always on the alert,” he said (R. Gordon, July 24, 2008, Herschel Island, Yukon 
Territory). Gordon also observed that a highly secretive DEW Line society was 
strengthened by the fact that once people gained positions at the sites, they protected 
them and followed orders -  i.e., they did not mention what was going on at the base 
during their time off for fear of losing their job.44 Gordon said that there were secrecy 
stories from people that worked there “that you wouldn't believe” (July 24, 2008,
Herschel Island, Yukon Territory). In Kaktovik, Carla Sims Kayotuk remembers hearing 
about Russians trying to attack them when she was growing up, but mainly from her 
uncle. She thinks that people living near DEW Line sites received a heavier dose of Cold 
War messages, although her father (a tanik DEW Liner) did not scare his children with 
them.
The only mention of communist infiltration made in Doctor Howerd’s memoir 
regards the infamous Moscow Molly, whose sultry voice came over the pole from the 
USSR as she played popular American songs interspersed with propaganda messages. 
Addressing her American and Canadian “fellow workers” and “Mends” working in the 
Arctic radar stations, Moscow Molly Med to convince DEW Liners to give up their 
misleading, war mongering capitalist masters and abandon their work.
44 “So it was something that was put upon you - again, we did not understand what kind o f a war we were 
at or what W-A-R meant but i f  you leaked it out we were going to hurt everybody so we were hush hush.” 
-  Richard Gordon.
200
For a place where a main complaint of employees was boredom, the DEW Line 
made an ideal setting for Cold War espionage thrillers and sci-phi horror movies. One 
fictional work of the era, Dale o f the Mounted DEW Line Dutyput the Arctic radar system 
at the center of heated international action replete with savvy Mounties out-maneuvering 
Dew-Line-wide communist spy networks in which every “swarthy” communist infiltrator 
had an unhealthy, sallow complexion and shifty eyes (Holliday, 1957). Beyond the 
fantastic plot and plenty of high-tech fodder for militaristic technophiles, the book 
contains a considerable historical information on the DEW Line. While the intrepid 
RCMP voyages across the Arctic, the reader learns about the network of long thin lines 
on the tundra made by the tractor trains that ferried supplies to the sites, failed early 
attempts to deliver bulldozers to the sites by dropping them with parachutes out of planes, 
and “Eskimo-developed” ways to test ice thickness (Holliday 1957: 37, 40, 41). 
Furthermore, no Arctic thriller would be complete without Navy frogmen in frigid water 
being mistaken for seals and shot at by Inuit (ibid: 42).
Holliday includes this information alongside a detailed description of how “the 
Eskimos hadn’t thought much about money before.. .It had quite an influence on their 
way of primitive living” (1957: 44). “Already these fellows have caught on,” one 
character was happy to report, and it was charming that boys liked U.S. officer badges on 
their parkas, girls liked lipstick and finger-nail polish, and all Eskimos were fascinated 
with chemical hand warmers (Holliday 1957: 45). A serious Canadian bureaucrat in the 
book pointed out that the Canadian government arranged to bank all but $120 from each 
Native’s pay -  the authorities did not want the money squandered and they knew the jobs 
would peter out. (The book did not mention if the Natives wondered whether the 
government had any right to withhold their pay.)
The freedom afforded by fiction allowed suspicions about the Cold War military 
build up to be voiced through characters whose (Canadian) patriotism was 
unquestionable. Throughout Dale o f the Mounted DEW Line Duty, Dale, the tough- 
minded Mountie, had several occasions to ask members of the Canadian Defence
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Research Board and military officers questions such as: “Do you feel that the three radar 
lines will be worthless by the time they are completed?” (Holliday 1957: 37).
This Cold War mythology was also rich with fantastic Arctic stereotypes. The spy 
network communicated via messages “encoded” in Inuktitut syllabic on the bottom of 
tiny Inuit soapstone carvings. The messages to coordinate the system-wide sabotage were 
delivered by the Inuit carver, who traveled by dog team to all the sites and sold the 
special items to certain radio operators. Other secret operatives were busy bumping off 
Oblate Fathers and traveling far and wide to all the Inuit communities while 
masquerading in the missionaries’ costumes. The false White Fathers gave wads of 
counterfeited money to the Inuit and convinced them that working on the radar sites was 
evil and “can bring bad luck to Eskimo people” (Holliday 1957: 64). Without the native 
employees, work stalled on the sites even before the communist saboteurs used their 
mysterious black suitcase with futuristic equipment to send high-frequency radio signals 
to every radar and take over guided missile tests. Fortunately, a nerdy Air Force officer 
(who was busy reading a book on anthropology) was able to translate the native language 
when the Mountie needed it (Holliday 1957: 109).45 As it turned out, “the Eskimo’s 
weakness in succumbing to the offer of a higher price might just be the weak stitch in the 
carefully-woven fabric of international intrigue and espionage” (Holliday 1957: 108).
Thinking back to that era, however, Ben Linn of Kaktovik does not think he was 
ever afraid of the Russians despite the Cold War message. Mary Ann Warden of 
Kaktovik did not think so either, and Robert Thompson thought the drills at Lathrop High 
School (in Fairbanks) were silly and he calculated that Barter Island and Fairbanks would 
not be the Russian’s top targets. On the other hand, Isaac Panik remembers that he bought 
the message and the DEW Line provided ease of mind and a feeling of security. He was 
taught that the Russians were dangerous and that the Cold War was a real threat. Despite 
those two beliefs, Isaak has never felt like Wainwright played a role in the Cold War 
(Panik, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
45 The translation yielded this cryptic message: “The sky harpoon is next, on the day o f the Great White 
Fathers,” (Holliday 1957: 109).
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“Even if we didn’t dwell on it our proximity to Russian air bases was real,” Bob 
Pittenger (2000) admitted in his memoirs. Pittenger may have had conflicting thoughts 
about who the “weak stitch” in any international intrigue might be. A small Army group 
set up on the outskirts of the DEW Line site doing “super secret work,” Pittenger wrote. 
“They would never tell us what they were doing but we got them drunk a couple times 
and they spoke Russian. They were monitoring Russian radio” (ibid: 162). Pittenger 
marveled at the experiences of one Inuit family who were out seal hunting when a freak 
wind blew them to Siberia. After the Soviets had determined that they were not spies, 
they did not know what to do with them and he family ended up going on a Cold War 
odyssey to Vladivostock, Tokyo, San Francisco, Seattle, Fairbanks, and finally back to 
Barrow.
On the whole, Pittenger made very little commentary about the Cold War forces 
that kept him employed on the North Slope. He did recount that when he became the 
superintendent of the POW-1 DEW site (Point Lonely) he had to pass clearance for secret 
information, even though he had no more access to information than he had in the past. 
The military administered to Pittenger an extremely lengthy survey with all manner of 
personal questions that was to be held in the strictest confidence, and then it was lost.
“I’m not trying to imply that the project was inefficient,” Pittenger wrote. “For the size 
and scope of it, it was very well run” (Pittenger 2000: 145). However, after he had a run 
in with an Air Force VEP who did not know which way North was and he himself had to 
override “stupid” conflicting orders from Western Electric, he did indicate that the line 
was well run despite some incompetence on the part of the military and industry (2000: 
144). Pittenger did have complete confidence that the early warning radar line would 
work in case of a massive attack by the Soviets: “I was happy that the Russians knew we 
did not have any military, just radar. If we had gone to war, the Russians would’ve blown 
up a couple of stations in the first minutes of the war and the whole line would have 
served its purpose. We would have known they were coming” (Pittenger 2000: 146).
Certain aspects of the Cold War did inspire thrilling scenarios for local residents. 
In particular, Soviet and U.S. nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines plying the
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depths of the ocean is an iconic Cold War scenario. Richard Gordon expressed that the 
subs were an example of the larger problem: “That’s the thing, we don't know what’s out 
there” (July 24, 2008, Herschel Island, Yukon Territory). Submarines also lend 
themselves to fantastic stories: submarine films constitute a subgenre of war films that 
are characterized by a high level of dramatic tension. Given that there were 26 WWII sub 
movies and 17 Cold War sub movies46, it is possible that indigenous residents may have 
seen one or two at their local DEW Line site. People were certainly aware that there were 
subs in the ocean and when they saw something strange sticking out of the water, they 
wondered whether it was a sub.47
Arctic submarine stories are very often connected with fears of abduction. This 
connection may be due to historic stories of whaling ships abducting people. “People live 
there, under the ice, maybe. Way down in the deep water, there,” remembered Daniel 
Akootchook (May 5, 2009), before he recounted the regionally well-known story of two 
people from Canada that were out hunting with their dogs and disappeared without a 
trace, leaving everyone to conclude that a submarine had abducted them. The 
Kaktovikmiut, then, were already highly suspicious of submarines when, on a dark fall 
night, Vincent Nageak and another man saw one and deduced it was trying to get to the 
beach and abduct them. The two men started yelling and screaming, thinking that a great 
deal of noise would convince the submariners that there were more than just two people. 
MaryAnn Warden of Kaktovik remembered that the men had heard a loud humming 
noise and concluded it was a submarine or another ship.
Love and Marriage
Certain kinds of social interactions between DEW Liners and locals were not 
reported on in the pages of the Polar Echoes. During the heyday of construction in the
46 There were also 6 pre-WWII sub movies, 6 post-Cold War sub movies to date, and 16 futuristic or 
fantasy sub movies. http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine films
47 Within the past three years there have been at least two incidents with subs in the Arctic, one involving 
an explosion in which two British submariners were killed and a third was airlifted to a U.S. military 
hospital. Bruce Iglangasak believed that people were unaware that there were nuclear subs in the Arctic 
Ocean until this accident made the news, but other interviewees had certainly heard o f them.
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western Canadian, for example, Jack Ferguson reported that the RCMP were charging 
two employees with contributing to the “juvenile delinquency” of a 14 year old girl. The 
two men had slept with two young women and were found guilty by the magistrate in 
Yellowknife. "I believe that every effort was made by all parties to keep the thing quiet," 
wrote Ferguson (1956). Bob Pittenger remembered that “If you got a girl in trouble you 
were really in trouble.. .Very few of the marriages between white men and native girls 
worked out. As long as they stayed in Barrow it usually was all right, but if  they went 
back to the Lower 48, it usually didn’t last. It was a terrible culture shock for the girls...” 
(Pittenger 1964: 73).
Hal Phillips engaged frequently in social activities outside of work with the local 
men and he loved attending dances in Point Lay, but he recalled that the women barely 
associated with the DEW Liners. His impression was that “they seemed almost bashful - 
very polite and everything, but they were not open” (Phillips, Dec. 13, 2006, Texas City, 
Texas). However, Hal’s co-worker48 at the Wainwright site had a girlfriend in that town, 
which is perhaps a sign of the difference in a larger community. Most people recall that 
the rules were quite strict and there was very little contact for many years between the 
DEW Line and the villages. By most accounts (with marriages as evidence), the situation 
started relaxing by the late 1960s and early 1970s. DEW Line rigger and longtime 
Kaktovik resident Walt Audi, who first came to Barter in 1964 and later became the first 
Tanik to move his family to Kaktovik, said that the prohibition on visiting the village was 
“kind of a flukey deal.” The rule was that DEW Liners were not allowed to come to the 
village or they would get fired. “Of course, the village was in the radar site, almost, in the 
old days, over on the bluff there” (Audi, Aug. 8, 2008, Kaktovik).
MaryAnn Warden thought that the best way to characterize the relationship was 
that Inupiat “tolerated” the DEW Liners. At the same time that people did not want to be 
overwhelmed by scores of DEW Liners all over the island, they were seriously opposed
48 That particular co-worker became part o f DEW Line legend when, in order to visit that girlfriend, he was 
traveling over the lagoon to Wainwright in a Weasel when he fell through the ice and drowned. His 
memory was made stronger by the subsequent pan-DEW Line initiative to cut openings in the top o f every 
single Weasel at the radar sites.
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to DEW Line policies that attempted to separate male-female relationships that 
eventually occurred between the two groups. Mary Ann frowned with anger in describing 
how her “uncle Jack” (a tanik DEW Liner) and her aunt Alice left the village since they 
were not allowed to be together.
“There were some that were nice. Well, one of them married my aunt.” MaryAnn 
Warden remembers that the DEW Liner Jack France was beloved because he used to go 
out hunting with the men, which is how he got to know her aunt. He was also an excellent 
singer and a fantastic cook who would only sing while he was cooking. Warden 
remembered that Jack France was the one DEW Liner the children used to run after and 
try to catch whenever he came down from the base. Jack France married Mary Ann’s aunt 
in the early 1950s, probably the first DEW Liner at Barter Island to marry a local. He was 
subsequently banned from visiting his wife. Forced to choose between his job and his 
wife, Jack Frances quit his job at the DEW Line and, with his wife, moved away from 
Barter Island.
“There wasn't supposed to be socializing between the two, I think. But, my mom 
and dad ended up together anyway,” said Carla Sims Kayotuk (May 29, 2009, Kaktovik). 
When her father and mother started going out, the DEW Line sent somebody down to the 
village a few times to try to order him back to the site, but Carla’s mother’s family hid 
Mark Sims in their house. In order for him to move into the village and marry her mother, 
Mark Sims had to be adopted by the tribe. Carla Sims Kayotuk thought that about seven 
DEW Liners had married local women. Several of the couples stayed in Kaktovik for a 
period of time after their job at the DEW Line ended, but Carla’s father Mark Sims was 
the only one who (until his premature death) stayed permanently in town.
Alice Agiak claimed that she did not really notice any relationships between 
DEW Liners and local woman when she was young, and that it was later than couples 
began to form. Smiling at a picture of herself dressed up at a DEW Line function, Alice 
thought the workers there were “pretty nice” when they invited the villagers up for 
Christmas and Thanksgiving (Agiak, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik). Agiak commented that 
the DEW Liners did drink a lot, but that they were friendly. Nora Jane Bums remembers
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her aunt getting ready for a community dance and that it made things more interesting for 
the young women that military men would be coming.
Upon seeing a photograph of five DEW Liners posing in front of the fireplace in a 
Fairbanks bar in 1967, both Mary Ann Warden and Alice Agiak were able to identify 
them and Alice had dated one. (Alice’s brother John Niglik took one glance at the same 
picture and quickly identified the bar as Tommie’s Elbow Room).
Harry Merriman did see socializing and what he called “short term relationships” 
in the larger city of Barrow during his years on the DEW Line. “And I'm sure that didn't 
help some of the females. Probably confused the girls.” However, he hardly saw any 
evidence of sexual relations between DEW Liners and locals at other sites, particularly on 
Barter Island since Kaktovik was “more of a Native village” (Merriman, March 3, 2009, 
Fairbanks).
As evidenced by Hal Phillip’s co-worker who perished in the weasel, DEW 
Liners had been dating women in Wainwright since the 1950s. Betty Tulugak (2009) of 
Wainwright remembered that “it was normal to have military guys” and that one of her 
cousins had a daughter by a DEW Liner, although they did not marry and the father 
moved away.
Considering the major social impacts of the DEW Line, Sammy Lennie said, “I 
could say they did leave a few DEW Line babies behind. [] I have a few DEW Line 
relatives. We used to call them when we were kids ‘DEW Line baby’” (Lennie, April 3, 
2009, Fairbanks). Sammy remembers one couple in Tuk who did marry, but the husband 
still lived at the site and would visit his wife in town. “They had pretty strict rules about 
females on the DEW Line,” Sammy said. Later these rules were relaxed, and girls in Tuk 
liked to party with the DEW Liners. However, Sammy remembered that at some point in 
every party, “it got pretty scary for DEW Liner, being the only white guy and everybody 
else is Native, it got time for them to go home.” As the evening progressed and plenty of 
alcohol was consumed, parties in Tuk got “pretty rowdy -  really rowdy” (Lennie, April 
3, 2009, Fairbanks). Still, some DEW Liners would head to town with a stash of booze to 
go curling, to party at the RCMP, and to try to pick up girls. It was quite common,
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according to Sammy Lennie, for the parents of the girls to raise any children bom of 
these unions.
As James VanStone found in Point Hope, some Native men were displeased with 
these developments. James Tazruk of Point Lay expressed disapproval of the ‘DEW Line 
baby’ trend and mentioned that it reminded him a bit of the movie “Braveheart” with Mel 
Gibson, “when they were trying to breed it out. They are trying to take the Native lines 
over or something” (Sep. 24, 2009, Point Lay). Of course, the DEW Liners were not 
trying to take over Native bloodlines; they were simply going after women -  one of the 
most consistent impacts of militarization throughout history and around the world.49
Women
Historically, Inuit were baffled by the all-male expeditions to the Arctic in part 
because they could not fathom why Taniks would want to travel without women. Several 
Inupiaq informants for this research were adamant in their description of a completely 
egalitarian traditional society in which women’s work was as highly valued as men’s, and 
the early era of military activity in the Arctic did not change that. Women could not enlist 
as soldiers, but during World War II, women in Yupik and Inupiaq villages had been 
allowed to enlist with the Alaska Territorial Guard. Roy Nageak of Barrow said that his 
mother and several women in town learned Morse code when they were in the ATG. 
Arnold Brower Sr. of Barrow fondly remembered working alongside his wife for the 
military during WWII, folding parachutes and taking care of equipment (Brower 2000). 
Many women earned money sewing mukluks and clothing for men at WWII-era bases.
Although there could be nostalgia and a rosier representation of history at play, 
the question is whether the DEW Line, as militarism is thought to do, introduced or 
reinforced a gendered nature of power and perspectives of a masculine-dominated world 
to the western Arctic. During the Cold War, American defense planners tried to shape the 
private institution of the family to fit the military demands of the national security state. 
To this end, they promoted policies that domesticated civil defense programs by
49 This author was invited over to POW-Main in Barrow for cocktails by a very friendly DEW Liner, who 
was distinctly less friendly when I inquired about bringing along my boyfriend.
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constructing them as home and family issues. The ideal family included a non-employed 
mother-homemaker as second in command under the leadership of the decision-maker 
husband (McEnaney 1996). In mainstream U.S. society, this process was facilitated by 
the fact that it depended on conventional gender role arrangements and not on the radical 
notions of independent women workers that labor shortages during World War II had 
required.
The DEW Line sites were male-only enclaves for the most part of their 
operational years, and it was only in the 1980s that a few women began working at them. 
Originally, the main representation of women at the sites was in the form of girlie pin-up 
posters. Inuit men were allowed to work and, often whether they were actual employees 
or not, play pool and poker, become ping-pong champions, and generally participate in 
the DEW Line world.
There is evidence that employment on the DEW Line did cause food shortages for 
employee’s families at times, and this was an issue that the Canadian government was 
highly sensitive about. The employees themselves were fed from one to three meals per 
day, but their families were not eating at the sites and their main provider did not have 
time to fish and hunt for them. The situation was sometimes exacerbated by delays in 
orders from the HBC, and particularly acute food shortages occurred at three sites in 
Canada’s western Arctic in the winter of 1956. In light of the Canadian government’s 
previous embarrassment from instances of starvation, they would have preferred that 
letters like this, sent to the head cook at a radar site from a local Inuvialuit mother, never 
came to light: “To sir cook - Would you please let us have a piece of meat to cook even 
though its small. We got nothing to eat. My children will be starving while there [sic]
Dad working and getting good meat every day while we get hungry having nothing to 
eat.”
The Kaktovikmiut have many stories of women managing to hunt, fish, and take 
care of the family when the men were working at the DEW Line. Nora Jane Bums’ 
grandmother used to go sealing with her cousin whenever their husbands worked. When 
her father was working at the DEW Line, Alice Agiak and her mother went fishing and
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hunting. Alice has also steered the boat for her family’s whaling crew herself and thinks 
it is ridiculous that women in other villages don’t participate. She also found it frustrating 
in Canada that when they were out on the land, the men did all the work and thought she 
was strange for wanting to help. Alice and others assert that Kaktovik women are 
particularly liberated.
Because her husband was away working at another site, Mary Akootchook took it 
upon herself to hunt caribou, seals and polar bears to feed her family. Mary’s daughter 
Jane described her 80-year old mother as one of the very few truly independent and 
liberated women, because she was completely capable of raising a family and expertly 
executed every aspect of hunting and survival. One time, Mary grew frustrated when her 
husband Isaac had been stationed at a remote DEW Line site for several months, but 
Isaac did not think he could request a transfer back to Barter. Mary marched up to the 
DEW Line to talk to the BAR-Main station chief herself, and her husband was transferred 
back to Barter Island the very next day (J. Thompson, Aug. 2005, Kaktovik).
Other women were not as fearless. Ruth Tagarook, who is the same age as Mary, 
was bom at a nomadic camp on the inland side of Barter Island. She grew up and lived in 
or around Kaktovik her entire life and married a man who came to Barter from 
Wainwright to work at the DEW line. Although it seems inconceivable, Ruth Tagarook 
claimed that she has not been to the DEW Line site once in these past 50 years. Ruth 
never went for the weekly movies, nor the holiday feasts, nor to the famous Barter Island 
Social Club, the luxurious bar and lounge out of which alcohol flowed to the now-dry 
community for decades. She did not actually say that she was afraid of the DEW Line 
site, but she made it clear that she had no desire to go there and insinuated that it was a 
place to be avoided.
To whatever extent new forms of patriarchy and the objectification of women 
were imported, most interviews left the impression that Inupiaq and Inuvialuit residents 
paid little heed to them. While women nationally made progress towards equality by 
joining the workforce during WWII, many of them were re-confined to traditional roles 
during the Cold War. In Kaktovik, many women were obliged to hunt for their families
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while their husbands worked at remote DEW Line sites. Women in Kakovik today are 
proud that their village produced incredibly strong, liberated and independent women.
Alcohol
The important job of building and maintaining a defense perimeter for all of 
North America served as a great motivator for DEW Liners (at least in the pages of the 
Polar Echoes), but life on the Line was equally inspired by another central subject: a 
never-ending and serious quest for beer and whiskey. The DEW Line created a veritable 
cult of alcohol in Alaska’s Arctic. Management during that era was largely permissive of 
drinking while loneliness, boredom, camaraderie, the lack of social deterrents and the 
sheer availability of alcohol exacerbated the men’s thirst. This created an authorized and 
sanctioned drinking atmosphere and an efficient system in which alcohol flowed up to 
and throughout the radar network in enormous quantities. The regular and over­
consumption of booze was celebrated among DEW Liners like war stories. Ingenuity on 
the part of locals and DEW Liners to get inebriated is widely respected and stories about 
this are shared often. DEW Liner stories about Native drinking ignore any reference to 
the repercussions of alcohol in native communities: the stories are funny, friendly, cute, 
brotherly, and patronizing. Natives recognize the large influx of alcohol as the most 
significant and a very negative social impact of the DEW Line. Alcohol reduces 
inhibition, thus it is not surprising that much of the evidence about alcohol also mentions 
sexual relations.
Briefly tracing the history of Point Lay, photographer and author Bill Hess 
discovered the significance of the radar station for the Kalimiut. “Following construction 
and manning of the DEW Line in the mid-1950s, Kali slipped into decline. ‘It was the 
alcohol,’ village Mayor Amos Agnassaga told me. ‘The DEW Line brought alcohol into 
the village. It really hurt the people.’ The military bar was open to a community that had 
never before had a convenient source of liquor. DEW Line personnel used drink as barter 
in the village. Social problems grew. The quality of life deteriorated. ‘The people who 
didn’t drink left first,’ Amos recalled. ‘Then, after they closed the school in 1958, the
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whole village left” (Hess 1999: 85-6). A decade earlier, Amos Agnasagga had described 
this in greater detail:
“I  liked living in Wainwright but I  thought about the place I  grew up. After all us 
kids went away to school the DEW Line was about the only thing left at Point Lay. I  have 
to strongly blame DEW Line for part o f the village decline. When the DEW line first 
started I  was growing up, in the 1950s. The first bunch o f men were construction workers 
and they used to come around with alcohol all the time and let50 the whole village get 
drunk. At first people thought it was something fun. After awhile the steady workers at 
DEW-line did the same thing. There was nobody to see the future o f how it was hurting 
the village. They didn’t have local option laws in those days. Pretty soon the steady 
village people started leaving. Then the next thing you know, it was an empty town.
That’s why we didn’t have enough kids to keep the school.
Now DEW-line keeps pretty much to themselves and the village keeps to itself. But 
we ’re on a friendly basis and willing to help each other. I t ’s changedfrom back then and 
now there's hardly any communication between the two groups. ” -  (Amos Agnasagga, 
quoted in Yarber 1989).
One man (‘John’) in a North Slope village who had worked for over a decade on 
the DEW Line did not want to divulge very much information about the radar system 
because he “still gets money from them!” His job involved all aspects of expediting 
goods to the sites all over the slope: keeping track of what each site needed, loading the 
gear in the plane, flying in the plane with the gear alongside the pilot, and unloading it at 
every site. In describing the amount of alcohol that moved through this system, John 
rolled his eyes, shook his head, and asserted that it was an unimaginable amount. He 
joked that it was “their” main business and that certain people made an extremely rich 
profit on the alcohol delivery system. James Tazruk of Point Lay, reflecting on how
50 ‘Let’ does not mean the same thing in North Slope English as it does in mainstream English. ‘Let’ is 
almost always used for ‘cause’ or ‘make/made’ in the sense o f coerce (i.e. the teacher let me do my 
homework, my parents let me stay home when I wanted to go hunting).
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travel along the coast was changed by having radar sites every fifty (or one hundred) 
miles, described it as “bar hopping” (Sep. 24, 2009, Point Lay).
Each site had an employees’ recreation committee, which was incorporated and 
had a liquor license (in addition to managing dark rooms at each site, saunas at some, 
gyms, game rooms with ping pong and pool tables, etc.). A shot of Chivas Regal sold for 
85 cents at one site. Each Auxiliary and Main site, at least in Alaska, had an expansive 
storeroom with an entire wall covered with deep metal shelves exclusively for hard 
alcohol (fig. 20). The price for a case is about the same as what people currently pay for a 
single bottle in North Slope villages today. “You’ve got to watch the alcohol,” Bob 
Castonguay, a DEW Liner at Point Lonely, said in a 1979 newspaper interview. “In my 
four years on the DEW Line, I’ve seen six guys carried out on stretchers because of their 
over-indulgence after work. There’s nothing else to do” (Associated Press 1979).
Figure 20: Shelf in liquor stockroom in LIZ-S (Wainwright)
On his return trip to the Arctic after his first R&R break, Bob Pittenger’s luggage 
consisted of 36 fifths of Bushell’s whiskey and 18 pairs of socks -  one fifth in each sock. 
After Pittenger’s stints in the army and at a mining camp, a union agent tracked him 
down in Fairbanks to hire him to work on the DEW Line project. Pittenger, just in from 
the bush and with plenty of cash, had no intention of working anywhere until he made up 
for months of missed partying. He wasted no time implanting this plan, yet -  in a style 
reminiscent of the Yankee whalers - he woke up the next morning in a plane on the way 
to Barrow. Another of his favorites stories involves a plane crash in the Beaufort Sea. 
Everybody was able to swim safely to shore, except one well-known drinker who swam 
out in the ocean to save his bottle of whiskey and then drank the whole thing once on 
shore.
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One of American DEW Liner Clive Beckman’s memorable ‘war stories’ recounts 
his traveling Sector Crew’s reputation as hard workers and “hard-partying dudes” who 
traveled with a travel trunk full of Mexican food. Their first night at each site was Sector 
Party Night, but POW-2 (Lonely) was out of alcohol when they arrived for Thanksgiving 
weekend. The Station Chief was a Cutty Sark man and the entire crew was made up of 
partiers. POW-2’s booze order was at Barrow, 80 miles away, but an unauthorized 
chartered flight would probably cost the Station Chief his job and bring down the wrath 
of the Air Force. Despite these risks and the almost zero visibility outside at the time, an 
Inupiaq pilot with a Cessna too small to carry the whole order was contracted. When the 
pilot successfully flew from Barrow to Lonely through an almost complete white out, he 
could not even open his own door as he had packed in the entire order around him.
The memoir of a teacher on Baffin Island summarized the impacts of the DEW 
Line and alcohol:
‘‘In the late 1980s when I  arrived the people were still struggling with the challenges o f  
acculturation...The DEW Line never did manage to employ more than a small handful o f  
local Inuit on a full-time basis. The few  positions that Inuit held were usually at the 
lowest level and often took men away from their families fo r  several months at a time, 
which created strain on the family unit. As well, the DEW Line had negative effects on the 
hamlet by making alcohol available to the community. DEW Line employees, most often 
single men, fraternized with women, especially younger women from the village, and 
often permanently disrupted family units in Anurapaktuq. Many men fathered children 
there, yet never stayed long enough to provide support fo r  those children ” (Tompkins 
1998).
Akin to the children sired by Yankee whalers, there is a “DEW Line generation” 
along the Arctic coast and the same term also evokes the concurrent transition to a largely 
starch- and sugar-based diet. More broadly, it is reasonable to question whether a 
significantly high percentage of the Taniks who have come to the Arctic within the past
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150 years (i.e. whalers, traders, Jesuit priests, roughnecks, DEW Liners) have been 
alcoholics, and how many of those genes were passed on while they were in the North. 
Perhaps more significant than any genetic components, the drinking tradition that was 
imported to the Arctic was not one of moderation or cultured appreciation -  it was a 
largely a tradition of chronic abuse, binging and machismo contests.
While the wide availability of alcohol caused so much trouble, the lack of it had 
its own issues. Doctor Gareth Howerd related that, during his tenure as medical doctor in 
eastern Canadian sectors during the early years of the line, there was a ban on taking 
alcohol to the Arctic because of the danger of men becoming intoxicated, falling in the 
snow, and being frostbitten or frozen to death (1960: 38). There had been beer parlors in 
Canada when work on the sites first began, but prohibition was soon implemented, 
making men crave alcohol and go to any length to obtain it. The doctor was often called 
to the base to attend to men suffering from delirium tremens after they managed to get 
alcohol, and eventually a ration of four cans of beer per week was imposed. Dr. Howerd 
recounted deaths from the consumption of various poisonous moonshine mixtures and 
transported patients to Montreal who had gone into moonshine-induced epileptic fits. He 
learned of DEW Liners brewing hootch out of after-shave lotion, anti-freeze, boot-black 
strained through bread, raisins and even beans (Howerd 1960 125).
In the online DEW Liner community’s collection of “DEW Line ‘War’ Stories,” 
Bucky Harris’s story entitled “DEW Line Ingenuity” describes his trip as Sector 
Supervisor to BAR C (Tununuk Camp, NWT). Strangely, the entire crew was nowhere to 
be found when his flight arrived with the chaplain, mail, fresh fruit, produce, and new 
movies. Eventually forced to walk to the site, Harris and Chaplin Mauer searched the 
main buildings and deactivated the Doppler alarm that was ringing in the control room. 
The Supervisor and the Chaplain then made their way to the offsite garage and found the 
crew using the site’s welding equipment to boil fermented dried fruit mash. They had 
made a copper still from construction leftovers, and soon the entire group was enjoying a 
few belts of 180 proof with grape juice before dinner.
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The DEW Sites in Canada soon lifted prohibition for white DEW Liners and for a 
period rationed their beer while maintaining prohibition for Natives. Eventually all 
restrictions were lifted.
Barter Island Social Club
‘John,5 the man whose longtime job had included loading and unloading supply
planes, confirmed what all other evidence supports: the Barter Island DEW Line site was 
the heaviest drinking site on the Alaskan coast if not in the entire western Arctic. “Too
many Natives go there,” he said.51 BAR-Main was the largest site in Alaska, and the 
Barter Island Social Club was (and is) the stuff of drinking legend in the region. “Barter 
Island was the worst site -  they drink the most there, even in the village” (“John Imnaiq”, 
Sep. 15, 2009, Wainwright).
One summer, in addition to his normal full-time job as a technician on the DEW 
Line, Harry Merriman took on an extra 5-6 hours of work as a bartender in the in/famous 
Barter Island Social Club (fig. 21). The bar’s nickname was “The Tiki Club.” To this day,
51 He then qualified this by saying “well, every site got a bar and town people would go -  but here it was 
far!” (The Barter Island bar was within easy walking distance from the village. In Wainwright, it is almost 
six miles to the site.) “They don’t care! They go -  some walking, some with Skidoo, some with dog team” 
(“John Imnaiq”, Sep. 15, 2009, Wainwright).
52 The community wanted to take the building but it was designated a contaminated site.
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Merriman is incredulous that he earned more money as a bartender than he did from his 
regular job. According to Harry, the daily activities of watching movies and drinking in 
the bar were essentially the only forms of social rest and relaxation. Harry remembers 
one elderly Inupiaq employee who drank regularly at the Barter Island Social Club, 
entertaining the men with tricks such as touching his nose to his chin. As regularly, the 
man’s wife would come in yelling and drag her husband out by the ear, which was 
equally entertaining to the men. Merriman, however, took his responsibilities as a 
bartender on Barter seriously and quit serving anyone who appeared to be getting too 
drunk (March 3, 2009, Fairbanks).
“Whiskey and Eskimos didn’t mix very well,” was Bob Pittenger’s summation of 
this problem (2000: 73). Pittenger’s entire heavy equipment crew at a DEW site was 
cheered when one of their operators managed to make off with an entire pallet of beer 
from the Navy cargo. They locked it up very securely in an old cat train cook wannigan, 
yet the beer, very mysteriously, kept disappearing. Pittenger admired the ingenuity of the 
Inupiaq children he finally spied at three a.m. as they climbed atop the wannigan, pried 
off the small smoke vent, and lowered the smallest child down on a rope to which he then 
tied six-packs (2000: 41).
Robert Alexie worked on the DEW Line sites in Tuktoyaktuk and Tununuk 
during construction in 1956 and 1957, when alcohol was banned at the sites. “[Y]ou 
could drink but you had to sneak it. But not too much. There was a lot of brew around 
Tuk,” he said (July 6, 2008, Fort McPherson, NWT). When asked whether the sudden 
influx of money changed the social order in the hamlets, Alexie explained that it did - not 
because young inexperienced men had more money than older, established trappers, but 
because of the simultaneous availability of alcohol. The opening of the first liquor store 
in his hometown of Aklavik also occurred in 1957:
"Well, money start coming and then booze start coming. I  bought a bottle o ff a cook for  
$18. You know, whiskey was a great thing back then.That was big mistake, nobody asked, 
nobody knew about it. The old peoples, they knew - my father was born in 1887 and a lot
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o f old people seen that in Dawson, they talk about it, they seen it. They seen how people 
act to it. ” “[NJobody said anything about liquor was bad fo r  you, nobody said nothing. 
Until the '70s, eh? Nobody knew about it, nobody knew there was help. There was help 
out there, nobody mentioned. I  always wondered how come. I  worked long time on the 
rigs after that too and I  gave myself a real time. They should have told me there was help 
out there, they should have told me that, they should have mentioned that...Alcohol is the 
biggest problem in this part o f the country. The whole damn North ” (Alexie, July 6,
2008, Fort McPherson, NWT).
Nora Jane Bums of Kaktovik remembers how scary it was as a child when her 
grandfather and uncles, after working at the station and drinking, would come home wild 
and loud and incite fighting within the home. Due to living at DEW Line sites, Sammy 
Lennie grew up believing that all men had strong whiskey breath. “Drink drink drink 
drink drink,” Sammy Lennie said, describing the life of DEW Liners, including his father 
(April 3, 2009, Fairbanks). His mother never drank, but her attempts to stop her husband 
during the two decades he worked on the DEW Line were in vain. Sammy also noted that 
the bar at the radar site in Tuk seemed to have undergone a great number of renovations 
and was in general the first place looked after.
Conclusion
The nature of DEW Line society can be gleened from a wide variety of sources, 
ranging from individual Inuit to the calculated messages of industry. The accounts of men 
from sharply divergent backgrounds who were involved in (and themselves shaped by) 
the creation and operation of the radar system shed light onto the complex societal 
attitudes at play in the DEW Line recipe. Most interestingly, the images of DEW Line 
society that were projected by the Cold War military industrial complex, especially 
regarding cultural interaction between Whites and Inuit, bear a striking resemblance to 
the fictional Cold War thrillers of the time. However, neither the official images nor the 
fictional thrillers bear much resemblance to what appears to have been the situations or 
perceptions of the individuals actually involved in the event. This disparity reaffirms the
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values of an ethnographic and an ethnohistorical approach to studying militarization: 
directly under the surface of the official story, an exponentially more interesting and 
complex array of stories unfolds. Exploring various perspectives on DEW Line society 
illustrates the incomplete view of history that would be perpetuated if only official 
accounts of events were presented by the same powers that create and profit from the 
events.
The voices of indigenous Arctic residents illustrate how the global geopolitical 
event that was a nuclear deterrence system was an extremely localized occurrence for the 
Inuit, to the extent that there was and is little knowledge of or concern for the larger 
project.
One group is not represented in this discussion: actual military personnel. This is 
not because the military aspect of the DEW Line was or is unimportant. What emerges 
with this description of DEW Line society is that an event can be very strongly connected 
to global militarization despite the fact that very few actual military personnel are present 
and despite the fact that many other actors see the military individuals as inconsequential. 
Furthermore, the increasingly close and codependent relationship between the military 
and corporations on the DEW Line illustrates another central step in the evolution of 
modem militarism. This blurring of any distinction between civilian and military is a key 
characteristic of the militarization of society.
A related phenomenon inherent in the local manifestations of militarization that is 
elucidated by ethnographical inquiry into DEW Line society is that, despite the 
monolithic infrastructure and federal policies behind it, the main results are individual 
relationships that have little to do with the Cold War. Normalized relations between 
DEW Liners and locals could be understood as a result of militarization, but it could also 
be argued that nothing served to undermine militarization more than those relationships. 
DEW Liners who befriended the community and the few useful infrastructure items from 
the DEW Line were quickly differentiated from the institution and were accepted on their 
own terms, as entities removed from and innocent of the policies that resulted in them 
being in the Arctic. The DEW Liners who were accepted by the community became as
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much barriers between the people and military as they wed the two. That their human 
relationships were opposed by the military policy instilled a deep-seated mistrust of 
military policy and its anti-human perspective.
It is understandable that Jack Ferguson’s ethnographic snapshot of arctic 
communities during DEW Line construction depicted exaggerated fears over the loss of 
Inuit culture due to capitalism. Many Taniks believe that groups of people will 
automatically lose their culture and identity if they lose their indigenous language, when 
in fact this is not the case, especially among people unfamiliar with the ideology. Many 
prevalent ideologies about economic issues are similarly fraught, and notions of identity 
are inexorably linked with how one makes a living. Various understandings of the gift 
economy of bases are thus to be expected, as well as ideas that money and material goods 
will supplant a culture. This is not to say that Inuit material and spiritual culture has not 
changed drastically since contact, because of course it has. However, the fact that 
someone is an Inupiaq seems to be their foremost self-identifier, not how they make a 
living. Ferguson’s fear that Inuit culture would disappear once they had jobs was 
grounded in the idea that culture is non-adaptive, unchanging and fragile. Likewise, the 
equally false idea expressed by Game Warden Rees encapsulates the view that having 
jobs and money will solve everything.
DEW Line society, in ways obvious and subtle, shaped communities of the 
western Arctic. The land itself became a bitter enemy to be conquered through the 
combined forces of modem industry and the demands of the new national security 
doctrine. Machines replaced people as defenders of the frontline, and men learned to 
serve the machines as wage laborers while the professional role of women was 
diminished. The big money those jobs brought enabled people to buy manufactured 
clothes, musical instruments, cigarettes and alcohol -  as well as donate to charity. The 
arctic Cat skinners and sourdoughs were familiar with the land and the people, if not 
always respectful of them. The corporate technicians and other civilian employees - the 
enduring human side of the DEW Line -  shaped arctic societies through their presence, 
through their progeny, through their relationships with women and their roles as
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community leaders outside of -  and sometimes opposed to -  the DEW Line. There was 
less time for subsistence hunting and the risk of scarcity involved with that way of life, 
while the availability of processed food increased along with the health impacts 
associated with that diet. Basic emergency health care was available through the bases, 
but that benefit was overshadowed by the heavy drinking that went hand in hand with the 
DEW Line. Many of these social influences are ones that the Inupiaq and Inuvialuit of the 
western Arctic share with people in small, militarized communities globally.
While arctic people’s perspectives and life experiences were shaped by their 
connections to DEW Line society, their way of living was also transformed on a purely 
physical level by the waste material, radomes, towers, and other infrastructure that 
reshaped and contaminated areas along the coast. An exploration of those physical 
legacies is required to understand and analyze the overarching themes of militarization of 
the western Arctic.
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Chapter Five:
Environmental Legacies along The Trail of the Tundra Daisy;
Infrastructure, Debris, and Contaminants
Introduction
Especially when someone’s boat hit the submerged hazard off Seagull Island 
(near Shingle Point, Yukon), Richard Gordon would hear stories about the spring clean 
up ritual during the early decades on the DEW Line. Crews would pile garbage, drums, 
dead equipment, and debris onto old cat trains. They would point the tractor north, turn it 
on, and let it go across the ice to the open ocean. Sometimes, as is suspected with Seagull 
Island, the garbage train fell off the ice edge in a bad spot and created a navigational 
hazard for subsequent generations.
The Arctic is not the only place that where this method of trash management has 
been employed. In the early days, when McMurdo Station in Antarctica was run by the 
military, very little was known about the sea life which was hidden by thick ice ten 
months of the year. Crews stationed there did not think anything could live under the 
water in such bitter cold conditions and they dumped large numbers of 55 gallon barrels, 
broken down tractors, and other large trash items into the ocean. Recently, scientists 
worried about possible risks to the marine environment started studying the garbage.
They are creating an underwater map of the trash to better understand how it is 
distributed and running tests to determine whether it is hazardous and should be removed. 
Cold-water divers were surprised to discover that the trash has formed an unusual 
artificial reef that is supporting a variety of sea life.
People, too, can live happily in shelters made of debris while surrounded by 
waste, much of it toxic. DEW Line infrastructure, trash, and contaminants across the 
Arctic have been incorporated into the ecosystem at every level. Military industrial 
material was widely used to construct new houses and provided material to heat those 
homes in new ways. It created highly entertaining playgrounds for children. To a
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landscape devoid of many natural vantage points, it brought lookouts and landmarks as 
well as gravel roads and vehicles to use on them. On the other hand, many DEW Line 
materials, particularly transformers and other electrical equipment, contained PCBs and 
other poisons that have been leaching into the land and sea for over five decades, while 
the dumps and roads have terraformed and left the landscape around sites vulnerable. 
Although unconfirmed, most residents suspect that these toxins contribute to high cancer 
rates. The invisible toxins are psychologically pernicious, and the highly visible 55- 
gallon drums are everywhere. Most of the towers that were beloved as lookouts and 
landmarks have already been toppled, and everyone agrees that they would like to see the 
rest of the sites taken away and everything cleaned up. Few people have any idea how 
large of a problem that is.
Spending their entire lives adjacent to a DEW Line site makes people intimately 
familiar with the base’s physical make up. They are authoritative experts on the dumps, 
towers, buildings, radars, and physical history of their town’s radar site. At the same 
time, the scale of the DEW Line’s infrastructure is unknown to most residents. Military 
planners did not present the idea and scope, much less maps and graphics, of the DEW 
Line project to the people whose homelands were subsumed by it. When they see a map 
depicting the original sixty-three radar stations stretching across the entire Arctic coast, 
most people are shocked.53 Many have assumed that their area of the Arctic is the only 
one that has undergone such pervasive construction. The shock may be partly due to the 
fact that they have an intimate understanding of how big an environmental problem just 
one site can create.54 With the simple act of showing a map, this research project changed 
some people’s understanding of the DEW Line’s impact on the Arctic coast.
Mary Ann Warden of Barter Island had stated that she knew there were stations 
all the way along the coast, but when she saw a map depicting just the 19 stations in
53 Ironically, nearly every proposal for an Arctic science project during the early decades o f the Cold War 
featured a polar perspective o f  the globe in order to highlight the national security threat that justified the 
extra expense for the arctic research (Farish 2006). This current research project was introduced in a similar
way, which indubitably contributed to its success with funding agencies.
54 Southerners are also usually surprised by a depiction o f  the DEW Line sites because their preconceptions 
o f the Arctic do not include notions o f  widespread industrialization.
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Alaska’s North Slope, she was amazed (fig 22). “Wow. DEW lines. There were that 
many? [] Wow. That is so amazing. [] Well, I knew there were some along the coast, but 
I never saw them this way” (Warden May 28, 2009, Kaktovik).
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Figure 22: The 19 DEW Line sites on Alaska's North Slope55
Nora Jane Bums, also of Kaktovik, had a similar reaction upon viewing a map of 
all 63 sites: “Holy cow! They went all over. That’s a lot. And that was for their radar, 
huh? It’s surprising, because when you are growing up you only think that that was the 
only site and then later you hear there’s some to the East and some to the West and when 
you go to Barrow you find out they have one too. [] The only ones I would hear about 
were POW-D and BAR-A” (Bums, July 31, 2008, Kaktovik).
Alice Agiak of Kaktovik, who mentioned during our interview that nothing 
surprises her anymore, was genuinely surprised as well: “I knew that there was BAR and 
POWs. But I did not know that there were that many all the way across there. But I know 
that BAR-Main was the main DEW Line. [T]he only ones I know are all the way to Tuk. 
But all this here, I didn’t know” (Agiak, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
The number surprised Robert Thompson as well: “There were that many? Well, 
gee” (Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik). Carla Sims Kayutok was less surprised: “I
55 Map (cropped) produced by the Alaska District Army Corps of Engineers.
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knew it went all along the coast like every 36 miles or something? I know there’s POW 
sites and BAR sites. But I know a lot of that too because my dad worked there.” George 
Agnasagga, due to his age and experience, including trapping along the coast and visiting 
the intermediate sites while they were still open, was not at all surprised. George 
surmised: “And they could have done it all from Denver” (Agnasagga, Sep. 13, 2009, 
Wainwright).
Despite the varied locations, site infrastructure was completely standardized.
Main sites had one more module train than Auxiliary sites (the smaller I-sites had one 
module and outbuildings). James Tazruk of Point Lay remembered that he went to go see 
the DEW Line site in Barrow when he moved there: “I just wanted to see if it was the 
same, and it was exactly the same. Whoever designed them was a one-track mind.” 
Tazruk corroborated the premise that focusing on this uniformity distracts from the very 
distinct histories of each location and he qualified that the sites were all the same “except 
the people” (Sep. 24, 2009, Point Lay).
In Wainwright, Isaac Panik’s earliest memories of the DEW Line were visits to 
the site with his father, who knew the station chief. His strongest impression of the base 
was how very modem everything there was (the site was about 20 years old when he was 
young) and how different that was from his community, where there were no flush toilets 
or running water. The contrast, he said, “was like going from the Stone Age to the 
modem world with all the goodies -  pop, chips, fresh fruit...” (Panik, Sep. 13, 2009, 
Wainwright). The author of a fictionalized novel on the DEW Line had the same 
impression: “The Kuk River, which separated Wainwright Village and the DEWLine site, 
might as well have been as wide as the distance between two planets, or the time between 
millennia” (Griffin 1980: 9).
A little-mentioned but significant factor that contributed to the other-worldliness 
of the DEW Line sites was that all the sites, from Greenland to the Aleutians, were on a 
single time zone that was synchronized with Ottawa. The sites that Sammy Lennie lived 
at in the Mackenzie Delta area were four hours different than local time, and this 
separation had the most significant effects on local families with members employed at
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the sites. Lennie recalled that he would get up to catch the school bus early in the 
morning, but four hours after his father had started work.
RAdio Detection And Ranging ~  Radar
Despite their age and deteriorating status, the DEW Line sites, though no longer 
futuristic, still manage to exude an air of otherworldliness. Much of this is due to their 
dominant feature -  the large geodesic dome that covered the spinning radar dishes and is 
at the center of every iconic image of the DEW Line. The distinctive, golf ball-shaped 
domes, ironically similar in structure to an ice igloo, now serve as landmarks over much 
of the Arctic coast and at related communication systems around the globe.56 The domes 
are made of light, straight structural elements arranged to form a hemispheric surface and 
they provide significant advantages in that the material is very light, no supporting 
columns are needed, and structural stress is spread out evenly over the entire dome. They 
are the lightest, strongest, and most cost-effective structure ever designed. Buckminster 
Fuller invented geodesic domes57 and once the DEW Line contractors were finally 
convinced of their utility, the U.S. Marine Corps hailed the geodesic dome as "the first 
basic improvement in mobile military shelter in 2,600 years” (quoted on the Buckminster 
Fuller Institute website) (fig. 23). The contract for the DEW Line radomes resulted in a 
patent and recognition for Fuller that ignited his illustrious career.
56 "The most distinctive feature o f  the station was the bulbous geodesic dome which squatted above the 
long, low module train. The same housed search radar antennas. Their slowly rotating back-to-back 
snowplow antennas sent out a million-watt ray o f  focused radar energy hundreds o f miles into the Arctic 
skies. These giant plastic protuberances hunkering on four stilts gave the station an air o f  ominous 
unreality. The buildings and other antennas could be accepted by the landscape, but not this ugly bulb. 
These electronic warts were positioned every hundred miles across the pate o f the earth," (author John
Griffin’s fictionalized 1980 thriller: Icy Cape, p. 8-9).
57 R. Buckminster Fuller was the author o f  Operating Manual fo r  Spaceship Earth, among other works, 
and was a well-known inventor, architect, engineer, mathematician, poet and cosmologist.
58 59Figure 23: Buckminster Fuller and a geodesic radome under construction
Radicians and other DEW Liners usually refer to them as radomes, but locals refer to 
them as big balls, balloons, and golf balls. In Fairbanks, wealthy and eccentric landowner 
and historic preservationist John Reeves added a DEW Line radome to his collection of 
Arctic equipment alongside the Steese Highway. In the Northwest Territories, one of the 
radomes from Tuk was reconstructed in Inuvik where it houses a local wireless telephone 
and internet business. Sammy Lennie cannot believe the irony: “I grew up looking at that 
big ball and somebody bought it and took it all the way to Inuvik and now I have to grow 
old looking at that big ball” (Lennie, April 3, 2009, Fairbanks).
A twelve year old Kaktovik resident, (who had previously had a dream about 
going into the golf ball in her other hometown of Inuvik and finding a swimming pool 
there), described her school field trip to the radar site on Barter Island as “super duper 
cool.” “When you go into the ball, you gotta go straight -  all the way straight -  and then 
you gotta go up this ladder and then you have to go up these stairs that are curly and 
when you go into the ball, it’s like you are tiny. It’s really fun. [W]hen the ball moves 
around in the circle, if we are in it, it will move too fast for us. It was really cool” 
(Iglangasak, May 28, 2009, Kaktovik).
DEW Line radician Hal Phillips, who worked during the early years of the Line at 
all three types of stations, also thought the DEW Line was super cool but had a distinctly 
more technical explanation of the radar system. All the Auxiliary and Main sites had
58  •Photo courtesy o f  the Buckminster Fuller Institute website: http://www.bfi.org/
59 .Photo courtesy o f  the Ollie Eksted & Bell System Memorial: http://www.porticus.org/bell/dewline.html
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long-range pulse radar systems known as AN/FPS-19 and receiving antennae. Small 
Intermediate sites, whose only purpose was to transmit, consisted of a single 5-module 
building, support facilities and Doppler-type radar fences. They were used as gap-filling 
anchor points between rotating radar-equipped stations. The search antennas at the 
Auxiliary and Main sites had an upper and lower beam with overlap, but they were very 
limited for detection of low-flying aircraft, which is why the Intermediate sites had their 
transmitters. Hal Phillips remembered the crew never knew what they were tracking, but 
he recalled a couple more exciting situations when the targets actually did come from the 
direction of Russia and the military authorities ordered a ‘Cease Tell’ to the radar crews: 
stop transmitting/communicating any information -  do not report on what could be seen. 
On a lighter note, NORAD would make seasonal public announcements that the DEW 
Line stations had picked up an unknown object, crews having determined that it was 
apparently a fat man in a red suit with some reindeer approaching North America 
(Phillips, Dec. 13, 2006, Texas City, Texas).
Indigenous residents have incorporated radome technology for diverse purposes. 
Growing up in the original Point Lay village site on the barrier island, George Agnasagga 
found an ironic use for the big dome on the point across the lagoon: to site in his rifle. 
“[T]he dome fit right into the barrel of my rifle and then I set my scope. It was great, I 
didn’t have to waste no bullets” (Agnasagga, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
In Wainwright, the DEW Line site was closed down in 1995 and abandoned. The 
co-located North Warning System radar, activated in 1994, was closed in 2007 due to soil 
erosion and budget concerns. Locals soon broke the locks off the front door of the old 
DEW site and scavenged everything of value out of the place (save the exceptionally 
stout, built-in cedar sauna). As in other communities, the site is used as a destination (it is 
5 miles up river) and one of the few places where young people can hang out. For the 
more adventurous, the block and tackle used during dome maintenance are still hanging 
from the inside top of the radome. One young man demonstrated a typical DEW Line 
activity: get the radar itself spinning as fast as possible, climb to the top of it, then leap
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out and grab the rope so that you could swing back and forth in the radome while 
drawing your legs up to swing over the spinning radar (fig. 24).
Figure 24: Wainwright’s DEW Line site LIZ- 3 and radome recreation.
DE W Line Playground
Sammy Lennie concluded that growing up as a DEW Line kid had major 
advantages. “For the most part we had a ball because year ‘round, the DEW Line was our 
playground” (Lennie, April 3, 2009, Fairbanks). Sammy explained how every different 
part of the radar sites and their adjacent dumps provided endless entertainment and 
opportunities for adventure. The first military site where his father worked in the 
Mackenzie River Delta was “Yellow Beetle,” part of an interesting precursor to the DEW 
Line. The site was commonly referred to as both ‘Army Camp’ and ‘Kittigazuit’60 and 
was the location of the gruesome Inuvialuit/Gwich’in battle mentioned earlier. The U.S. 
Air Force was responsible for a trial installation of three LORAN (Long Range Aid to 
Navigation) transmitters in the western Arctic from 1947-1950. The system never worked 
properly, but the master Yellow Beetle station site, at Army Camp 37 kilometers 
southwest of Tuktoyaktuk, it provided temporary employment and a landmark.
60 Kittigazuit is an Anglicization o f Kitigaaryuit. Archaeological evidence and oral history research 
indicates that, before disease epidemics ravaged the population, the Kittigazuit site hosted the largest 
gathering o f  people in the Arctic.
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During fieldwork for this research, we made camp at an area known as Nulagvik 
or Skull Cliff, about 25 miles southwest of Barrow and the location of the western 
LORAN “slave station” (Beetle A) for the system. Evidence of old industrial activity was 
everywhere on the ground around the area, but it was difficult to imagine that a 625 foot 
steel tower had stood on the tundra there some 60 years previous. Massive concrete 
foundations had been required for all fours legs of the 300,000-pound tower. James 
Olemaun of Barrow has traveled this stretch of coast numerous times and reported that he 
was very surprised, when passing by Nulagvik during a particularly low tide, to see that 
the entire coastline in front of the small valley had been reinforced with rows of barrels 
sunk into the sea floor.61 The tower at Army Camp/Yellow Beetle/Kittigazuit had been 
toppled over in the early 1950s and, luckily for Sammy and his brother, was lying on the 
ground there for decades (fig. 25). “That was our playground,” said Sammy.
61 This may have been done in the late 1970s, when Skull Cliff was the site o f  a National Petroleum 
Reserve-Alaska clean up and 2,200 tons o f  debris were stockpiled there. In 1982, the debris was moved 
about one mile inland and buried, but efforts to relocate the landfill in 1989 were unsuccessful. 
Nevertheless, elevated levels o f  pesticides and other contaminants have been found in nearby surface water 
and soil (Alaska Department o f Environmental Conservation 2010b).
62 Archaeological team under the toppled 625-foot Yellow Beetle LORAN master tower in the Northwest 
Territories. Photo courtesy o f  http://pwnhc.leamnet.nt.ca/research/archrep/archrep98/westarc.html
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In the mid-1950s, Sammy’s father was sent to Leduc outside of Edmonton with 
approximately 50 other Inuvialuit to train for work on the DEW Line and returned to 
work at Tununuk (BAR-C I-site), Shingle Point (BAR-2), and Tuktoyaktuk (BAR-3). 
When their father worked at BAR-3 next to Tuktoyaktuk, Sammy and his brother used to 
haul their bikes through some nearby sand dunes to reach an enormous radar dish that 
had been knocked over and partly buried. It was a fifteen foot climb up into the dish, 
which was complicated by the fact that the boys hauled their bicycles up with them. 
However, once there they could ride around and around having great fun - until the time 
Sammy’s brother was seriously injured63 and the game was over -  the DEW Line got rid 
of that particular playground by completely burying it in the sand.
Other equipment was less exciting but still fun. Mary Ann Warden pointed out a 
large pipe that drained from the Barter Island site which she and other children used to 
walk on and practice their balance. Richard Gordon remembered traveling the western 
Canadian coastline with his parents and stopping by the DEW Line sites to camp. “We as 
kids didn’t know anything about DEW Line site, we just knew there was a camping site 
and there was a couple of buildings that we stayed in as a family and I remember during 
the day when we came out there was garbage and metal and stuff all over the place and 
there was ground squirrels at that time in those areas and we as kids were hunting the 
ground squirrels and running around all these things like a playground. Never was told it 
was dangerous, we were touching this and touching that and I guess our parents at the 
time were uneducated, didn’t have the reading abilities if there were warning signs” (R. 
Gordon, July 24, 2008, Herschel Island, Yukon Territory).
Jimmy Olemaun was able to describe in precise detail the abandoned base he 
grew up playing in at Peard Bay (LIZ-3), including the line of strange machines, all the 
dials and wiring, the holding tanks, and the wringer washer (Olemaun, Aug. 31, 2000, 
Peard Bay). As children, Jimmy and his brothers and friends climbed into giant and pitch-
63 Sammie Lennie’s little brother had an even scarier incident when the children found a deflated weather 
balloon on the tundra and decided to see whether it could make the smaller child fly. It did. At one point 
Sammie almost lost sight o f  his brother. He finally snagged him and then “really caught hell at home” for 
that adventure.
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black holding tanks to have match fights64. One of the support structures at the base was 
a natural gas containment building that Jimmy said was always full of snowbirds and had 
a great view, like their own gazebo on the hill. However much fun he had in the gazebo 
and the module, Jimmy thinks they were too much of a risk and he is glad that everything 
is gone - except the tower.
The fact that DEW Line infrastructure was an accessible and irresistible 
playground to children along the Arctic Coast may be a significant factor that normalized 
the bases for the population. Military-themed toys are seen today as evidence of social 
militarization, and with radar base playgrounds two goals were accomplished in one. 
Many children knew every square inch of the sites, all of them seem to have played there, 
a huge amount of fear was dissolved in this way and good will was created.
Lookouts and Landmarks
Indeed, there is an almost unanimous consensus among informants that the people 
of the western Arctic coast loved their local towers, put them to great use for generations, 
and were sad and angry to see them go. In an environment where any vantage point gives 
the viewer an incredible vista, the towers were simply irresistible to children as well as 
adults and extraordinarily useful. “Like, I wonder what is up there, I wonder how far I 
can see. But we did climb. I climbed all the towers,” remembered Sammy Lennie (April 
3, 2009, Fairbanks).
Mary Ann Warden remembers that even though she is afraid of heights, she and 
her playmates would climb all the way up the ladder to the top of the tower. “We just 
went up there and stood in the little thing and screamed (aaah!) ‘I’m being rayed! 
(Warden, May 28, 2009, Kaktovik).
James Tazruk of Point Lay grew up fifty miles from the Doppler tower at the old 
Icy Cape intermediate site (LIZ B), where Point Lay people hunt and camp. He was 
equally enthusiastic about the towers: “Yeah, we climb them all the time. Like, all the 
time. I’d throw my parka down. Every chance I’d get, I’d climb them. I don’t care how
Lighting matches and throwing them at each other.64
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long it took. It was 205 steps. I can never forget that number, yup. My legs were like jello 
after” (Tazruk, Sep. 24, 2009, Point Lay).
James Olemaun’s mother cried the day the tower at Peard Bay was taken down. 
(The towers were toppled because, at 240 feet and with no light, they posed a hazard to 
airplanes.) Peard Bay is located fifty miles southwest of Barrow on the Chukchi Sea 
coast, formed by the prominent Franklin Point on the west side. The land at Tatchim Isua, 
at the far east side of the bay, rises relatively steeply to a small but prominent hill, and a 
gravel road runs from the beach to the hilltop where the Intermediate LIZ-C DEW Line 
Site was constructed. If one climbed only half way up to the top tower at Peard Bay, the 
runway lights from the village of Atqasuk were visible. In describing the tower, James 
Olemaun used the word ‘awesome’ numerous times and expressed feelings of loss. “You 
could just see for miles and miles. It was just awesome,” he recalled nostalgically 
(Olemaun, Aug. 31, 2000, Peard Bay). Olemaun and other young people would climb all 
the way to the top and then out to the radar dishes themselves to paint graffiti. Olemaun 
described in great detail the guy wire and cable system that the tower had, pointing out 
every spot on the ground where a cable had been fixed and describing the harrowing 
adventure of wrapping a loose cable around the tower as you climbed the first section, 
then jumping out and swinging around the tower on the cable: “It was awesome jumping 
off like that” (Olemaun, Aug. 31, 2000, Peard Bay). Alternately, you could climb to 
where the fixed cables were attached to the tower and slide down those, Tarzan style.
Although there were ladders on the inside of the towers, more adventurous people 
would also climb the tower on the exterior lattice (fig. 26). A famous Peard Bay tale was 
of a man who was climbing the exterior lattice and was near the top when he slipped and 
fell. About half way down, the man managed to grab at the lattice, which slowed his fall 
and broke his arm. When he hit the ground (tundra, thankfully) he bounced about five 
feet up in the air. As the story goes, the gentleman lived but was two inches shorter after 
his adventure on the LIZ-3 Doppler tower.
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Figure 26: Intermediate Site Doppler Tower65
Industrial infrastructure in the Arctic has created new habitat for ravens and other 
fowl, particularly peregrine falcons. Both of these birds nested in the tower at Peard Bay, 
and Jimmy Olemaun remembered the ravens “weren’t so bad” but that the peregrines 
were extremely protective and would dive-bomb the tower when people were climbing it. 
Jimmy remembers that they would actually clip the tower, resulting in a nerve-rattling 
‘ding! ’ that could make the entire tower vibrate. Once, a peregrine falcon kept Jimmy 
captive in the tower for over an hour, trying to attack him whenever he began to descend 
the final flight of stairs and leave the protection of the latticed exterior (Olemaun, Aug. 
31, 2000, Peard Bay).
Sammy recounted that people still climb the remaining towers, but it is strange 
now that the sites are automated and monitored remotely by video camera. A man who 
lost track of the group he was with while hunting caribou near Running River/Shingle
65 Image courtesy o f Larry Wilson’s DEW Line website http://www.lswilson.ca/dewline.htm
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Point went up to the site and climbed the tower to scout for them. A loud official voice 
came over a microphone: “Please get off the tower. I am watching you from Gander, 
Newfoundland.” Sammy was impressed both at how much citizens are being watched 
and the fact that they are being watched from the other side of Canada.
DEW Liner Hal Phillips recalls one time in the winter of 1956 when he almost got 
lost in dark, wet, cold and blowing weather just making the crossing from the village of 
Point Lay back to the DEW Line site. Luckily Hal was with his co-worker, Buck, who 
had a lot more experience traveling on the Arctic coast. As soon as the pair realized that 
they could not see anything or make out their direction, they stopped and sat back to back 
for what seemed like an entire day before one of them saw the red tower and they took 
off running towards it (Phillips, Dec. 13, 2006, Texas City, Texas).
Although towers are not adored for their landmark function as much as they were 
for their lookout function, this aspect of DEW Line infrastructure has had a significant 
and deeply appreciated impact on travel in the Arctic. Richard Gordon confirmed that 
everybody uses the DEW Line sites when they travel -  in the wintertime people would 
be able to see the light and in the summer the white radome would contrast with the green 
landscape. “[IJt’s used as a safe haven -  you know there was humans there. Nowadays it 
is unmanned but you are still going to have contact with the outside world” (R. Gordon, 
July 24, 2008, Herschel Island, Yukon Territory). Gordon described the DEW Line as 
“there for those things - it is one of those things you adapt to it and you use it for some 
way as part of survival... We still use them as part of our travel, we’ll use them as 
reference, they are even in our GPS at least by people who are traveling along the coast” 
(July 24, 2008, Herschel Island, Yukon Territory).
In Point Lay, residents seem pleased that the entire site is gone except for the 
hangar, two warehouses, and two smaller buildings that have been moved out of town 
near the gravel pile. The hangar, with a bright red light that is a valued landmark, belongs 
to the village corporation and is used by the Department of Public Works to store 
equipment. James Tazruk is glad that “the landmark is still there. The hangar. They kept
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that up so that when we are out traveling winter time or summer, it’s foggy, we can see 
that light, that’s home” (Sep. 24, 2009, Point Lay). According to Tazruk, the hangar and 
its red light was always a better landmark than the golf ball.
In addition to its other features as the largest DEW Line station in the western 
sector, Barter Island’s site was linked with a White Alice tropospheric telecommunication 
system (fig. 27). The 120-foot high parabolic White Alice towers constituted the most 
visible features on Barter Island. Daniel Akootchook remembered how convenient and 
reassuring the towers were when he used to travel and hunt 60 miles away across the 
coastal plain in the Brooks Range, from where the towers were visible. “They should’ve 
just kept them there like they were. Because these are the ones that we could see with our 
own eyes from the mountains. There’s Barter Island, there we go” (D. Akootchook, May 
5, 2009).
Figure 27: Barter Island White Alice towers66
66 Photo courtesy of Gary Kotinas.
236
Nora Jane Bums was at work one day in the early 1990s when she and everyone 
else in Kaktovik heard a loud boom that seemed to shake the entire island. The 
community got startled at hearing this, she said, “and then they saw these rabbit ears go 
down” (Bums, July 31, 2008, Kaktovik).
According to Walt Audi, the demolition of the White Alice towers was a fiasco. 
“That was a joke. Blowing the towers over. They brought in all these explosives guys, 
did all the fancy stuff, then ‘BOOM’ and the tower went ‘eek’ (tilted over a little bit) and 
stopped” (Audi, Aug. 8, 2008, Kaktovik). After this first effort, the demolition crew used 
caterpillars and cables to pull the towers over, but since everything was still connected 
the structure was under great stress. As soon as the demolition crew started cutting, huge 
beams of steel sprang out, nearly taking out the workers. Walt reports that the elite demo 
team that had come up for the job went home, and eventually the regular clean up 
contractors designed a very long “stinger” with a cutting device on the end, so they could 
stand at a safe distance from the structure and cut it up.
It seems that disappointment at losing the towers was significantly exacerbated by 
the fact that the community had not been informed or consulted beforehand. Walt Audi 
did not know why the community wasn’t told, but suspects that the Air Force was 
attempting to avoid any conflict or protest. (In addition to the residents’ concerns, it is 
possible that if peregrine falcons were nesting in the towers, the Air Force would have 
had complications.) As Nora Jane explained, “the community liked them ears, they got 
used to them after how many years, them big ears, because when they go out whaling, 
when they lose their bearings they’d see these two rabbit ears.. .and they’d come home 
safely. [] Especially when it’s whiteout and you don’t have any bearings which way to 
go, you’d look for the two rabbit ears. At least they were good for something!” (Bums, 
July 31, 2008, Kaktovik).
Alice Agiak, the only informant who claimed that the community was informed 
about the tower demolition (“oh, that’s their way of saying. Other people got different
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opinions,”) was nonetheless nostalgic about the White Alice towers: “The only thing that 
we kind of miss was them ears” (Agiak, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
Robert Thompson was the only person interviewed who did not think the towers 
made good landmarks. This is partly due to his fear that any DEW Line infrastructure 
will be preserved, but also due to the fact that he is a renowned Arctic wilderness guide. 
He was a bit insulted at the suggestion: “No! We got around before we had those things 
and now we got GPS. I could get around without having to see the DEW Line stuff’ 
(Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik). Robert does acknowledge that they have been used. 
“I was actually happy to see that big ugly old tropo tower one time when we were coming 
along the coast in the fog and a blizzard: ‘Wow, we’re home.’ But I would have got here 
without it.” The line’s service as an aid to navigation should be considered “a minor plus” 
(Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
According to Nora Jane Bums and others, the DEW Line officials said they were 
going to clean up the downed White Alice towers the following summer. However, it 
took them about a decade to do it-  long enough for the bizarre mounds of twisted metal 
to become part of the island’s habitat in their own right (Fig. 28). Especially for younger 
people, the collapsed towers entered part of a normalized background. The entire area 
was officially off limits. Warning signs, alerting people to the presence of PCBs and 
other contaminants, surrounded it. However, when the crews knocked the enormous 
concave towers down, they created two secluded and sheltered spaces underneath them 
that were immediately co-opted by local teenagers and young adults as a great place to 
hide out, do drugs, and have sex.
*  _
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Figure 28: Toppled White Alice towers at Barter Island
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Travel
Though it is rarely mentioned in post-DEW Line Arctic adventure and exploration 
journals, the fact that people had access to company and all the comforts of an industrial 
outpost at regular intervals along the coast created an entirely different landscape and 
logistical character for arctic voyages. The bases constituted a enormous benefit, Sammy 
Lennie recalled, for a lot of the explorers that were trying to make the Northwest Passage. 
When such explorers would arrive in Tuk and announce that they had done it, Sammy 
says that the people always used to tell them “oh, but you had the DEW Line. You can 
stop and have a shower.” Travelers were not only able to call home and tell their families 
where they were, but they could refuel if they were using gas or oil. Local people would 
compare all these luxuries this to the long-distance traveling in stark conditions they had 
done and conclude that traveling with the assistance of the DEW Line was not really 
exploring. Sammy contended: “Being an explorer -  you’d have to travel the whole 
distance and people wonder.. .whether you are alive -  that’s exploring” (Lennie, April 3, 
2009, Fairbanks).
During fieldwork, little evidence was found to support the idea that the DEW Line 
increased travel between villages before the advent of commercial air service. Certainly 
the villages with radar stations got commercial air service earlier than communities that 
did not have bases, but, at least in Alaska, having the air strips and supply planes 
constantly traveling along the coast did not mean that local populations were able to 
easily travel between communities. One person said that people had already traveled 
widely and gotten “mixed up” through reindeer herding.
Pilot Walt Audi explained that no one just jumped on a plane back then. All 
potential passengers had to have security clearance and it had to be run through Federal 
Electric’s headquarters in Paramus, New Jersey. Walt did not think that Paramus would 
ever refuse anybody’s request, but it was a time-consuming requirement. In fact, one of 
the reasons that Walt Audi is regionally famous and beloved is because once he had his 
own plane, he would fly people out if they had to go to the hospital or had some kind of 
emergency.
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Dumpster Fresh Building Material
The planes may not have flown people out of the village, but they certainly flew 
cargo in to the bases. Everywhere that DEW Line construction touched the shore, a 
supply of dunnage, packing crates, and other materials appeared. Like many people who 
have lived next to industrial construction sites, the Kaktovikmiut and other Inuit along the 
Arctic coast recycled material and debris from the sites, and many built their first wood 
frame homes with it.
Mary Ann Warden (2009) recalls the arrival of the first building material: “the 
LSTs, and [I] remember this clearly, they would throw out planks of wood and I 
remember my uncles and them getting all the planks of wood and bringing them in 
because they could use them to build houses.” Considering what percentage of the cabins 
along the western Arctic coast had been constructed used DEW Line scrap, Richard 
Gordon of Herschel Island and Inuvik concluded, “[y]ou could say all of them” (July 24, 
2008, Herschel Island, Yukon Territory). Anytime people were walking around and saw 
plywood, he said, they would definitely grab it for floors or walls. Anything resembling 
boards and planks were, naturally, rare and valuable. Alice Agiak of Kaktovik remarked 
sardonically: “Everything come out from the DEW Line. Where else would it come 
from? We live in the island” (Agiak, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
Walt Audi was surprised and amused at the terminology for what he considered 
scrap lumber at best: “Well, I don’t know if you would call it building material. I could 
take you for a tour and show you what people used to live in. God! It’s amazing.” At the 
same time, Audi feels strongly that the DEW Line caused an increase in the local 
standard of living: “They would have still been living in the ground if it wasn’t for the 
DEW Line. Well, living in the ground meaning driftwood logs with sod on the outside” 
(Audi, Aug. 8, 2008, Kaktovik).
In 1957, anthropologist Jack Ferguson noted that in Canada, the Inuit camps that 
were cobbled together around DEW Line sites contrasted sharply with those constructed 
for the non-Native workers, who were snugly housed in heated and specially insulated 
modular buildings. In Alaska, there was no regular policy to construct special housing for
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Inuit employees. Sometimes there was fuel oil for the Inuit houses and white workers 
often showed the Inuit how to attach regulators to oil-drum stoves.
Kaktovik’s first school was constructed by Nora Jane Bum’s father, Harold 
Kaveolook, after whom the current school is named. Kaveolook built the schoolhouse, 
which is still standing, out of DEW Line packing crates. Later, the community used the 
armory for a school before a larger one was built.
In addition to buildings built from scrap lumber, five or six Quonset huts, 
originally set up as a temporary camp for construction crews, were incorporated into the 
village of Kaktovik after the DEW Line was complete. Several of the huts are still in 
town and a few are in use as living quarters. Kaktovik people had started using one of the 
huts as their own movie house while still in the old (second) village, and then they 
brought it over to the current site and used it as a community center for services, dances, 
and feasts.
Carla Sims Kayotuk thinks that the store she inherited from her father is made of 
DEW Line material. When she was young, she and her family lived in a little shack in 
town and then, with seven members including a cousin, they moved over to a Quonset 
hut which was later made into a clinic. Carla recalled that larger families also lived in 
Quonset huts. Her family then moved into their store before they finally got borough 
housing in the mid-1970s.
The way Robert Thompson of Kaktovik saw it, “So they moved from sod houses 
into sub-standard frame houses. I don’t know if that was a plus. They were very hard to 
heat. In that era, 3.5 inches of insulation was a lot of insulation” (May 5, 2009,
Kaktovik). Ben Linn realized this as well when he helped tear apart his family’s old 
house to renovate it. “I wonder why I had to chop so much wood. Look inside the walls, 
there we had cardboard insulation” (Linn, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik). In addition to being 
difficult to heat, the structures were particularly flammable. During several discussions 
over housing, several interviewees mentioned the loss of houses and lives in structure 
fires.
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Nellie Arey, whose father worked at the Shingle Point site, recalled that the DEW 
Liners asked the people at the Shingle Point camp if they needed left over materials. Most 
of the cabins built during that era are built from DEW Line material, and since then 
people have used the rich supply of local driftwood and/or hauled material from town if 
they want to build. Nellie Arey’s family cabin at Shingle Point was built out of DEW 
Line material, but Nellie was reiterated that just the outside of the house had DEW 
material, not the inside. This qualifier was almost certainly made because almost 
everyone along the coast is aware that much of the material recycled from the DEW Sites 
was produced before there were any regulations on lead paint, PCBs, asbestos, and other 
hazardous material.
Numerous individuals on both sides of the border recounted the same 
contaminated cabin story when the subject of hazardous building materials came up. 
During fieldwork, we had set up camp at Shingle Point next to an older and unused cabin. 
That cabin was likely made out of DEW Line material, but the story concerned the couple 
who had owned it. The couple had lived for several years in another cabin at Stokes Point 
(BAR-B Intermediate Site). Both people had passed away from different types of cancer 
while they were still fairly young. Furthermore, the material that their Stokes Point house 
had been built with had subsequently tested positive for contaminants. That is precisely 
the amount of detail, no more, no less, provided by every person who relayed this story. 
After his wife Lillian recounted this story in Kaktovik, elder Daniel Akootchook said,
“No wonder we’ve been told not to roll around in the DEW Line building” (May 5,
2009).
Shortly after the intermediate sites were abandoned in 1963, George Agnasagga 
decided to implement a minor recycling operation. He was trapping with his dog team 
along the coast between Point Lay and Cape Lisbume and he liberated as many chairs 
and beds as he could carry on his sled from the obsolete Cape Beaufort (LIZ-A) site. He 
hauled the furniture to Wainwright and distributed it to friends and family, but soon heard 
from the station chief at the Wainwright site that he should return the ‘stolen’ property 
before the wrong people found out about it and got him in trouble. George loaded his sled
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back up and undertook the minimum four-day trip by dog team from Wainwright to Cape 
Beaufort, where he put all the furniture back into the abandoned module that was then 
ignored for decades.
Isaac Panik recounted a somewhat similar story that occurred decades later when 
the Auxiliary site at Wainwright was abandoned in the 1990s. A few people went out to 
the site and took some beds that were still in good shape. Many people then got rid of 
their own beds, which were not in as good condition. Afterwards, officials contacted 
some of the people to let them know that this was a crime that they had committed, and 
that they had to return the beds to the site unless they wanted to face prosecution. The 
beds were returned, but since many people had already gotten rid of their own beds, they 
were without any bed at all for an extended period of time before they could arrange the 
logistics and money necessary to order new ones and have them delivered.
By contrast, when the Point Lay DEW Line site was closing down, community 
members were allowed to come and take anything they wanted. James Tazruk scored the 
actual bar, including the mirrored glass behind it. “Yeah, actually, they did give away all 
that stuff to the village. Pots, pans, beds, you name it. [] If you can lift it you can take it” 
(Sep. 24, 2009, Point Lay).
In Wainwright, the beds were returned to the empty DEW Line site, which has 
been basically unattended and rotting since it closed in 1995. The locks on the doors were 
long ago busted off and the eerie, dark, contaminated site is completely open for anybody 
to pilfer through, recreate in, and enjoy a measure of privacy that is often difficult to find 
in the crowded and close-knit community of Wainwright. Ignoring the stale warnings and 
restrictions, the Wainwright Search and Rescue Base has benefited since friends of the 
organization liberated the old DEW Line pool table one winter and set it up at the base in 
town.
Drums
Other than building material, one of the smallest and most commonplace objects 
brought up by the DEW Line has had a significant impact on people’s lives: the 
ubiquitous 55-gallon barrel. Abandoned, and usually empty, 55-gallon drums dot the
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entire landscape of the Arctic from oil exploration, military projects, and any number of 
other modem activities. Every DEW Line site has or has had thousands of drums that 
contained fuel, PCBs, or heavy metals. The dmms, which eventually rust and release any 
remaining contents, have become one of the most pervasive and symbolic - yet practical - 
results of military activity in the region. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine life on the North
cn
Slope during the past 60 years without the ‘taigruaq’ (Inupiaq for drum).
Over 818,000 fifty-five-gallon dmms were brought to the Arctic just for initial 
construction of the Line. Once the DEW Line sites were complete, bulk fuel was stored 
in large fuel tanks. Small Intermediate sites usually had two 10,000-gallon tanks near the 
site and fuel would be pumped into these from two 25,000 gallon storage tanks near the 
beach. Before the tanks were in place and supplied, all POL (petroleum, oil, and 
lubricants) were shipped in dmms. Other fluids were supplied by 55-gallon drum for the 
duration of the I sites, including all aviation gas and MoGas which was kept in and 
pumped from 55-gallon drams at I sites during their use.
The Arctic coast had previously been littered with dmms due to military oil 
exploration in PET 4. Unique legacies of that exploration include not only the piles of 
dmms along the trails, but -  because the heavy equipment used scraped the tundra down 
to the permafrost -  ice highways that are ideal for snow machining with the right freeze 
up conditions. Inupiaq wilderness guide Robert Thompson, who has traveled these trails 
extensively over the whole Arctic coastal plain, confirms that the entire Arctic coast is 
scattered with dmms, usually in piles.68 The coast itself was littered with them due both 
to on-shore dumps and currents and waves returning the dmms that had been hauled off 
the ice edge by the cat trains. The spread of the dmms is aided by wind and water along 
the coast, but also by scientific and military activity even further at sea. A scientist who 
worked for years at the research base on ice island T3 for several years calculated that by
67 "The route was littered with rusted fuel drums, which were left where they were drained. Steel shards o f  
progress which would be preserved for centuries, their cryptic markings: 55 GAL, DIESEL, AV/GAS, 
FSN-6565-473-SA30, the subjects for archeological and sociological research for pedantic
dissertations for eons," (Griffin 1980: 69) (emphasis added).
68 "He stared down at the trail o f litter. Fuel drums were strewn along the shoreline as if  teen-age giants had 
been racing by, chug-a-lugging beer and chucking the cans out a car window," (Griffin 1980: 70).
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1968, after ten years of operation, the station there had produced 80,000 empty drums 
that were abandoned along with the island when it started to break up. Tens of thousands 
of drums have also been abandoned in villages and former military sites throughout the 
Russian Arctic. Once introduced, the drums were quickly put to use as honey buckets in 
most communities and for many years people employed a modest version of the cat train 
method to dispose of these.
Although not in wide use on the North Slope (except among wildcatters), one 
Alaskan slang term for 55-gallon barrels is ‘tundra daisy.’ As far as research can 
determine, this term has probably been in use by roughnecks for many years but became 
more popular after a great flood of the Yukon River devastated the village of Galena in 
1971. Galena’s defense site line had been created as a supply point along the ALSIB 
(lend-lease) route during World War II and evolved into a forward-operating Air Force 
base during the Cold War. If the DEW Line perceived threats, jets would be scrambled to 
meet them from Air Force bases in Galena, Eielson (Fairbanks), and King Salmon. As a 
remote base, Galena amassed an enormous amount of military waste, including tens of 
thousands of barrels. The great flood of ’71, after inundating the entire town and 
surrounding area, spread thousands of barrels downstream for miles and over a wide 
swath of tundra and the name ‘tundra daisy’ was bom.
Although the possible uses for drums is endless, perhaps the most important use 
emerged as people moved from semi-subterranean sod homes into frame houses that were 
much harder to heat. Barrels were used as wood stoves and drip oil stoves that they could 
use to bum diesel or waste oil for heat. Drums are certainly used as fuel containers, but 
they have also been employed for purposes as varied as lining the tunnels into ice cellars; 
barbeques; bum barrels; reinforcements for runways, roads, and beaches; housing 
foundations; water or food containers; rain water collectors; ammo/firearm storage; scrap 
sheet metal; floats for rafts and docks; dog food cookers; steamers for bending wood; 
runway markers; wind indicators; musical instruments; culverts; and to mark off radome 
cables near roads and runways so that planes and vehicles would avoid them.
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George Agnasagga, who was bom in Point Lay and spent a great deal of his youth 
trapping by dog team, used drums that he and his trapping partners would find along the 
trails to cook dog food. He had a galvanized tub for cooking the food and would use a 55- 
gallon drum that “you could find anywhere.” He would cut the top out with an axe, punch 
multiple holes in the bottom and get a good fire going in it. Next he would set the tub in 
the top, add water or snow and get it “super hot” before throwing in lots of seal oil, seal 
meat, and sometimes caribou. “It was never a problem finding a 5 5-gallon dram - they 
were left along the trap lines” (Agnasagga, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright). George also said 
that before the USGS and PET 4 era and all the associated drums, people did not have 
such large dog teams.
As the base for PET 4 exploration, the site of NARL and a hub for DEW Line 
construction, Barrow has dealt with several large mountains of barrels including ones at 
the end of the lagoon. Like other communities, Barrow used the drams for years as honey 
buckets which, once full, would be hauled out on the ice and left to sink come break up. 
One particularly memorable storm in Barrow brought the drums and their contents back 
to shore where it contaminated the houses nearest the beach. In Kaktovik, Nora Jane 
Bums remembers helping her father with the same system: “The community would select 
what area to bring your thing and drop them off all at once. And then it would be as far as 
you can go and the deepest where that thing will sink to the bottom” (Bums, July 31, 
2008, Kaktovik).
George Agnasagga recalled that drums were often found full or partly full of fuel, 
and that the reason many of them have holes in the side is because when people came 
across them in the winter and could not pull them out of the tundra, they punched holes in 
them and pumped the fuel out. During DEW Line construction, a few locations were used 
as staging areas or supply caches that were not actually radar sites. One of these sites is 
Brownlow Point, on the western side of Camden Bay (not to be confused with the 
Intermediate site POW D at the bottom of the bay which is known as Collinson Point or 
Camden Bay or Kongegivik or, sometimes, Brownlow). According to Kaktovik resident 
Ben Linn, whose father was a long-time DEW Line employee, DEW Line construction
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crews constructed one small building and cached an enormous supply of fuel at 
Brownlow. A gentleman who ran a barge business between Prudhoe Bay and Canada was 
aware of the cache’s location, and he got free diesel from there for years (Linn, May 31, 
2009, Kaktovik). Other common drum stories resemble those told by Isaac Panik of 
Wainwright, concerning rumors of the secretive storage or burial of drums full of “highly 
classified” toxic substances69 (Panik, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
Harry Merriman, a white DEW Liner from Fairbanks, remembered his job in the 
early 1960s reinforcing Barter Island’s spit runway with barrels full of gravel. “We ran 
cables through them and then we filled them up. The first thing we had to do with these 
old drums was take a cutting torch and cut the tops off and that was a little tricky because
70you never knew for sure what they held and what fumes might be in there” (Merriman, 
March 3, 2009, Fairbanks). Looking at a picture of the drums along the airstrip, elder 
Lillian Akootchook said, “Yeah, that’s what we have, they always wear out. They make 
the water taste really bad. [] Smell bad, you know. I don’t know why they don’t use no 
cement. That would last a long time” (May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
Barter Island’s runway, constructed on a gravel spit subject to erosion, has 
provided periodic small employment booms for generations of Kaktovikmiut. Ben Linn 
worked on it once the reinforcement technique had been upgraded: he covered some of 
the old barrels with newer plastic containers, filled them with gravel, sank rebar through 
them with a jackhammer and anchored them down.
With the largest DEW Line site in the western sector and the hub for DEW 
activities, it is no surprise that Kaktovik has a close relationship with drums. (Having 
picked fish out of gill nets in many locations around the state and the Arctic, Kaktovik 
was the only place where I have wrestled with rusty pieces of drum tangled in the nets). 
The environment surrounding Kaktovik is literally inundated with rusty metal.
69 “Mr Nartok recalls information passed on to him by a former employee who has since deceased, that the 
USAF had asked him to bury approximately 200 full drums o f waster petroleum product near the airstrip.
In response to this concern, samples were collected by ESG in suspect areas” (Cote et al 2005).
70 Mary Ann Warden remembered her uncles working on the same job. Her uncle George said, 
“I’m sorry” every time he filled a barrel: “I’m sorry, I’m sorry.” Finally, her uncle Daniel asked, 
“What in the world are you sorry about?” and George reminded him that sauri is the Inupiaq 
word for filling something up. “I’m sauri.”
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Manning Point is a small peninsula next to Barter Island which many people 
know only as Drum Island. Before it was cleaned up, the stack of over 20,000 drums on 
the point had been there as long as most people could remember. “Tons and tons of 
drums. That’s where people used to get some drums if they needed drums for fuel, or if 
they needed to clean it out and use it for water, holding tank and stuff,” remembered Nora 
Jane (Bums, July 31, 2008, Kaktovik). Another pile of drums was also located on Barter 
Island itself, on the southern side near the current dump. “Just huge, huge, huge. I don’t 
think it was quite as many as Drum Island but it was close,” recalled Walt Audi (Aug. 8, 
2008, Kaktovik). Nora Jane remembers that she used to go climb around on all the dmms 
just to go look, but walking around she used to see old oil and other substances around 
them. “I used to ask, why they put them all there? [TJhey never really give me a good 
answer” (Bums, July 31, 2008, Kaktovik).
When Walt Audi became disoriented once while riding his snowmachine back to 
the island in a whiteout, he happened to come across the huge pile of dmms. He assumed 
that he was more disoriented that he had thought and had somehow wound up on 
Manning Point. Walt took the heavy tarp he carried with him on his snowmachine, tucked 
it over a barrel and crawled underneath it to wait out the storm. Several hours later, when 
he was finally forced to crawl out and urinate, he saw the DEW Line light, realized he 
was on Barter Island’s mountain of barrels, and was able to make it back to town just as a 
search crew was leaving to look for him. Two central DEW Line legacies, then, helped 
famous DEW Line rigger and bush pilot Walt Audi save himself that night.
In the 1960s, Kaktovik had a Galena-like experience when an especially strong 
storm blew thousands of the dmms on Manning Point and Barter Island away, scattering 
them around the surrounding countryside. While the remaining dmms on Dmm and 
Barter Islands were cleaned up in the nineties, the scattered drams were not and a third 
large barrel dump at the mouth of the nearby Jago River also remains.
The inundation of the Arctic slope with drums creates a sense of ownership that 
exists alongside a denial of association. For example, James Tazruk was somewhat 
indignant and about the state of Point Lay’s dmm collection: “Our dmms are so old you
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can just poke a hole in them with your finger” (Sep. 24, 2009, Point Lay). When Nellie 
Arey at Shingle Point, Yukon described obtaining building material from the DEW line, 
she explained that the crews would set aside whatever they had for the people. This did 
not include barrels: “No! Not barrels, not that,” as if the idea that barrels would be 
valuable was silly (Arey, July 18, 2008, Running River, Yukon Territory).
Thus, despite their many uses, the large quantity and poor quality of drums ensure 
that they are seen as trash. Also because of their ubiquitous nature, it is difficult to assign 
responsibility for them. Although ownership is obvious when piles are adjacent to DEW 
Line sites, many barrels are not. People in Kaktovik are still incredulous about one clean 
up project that was stymied because the officials were not able to determine that the 
drums belonged to the DEW Line and not to the community. Responses to this included 
“we have never made drums, we are not the one who brought these millions of drums 
here, drums are foreign.” Isaac Akootchook said “they Air Force bring it in to places. All 
the coast and those Air Force stations. DEW Line, same thing” (May 31, 2009, 
Kaktovik).
In Canada’s western Arctic, as Richard Gordon remembers, residents had similar 
drum clean up issues. They had to work a long time to get the funds to do a shore line 
clean up, “because there was so much [] bureaucracy, politics mixed into it, because they 
knew it was American DEW Line sites but anything out of their jurisdiction was 
Canadian -  whatever, some big money talkers as to who was going to pay for that clean 
up” (R. Gordon, July 24, 2008, Herschel Island, Yukon Territory). Eventually the project 
was funded and people traveling along the coast would carefully collect each drum that 
they saw once they made sure it was empty.
Bruce Iglangasak, bom in Canada to Kaktovikmiut parents, has lived in both 
countries and travels back and forth between them regularly. He worked on a ship doing 
clean up of DEW sites in the western Canadian Arctic for two years and recalled hauling 
approximately a dozen barges of mainly drums out of them. “I guess for a number of 
years they had locals from all the communities go and tie up all these dmms together and 
put them on pallets. We took a lot of dmms out” (Iglangasak, May 24, 2009, Kaktovik).
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Bruce recalls that only the drums were taken out and shipped south -  all other equipment, 
debris, and buildings were buried.
From the fieldwork conducted for this project, it appeared as though the drum 
clean up in Canada’s western Arctic was very successful since no drums were seen in that 
area. This was in stark contrast to eastern Arctic Alaska, and in particular the coastline 
around Barter Island and other sites in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, where limited 
drum clean up projects, but no comprehensive clean up of the coast, have been 
undertaken.
In Point Lay, George’s brother Amos Agnasagga emerged as a strong local leader 
who fought against what he perceived to be reckless industrialization of his homeland. 
The Point Lay DEW Line station was located on the tip of the mainland when the original 
village was still located across the Kasegaluk Lagoon on a prominent section of barrier 
island (fig. 29).
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After construction and years of DEW Line operation, the entire lagoon between village 
and radar site was filled with drums. Amos instigated a massive clean up and worked to 
have the lagoon restored so that it could be used again since it is traditionally where the 
residents of Kali, which is probably the last remaining village of the Kuukpaagruk 
people, boat and set their fishing nets.
At Wainwright, the DEW Line site is several miles from the town and from its 
main fuel tanks, therefore a long (and apparently very leak-prone) pipeline carried fuel 
some 6 miles from the tanks on the coast, above and past the village, to the radar site on 
the inland lagoon. Several years ago, a man in his forties (who has since died of cancer) 
related that when they worked on the drum clean up along the pipeline, the community 
learned the extent of petroleum contamination in the ground around town (he 
dramatically stated that the entire village was flammable). Betty Tulugak of Wainwright, 
bom in 1958, also worked on the drum clean up run by Olgunik Environmental Services 
in that community. Alice obtained her 40-hour Hazwhopper training and said that about 
12 people worked on the pipeline dmm clean up for about a month. The dmms, she 
thought, had been there before she was bom. Barrels that were not empty were put aside. 
As far as Alice can remember, the pipeline dmm clean up is the only clean up that has 
ever been done on the Wainwright DEW Line site.72
Carla Sims Kayotuk of Kaktovik recounts that she never had any health problems 
until the summer of 1997 when she worked at Manning Point (Dmm Island) cleaning up 
dmms. The job was great in that she met her husband on it, but by the time the project 
was done in August, she had strep throat for the first time and subsequently began to 
suffer from numerous health problems. Koyotuk and the other workers were cmshing the 
drums but were not wearing masks and were not required to wear them. “So we breathed 
in a lot of the debris and stuff that was coming in from the dmms and the cmshed metal 
and stuff. There’s no proof, but I was healthy until that year” (Kayotuk, May 29, 2009,
Since the 2009 fieldwork season, a clean up project has been instigated.72
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Kaktovik). Since then, Carla has suffered from non-alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver; 
ulcerative colitis; a form of arthritis that is related to Lupus; and benign ovarian cysts.
The drums were not all empty, and Carla recalls that a woman who was working for 
another company that was testing the drums was “furious” at the people in charge 
because other employees (including Carla’s husband) were cutting the drums before they 
were tested to see if they were safe. Carla contended that this woman filed a complaint 
and was fired. “She would complain all the time: ‘You can’t be having these guys do 
this! You need to make sure they are wearing their masks! ’ They wouldn’t listen to her 
and she never got a job doing the rest of the clean up stuff’ (Kayotuk, May 29, 2009, 
Kaktovik). The job to clean up the pile of drums on Barter Island the following summer 
was going to be at least as big, but Carla refused to have anything more to do with such 
projects after her experience on Drum Island. “[Ajfter the way we were treated and 
everything, there was no way I was going to work for them again” (Kayotuk, May 29, 
2009, Kaktovik). Carla also pointed out that some drums had ended up in the island’s 
(and the DEW Line’s) precious freshwater lake but had finally been cleaned up. This was 
similar to other sites, including Peard Bay where dozens of drums are still in the 
freshwater lake.
Elder Lillian Akootchook thought that, other than the pile of drums near the 
mouth of the Jago River, the military had done a good job of cleaning up the island. Alice 
Agiak confirmed that although there are still drums around (“here and there they come 
out”) there are less now (May 5, 2009). Considering whether the drums had ever 
interfered with her fishing or other subsistence activities, Alice said “Never thought about 
empty, rusty drums. We just look at it. Can’t do nothing about it” (Agiak, May 31, 2009, 
Kaktovik).
“Mother Nature cleaned it for them ” ~  Gravel, Erosion, DEW Line Dumps & 
Contamination
One might assume that the cat train method of garbage disposal described by 
Richard Gordon in Canada’s western Arctic was a thing of the distant past. However, 
environmental consultants in Canada who have improved the risk assessments for DEW
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Line sites by including Inuit traditional environmental knowledge have learned that 
similar methods of waste disposal (including the dumping of trucks and radio towers) 
were commonplace at other sites even up to the time of site deactivation in the early 
1990s (Cote et al. 2005).73
The original layout plans for most sites indicate beach areas to be used for 
garbage dumps, and bulldozing garbage and equipment into the ocean at the beach dumps 
was standard operating procedure at the sites for decades. The Auxiliary and Main sites 
generated and dumped garbage without any regulations from around 1954 until the early 
1970s. The practice of bulldozing garbage into the ocean declined in the 1970s as 
environmental laws came into existence, and the terrestrial dumps grew. They continued 
to generate and dispose of garbage locally under some restrictions throughout the 
deactivation of most DEW Line sites (around 1994) and the throughout the construction 
of the North Warning System radar facilities at many of the same locations. However, 
erosion has been an issue at nearly every site and, in certain cases, almost the entire dump 
is in the water. Clean up projects did not begin until the late 1990s. Many of the dumps 
were first reported to be eroding in the 1980s. Therefore, despite the presence of 
impressive dumps at several DEW Line sites, I believe that the majority of DEW Line 
garbage is already in the ocean, and that the dumps or remaining sections of dumps that 
are still visible are akin to the tips of icebergs.
The theory that most of the garbage is in the Arctic Ocean does not imply that 
there is not significant pollution of the land around the sites. A brief official description 
of one site is very similar to the clean up assessments for any of them: “The extend of 
contamination is unknown. Potential environmental concerns include abandoned drums, 
solid waste problems, fuel-related contamination, and polychlorinated biphenyls.
Potential pathways of concern include migration to surface water, direct contact to
73 “Mr. Kayaitok reported that it was common during operations and closure o f the CAM-5 site that 
materials such as trucks, radio towers and other discarded items be deposited on the ice o f Bagnell Lake 
and allowed to sink to the bottom o f the lake” (Cote et al 2005: 7). CAM-5 was an Auxiliary site that was 
deactivated in 1992.
253
contaminated soil or sediment, and subsistence pathways” (Alaska Department of 
Environmental Conservation 2010a).
A Canadian study has estimated that DEW Line pollution constitutes five percent 
of the total Arctic contamination burden (Ducharme 2002). This is a significant amount, 
but it also has a disproportionate impact because DEW Line contamination is 
concentrated into areas where people are far more likely to live and hunt. The Arctic’s 
indigenous people inhabit a small percentage of the Arctic’s overall landmass, and most 
of their small, scattered communities overlap with contaminated DEW and other military 
sites.
Gravel
Another seemingly inconspicuous yet critical element of DEW Line infrastructure 
that played a significant role in reshaping sections of the Arctic coastline was the use of 
gravel. Gravel was critical for DEW Line construction and throughout the life of the 
stations. 9,600,000 cubic yards of gravel were initially flown in to create 625 acres of 
airstrips (over 152,000 cubic yards per sites). Local gravel collection -  often on a 
monumental scale -  was subsequently undertaken to maintain the airstrips and to build 
and maintain roads and building pads. Regular gravel extraction continued throughout the 
life of the sites, and, some fifty years later, massive amounts of gravel are once again 
being dredged up to cover the dumps and other debris at those sites undergoing clean up. 
Between construction, maintenance, and clean up, the movement of gravel on the coast 
amounts to significant terraforming of the coastal terrain. Carla Sims Kayotuk thinks it is 
particularly ironic that the DEW Line used Barter Island’s gravel for all these purposes 
while locals were always told that they could not touch the gravel: they were not allowed 
to use it in their own yards or driveways because the island’s gravel was DEW Line and 
Air Force property.
Gravel removal for use in roads and airstrips has had several serious and 
unfortunate consequences at many of the DEW Line sites. In addition to destroying some 
traditionally used beaches, gravel removal has directly contributed to the biggest 
challenge facing many communities (and many DEW Line sites) in the Arctic today:
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erosion. Erosion along the Arctic coast is nothing new, and certainly there are sections of 
coast like the Shingle Point spit where people are witnessing beach growth. However, 
most communities in the Arctic are situated on strategic points of land to allow for better 
hunting opportunities, among other reasons, and these areas are particularly susceptible to 
localized impacts of gravel removal and erosion. As mentioned, strategic points along the 
coast were also much more desirable for radar stations, which is one of several reasons 
that villages are often co-located with radar sites.
Erosion is threatening communities themselves and, in many places, DEW Line 
dumps and infrastructure have been eroding for decades, releasing garbage and 
contaminants into rivers, lagoons, and directly into the ocean. Climate change in recent 
years has resulted in much longer periods when there is no shore ice protecting the 
coastline from storm surges and crashing waves. Richard Gordon summarized the 
situation faced by Arctic residents:
“Over the years now that the world is changing with this global warming and the 
erosions that’s happening along the shoreline, all the contaminants that were buried over 
when the DEW line sites were started- we ’re starting to see all those things come up 
again and it worries us because now we are educated about what these things held that 
were unknown in the past” (R. Gordon, July 24, 2008, Herschel Island, Yukon Territory).
The case of Brownlow Point illustrates the erosion problems. Mentioned above for 
its plentiful fuel barrel cache, Brownlow Point, on the west side of Camden Bay, was an 
official DEW Line staging area. It was not a radar site and it had only one small building 
and the large supply of barrels. (Brownlow, originally known as Kongegivik, was also the 
birthplace in 1934 of the late Thomas Pannigona of Barrow, who helped his father trap in 
the area and enjoyed visits from reindeer herding friends.) The site was scheduled for a 
clean up in the early 2000s, but the entire site disappeared before the clean up could 
occur when it eroded into the ocean during a large storm. Brownlow Point now has a 
sharply eroded bluff and various timbers, caterpillar tracks, and cables are visible both
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falling off the bluff and scattered around the land near the bluff, including a small 
remaining pile of barrels. No clean up is scheduled for these last traces of the staging area 
and likely within a year or two there will be no need.
As described above, the original village of Point Lay was located on the barrier 
island next to an unusually prominent small mound. Although there are several natural 
inlets through the barrier island into the Kasegaluk Lagoon from the ocean along the 
coast, there were never any inlets near the village site until the DEW Line arrived. As 
indicated by the official DEW Line site layout map and described by George Agnasagga 
and Bill Tracey of Point Lay, the DEW Line’s main gravel haul was the area just south of 
the village mound. The extent of gravel removed was such that within just a few years, 
water pushed through the area and a man-made inlet was created. Once water started 
flowing through the inlet, the village faced the drastic and fast-paced erosion that forced 
them to relocate to the mainland, playing a role in the temporary demise of the village. 
“Because of that inlet the coast is eroding, the old houses are eroding into the ocean,” 
said George Agnasagga (Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright). Bill Tracey explained74 that, 
although they would deny it, the DEW Line caused the inlet and the erosion.
Because it was the 1950s before everyone settled permanently in the larger 
communities on the North Slope, many older people were bom at remote traditional camp 
sites. Especially since those were often coastal sites, many people have seen both their 
birthplace and the community they settled in affected by DEW Line construction. With 
PET 4 exploration and NARL, the military was already active in Barrow when Lillian 
Elavgak moved there from Kalovik (“where you dip net for fish”) in 1947 (Elavgak, Oct. 
1, 2009, Barrow). When her family moved to Barrow, they lived with an uncle until her 
dad built a house out of things from the dump that “the Navy people threw away” 
(Elavgak Oct. 1, 2009). The extended family had had four sod cabins at Kalovik, which is 
located just west of Point Lonely, DEW Line Auxiliary Site POW-1 (fig.30). (Marchie 
Nageak, Lillian’s late husband, worked at Lonely before she met him.) Lillian’s mother
74 Bill Tracey described the man-made inlet in an interview concerning fish with Sverre Pedersen o f Alaska 
Fish & Game. Tracey’s father-in-law, Warren Neakok, was the one who ran the equipment and removed 
the gravel as part o f  his job on the DEW Line.
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claimed the land as her native allotment and willed her cabin to Lillian, who is the only 
remaining member of her immediate family. Her family’s cabin is now the only one still 
standing at Kalovik -  the other ones have eroded away. There used to be a large sand spit 
in the ocean in front of them, but the DEW Line gravel source was the beach at the base 
of that spit and, presumably, the spit itself. The spit is now completely gone and the 
beach has transformed into an eroding bluff. “It is way different with the DEW Line there 
now,” Lillian remarked (Elavgak, Oct. 1, 2009, Barrow).
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Figure 30: Site Plan for POW-1 (Point Lonely)75
75 • • •Kalovik (now abandoned) is located just off the top of this image, on the west side of the site 
very close to the fresh water lake seen in the top left comer of the image. The beach is the gravel 
source and site of the garbage dump, while the sewage disposal area (and second dump) is on the 
shore of the lagoon.
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Figure 31: ‘Sewage Disposal Area’/dump site on lagoon at Pt. Lonely (Aug. 2008). 
Dumps
“They always dump something here, dump something there, you know. They can't help 
but dump this here, and dump that there, and so, well i f  they watch their dumping, you 
know? ” (Ben Linn, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
Other than communities losing their beaches and homeland at an accelerated pace, 
the most serious problem with erosion at DEW Line sites is when garbage dumps, many 
with contaminants, erode into the ocean (fig. 31). Although many people are aware of 
this issue in their own area, the extent to which this has occurred and/or is occurring at 
nearly every single DEW Line site on the North Slope was a significant finding of this 
research project. Before environmental protection laws were created in the 1970s, no 
records were kept of waste disposal, which is one of the reasons that local knowledge of
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dumps and contaminants disposal spots is important. Official DEW Line layout images 
indicated that most sites simply used the beach for dumps, which meant that they would 
be affected by increasing erosion early on.
The dumps are notorious for the PCB-laden electronic transformers that crews 
regularly threw in along with lubricants, fuel, solvents, paint, anti-freeze and other 
compounds. Arctic cold slows the decomposition and breakdown of the chemicals, so 
persistent pollutants are still abundant in the dumps. “The halo effect” is the military’s 
euphemistic term to describe how the chemical contaminants concentrated at DEW Line 
sites tend to spread out to surrounding areas.
Until they were aware of contaminants, people used the dumps on a regular basis. 
Many people refer to activities at the dumps “before they were contaminated” or “before 
they got dirty,” which may simply mean before EPA laws passed and people became 
aware of invisible yet dangerous substances.
Sammy Lennie has had a wealth of experience with DEW Lines and their dumps 
since he grew up at three different DEW Line sites in the Mackenzie River Delta area: 
Tununuk (BAR-C); Shingle (BAR-2); and Tuktoyaktuk (BAR-3). The last time he saw it, 
the dump at Tununuk had not been cleaned up. Sammy Lennie remembers the first DEW 
Line dump near Tuktoyaktuk was never cleaned up, and he never understood that. The 
next dump was started very close to the community’s drinking water source. The dump 
was then moved back to the lagoon near Tuk, which runs off into the ocean. As Sammy 
explained, it ran off right where people used to fish for bottom feeders. In indicating on a 
map where the current dump is, Sammy said “[I]t is atrocious. [] There’s a lot of garbage 
there and a lot of run off, and it just runs off into the ocean” (Lennie, April 3, 2009, 
Fairbanks).
Growing up next to the dump, Sammy remembers that people used them quite a 
bit, including regularly taking their dog teams there to set them loose and let them feed -  
in effect a strange and industrial form of pastoralism.
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“We used to go there all the time. Me and my younger brother spent the whole day there, 
especially on the weekends with friends. Especially when they were burning the garbage, 
we ’d find  old paint cans and pound the lids on, through them into the fire and watch them 
explode. We loved blowing up things. We ’d find  cans and seal them up tight and throw 
them back in the fire and stand back and watch. Few times w e’d come home covered like 
green, blue... little too close” (Lennie, April 3, 2009, Fairbanks).
For years the wastewater from the Tuk site ran off the end of the small peninsula 
where the site was located (fig.s 32 and 33). Sammy said he does not know what it is was 
that they used to dump off the end, but that half barrels were tipped over and very dark 
black sticky sludge was poured over there bank and, “They done it for years ” (Lennie, 
April 3, 2009, Fairbanks). A friend of Sammy’s ended up being a foreman on the clean 
up project, and he called Sammy up to ask him whether he had ever been tested. The 
clean up crew had worked on the entire beach and it was so contaminated with arsenic 
and PCBs that they simply removed the entire top of the hill where the site sat. Sammy 
Lennie remembered that the clean up crews, after removing the buildings, removed the 
entire top of the mountain and that the contaminated dirt was stored in large containers on 
the site for years.
76 The community of Tuktoyaktuk is on the left, the site of BAR-3 is on the peninsula on the 
right, and the dump is inbetween.
Figure 33: BAR-3/Tuktoyaktuk Site Plan77
Even after his habituation to the dirty dumps at the DEW sites in the Delta, 
Sammy remembers being distinctly impressed when he took a tour of the dump at 
Cambridge Bay (CAM-Main). Apparently the dump was spread out and exposed, so that 
equipment from the earliest days of DEW Line operation was still visible. “That was 
garbage from way back,” said Sammy.
Less than fifty miles east of Brownlow Point, the original Bullen Point DEW Line 
Auxiliary Site (POW-3, radio call name ‘Flaxman Island’)(fig. 34) buildings had been 
demolished after the DEW Line was deactivated in 1995. The North Warning System 
buildings remain, but the site was closed in 2007 due to erosion and budget concerns.
77 This site plan for the Tuktoyaktuk DEW Line site BAR-3 shows not only the site gravel pit, but 
a ‘large gravel’ area and a ‘pea gravel’ area. It also shows one of the dump sites used as well as 
the “Eskimo House” where Sammy Lenny lived with his family.
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Bullen Point is at the lowest elevation of any DEW Line site and, with no barrier island 
or ice to break up the waves, approximately 300 feet of land were lost just in 2006, 
according to Walt Audi. Bullen’s garbage dump was at the tip of the point, the area that 
has suffered the most from erosion and some of it has been moved further back and 
covered with gravel. The entire original dumpsite is gone or is submerged, and a 
sprinkling of barrels is left to indicate what was there (fig. 35).
Figure 34: Site Plan for POW-3/Bullen Point78
78 The site plan for Bullen Point shows the waste disposal area at the base of the spit, a summer 
dump on the beach southeast of the site, the gravel sources in front of the lagoon, and the original 
fresh water source (which is now salty).
Figure 35: Bullen Point's northern waste disposal site viewed from the water
When it comes to dumps and contamination, George Agnasagga thinks that 
Kaktovik had it the worst of all the communities - except for the barrels in the lagoon at 
Point Lay. George remembered that there was no fishing for a long time on the river that 
goes into the lagoon. He and others from Point Lay described how the dump there was 
located behind the hangar, right down the bluff on the point of the mainland. About 15 
years ago, the dump started eroding into the lagoon. Interestingly, that prominent dump 
site figures in the much older story of how Kali got its name. The people were living in 
the old village site, but there was no prominent mound on the island. A young boy had 
intense cravings for a particular plant that only grew over on the mainland. As George 
told it, the boy’s grandmother told him to stay inside and not to even look out. She 
crossed the lagoon over to where the DEW Line dump is with her ulu and cut a big chunk 
of ground out. She packed it into her belt and compressed it down, but before she got 
home her son came out of the house and saw her. As soon as he saw her she was 
immobilized, never to move again. The mound of earth on the spit at Kali (Kali or ‘qulli’ 
means pull, referring to the fact that she pulled the land over) is the only mound on the 
entire series of barrier islands (Agnasagga, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
Point Lay people also have a second dump on the spit about six miles from town 
at an old US Coast and Geodesic base from 1947-’48. George Agnasagga thinks there
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might still be a couple of buildings there. There is a fairly impressive landfill at this site 
that is still open and is full of batteries with drums piled and scattered about. “No one has 
complained, I guess they just don’t know who to complain to,” said George Agnasagga 
(Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
Intermediate Sites
An unexpected finding during the fieldwork for this project was the extent of 
debris and contamination at several Intermediate sites. The Intermediate DEW Line sites 
are often overlooked and their impact is underestimated because, relative to Auxiliary 
and Main sites, they were very small and because they only operated for about six years 
(fig. 36).
79Figure 36: Intermediate Site
Like other remote Arctic outposts, the I-sites are somewhat legendary. The sites 
technically only required one radician to run the entire base, and they did operate this 
way for a short time in the first year or so of their existence. However, management 
decided that it was logistically unsafe and possibly psychologically detrimental to have a 
single man stationed by himself at a tiny remote base, 50 miles from the nearest Auxiliary
79 A standard Intermediate Site with Doppler tower, module, and warehouse. The photo is of the 
Stokes Point site in the Yukon (BAR-B), courtesy of www.lswilson.ca/dewline.htm.
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or Main site, with hazardous travel, inclement weather and the constant threat of polar 
bears. The single crewperson was delivered to the site along with hundreds of TV 
dinners, something most people had never seen before (and with which most were 
singularly unimpressed). Lonely radicians, the stories go, would slowly lose their minds 
at the compounds - some taking out their frustration on the prepackaged frozen meals.
However, employees like Hal Phillips were what DEW Line managers’ dreams 
were made of. It seems that if all DEW Liners had been like Hal, the Line would have run 
much more smoothly and would have required far fewer men. Phillips loved just about 
every aspect of the job and his years on the Line are some of the fondest of his full life. In 
addition to Point Lay, Wainwright, and Barrow, Hal worked alone at the intermediate 
sites along the Chukchi Coast, particularly Cape Beaufort (aka Cape Sabine, LIZ-A) 
halfway between Point Lay and Cape Lisbume and Icy Cape (LIZ-B), halfway between 
Point Lay and Wainwright. Hal, who wasn’t necessarily a loner and got along splendidly 
with everyone at the larger sites, did not think that working alone at the I-sites was too 
bad at all. Moreover, he was very fond of the TV dinners.
Management replaced the TV dinners and single radicians with teams made up of 
a chef and four other men, almost always including a local Inupiat since it was 
understood that their knowledge would be particularly necessary at these more 
independent and rugged sites. Life at the I-sites was still adventurous enough to serve as 
the basis for a fictionalized thriller, Icy Cape, (Griffin 1980), a book that portrays life on 
the line as populated by heavy drinking and sardonic characters replete with intrigue and 
explosions.
Icy Cape gained additional modem notoriety when the popular sci-fi detective
RO •television series The X-Files aired an episode involving primordial ice worms that cause 
intense paranoia in hosts which took place at a remote research station supposedly
80 “Mulder: This is Agent Mulder, we have a serious biological hazard. Request air pick-up and quarantine 
procedures, over. Come in, Doolittle Airfield.
Radio: We copy, Agent Mulder. This area is under a heavy storm and no aircraft can get out for the next 
day. Maybe the military base in Kotzebue can set up a quarantine. Advise immediate evacuation, the arctic 
storm is bearing in your direction, over.
Mulder: We were told we would have three clear days o f weather, over.
Radio: Welcome to the top o f the world, Agent Mulder. Over.” - http://x-files.wikia.com/wiki/Ice
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located there, but Icy Cape had long been a place of legend. Icy Cape has not had a 
permanent settlement since the 1930s, but the area is very important for people from 
Point Lay and Wainwright. Before it was evacuated due to erosion, Icy Cape had long 
been the largest community in the region and a main whaling station.81 People said that 
the northwest Arctic coast was dominated by Point Hope, Icy Cape, and, to a lesser 
extent, Barrow . Icy Cape was larger -  similar to Point Hope -  and the people of Icy 
Cape were the largest Inupiat of all. One story told of a mummified Inupiaq man from Icy 
Cape at the Smithsonian Museum who was almost seven feet tall. Another story was of 
an Icy Cape man who was such a great hunter that no one believed he had succumbed to 
the sea and ice when he disappeared on an ice floe -  they believe he made it to the 
Seward Peninsula and started a new life.
Because Icy Cape and other Intermediate sites were simply transmitter stations 
with a tower, one modular building, a small warehouse and five-man crews that operated 
from 1957 to 196383, it seemed like the amount of debris would be proportional and, so 
many years later, largely gone. The scattered and vague environmental reports on I-Site 
remediation projects indicate several kinds of contaminants, but “the extent of 
contamination is unknown.” In my mind, that extent would be small (tiny base, tiny 
dump, contained). The reality of the I-sites was nothing like that. In effect, the military 
built a miniature city in each spot so that one radician could run a transmitter. Not only 
was the footprint of the I-sites far more extensive than I had imagined, the dumps were 
not removed at most of them (at some the dumps were eroded and at least one they buried 
a dump). Otherwise, the buildings and towers were removed at the sites and gravel was 
hauled in to level it off a bit. Tests were done, they showed contamination, yet there is no
81 According to George Agnasagga, fur prices were so good at that time that the people o f Icy Cape had 
been able to afford to build and then move many o f the framed houses from the village. Icy Cape people
mainly moved to Point Lay, Wainwright, and Barrow.
82 Before the Yankee whalers and the military created such a build up, Barrow was always small and
relatively poor, and people in other communities note that Barrow people were also smaller and had fewer
resources than other communities. While they had bowhead, Barrow had no wood or coal to bum and were
largely reliant on seal oil.
83 The Intermediate sites that were part o f the BAR sector were operational for a few years longer since that 
sector was the early prototype (The BAR sector ran from Barter Island to Atkinson Point, NWT and 
included I sites at Demarcation, Stokes Point, Tununuk, and Atkinson Point).
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method to enforce the laws that the State of Alaska Department of Conservation or any 
federal agencies conclude are being violated.
George Agnasagga filed a complaint about the dump at Icy Cape (LIZ-B), which, 
like Point Lay, is on the Kasegaluk Lagoon. George was on location when contractors 
demolished the buildings and reported that the crew did not touch the dump. “The DEW 
Line is on a hill and down where the bank is they put a lot of barrels and other stuff and 
at the bottom there is stuff seeping out. I don’t know what it is but it is pretty gooey” 
(Agnasagga, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright). There is also a half-buried upside down tractor 
and a wooden frame house. The land under the tower at Icy Cape eroded into the lagoon 
and the tower was twisted and dragged away by shore ice. James Tazruk also observed: 
“They did not exactly get everything when they should have” (Sep. 24, 2009, Point Lay).
The first Intermediate site passed during fieldwork was Stokes Point, Yukon 
Territory. Nellie Arey had pushed for clean up at Stokes Point Intermediate site after 
visiting there with her children and being horrified by the widespread debris and 
contamination. Several people, including her uncle, have had cabins near Stokes since 
before the DEW Line was built. As mentioned above, Nellie’s family cabin at Shingle 
Point is built from DEW Line material and sits in the shadow of the large Shingle Point 
Auxiliary site BAR-2, but she does not have any problem with BAR-2. Nellie reported 
that it wasn’t just the dump at Stokes that was dirty, but that it had garbage all over and 
was unbelievably “gross” in the summertime. She had visited with her children and found 
the ground around the site was soaked with oil. When she and her family built driftwood 
fires, the wood produced only thick black smoke. “I didn't like my little ones to go out 
that way 'cause when you walk you could just see bubbles coming up - on the ground!” 
(Arey, July 18, 2008, Running River, Yukon Territory).
At the Peard Bay Intermediate site, it is safe to assume that the original dump is 
completely gone with the approximately 200 feet of shore that have eroded. Although the 
DEW Site was deactivated in 1953 and no further DEW-specific clean up occurred until 
the 1990s, Peard Bay was, like the old LORAN site at Skull Cliff some 25 miles away,
84 “I don't know. This one was good - at least they didn't have garbage all over. Like that one down there” 
(Arey, July 18, 2008, Running River, Yukon Territory).
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part of a clean up of the Naval Petroleum Reserve in the early 1980s. An unknown 
amount of drums from that clean up were buried at Peard Bay in 1982 at the end of the 
lagoon (the area referred to by the subsistence users of the area as ‘the wood pile.’) 
Sampling has documented the presence of PCBs, pesticides (including DDT), petroleum 
products, volatile organic compounds and possibly arsenic on the road. The Alaska 
Department of Environmental Conservation records indicate “contamination is extensive” 
and noted another report of children playing at the site (2010a).
Fifty years after construction of the DEW Line was perceived as an invasion by 
his ancestors, James Olemaun remembers that the DEW Line clean up at Peard Bay 
turned the area into an active base. “It was something else,” Jimmy recalled, when a 
barge loaded with heavy equipment, wrecking balls, and a crane parked in front of their 
hunting cabins for the entire summer. The crews tore down the module, the outbuildings, 
and the tower. Jimmy complained that the heavy equipment scared off the caribou he was 
trying to hunt, but the clean up crew gave him open access to their kitchen. “They let us 
eat over there and what not. We’d go to their kitchen and watch movies and had access to 
everything in their kitchen -  ice cream, pie, so .. .it kinda made up for it, missing out on 
some of the caribou, I suppose” (Olemaun, Aug. 31, 2000, Peard Bay).
The only obvious dump at Peard Bay is a medium-sized dump, now covered with 
gravel, that contains all the heavy equipment batteries that were gathered up during the 
project. A gravel pad covers the pit, which was lined with black rubber containment. At 
the current rate of erosion, that new dump (as well as the Tatchim Isua cabins) will be in 
the ocean within decades. During the three-stage clean up project at the site, crews were 
required to extract considerable amounts of gravel from the beach to cover up all the 
foundations and the dump. The crews first tried to take the gravel from the area right 
around the cabins (some of which are located next to the DEW Line road that runs from 
beach to the site on top of the hill) but the families who camp there successfully stopped 
them. It is safe to conclude that the Peard Bay DEW Line site underwent remediation 
earlier than many other sites because it is the seasonal camping and hunting area for two 
relatively powerful Barrow families.
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In part because it is very difficult to obtain funding to undertake clean up projects 
unless hazardous substances are documented and because it is very expensive to contain 
or remove them even once substances are identified, many dumps and contaminated areas 
are abandoned. Complicating the situation, often to the point of complete dysfunction, is 
the fact that responsibility for many of the sites has passed through the hands of several 
agencies. Moreover, none of the agencies welcome responsibility for the DEW Line sites 
or the struggles involved with managing them.
Collinson Point, for example, lies at the bottom of Camden Bay, just west of 
Barter Island and within the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Families in the region had 
used this area, presumably for hundreds of years. Isaac Akootchook of Kaktovik was 
bom at the site, known colloquially as Aguilguagruk (‘jaw ’) or Nuvukpak (‘sandspit 
point’). The land for the POW-D Intermediate Site85 was transferred to the Air Force in 
1957, and the site was deactivated in 1962. The land was transferred to the Navy in 1965, 
transferred to the Bureau of Land Management in 1970, and then transferred to Fish and 
Wildlife when the Arctic Refuge was expanded under the Alaska National Interest Land 
Conservation Act (ANILCA) in 1980. It was designated a Formerly Used Defense site 
(FUD), therefore the Army Corps of Engineers directs the cleanup and the Alaska 
Department of Environmental Conservation oversees it because they have authority to act 
in the place of the Environmental Protection Agency for FUDs in Alaska.
In 1997 and in 2000, the buildings at Collinson were demolished and 32-tons of 
contaminated soil were removed, along with towers, transformers, pipelines, and 176 
dmms. However, tests in 2001 indicated that PCB and diesel contamination remained 
significant and, according to the Alaska Department of Conservation website, there were 
concerns about a potential dump or dumps at the site but their status was unknown
85 The POW-D DEW Line intermediate site is usually called Collinson but is sometimes called Camden 
Bay and sometimes Brownlow Point or Nuvugaq (which means 'point' but would actually be Nuvukpak: 
'point' or 'sandspit point' in Inupiaq). Other names for the area are Kangigivik Point and Agilguagruk 
(which means 'jaw' since the point is shaped like one - this is how it is known to the Inupiat o f Kaktovik). 
The naming is quite confusing because there is another point in Camden Bay that is called 
Brownlow/Kongigivik, that site is the non-radar DEW staging area with fuel stache and eroded building.
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(2010). Nevertheless, the Corps of Engineers issued a “Draft No Department of Defense 
Action Indicated Report.” The Alaska Department of Conservation, in part because of 
public comments it received indicating that contamination was still an issue at the site 
(Collinson, now usually referred to as POW-D, is an important subsistence area for 
Kaktovikmiut), refused to concur with that report and noted that the area was still littered 
with barrels. DEC compiled its findings and comments in a remedial investigation report 
and submitted that to the Corps, and eventually the ADEC closed out the project in 
September 2009 (Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation 2010).
Thus for the Intermediate sites, which are now FUDs, state agencies are 
attempting to enforce federal agencies to comply with federal environmental procedures 
and the result is less than efficient. The Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation works with the Bureau of Land Management in attempting to compel the 
Air Force to comply with federal environmental procedures for other DEW Line sites 
without much more success. Point Lonely (POW-1), for example, was a DEW Line 
Auxiliary site (deactivated in 1990) and North Warning System Short Range Radar that 
was closed in 2007. Husky Oil had previously done exploratory work in the Naval 
Petroleum Reserve from the area. The federal government (Department of the Interior) 
had granted 2,830 acres of "public" land to the Air Force for the site in 1957. When 
ownership passed to the BLM in the 1970s, the BLM leased 1,801 acres to the Air Force.
Contamination issues at Lonely are particularly sensitive because Lonely is 
located within the Teshekpuk Lake Special Area of the National Petroleum Reserve. 
While conservation groups (i.e. the Northern Alaska Environmental Center) would like 
the area to be restored to its original state, the Air Force characterizes use of the site as 
industrial and the BLM will most likely continue to lease the site for future oil industry 
activity. BLM and DEC have requested that the Air Force have the dump(s) at Lonely 
removed and consolidated at a previously industrialized spot that is some 50 miles inland. 
The Air Force, claiming financial constraints, wants to relocate the dumps to a site close 
to the eroding shoreline.
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Lonely’s dump was first reported to be eroding into the lagoon in 1983. In the 
summer of 2008, 25 years later, an apparently ineffective containment system was on 
the beachfront of the dump and scores of piles of contaminated rubble and dirt sat in 
rows, reeking of garbage and chemicals. Enormous bags of contaminated dirt were 
readied near the boat ramp to be loaded on the barge, and several of the bags had 
already ripped and spilled (fig. 37).
At Wainwright, the DEW Line dump was originally situated on the shore of the 
Kuk River, which forms the lagoon that wraps around the community. DEC’s record 
search indicated that the landfill had been closed in 1974 and reportedly cleaned up in 
1979-1980 (none of the informants for this project recall that clean up). It is also reported 
that a North Slope Borough gravel extraction project covered the site in 1987. Likely 
because of extensive DEW Line and NSB gravel extraction, the dump area has subsided 
and almost the entire dump has disappeared into the lagoon. Debris can be seen on the 
shore and in the water. Residents report that during especially low tides, much of the 
larger debris and sunken equipment is visible. The city used the dump as well (until it 
built its own in the 1970s) in similar ways as other sites: people would go find stuff and 
would feed their dog teams there. Since fieldwork was conducted in Wainwright in 
September 2009, a clean up project has begun on the dump.
On Barter Island, areas where the gravel was removed and, in part, used to 
prevent erosion in other areas (i.e. in drums along the airstrip) have experienced
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considerable erosion. Nora Jane remembers playing as child on the immense gravel 
mound that was staged at the area in front of the hangar on the spit. “[T]he DEW Line 
had got [it] along the coast. I think that is why we’re eroding, cause of they took that 
buffer. [T]he beach used to be further away when we were kids” (Bums, July 31, 2008, 
Kaktovik). Children were not allowed to go over to the area further along the beach (to 
the west) because the DEW Line crews (including many of the children’s fathers) were 
digging up gravel from there and bringing it to the base of the runway. Middle-aged and 
older people in Kaktovik become nostalgic when they describe the beautiful, thick gravel 
beaches that the island used to have:
‘‘Well, we used to have a big, long beach. I  remember that. Big, long beach. Till the 
DEW get gravel out from it. [] We used to put our boats way up there, and we have no 
problem. And then the DEW Line come over and take gravel out where there is needed. ” 
“And then when there is a big wind, the tide erodes a little at a time. [] It really tore that 
off. You can’t even go around the island anymore. [] Me and mom used to go all the way 
to the end, past where Grandpa’s place is86. Used to walk andfish, come back with the 
dogs. [] Well, our island is getting smaller and smaller I  guess. ” - (Agiak, May 31, 2009, 
Kaktovik).
Nora Jane Bums remembers poking around in the Barter Island dump just because 
she was nosy and curious. She does not remember anybody being afraid of it, it was a 
normal pastime for kids and adults. She and the other kids “used to hook up Eddie 
Rexford’s dad’s dogs so we could go to the DEW Line dump before it got contaminated. 
[T]hose guys from the DEW Line used to throw brand new erasers and pencils that we 
can find and use at school.” They would look for all kinds of office supplies that hadn’t 
been dirtied with food and whoever found a cigar box was “king of trading” (Bums, July 
31, 2008, Kaktovik). Often the DEW Liners would set food that was recently outdated 
(especially cans of fruit and tomato juice) on the side where families could get to them
Tom Gordon’s trading post was located on the western side o f  Barter Island.86
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easily. Elder Lillian Akootchook remembered picking up “good stuff’ when she was 
younger. “They throw away some new stuff, I pick it up and use it. [G]ood bucket, you 
know” (May 5, 2009).
A particularly satisfying dump diving memory for Alice Agiak was the day she 
and her cousin were bored, decided to go to the dump and found six cartons of cigarettes. 
Her father was a bit suspicious when they brought them to him, but she explained that 
they were from the iqtak. “Yeah, we hit the jackpot that time. Free cigarettes! I guess 
before their merchandise come. You know, throw out the outdated, so” (Agiak, May 31, 
2009, Kaktovik). Even though she got a serious scar on her head from playing Frisbee in 
the dump with objects that she describes as computer discs larger than vinyl LPs, overall 
the quality of goods in the dump was high. “They throw a lot of stuff in the dump. Cases 
of this and that. Nice, good stuff, though” (Agiak, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik). Alice does 
not remember when she became aware that there were contaminants in the dump, 
although now she knows.
Nora Jane guessed that people stopped dump diving “when they started getting 
real dirty dumps, I guess. Or, not clean trash, or I don't know” (Bums, July 31, 2008, 
Kaktovik). Nora Jane can only recall for sure that she left Kaktovik in 1969 for several 
years, and when she returned it was totally different.
Although most people who were shown pictures of eroding DEW Line dumps 
along the coast were shocked at the extent, James Tazruk was not surprised to see a map 
depicting a few of them. “No. It’s what they do best: make a mess. Yup. Just use it and 
leave it and never mind” (Sep. 24, 2009, Point Lay).
Contamination
In Silent Spring, Rachel Carson remarked that the only location where scientists 
could find a diet free from DDT and related pesticides was “on the far Arctic shores of 
Alaska” among people who had never left the area (Carson 1962). However, Carson 
lamented that “even there one may see the approaching shadow,” (ibid) and this omen 
was based only on her knowledge of persistent pesticides and cancer risks. It would not 
have occurred to her to include other persistent industrial chemicals, such as PCBs,
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because at the time most people only considered an agent as “poisonous” if it caused 
immediate death or obviously gave people cancer. Scientists did not recognize until 1966 
that many persistent compounds that are not acutely poisonous or carcinogenic can wreak 
at least as much havoc in the environment. Carson died in 1964, of cancer, before people 
realized that synthetic chemicals, many created decades before the pesticides, could 
seriously impact human developmental processes and reproduction.
In the Arctic, it was a particularly relevant and personal to learn about the dangers 
of invisible poisons as people learned at the same time that the radar bases were hotspots 
of contamination. Sammy Lennie said, “I wasn’t aware of it, didn’t know what 
contamination was. I remember seeing ‘Caution Radiation’ but I didn’t know what it was. 
Especially around the big radar dishes, they were used to have signs on them: “Caution, 
Radiation, Radioactive Material. [] But you see, that was our playground” (Lennie, April 
3, 2009, Fairbanks).
Most people have accepted that the military and contractors were not intentionally 
putting them at risk. “They didn’t know anything about environmental stuff back then 
either so they didn’t care whether they messed up our shores or anything,” said Mary Ann 
Warden. George Agnasagga was sad about the contamination but said, “I don’t really 
blame them too because at the time there were no EPA laws and the only ones who 
would be complaining would be us villagers and who is going to listen to us? What voice 
do we have?” (Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
The lack of blame, however, does not mean that residents are unconcerned about 
or ignorant of contamination. Some people are quite bitter about the health risks and the 
deaths that they believe are attributable to the contamination. When it was suggested to a 
Kaktovik man (by his friend) that he might be interested in talking to me about my 
research, the man said, “I don’t want to talk about the DEW Line because the DEW Line 
killed my parents.” This perspective does not raise any eyebrows in Kaktovik.
Etok, on the other hand, sees contamination from the DEW Line as a small scale 
and secondary issue. “Most of it has already leached out. Gone.” Later, however,
274
discussing the issue of contamination on personal allotments, he said, “Oh yeah -  
completely. Everybody’s land is contaminated” (Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks).
Robert Thompson thought that operation of the entire DEW Line was a 
particularly “big drain” on the U.S. economy because of the “cost plus” practice that was 
used for all contracted projects. In addition to being financially profligate with taxpayer 
dollars, this method also resulted in more material being procured, wasted, and dumped.
“I  worked there and the projects that they would come up with, the more it costs, the 
more the contractor makes so there’s no incentive to get it done in the most efficient 
manner. The longer it took, the more they’d  make and that was quite obvious when I  
worked there on summer work projects that they were taking their time and making it 
last. That’s just the way it was”87 (Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
Robert worked at the DEW Line doing summer labor work for a few years. “I saw 
things go into that dump,” he recalled. “Fire retardant paint, which is something that 
they're finding in animals in the Arctic, and there's thousands of gallons of it in there.” 
The vast amounts of extra paint, for example, were due directly to the cost-plus method 
of project procurement:
“They would order huge amounts o f paints and it would cost more so they could make 
more money. And they would take it and put it into the dump, into the ocean. [] They had 
a warehouse where they put all the extra paint that was left over from all the paint 
projects they do every summer fo r  years and years and years and a lot o f the paint had 
spoiled and got frozen and they disposed o f it and it went into the ocean, it went into the 
dump ” (Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
87 Robert was incredulous that one summer he worked there he was assigned a room at a cost o f $75 per 
day. He told the managers that he did not need a room since he lived in Kaktovik, but they did not care.
275
Other people in Kaktovik, including Mary Ann Warden, have reported that they 
used to catch a wide variety of good fish around Kaktovik “before the water got really 
dirty.” When asked whether she meant it was muddy, Maryann said no, the water was 
“gunky” and that there was “gunk,” like globs of paint, all over the fishing nets.
The issue of contamination causes Robert Thompson to reflect on the health 
effects of the Agent Orange his troop dropped on people in Vietnam. Agent Orange was 
determined to have negative health effects on the U.S. troops who were in and out of 
there quickly, and Robert wondered about the people that have had to deal with it until it 
wears off. “And the DEW Line here -  there’s still chemicals on the ground, there’s PCBs 
-  polychlorinated byphenols -  on the ground at Kaktovik at this moment that still haven’t 
been cleaned up. There’s a number of sites that we’ve told the Restoration Advisory 
Board and it hasn’t been cleaned up adequately. They just got a dump site that got 
washed into the ocean and that was moved, I’m not sure that’s an adequate remedy for it, 
it should have been moved out so we wouldn’t have to deal with it” (Thompson, May 5, 
2009, Kaktovik). Realizing that the problem is certainly worse in other parts of the 
world88, Robert says that the issue of contaminants being left or buried near arctic 
communities isn’t surprising. “Yeah, that’s a common problem for indigenous people. It 
wouldn’t happen in Los Angeles or wherever.” Robert remembers when a transformer 
full of PCBs exploded in Fairbanks: the entire area was cordoned off and they cleaned it 
up on the spot. “They didn’t leave it there for 40 years on the ground...” (Thompson,
May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
Thompson is certain that contamination from the DEW Line has contaminated 
local food sources. It clearly had, he thought, because they pushed everything into the 
ocean for fifty years. Much of that material does not degrade but bioaccumulates in the 
food chain and is still present in the environment. He would like to see testing done on
88 “.. .where nobody is watching them - you know, you got contractors, they are trying to make money, you 
got chemical problems, takes money to clean it up, there's nobody watching, no oversight, they are going to 
do it the cheapest way possible. It's just human nature. It's happened just about everywhere. The only thing 
that stops them is that here in the United States we have laws that can be enforced if  people report it but if  
people didn't report it they wouldn't do anything - they were prepared to let the dump wash into the ocean 
up here and there's a lot o f hazardous chemicals in them.” -  Robert Thompson
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some of the fish and other food resources. At RAB meetings, Robert brought up the fact 
that there was still contamination on the ground and he claimed that the DEW Line 
engineers and other officials would become angry, claiming that leaching does not occur 
in the Arctic and that everything had been thoroughly tested. Robert acknowledged that 
they did come do testing but that they actually lied to the community about it. For 
example, the officials showed pictures at the RAB meetings and reported finding a little 
bit of battery acid in one spot, no more. “We're probably lucky they have made what 
attempts they have did to clean up things but there's still chemicals on the ground” 
(Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
One reason that people in Kaktovik are suspicious of environmental testing that 
finds only small, isolated amounts of contamination is because, like Robert Thompson, 
they worked at the site and they themselves participated in the disposal of hazardous 
material. Several buildings, such as the garage and the warehouse, simply had large holes 
in the floor through which all waste material was dumped for decades.
On the question of whether contamination from DEW Line sites has affected 
subsistence resources, James Tazruk of Point Lay said, “In some way, I think some of it 
might, I’m sure it did” (Sep. 24, 2009, Point Lay). He thinks that people are aware of it 
and that is why people will bag, tag, and send out any animal that has something wrong 
with it.
Walt Audi was one of very few people who did not believe that DEW Line 
contamination had affected local food and resources. Audi did not believe that the 
Kaktovikmiut thought so either: “Nah, they are still getting plenty of fish...” (Audi, Aug. 
8, 2008, Kaktovik).
Ben Linn did not think that contamination from the DEW line had affected 
animals. He thought, if  it had, you would notice after all these years. Only the people 
have been affected, he said, but animals tend to stay away from populated areas.
On that subject, Ben Linn is in agreement with most people on the North Slope. 
Linn, whose father passed away 30 years ago after working on the DEW Line for many 
years, said “all those people that worked at the DEW line sites, they're buried up there
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(indicating the cemetery), they had cancer. You know, they didn't know about asbestos, 
or all those cancer causing agents, and they mostly wound up in the grave, almost 
everybody that worked up there at the DEW line site” (Linn, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
Sammy Lennie does not understand how he hasn’t gotten sick, given the number 
of people he has known that have died of cancer around Tuk. Many there suspect the 
illness is due to the fact that they used to take their drinking water right from the harbor 
in the wintertime.
Jimmy Olemaun, remembering his summers spent playing in the abandoned 
module at Peard Bay LIZ-C, said, “I wouldn’t be surprised if we got cancers from that 
deal. I mean the walls, the insulation. We were exposed to it without a doubt. PCBs are 
the worst. [] We had people come by here a few times getting water samples -  they 
would get a bunch of water samples from especially that lagoon because of their junk that 
they buried at the wood pile” (Olemaun, Aug. 31, 2000, Peard Bay).
Carla’s father Mark Sims had died while he was in his forties of a brain tumor.
His family suspects that exposure to radiation and contaminants may have played a role, 
and Mark Sims himself had been very critical and distrusting of the DEW Line’s impact 
on the environment. Carla remembered that her father borrowed her camera to take 
pictures of containers marked “PCB” that he found in the dump to document it before it 
was covered up.
“For me, I think high cancer rates are due to military contamination/actions 
whether nuclear testing or throwing stuff into the so-called landfill, our lagoon,” Isaac 
Panik of Wainwright concluded (Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
In Kaktovik, Alice Agiak also thought that contaminants had affected the local 
area. “Big time. Yeah, there's still metals all over this lagoon over here. The 'dozer, its 
still there, I could walk on over here, there's still a lot of metal out there in the water” 
(Agiak, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik). Now that the people know how dangerous the 
materials are, she does think it made people sick. Alice also said that she did not know 
anything about concerns over home building materials, but then “Oh, there was a lot of 
asbestos. We used to play with them, too” (Agiak, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
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Walt Audi laughed when discussing homes built out of contaminated material. 
“And what -  they want the Air Force to be responsible for it?” (Aug. 8, 2008, Kaktovik). 
Walt was also incredulous that the village corporation had been offered the newest 
building on the site (an apartment train built in the late 1960s), but it wanted the Air 
Force to clean up the asbestos and lead-based paint. Walt laughed -  “No way! [] The Air 
Force gave the corporation a really nice building -  they just tore it down and buried it in 
the new dump up there” (Audi, Aug. 8, 2008, Kaktovik).
Walt Audi had already dealt with people’s suspicions about contamination when 
he was mayor of Kaktovik. Carla Sims Kayutok and many of her neighbors believe that 
the radar was (is) also affecting the health of the village. She explained that her father and 
other men documented the phenomenon and sent their findings to the military: “Low and 
behold, everything disappears.” Walt Audi acknowledged that some people think the 
radar is a concern and that it is causing defects, but he does not know. He recognized that 
it looked suspicious when Mark Sims died of brain cancer in his forties. Audi was a 
rigger - he used to work on the antennas at the sites. The antennas were supposed to be 
turned off when he was on working on them, but he did it with them running. “There’s 
one banked like that, one banked like that, there’s all this stuff in between pointing out 
like that. I used to get up in there and work on the wave guides and stuff like that, with it 
running. Wasn’t supposed to be, but you know, I was in the radome quite a bit” (Audi, 
Aug. 8, 2008, Kaktovik).
Carla and her neighbors refer to the area of town as “the little triangle” and kept 
track of all the places in that area where the phones beep periodically. People are pretty 
sure it is coming form the DEW Line (“but they’ll deny it”). Carla told then-mayor Lon 
Sonsalla (an ex-DEW Liner like her father) about it and she said she found out that the 
beam does go straight through that section of town and that with new technology the 
beam can actually be diverted, but the military will not change it. Carla and her neighbors 
have wanted to formally document who in town has had tumors, cancer, other things and 
came to the conclusion that it was mainly people who worked at the radar site or lived in 
the path of the radar.
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Almost every interviewee for this research had the same impression -  that men 
who worked at the DEW Line died of cancer. North Slope Natives’ experiences with and 
perceptions of cancer is a critical element of modem history in the western Arctic. 
Connections between the DEW Line and cancer have been introduced here, while the 
larger issue of cancer’s role in shaping attitudes on the North Slope is analyzed in the 
conclusion to this dissertation.
Clean up
Once the extent of the contamination on the DEW Line sites was understood, a 
controversy developed between the United States and Canada over responsibility for the 
cleanup of deactivated Canadian DEW Line sites. The United States insisted that it was 
Canada's responsibility to clean up the sites they had managed, but the Canadian 
government disagreed. In 1996, an agreement was reached that saw the United States 
contribute $100 million to the estimated $600 million cleanup effort.
In Alaska, employees of various contractors and government agencies spoke 
candidly about how the clean up program is increasingly seen as a contentious 
bureaucratic boondoggle. After endless meetings, comment periods, and bureaucratic red 
tape, the people are usually frustrated as well and few have faith in the clean up process. 
It is safe to assume that most people on the North Slope have a better understanding of 
Contaminants of Concern, Persistent Organic Pollutants and PCBs than average 
Americans do. Not only have many attended RAB meetings, but as mentioned, many 
have taken hazardous material remediation training courses at Ilisagvik College in 
Barrow.
It must be said that people, usually elderly people, who do not have a full 
understanding of chemical contamination, exhibit greater faith in the clean up. Older 
people understand petroleum spills as pollution but otherwise discuss contamination as 
though they conceive it to be like garbage in the dump and rusty abandoned barrels: 
something tangible that can be removed. There seemed to be a direct correlation between 
the amount of knowledge a person had regarding toxic chemicals and their faith that 
clean up projects have been adequate.
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Bruce Iglangasak’s grandfather, Old Irish, worked on the DEW Line sites in 
Canada’s western Arctic for several years and built a house out of DEW Line material at 
Stokes Point. This is an example of the cyclical nature of DEW Line employment: 
decades later, Bruce worked demolishing, shipping, and burying numerous DEW Line 
sites in Canada’s western Arctic. He reported that they never actually removed a great 
deal of trash, it was simply moved to other sites and buried. Using heavy equipment, they 
tore down the buildings at Tuk, cut them up into big slabs, picked up entire buildings at a 
time and set them on barges before pushing the barges to Cape Perry (PIN-Main) and 
burying everything there. Bruce had no idea why they decided to bury the material from 
Tuk at Cape Perry and guessed that it was just to get it out of Tuk (Iglangasak, May 24, 
2009, Kaktovik).
The ship that Bruce worked on spent two years hauling out just drums. “We 
didn’t take any housing materials, those were all buried. No, we didn’t take much out of 
the site. Mostly the drums, just the drums were taken out of the DEW Line sites and 
shipped south. Not sure why. Maybe because they couldn’t cover it all up, I guess. But 
there were lots of drums.” While burying all the other debris at Cape Perry, Bruce related 
that crews dug a huge hole right on top of the mountain and put a heavy liner in it. “I 
guess when they were filling it they punctured the lining and the following year after the 
project was over some people went and checked it out. They thought they did something 
good there, but it got worse” (Iglangasak, May 24, 2009, Kaktovik).
Bruce agreed with environmental contractor Defense Canada’s characterization of 
the DEW Line as the largest environmental problem in Canada. He said that not only has 
he been to ten sites and seen the mess that is still there, but that most of the sites are areas 
that are rich in wildlife: fish, belugas, bowheads, birds, etc. Bruce thinks that there is still 
much clean up to be done and that some sites will be particularly difficult to remediate:
“Pierce Point Harbor is going to be a hard one, ‘cause i t ’s right on top o f another 
mountain, and they just dumped the garbage over the cliff on the south side o f the site. I f  
you look over the cliff, you can see rust, metal, batteries, equipment, drums, etc. And
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there is a river that runs right along, comes out by that mountain. And a lot o f fish use 
that river. That site, I  remember taking eight 55-gallon drums o f  PCBs. This was taken 
just from the top, right from the site, the exact site where the houses were. I  know they 
gotta work on that one ” (Iglangasak, May 24, 2009, Kaktovik).
Bruce also remembers taking two sealifts out of Komakuk Beach, Yukon (BAR- 
1). Some of the contaminated debris was taken to Cape Perry, some went south, up the 
McKenzie River, and some went to Shingle Point:
“Shingle Point was another one - 1 don’t know why they find  that they can bury trash in 
a river or a gorge. They just dug a hole on the side o f the river, dug a pit, and then they 
bulldozed everything into it and buried it. Right in the river. Right alongside the river. 
And that area there is fu ll o f wildlife during the spring and summer seasons, all these 
swans, cranes, all kinds o f ducks, geese. We’ve even got eagles nesting in that area, a lot 
o f eagles along the rivers. Two o f them rivers. The trash just drains out into the 
Beaufort... A lot o f herring use that bay. Belugas, seals, they are all contaminated” 
(Iglangasak, May 24, 2009, Kaktovik).
Having seen a significant number of DEW Line sites on both sides of the border, 
Bruce thinks that Canadians are more informed about issues surrounding contamination 
because the clean up there started 15-20 years ago, whereas the clean up on the U.S. side 
started in the past 5-10 years. However, he sees no difference in the quality of the clean 
up projects in either country: “Same all around.” Bruce reported that at every site his 
crew worked on, “we’ve taken quite a bit of PCB out of the sites. Lots.'” Canadian sealift 
barges, he described, were 150 feet wide and 340 feet long with drums ten high stacked 
from bow to stem. “Just from one DEW Line site” (Iglangasak, May 24, 2009,
Kaktovik).
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Bruce was not aware of any local, native oversight of the clean up work and he 
does not believe that contracting out the projects leads to good oversight (the projects he 
worked on were contracted out to both Northern Transportation Company Limited and 
Grubbins Transportation out of Tuktoyaktuk). Another construction crew from Inuvik 
finished the remediation site at Cape Perry.
Bruce recalled that there was a good deal of local hire on the jobs, but that the 
employees were not properly trained:
‘7  guess they weren’t told how it should have been done to begin with. They just said, 
‘Here’s a pick and shovel and go bury this fo r  us, ’ and pay you this. Pretty much the way 
it went...I don’t know how these people think to bury PCBs right smack damn in the 
middle o f all this wildlife that happens. They ’re not very bright. Maybe they don’t value 
life, or anything” (Iglangasak, May 24, 2009, Kaktovik).
Like most people, Bruce does not have confidence that the contamination is 
adequately cleaned up or contained. “You can take a picture of a cleaned area, but you 
can’t see what it under the soil or the water, or what’s draining out into it. It they were 
going to clean it, they should have dug it right out. Shipped the whole thing, dirt and all. 
Out of the Arctic” (Iglangasak, May 24, 2009, Kaktovik). Bruce thinks that they are 
getting away with this kind of clean up because it is on native land, and thinks that if such 
a base were built near white people it would have been cleaned up better. He also 
believes that contamination from the DEW Line has caused an increase in cancer. “All 
our elders -  they all got cancer and they are dying at an early age. All our kids, all their 
kids are, everybody’s contaminated now” (Iglangasak, May 24, 2009, Kaktovik).
Bruce also thinks that the Army knew that PCBs and other contaminants were dangerous 
back in the early decades of their use. “How did they make that PCB to begin with? Right 
from where the person made it, who he sold it to, who’s buying it, must have knew” 
(Iglangasak, May 24, 2009, Kaktovik).
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After two years on the DEW Line clean up job, Bruce was transferred to a 
different boat because he was “saying things.. .against some other people about the way 
things were done.” Luckily, Bruce is a good and valuable operator so they relocated him 
to another boat for the rest of his years with the company, and now that he has his own 
eco-guide business he is not worried about getting hired back to do that kind of work.
Jack Oktollik worked on the clean up of the Cape Lisbume radar site in 2000 
through Agvik Environmental Services out of Point Hope. Besides being impressed at the 
amount of infrastructure at the site (a bowling alley, complete gym, a bar, utilidors 
connecting all the buildings), he noticed a distinctly more aggressive attitude from Point 
Hope people regarding contamination. The company in charge of the clean up wanted to 
bury everything, he said, but the people of Point Hope insisted that the military 
(contractors) haul it all out of there: “They tell them ‘No, take it back where you got it.’” 
He recalled that the officials had identified only one “hot spot” at the site that merited 
complete clean up, but that no one believed that spot was the only dangerous 
contamination at Cape Lisbume. There were numerous other spots with full dmms, but 
testing did not show a high enough level of contamination. “They left most of it anyway. 
Military is always hiding some stuff. [] The military was just trying to save money. They 
got all the money they need to haul all their buildings out.” The people at Point Hope, 
according to this informant, were particularly unimpressed by the clean up process and 
are convinced that the military is looking for uranium at Cape Lisbume. Summing up his 
observations on military pollution of the region, Jack said, “I guess that’s why there is a 
high level of cancer. I don’t know if it is higher but people are dying left and right of all 
kinds of cancer. They are pretty much contaminated.”
Like construction, an important aspect of DEW Line clean up was the short-term 
employment it provided for qualified local people. Many residents of the North Slope 
have received training (i.e. HAZWOPER -  Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency 
Response Standard) at Ilisagvik College in Barrow in the remediation of structures with 
asbestos and other toxic contaminants. Gwichin elder of Fort McPherson, Robert Alexi 
worked on construction of the site in Tuk back in the mid-fifties and has never been back
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to the Arctic coast since that job. He had, however, heard about the clean up: “I hear a lot 
of clean up, lot of money. Lot of clean up.”
Etok, haphazardly defending the DEW Line sites, claimed that the North Slope 
Borough has “made about a billion dollars from cleaning up activity of the military to this 
day!” (Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks). Aware that copper is one material 
valuable enough that crews have scavenged and sold it from DEW Line sites, I asked 
Etok if that was part of his calculation. “We made over a hundred and fifty million of 
selling their junk back to China -  hauling them out directly to China” (Edwardsen, April 
14, 2009, Fairbanks).
Other people reported that there was not enough local hire on any of the clean up 
jobs. “They always say local first, but its always the other way around,” said Betsy 
Tulugak of Wainwright. Elder (and 25-year employee of BAR-Main) Isaac Akootchook, 
however, is not so sure about whether local hire is appropriate for this kind of work: 
“[T]he Air Force -  they themselves maybe better clean up that mess” (May 31, 2009, 
Kaktovik).
Isaac Akootchook remarked that Intermediate Site BAR-A (Demarcation) had 
undergone a clean up, but that a lot of debris was left there. The community had pushed 
for several clean up projects, but he lamented: “Always waiting for money, doing 
paperwork,” while the debris is still there (I. Akootchook, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
Isaac said that the military’s stuff is always “left behind [] because of the DEW Line 
bosses can’t listen to the Inupiaq people. The Air Force -  because he know better [] but 
later on they find out the way it is. [] Well, we tell you. We live up here, we are raised up 
here” (I. Akootchook, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
BAR-Main Dump
No one in Kaktovik ever suggested that instead of removing the eroding three- 
acre dump on their island, the military should spend millions of dollars trying to stave off 
the erosion. When the erosion control measures failed, no islanders approved of Plan B: 
moving the dump about 1,000 feet back from the bluff. The story of the Barter Island
285
dump is an epic saga and the crowning irony of DEW Line clean up stories in the western 
Arctic - one that promises to provide drama for decades to come.
The shoreline along the northern front of Barter Island in front of the DEW Line 
site eroded over 160 feet between 1974 and 2000. Since the dump reached the shore, 160 
feet of the dump also eroded into the ocean during that time. In 2000, an erosion control 
program was undertaken that was designed to recreate beach in front of the dump (fig.
38). The project included extensive sandbagging of the eroding dump bluff and a series 
of steel groins and barriers implanted on the shore and in the shallow waters in front of 
the dump. According to informants in Kaktovik, everybody told the Air Force that this 
wasn’t going to work.
Figure 38: Erosion control measures at the Barter Island dump in 2005
Cost estimates prior to work were $770,000, but by completion the total cost of 
the project was rumored to be tens of millions of dollars. Furthermore, the system 
required annual maintenance. By 2005, people started noticing that is seemed like the 
beach was increasing in size to the east of the DEW Line site (at the base of the spit), but
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that the erosion of the bluff was continuing and the containment measures themselves 
were inundated and washing away.89
By 2007, continued erosion prompted emergency action and bulldozers were 
engaged in attempting to remove the eroding edge of the dump to a safer location. In 
2008, a new two-cell landfill was created directly in front of the remaining module at the 
radar base in the space created when the other buildings had been demolished (fig. 39).
Figure 39: BAR-Main Aug. 2008 90
Hazardous material in the existing landfill was supposed to be shipped south, one cell of 
the landfill was designated for low-level PCB-contaminated soil and debris, and the other 
cell was designated for non-hazardous waste. Reports indicate that this new site is about 
1000 feet south of the bluff, but since the entire area is now covered with gravel and 
freshly bulldozed, it is difficult to see where the new landfill ends. Nora Jane Bums
89 “The Corps of Engineers tried to put those posts in the water, it is just a waste. And, I think, 
with them doing that, it changed our coastline, because, it, what they were hoping it would do is 
build beach right there, when in fact it changed the beach completely along the coast, I think. 
‘Cause it is not building up there, but it is building up further to the east of us and I don’t think so 
much to the west of us.” -  Carla Sims Kayotuk (May 29, 2009, Kaktovik).
90 This image shows the new dump site in front o f  the radome and remaining buildings.
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described this as “the dumbest place” they could move the dump. “And they say they’re 
gonna give that land back to the community and they put all the debris, that last building 
that was standing, they buried it in that place where they have it. ‘Cause we watched 
them” (Bums, July 31, 2008, Kaktovik). Walt Audi remarked that the dump would need 
to be moved again in 50 years, but upon reflection he decided that it probably would not 
be that long.
Carla Sims Kayotuk said that this dump relocation was not what Kaktovik asked 
for as a community. “We asked that everything be hauled out. [] But they started 
relocating the dump, without really even telling us” (Kayotuk, May 29, 2009, Kaktovik). 
Carla used to be on the native village council and, more recently, the city council, but 
said these organizations found out as the clean up was progressing that most of the 
material was just being relocated.
While fieldwork was being conducted in Kaktovik during the summer of 2008, a 
very strong west wind storm resulted in a massive storm surge that pounded the island 
with waves, causing massive erosion to the bluff in front of the DEW Line site. Because 
the ice pack has been so much further out in recent years, storms like this have a far 
greater fetch and larger waves build up. Throughout the storm, a bulldozer worked on the 
edge of the dump attempting to remove garbage from the eroding edge (fig. 39).
Figure 40: Storm eroding Barter dump while removal is ongoing, Aug. 2008
However, it seemed that these and emergency efforts in 2007 were not successful because 
garbage was clearly visible eroding into the water and, once the surge subsided, onto the 
beach. As Walt Audi described it, “they are spending lots of money! But they are moving 
the dump from here, where it’s falling in real faster -  the dump is falling in faster than 
they are removing it. The waves are doing more” (Aug. 8, 2008, Kaktovik).
The storm surge also covered half of the runway on the spit with water, 
preventing airplanes from using it for a couple days. Isaac Akootchook, age 87, has seen 
a lot of change on Barter Island but said, “That is the first time I’ve seen that” (May 31, 
2009, Kaktovik).
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Figure 41: The eroding bluff of the Barter Island dump, Aug. 2008
Mary Ann Warden reported that when crews were working on that dump during the 
summer of 2008, polar bears were visiting the freshly disturbed garbage and digging up 
junk. “Yeah, contaminated food they ate. Ick.” Upon seeing pictures of the garbage at the 
eroding dump, Mary Ann Warden said, “Oh my God, so that is what the polar bears were 
getting into. [] Wow, oh my gosh, that is bad” (May 28, 2009, Kaktovik) (fig. 41).
Figures 42: Barter Dump erosion control measures following storm, Aug., 2008.
Now that the steel erosion control measures are in the water instead of along the 
beach, there is a question of what to do with them (fig. 42). Walt Audi reported that the 
Air Force/Corp of Engineers plan was to cut the poles off at water level. He thought this 
was a terrible idea because the poles already present a navigation hazard, but at least they 
are visible the way they are.
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The dump in front of BAR-Main is roughly bounded on the west side by a long 
snow fence that is also eroding over the bluff. Ice fences keep snow from drifting over 
roads and houses (and thus make the poorly insulated houses harder to heat). However, 
ice scientist and photographer Matt Nolan, who stages his Brooks Range glacier research 
project out of Kaktovik every summer, noticed that the snow fences have altered the 
insulation pattern on the tundra to the extent that they threaten to melt a straight line 
across it and create new drainage systems, thereby weakening the surrounding areas 
permafrost and causing more erosion. Worse, the ice fence on Barter runs from the coast 
back to Barter Island’s fresh water lake (fig.43).
91 With his permission, this photo is taken from Dr. Nolan’s website at 
http ://www.drmattnolan.org/photograt>hv/2010/sota/index.htm. where there are also excellent photographs 
showing dramatic erosion o f the bluff on Barter Island. As Nolan explained, “This snow fence in Kaktovik 
Alaska creates drifts on either side o f the fence in an attempt to minimize similar drifting in the village 
itself. The thicker snow around the fence insulates the ground better, effectively warming it up, melting ice
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On the east side, the dump is bounded by a gully widely known as the 
Contaminated Ditch (fig. 44) (since it constitutes an official contaminated site), which 
discharges into the Beaufort.
Figure 44: ‘Contaminated Ditch’ on the east side BAR-Main’s dump (Aug. 2008)
There are of course many people who, for various reasons, have no issue with the 
clean up process. As mentioned earlier, unclear understandings of toxic chemicals partly 
explains the opinion of some individuals. Elder Lillian Atkootchook of Barter, for 
example, reported that they cleaned up quite a bit and she wasn’t worried about it 
anymore. There used to be a lot more drums and metal, she said, but they picked most of 
them up and she thought they did a good job. She did not know if contamination got into 
the animals, but thought it could be. Other people can be described as somewhat 
apathetic, bordering on fatalistic. Alice Agiak concluded that the clean up process on 
Barter Island had been “pretty good,” although she did not believe that everything was 
cleaned. Alice also expressed that she did not care if the remaining structures at the site
wedges, and creating new ecosystem dynamics. [] An unfortunate consequence o f  the snow fence seen here 
is the potential for a stream to form which will drain the large lake [] by incising into its bank and linking it 
with the ocean. This lake is Kaktovik’s water supply and is the only large lake on Barter Island suitable for 
this. It is not clear what the future holds for this water supply, but it is clear that both man and nature can 
conspire to change the landscape o f permafrost terrain on time -scales that matter to all o f  us.”
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stayed or were removed, and she did not care whether contaminants were left over.
“Well, we’re all infected anyway,” she said (Agiak, May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
Another type of reaction can be heard from a person like Chuck Ekak of 
Wainwright, who is determined to make the most out of the present and the future 
without dwelling on things in the past that cannot be changed. Asked how he thought a 
clean up of the Wainwright dump was going to proceed, given that almost the entire 
dump has been in the lagoon for decades, Chuck said, “Modem technology!” (Ekak, Sep. 
2009, Wainwright).
Quite a few people consider it lucky that the contaminated sites in the Arctic have 
received as much attention as they have. Although Etok did not know a great deal about 
the remediation (he thought Barter was the only site left to be cleaned up), he was 
optimistic about the status of the sites both in terms of money made and by comparison to 
how much military waste has been cleaned up in other areas: “They’ve done a pretty fair 
job. I see the rest of the villages up here (in Alaska), it’s nowhere like it is up North. It’s 
the only spot where the government has served with some diligence: North Slope. [] They 
still haven’t cleaned up Fort Yukon. Or the mid-continental lines” (Edwardsen, April 14, 
2009, Fairbanks). Etok thinks that the environmental damage done by the oil industry is 
far worse because oil companies acted freely, on greed alone, and with what he terms 
“corporate fascism” at play.
Reuse
If there was a subject upon which the informants for this project were in 
consensus, it was the issue of whether the remaining infrastructure should be removed 
completely or if there was any use for it. Robert Thompson, in particular, was suspicious 
that any documented history of the DEW Line would be used to make a case for keeping 
them: “I suppose a person should document it but I’m not real eager about them saving 
all the buildings for historic preservation. Save them if they need them -  but to save them 
for posterity to look at for the next thousand years.. .They look like concentration camps 
or something. In the final stages they were all grey colored. I mean, they didn’t look
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pretty.. .1 can see saving historic buildings, but the DEW Line, I don’t think of any of 
them as being in that category” (R. Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
Isaac Panik said that he would like to see the Wainwright site be removed. “I’d 
like to see it gone. We have early warning system that does the job. I’d like to see nothing 
left of it, nothing, with all their stuff. [] I don’t want to see it be used again with all of its 
health hazards. It has to be like it wasn’t there before” (Panik, Sep. 13, 2009,
Wainwright).
For several reasons, Isaac may not get his wish. One reason is that remediation to 
restore these sites to their pre-DEW Line state is impossible. The other is that multi­
national oil companies are interested in using some of the sites to base future exploration 
and drilling operations. Shell Oil, for example, is exploring for off-shore drilling in the 
Chukchi Sea and would possibly like to use the DEW Line site (pads and roads) as the 
location for their Wainwright off-loading base. Cape Simpson, DEW Line Intermediate 
Site POW-A, has already been converted to serve as an oilfield services base for 
Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation of Barrow (fig. 45). Point Lonely near Teshekpuk Lake, 
as mentioned above, will likely be leased for oil industry as well.
Even Sammy Lennie, who could be nostalgic after a fabulous time as a kid with 
the exciting industrial playgrounds he grew up on, wants the sites gone. “They should
92 The first figure is courtesy o f  Larry Wilson’s DEW Line website (http://www.lswilson.caydewline.htm) 
and the second image is courtesy o f Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation’s webpage for its oilfield services 
branch, Umiaq: http://www.ukpik.com/OilfieldSvcs.htm.
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tear them down and clean them up and get everything out of there,” said Sammy. “'Cause 
I know what's in them now” (Lennie, April 3, 2009, Fairbanks).
Isaac Akootchook worked at BAR-Main for 25 years and lives off of his DEW 
pension. He would like to see the DEW Line site gone because he would like his village 
to be able to use that land. Isaac explained that he felt this way because Barter Island was 
his people’s home and where his family had chosen to live. He recounted that his uncles 
and aunties had been living at Demarcation, but the hunting and fishing there were not 
ideal. They had decided to seriously look around the region and had eventually decided 
on Barter Island. They chose the island site for Kaktovik based on its many advantages: it 
had a good freshwater lake, it was within easy traveling distance to the Brooks Range 
mountains, and there was excellent fishing in the lagoon.
Isaac said that he grew up on Barter and that his wife had grown up there and on 
Flaxman Island, and that when they got married they decided to move back to Barter 
Island. They were never informed that the DEW Line was going to come take up such a 
large amount of land on the small island, and Isaac reported that the Air Force simply 
began construction without a public hearing and without telling anyone. Considering 
whether the large hangar covering the original village of Kaktovik on the spit should be 
removed, Akootchook cracked a joke about moving back there. He was serious, however, 
when he said, “If they take it down I appreciate it. Because they use a big place down 
there -  lotta homes” (May 31, 2009, Kaktovik). Although he said he does not usually talk 
with outsiders about his “plan” to expand Kaktovik up to the current radar site, Isaac 
thinks that the entire site should be removed. “[I]f they gonna tear it down, go. Because 
we need a road, we need a place more over here.” Akootchook thinks that if that area had 
been available, the people of Kaktovik would have selected that land as their allotments 
and moved there by now. If it ever is cleaned and released, “a lot of people are going to 
be on top of that gravel.” He thinks that it is possible that new generations of Kaktovik 
families would like to move back to Barter Island from Barrow, but they cannot because 
there is a housing shortage. Asked whether he can imagine any use for the DEW Line 
buildings, Isaac laughed and said, “We don’t want to use that DEW Line. I’ve been there
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already. Twenty-five years.” What Isaac wants is to “use that land!” (I. Akootchook, May 
31, 2009, Kaktovik).
Akootchook was enthusiastic about a project that would tell the history of the 
DEW Line from the perspective of the Inupiat because “it’s not right. A little bit is right 
but not all, the whole thing -  what happening here.” Akootchook concluded, “DEW Line 
help us little bit, not too much. Not too much” (May 31, 2009, Kaktovik).
Conclusion
Both the useful infrastructure and the toxic waste of the DEW Line have shaped 
land and lives along the Arctic coast. It is also clear that, particularly in cases like the 
DEW Line, ethnographic research methods are particularly useful in this kind of study. 
From identifying known hotspots to overseeing clean up projects, the people who worked 
at the site, live on the land, and have the strongest incentive to restore the land for their 
own security are the ones whose knowledge should be at the forefront of environmental 
action and who should set the standards for clean up. Furthermore, this type of research 
specifically addresses the tendency of military activities to be lost in bureaucracy and 
secrecy.
Although Isaac Akootchook’s contention that the Air Force itself ought to come 
clean up the DEW Line is compelling, one might also consider that the military is the last 
institution that should be in charge of the clean up project. The Pentagon has a clear 
history of withholding information concerning environmental hazards, delaying action on 
known environmental problems, and resisting oversight from the EPA and other agencies 
(who in turn spend most of their energy fighting simply for the authority to enforce 
environmental laws on the military) (Shulman and Pollack 1989). Self-policing is a 
policy with inherent conflicts of interest, and the military has no incentive to obey the law 
when they account only to themselves. The Inupiat and the Inuvialuit of the western 
Arctic, like people everywhere, deserve an environmental clean up of their land that has 
their health and wellbeing in focus as the incentive.
Paradoxically, it could well be that having the military abandon contaminated 
sites is the least dangerous way to deal with the toxins. A recent biological study on the
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impacts of toxic chemicals on ocean life at abandoned World War II and Cold War 
military bases in the Aleutians found that fish caught near the bases are more 
contaminated than those caught further away. The scientific team tested for 
organochlorines, including PCBs that were used in the sites’ electrical lubricants and 
pesticides. This type of data is critical for local subsistence communities, but it is equally 
important for residents to know that attempts to clean up contaminated sites can worsen 
the effects of contamination for years as chemicals are both stirred up and preserved in 
cold northern waters. Biologist Keith Miles of the U.S. Geological Survey noted that 
tumors in fish around Adak increased for years after a Superfund cleanup of a site there 
(Anchorage Daily News 2010).
Miles has found himself opposing Fish and Wildlife plans to clean up military 
sites in California because he believes that this solution can be worse than the problem, 
especially if the contaminants are contained several feet underground. He characterizes 
the issue as two evils: either a slow release of contaminants over eons from a contained 
site versus a pulse of organochlorines and other pollutants created by a clean up that re­
releases them from the soil. He emphasizes that once the compounds are resuspended, 
they do not necessarily go away. Rather, many will be sequestered into the tissues of 
surrounding organisms. To determine which process is best for each site requires 
modeling of the hydrology, geology, soil characteristics, associated biological systems, 
climate and other factors. A main problem Miles sees is that continued monitoring would 
be critical for at least a decade after any clean up project, but this rarely happens in 
remote locations.
Miles’ opinion is that if a community such as Kaktovik is faced with the situation 
of either living on top of a contaminated site or living through the clean up of that site, 
the best solution would be to have that community relocated to a more pristine living area 
of the residents’ choice where the subsistence resources they depend on are less 
impacted. However, relocation is a contentious and emotionally fraught phenomenon 
with a particularly reprehensible history in the Arctic (Mikow 2010; Tester and 
Kulchyski 1994). As highlighted by anthropological research underway at the University
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of Alaska Fairbanks on the current relocation processes of Alaskan coastal communities 
(Marino 2010), relocation is a totalizing phenomenon that can create a fundamental shift 
in the social fabric of a town -  even under good conditions. Marino explains that one 
community leaves, another one is created, and a third exists ten years later. The legal 
definition and rights of people sometimes termed “Environmental Migrants” are 
problematic, particularly for potential migrants within one country (Marino 2010).
Despite this and despite the fact that any talk of relocating the community of Kaktovik to 
date has been purely speculative, there does appear to be widespread support for moving.
Concerns over potential relocations create stress, and that stress could compound 
stress over the doubt and ambiguity regarding the possible contamination of one’s 
environment and the physical risks of exposure to toxic chemicals. Recent research on the 
social and psychological impact of contaminants in the Arctic indicates that such 
concerns are pernicious. The Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami organization (ITK), which 
represents Canadian Inuit, argued that communication about environmental contaminants 
between health officials and the Inuit was so poorly handled that it caused “extreme 
psychological distress” (Cone 2005). ITK researchers led a project93 in the mid-1990s to 
gauge the success of efforts to inform residents of nine communities about contaminants. 
The report concluded that the most tangible and dangerous threat that toxic substances 
pose to Arctic people is fear:
In every instance, there was a pervasive unease and anxiety about contaminants. Whether 
or not individuals are exposed to or actually ingesting injurious levels o f contaminants, 
the threat alone leads to anxiety over risks to health, loss o f familiar and staple food, loss 
o f employment or activity, loss o f confidence in the basic food  source and the 
environment, and more generally a loss o f  control over one’s destiny and well-being 
(quoted in Cone 2005).
1995: Communicating about Contaminants in Country Food93
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The better one’s understanding of the true nature of PCBs and endocrine- 
disrupting chemicals, the more one experiences uncertainty about whether any activity in 
any location is actually safe, or whether it is exposing one to greater risk. This 
uncertainty is a hallmark of military industrial activity around the globe: an insidious 
physical and mental threat at nearly every installation.
This chapter has only sufficient background scientific information to provide a 
context for understanding Inupiaq perspectives on DEW Line contamination. A strict 
compilation of the hard facts of DEW Line contamination and a reminder of the many 
disturbing dangers posed by toxic chemicals would have been more sobering. This 
chapter did not include statistics on how many hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel 
have been spilled at nearly every site (NARL alone is responsible for nearly a million). It 
omitted any discussion of the dramatic issue of transboundary Arctic contaminants, 
biomagnification of toxins in the Arctic food chain, and graphic illustrations depicting the 
population-wide social impacts of the five-point drop in intelligence quotient associated 
with significant exposure in utero to endocrine-disrupting chemicals. It further omitted 
any comparisons to the much worse conditions at the scores of similar Russian bases on 
the other side of the mediterranean Arctic Ocean. A work covering that information and 
more would constitute a truly comprehensive toxicological study of Cold War Arctic 
militarization and is a critically valuable work that should be done.
Given the sheer volume and the extent of infiltration of DEW Line debris and 
infrastructure, it is not surprising that it shaped the physical environment of Arctic 
peoples in ways that brought about the perspectives portrayed in this chapter. However, 
even for people who are as closely connected to their environment as the Inuit, living in 
an arguably militarized landscape does not necessarily result in societal militarization.
My opinion is that real social militarization is more likely in cases where the 
geographical militarization is subtler than it is on the Arctic coast. The military’s impact 
on the physical environment in several of these communities is so significant that, despite 
how normal its 55-year long presence makes it, it is a regular reminder of environmental
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injustice94. As such, frustrating feelings of powerlessness and anger at the insidious 
contamination and the disappointing bureaucratic process is often actively resisted by 
ignoring the whole affair as much as possible and by diminishing its influence through 
humor, sarcasm, derision, and other culturally popular methods of transcendence.
Transcendence also involves a communal refocusing onto family, whaling, 
hunting, and the beauty of the sea, ice and land. A Fairbanks social scientist who has 
worked on the North Slope for several decades theorizes that it was the reintroduction of 
bowhead whaling in the early 1960s that saved the spiritual soul and internal cohesion of 
Kaktovik, possibly giving them the cultural resilience to survive what he describes as a 
horrific relationship with the military (Pederson, pers. comm.). Such cohesion makes 
possible a tradition of refusing to afford the military any more power and influence than 
that which it can take by force.
94 Environmental justice can be understood as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement o f all people 
regardless o f  race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and 
enforcement o f environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment means that no group o f people 
should bear a disproportionate share o f the negative consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and 
commercial operations or the execution o f federal, state, local, and tribal programs and policies.”
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Chapter Six: Conclusion: Militarization’s Role in Shaping Communities and 
Consciousness in the Western Arctic
Introduction
World War II and the Cold War transformed the geopolitical significance of the 
circumpolar North, and modem military activities have influenced society and the environment 
throughout the region at several scales. To discover how the processes of militarization have 
shaped small communities and indigenous peoples’ lives, this project specifically examined 
both abrupt and long-term effects brought by the construction, operation, and decommissioning 
of the DEW Line radar sites in Inuit communities of the western Arctic. The rapidly developing 
study of militarization, particularly as it affects small and/or indigenous communities, has 
provided a conceptual framework for this analysis. Building upon the extant historical and 
anthropological research on the DEW Line and military activity in the Arctic in general, this 
study gathered detailed information on both physical and social legacies of the strategic defense 
industry as perceived and conveyed by Inupiat of the North Slope of Alaska and Inuvialuit 
residents of the McKenzie River Delta, while the perspectives of a few Euro-American DEW 
Liners contribute to a general understanding of the society created by the radar bases’ 
personnel.
A central assumption among militarization scholars is that military activity shapes 
small communities by dominating their economy and controlling residents’ notions about 
security and the military itself in myriad other ways. The preceding chapters have 
described the infiltration of the Arctic by the social and economic forces accompanying 
the DEW Line and the physical legacies of the radar sites themselves. This final section 
presents an analysis of militarization in communities of the western Arctic based on 
indigenous Arctic residents’ perspectives and opinions on patriotism, the military, and 
national security, including how they perceive the DEW Line and other historical military 
activities in their region. Perspectives and feelings explored include the issue of whether
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the DEW Line is in fact perceived as “the military” and what this might indicate 
regarding the acceptance of a militarized ‘normal.’ A related issue is differences between 
military industry and other industry, namely petroleum exploration and extraction. 
Nationalism can be a key aspect of militarization, and, as colonized indigenous people, 
many informants have clear-sighted and practical notions of patriotism and the benefits 
and disadvantages of their national citizenship. The acceptance of militaristic notions of 
security and how those have changed over time as well as alternative conceptions of 
rationality and security are also analyzed.
Comparing the impacts of the DEW Line in each town with those stemming from 
other historic military activities keenly illustrates the value of localized histories. As 
presented in the body of this dissertation, the research project discovered that the effects 
of the DEW Line were distinctive in each community. This finding was anticipated as 
other studies of militarization explicitly focus on specific localized impacts to gain an 
understanding of a broader history. Nevertheless, the degree of difference in otherwise 
very similar North Slope communities is surprising, particularly given the uniformity of 
the radar sites.
Variation between communities is due in large part to the specific geographical 
layout of each area, which has had widely varying impacts on local land use issues. When 
land use conflicts are more intensive, this affects the social acceptance of militarized 
ideologies. The construction of the DEW Line in remote regions of Canada resulted in 
the creation of new, permanent communities. Although the DEW Line in Alaska did not 
actually create new communities, military activity has dramatically shaped the 
composition of the population and fundamentally altered the history of towns on Alaska’s 
North Slope. Military activity brought Barrow to prominence and helped maintain that 
city’s status, and the presence of the DEW sites played a particularly significant role in 
the survival of two of the four communities on Alaska’s North Slope which are co­
located with radar bases: Point Lay and Kaktovik.
Attitudes towards the military in the Arctic are strongly shaped by commonly held 
beliefs about cancer and contaminants. This concluding chapter summarizes critical
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research on northwest Alaskan beliefs about cancer in order to explain locally held 
attitudes towards nuclear activity, in particular to clarify the legacies of Project Chariot, 
the Iodine experiments, nuclear power and nuclear weapons.
Geeks and Geography
This analysis is first grounded in a consideration of the typical impacts associated
with radar bases and the relative size and the geography of each co-located base and 
community. Any analysis of the impact of the DEW Line sites must recognize that, of all 
the different kinds of manned military installations, an old and relatively remote 
defensive radar base is one of the least politically controversial and socially intrusive 
types. Bases are often understood as insuring security, and early warning radar bases can 
easily be understood as defensive and not a sign of aggressive militarism.
Just as no two communities of the western Arctic are alike, different types of 
military bases have significantly different impacts. Enloe notes that marine bases, for 
example, are known for creating more criminal behavior than other kinds of bases. Navy 
bases produce more episodic and thus visible social impacts, since ships dock and 
suddenly unload thousands of men and women looking for sex and alcohol. The DEW 
Line sites are Air Force bases, which are known to produce more toxins per square foot 
than Army bases (Enloe 2009).
The DEW Line’s small radar bases were predominantly manned by civilian 
contractors, not enlisted military personnel. Moreover, a significant number of the 
civilians working for the military at DEW Line sites were radar technicians. A troop of 
what are fondly known as “geeks” (typically a more highly educated person and often a 
computer expert) can be expected to have a different type of social impact than a troop of 
trained soldiers, regardless of the branch of service. Unbeknownst to them, the 
indigenous residents of the western Arctic were joining specific other groups of people 
around the world who found themselves living in the shadow of radars: a type of 
militarization without soldiers, without active conflict, and with high levels of uncertainty 
regarding health impacts.
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Another simple rule of thumb regarding military bases is that smaller sites have 
less impact. Relative to the size of an average military installation, most of the DEW line 
sites were small. Although construction of the sites brought thousands of crews north, 
once the bases settled into routine operation, the number of permanent employees varied, 
but was never high. Auxiliary Sites such as the ones at Point Lay, Wainwright, Lonely 
and Tuktoyaktuk usually had 40-60 employees until the 1980s when automation began to 
seriously reduce the number of people needed to operate the bases. The Intermediate 
sites, which operated from 1957 to 1963, had no more than five men working at them. 
Only the Main sites had significant numbers of people: Barter Island was the largest with 
up to 200 employees at its peak while POW-Main in Barrow, whose impacts are 
commingled with and largely indistinguishable from the co-located Naval Arctic 
Research Laboratory (NARL), never had as many people.
However, the size of a base is a poor method of gauging impact if the context is 
ignored. The DEW Line bases are in no way small relative to the size of the communities 
they have affected, and this illustrates a critical aspect of their impact on adjacent 
populations in the Arctic. Point Lay, for example, had only 30-40 residents when the 
Auxiliary DEW Line LIZ-2 site was built, thus construction workers and DEW Line 
personnel outnumbered residents. The almost 200 men stationed on Barter Island in the 
decades before automation easily outnumbered the population of Kaktovik (which was 66 
people in 1957 and has since grown to approximately 325). By comparison, the several 
hundred residents of Tuktoyaktuk and Wainwright were never outnumbered by the 
personnel at the nearby DEW Line sites.
Another seemingly simplistic but critically important characteristic of 
militarization is that impact depends on a base’s distance from a community. This is aptly 
demonstrated by the DEW Line: the difference between an “adjacent site” that is actually 
next door is extremely different than an adjacent site that is 1-2 miles away, which is in 
turn distinctly different from an adjacent site that is 5-6 miles away. Thus, in the western 
sector, the most heavily affected community is Kaktovik, a small community that shares 
a small island with a particularly large site. As Walt Audi (a Tanik DEW Liner who has
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become a local community member) described, when the village was in its second 
location up on the bluff, the community and the base were physically intermingled. The 
most physically militarized places can have the least mentally militarized population, and 
by this measure, Kaktovik is the least mentally militarized DEW Line community. 
Furthermore, the town that has gained the most and suffered the least from the DEW Line 
in Alaska is Fairbanks, which experienced a pipeline-like boom in serving as a hub for 
DEW Line activities. I asked a few of my informants whether they were familiar with 
the term ‘environmental racism:’ no one had ever heard the term, but all understood it 
immediately.
Both Tuktoyaktuk (Tuk) and Point Lay have DEW sites that are 1-3 miles away 
on the other side of their main lagoon (Tuk is connected to the site by land). Despite the 
very different histories of these two places, the degree of separation between the 
community and base is comparable. The bases occupied important land that had been 
used by local residents, but the military did not commandeer the main village site: in the 
case of Point Lay, it was the nearby point of the mainland, the site where caribou would 
pass by, and adjacent to what is now the main village site (fig. 46). In the case of Tuk, the 
small peninsula had been a living site. This measure of distance offered residents a 
degree of separation from the base that Kaktovik did not have and the obvious physical 
impacts are less dominating. In both cases, however, the less obvious physical legacies 
that the DEW Line did create include contamination of the communities’ principal 
lagoons.
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Wainwright’s geography presents an interesting case. With the site located six 
miles inland from the coast and five miles across the main lagoon from the town, the 
community has experienced fewer direct social impacts and less significant land issues 
from the site itself. However, due to their heavy subsistence use of the river and the fact 
that the entirety of the garbage at that site has essentially been dumped into that lagoon, 
people who subsisted heavily on fish from the lagoon were likely exposed to persistent 
organic pollutants and other industrial contaminants over the course of several decades. 
The large DEW Line fuel tanks are located directly on the bluff just north of town, and 
the pipeline that ran the six miles overland from these tanks to the radar base was 
mentioned earlier in the context of local employment on the clean up. One resident
95 The original village of Point Lay and the new DEW Line fuel tanks can be seen across the 
Kasegaluk Lagoon on the barrier island. Photo by Harold (Hal) Phillips.
306
considered that the land under and around Wainwright was saturated with fuel from that 
pipeline. People from Wainwright who wanted to go to the bar at the site would walk or 
otherwise find a way to get there. The impacts were certainly significant, but there is a 
definite sense that the site is and has always been more distant and more distinct from 
Wainwright than is the case in Point Lay, Tuktoyaktuk, and certainly Kaktovik.
In addition to the many differences resulting from its large, multi-cultural and 
relatively cosmopolitan character, Barrow has also had a completely unique history of 
militarization. The geography of settlement patterns on the North Slope would be very 
different had the Naval Petroleum Reserve Four (PET 4) exploration camp been 
successfully established at Cape Simpson, as originally planned, instead of near Barrow. 
The PET 4 exploration camp, established in 1944, permitted the expansions that first 
included the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory (NARL) in 194796 and, in 1953, the 
constmction headquarters for the Alaskan DEW Line sites and the POW-Main site near 
Barrow.
The PET 4 camp had an enormous impact on Barrow: the camp had a population 
of approximately 300 in the wintertime and additional personnel in the summertime. As 
PET 4 operations ceased, the camp became the headquarters for construction of the DEW 
Line sites in Alaska. Construction of Barrow’s DEW Line site, POW-Main, essentially 
constituted a massive expansion of the extant military infrastructure. One factor that 
somewhat mitigated impacts to the community was that this expansion and the original 
military infrastructure were located approximately five miles outside of town, connected 
by the road that runs along the beach. Currently, many Barrow residents have cars and 
four-wheelers, so driving up and down the beach road past the military area is much more
96 “The Laboratory had been established in 1947 and it was established essentially as an add-on to the 
petroleum exploration program that was also being conducted by the Navy, so the Office o f Naval Research 
prevailed on the Office o f  Naval Petroleum Reserves to provide them logistics for it at Barrow,” -  Max 
Brewer, director o f  NARL for 15 years, in a May, 2001 interview with Karen Brewster o f the University o f  
Alaska Fairbanks’ Oral History Program. Brewer also explained how the Eisenhower administration 
decided they would have to close NARL since the lab’s logistics base was disappearing. However, Brewer 
and other Laboratory researchers requested a significant amount o f  surplus equipment be transferred at no 
cost and ONR supported that, submitted other requests, and decided that the Laboratory could go it alone 
on a reduced budget. Therefore, the Laboratory did not close with the end o f the oil exploration program. 
Military activity and surplus equipment thus contributed directly to this important arctic science research 
base which in turn supported the construction o f the DEW Line and other subsequent military activity.
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common than it was in the past. Moreover, the community’s residents have never been 
outnumbered by the crews at NARL and the DEW Line (the population of Barrow has 
been at least 1,000 since the late 1950s). None of Barrow’s extensive military activities 
led to an influx of actual soldiers. With NARL, Barrow’s military personnel were largely 
scientists (slightly different types of geek specialists than the radician variety). Barrow 
residents enjoyed many military jobs in oil exploration from 1943-1953, filled positions 
as assistants and guides for the researchers at NARL for decades, ended up with a great 
deal of surplus equipment, and, with its strong native rights leadership, eventually 
instigated a Native takeover of ownership of the entire NARL facility and transfer of 
responsibility to the North Slope Borough and Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corporation. Another 
significant benefit for Barrow has been the availability of inexpensive natural gas for 
heating, a resource that was originally exploited by the Navy for its PET 4 exploration 
camp there.
Barrow’s size and strong leadership has been a source of strength and has diluted 
the influence of the military. Yet despite its social resilience and the wealth and 
infrastructure the village has gained, Barrow has paid a steep price environmentally for 
the military activities that made the town the regional hub of the North Slope. In addition 
to the beach erosion that may have been exacerbated by the military’s gravel extraction, 
the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (2010a) reports that there are 
significant contamination problems at several NARL, PET 4, and POW-Main DEW Line 
sites around Barrow.
Several geographical aspects of the DEW Line, therefore, influenced the degree to 
which residents were affected by the bases. Kaktovik would most likely not have 
survived as a town if the military had not provided an economy at a time when people, 
accustomed to store goods and increasingly obliged to put their children in school, were 
moving to Canada or Barrow. On a fundamental level, the very existence of the
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communities of Point Lay and Kaktovik would have been in question if DEW Line sites
0 7had not been built next to them.
Most interviewees saw little reason to explore hypothetical questions about what 
their communities would be like had the DEW Line site never been built nearby. George 
Agnasagga is an exception. When he thinks about it, he wishes the DEW Line had never 
come to Point Lay because it is on the point of the mainland. It was at that spot that the 
caribou would come right down to the lagoon: “A person could get a year’s supply of 
caribou. Every year. No more -  the airport and all the DEW Line buildings are in the 
way” (Agnasagga, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright). George Agnasagga reinforced the notion 
that the complete lack of consultation with the community was a significant issue:
“They could have built that DEW Line somewhere else. [] I f  they had come to the village 
and asked the leaders at the time we could have showed them a good site just a couple 
miles away, but it wouldn’t affect the village” (Agnasagga, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
The modem history of Point Lay is inexorably tied to the DEW Line station. The 
village, in its older location on a barrier island, was in decline when the base was built. 
Some elders are convinced that the DEW Line was to blame for the continued decline, 
with alcohol destroying the social harmony of the town leading to people moving away 
and the school closing. For over ten years, the only inhabitants of Point Lay were Dorcas 
and Warren Neakok, who stayed in part because Warren worked at the DEW Line site. 
After the North Slope Borough was formed in the early 1970s, the formation of a new 
Point Lay village was supported in part because of the infrastructure that already existed 
there (the airstrip, in particular).
These factors -  the type of base, its relative size, and its geographical layout -  are 
critical characteristics of DEW Line sites that shaped the impacts they had. Another
97 The Alaskan community that gained the most and gave up the least with the construction o f the DEW 
Line was Fairbanks. Much o f the regular freight came through Fairbanks, and many DEW Liners came to 
Fairbanks during their time off and spent significant amounts o f their earnings (even if  a solid percentage of 
that was on prostitutes and liquor). Some longtime Fairbanks business families thought that the DEW Line 
boom was more dramatic for Fairbanks than the later impact o f  the trans-Alaska pipeline (Ferguson, 2008).
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truism regarding bases is that more recently built ones attract more attention than long­
standing ones, which may disappear into a normalized background. The DEW Line 
corroborates this particularly well, because the sites go largely unnoticed by everyone 
who has lived next to them during the past half century despite their dramatic contrast to 
the surrounding landscape (fig. 47).
Figure 47: Barrow Whalers football game with POW-Main in background, Oct. 2008
Perception of the DEW Line, the Military, and Nationalism
An important issue that came to light during this research concerned whether 
people regarded the DEW Line radar sites as military bases and if they did, why? This 
subject aptly illustrates the influence of an individual’s personal history. A general trend 
observed was that the more direct experience with the military a person had (whether in 
the service or as a civilian contractor), the less likely they were to perceive the DEW Line 
as military. This phenomenon is interesting on several counts, first because it can be 
considered as further evidence for militarization theories that assert that people become 
less able to recognize militarism the further entrenched in it they are. It also reinforces the 
widespread understanding of ‘military’ as narrowly defined by actions or people directly 
involved in combat and wartime efforts. Furthermore, it highlights one of the main
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reasons that men are more likely to be militarized than women: men have far more 
opportunities and experience in both war and the modem workforce. Many men on the 
North Slope have, at least at some point, worked for the DEW Line during the past half­
century. Until the late 1970s, the DEW Line was exclusively a man’s world - women 
never worked there until recently when some have gotten jobs on DEW Line clean up 
projects.
The southern DEW Liners who had worked as civilian contractors were the least 
likely to perceive the radar sites as military. Hal Phillips explained that even radicians 
with “crypto” clearance98 who tracked potential enemy targets (possibly armed with 
nuclear weapons and headed for the U.S.) did not think that DEW Line work felt like 
military activity. Radicians felt linked to the military in that they were sitting in front of a 
console and monitoring all radar information. Their focus was on the use of the 
technology. As civilians, radicians never initiated a radio conversation and they never 
knew anything more about a situation than was necessary. The DEW Line did not feel 
like the military because there were no military pressures such as chain of command 
rales. In fact, the radicians and most DEW Line employees very rarely saw military 
personnel, and there were never military personnel assigned to Intermediate sites. Hal 
worked on the DEW Line in the days before the White Alice Communications System 
were installed, when radicians at Auxiliary sites reported to Air Force personnel stationed 
at Main sites, who would then forward the communication through Anchorage to 
NORAD. “It absolutely seemed like a civilian operation,” said Hal (Phillips, Dec. 13, 
2006, Texas City, Texas). Even at the Main sites where there were usually a few military 
officers, it made absolutely no difference to the Federal Electric men.
Harry Merriman worked various jobs at the Barter Island site during the 1960s, 
later became a permanent employee on the naval supply of DEW Sites across Alaska, and 
eventually worked at the DEW Line ice cap sites in Greenland. Harry had grown up and 
attended primary and high school on Eielson Air Force base outside of Fairbanks. Before 
working on the DEW Line, he worked at the Ballistic Missile Early Warning (BMEW)
98 When the sites would receive classified messages from military personnel, crypto technicians on hand 
would decode it.
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radar installation in Clear, Alaska. Harry asserted that, because of this background, he 
absolutely knew what constituted ‘military,’ and both Eielson and Clear were definitely 
the military. By comparison, according to Harry, the DEW Line sites did not seem 
military to any degree. The radar bases were military installations, Harry realized, and he 
does consider that the DEW Line constituted the militarization of the Arctic, but he 
explained that it still did not feel military. The main reason, in his opinion, was that the 
entire endeavor was contracted out. Harry remembers no more than one or two military 
officers being stationed at Barter Island and, upon reflection, he was not even sure why 
they had to be there. He surmised that it was to pass on encrypted information to higher 
ups who, to his knowledge, were the only military officers in the entire Alaskan sector. 
This illustrates the fact that the number of military personnel on the DEW Line, always 
small, decreased over the years. The only time high-level military brass would visit the 
DEW Line sites was when a general would come through during an “ArcticStars” 
inspection across the line. Along with many other DEW Liners, Harry’s principal 
memory about the ArcticStars tours concerned the huge parties that inevitably erupted as 
soon as the general’s plane was taxiing for takeoff.
After considering this subject, Harry decided that, more than anything, working 
on the DEW Line felt like living on a ship: “You worked with a group of people enclosed 
together, you took care of each other and you sank or swam together” (Merriman, March 
3, 2009, Fairbanks). The way the sites were physically constructed -  building trains 
raised off the ground, snow and wind blowing underneath them -  made them seem even 
more ship-like (fig. 48). All the latrines were marine toilets with pumps and pedals and 
each room had a vintage naval ash tray stand. “They just seemed like ships of the Arctic,” 
Harry concluded"(Merriman, March 3, 2009, Fairbanks).
99 Harry joked that, compared to the DEW Line sites in Alaska and Canada which felt like ships o f the 
Arctic, the sites on the ice cap in Greenland felt like space ships.
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Figure 48: BAR-Main housing train, Aug. 2005
While Hal Phillips maintained that it was a totally civilian job, he acknowledged 
that since the DEW Line was funded by the military, the Natives saw it as military. Harry 
Merriman, perhaps because of his greater experience with the military or due to the fact 
that he worked on the Line in the 1960s, did not believe that the Inupiat saw the DEW 
Line as military. Walt Audi, who had served in the military before working on the DEW 
Line, completely dismissed the notion that the DEW Line was military and was certain 
that locals differentiated between contractors and actual military personnel.
Many local Inupiat do make the distinction between military personnel and 
civilian contractors, particularly people who have worked at the site as civilian 
contractors and/or have had military experience. Ben Linn of Kaktovik thought that the 
DEW Line did not play a role in shaping his perception of the military because civilian 
contractors largely ran it. Alice Agiak did not think of DEW Liners as military personnel 
and did not think it mattered either way. Other people’s views on this have changed over 
time: Isaac Panik said that when he was young, he did not think about the DEW Liners’
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job that much: “They had a job to do and they did it and that job was for Uncle Sam... I 
thought they protected us from the Russians. The Army was supposed to be our friend.. .1 
thought all those guys were military, but as I got older, I realized that they were 
contractors, specialists” (Panik, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
Growing up at several sites in Canada’s western Arctic, Sammy Lennie thought of 
the sites as military because security was tight and there were signs everywhere saying 
“Unauthorized Personnel Prohibited.” Sammy also saw the bases as military because 
Army planes used to arrive that would quickly hide in the hangar. The site seemed 
military to Sammy for what it was: “It was a radar system and to us, a radar system was 
like, top secret, James Bond. And we used to watch all those movies, James Bond and ‘A 
Man Called Flint”’100 (Lennie, April 3, 2009, Fairbanks).
Robert Thompson, comparing the DEW Line to his experience in the military and 
in Vietnam, concluded that he never really thought of the DEW Line as a military site. 
Like many people, he connects military and militarization with a military capacity for 
fighting or offensive operations and sees the DEW Line as almost completely unrelated 
to that.
Thompson’s wife of over 40 years, however, had a completely different 
perception of the DEW Line. Jane Thompson had the same reaction most people did 
when they were asked whether they thought the DEW Line was military. After a look that 
expressed how ridiculous she found that question, Jane asked, “Who the hell else would it 
be?” (J. Thompson, Aug. 2005, Kaktovik). Jane is not unfamiliar with civilian contractors 
since her father Isaac Akootchook worked at the site for decades, and she is not 
unfamiliar with “true” military since she lived with Robert after Vietnam when he was 
decompressing from combat.
Carla Sims Kayotuk, whose father was a tanik civilian DEW Line employee, also 
did not think the distinction between contractor and DEW Line worker was important:
100 It is regrettable that this research project did not include an adequate amount o f Canadian interviewees 
to indicate whether indigenous Canadian are more likely to perceive the DEW Line as military. My 
assumption is that they do, especially because the DEW Line was largely an American-led (i.e. foreign 
military) undertaking, but not that indigenous Canadian attitudes are any more or less negative.
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“Yeah, well, that’s how everybody saw those people. They were military” 101 (Kayotuk, 
May 29, 2009, Kaktovik). Ron Brower of Barrow also considered DEW Liners to be 
“military people” despite the fact that they were civilians. “Oh, yeah. They belong to the 
military. They are owned by them. They don’t work for us. They work for the military” 
(R. Brower, Dec. 11, 2007, Fairbanks). After reflecting on the fact that many DEW 
Liners and some other Inupiat did not feel that the sites were military, Ron Brower 
replied, “I beg to differ with that thought.. .To us, all the people working at the DEW 
Line, because of the nature of the outpost, were considered military personnel. Whether 
they are contractors or not” (Dec. 11, 2007, Fairbanks). Nora Jane Bums of Kaktovik, 
whose grandfather worked at BAR-Main, felt similarly. “Just because they sublease, 
you’re still working for the military. There’s two sides to every story” (Bums May 27, 
2009).
A negative perception of DEW Line sites was not necessarily connected to a 
perception of the bases as military. Etok, in particular, has had a significant fondness for 
the DEW Line and NARL (in Barrow) since childhood and he certainly views the DEW 
Line as military. Inupiat and Inuvialuit interviewees recognize several differences 
between military industry and other industries, principally oil and other resource 
extraction activities, that have also had an impact in the North. Isaac Panik of Wainwright 
said that national security activity was different than resource extraction because, “back 
then the military had unlimited resources and were given prerogatives to go beyond the 
boundaries” (Panik, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright). One Kaktovik resident concluded that 
the only real difference is that the oil companies come and “kiss our asses” before they do 
whatever they want, while the military just does whatever they want without even asking 
anybody, much less offering sweet enticements.
101 Possibly more so in the early years, some Arctic residents recognized military hierarchy. Mary 
Ann Warden remembers that her father would only allow captains and lieutenants to come to the 
village because they were leaders that he trusted and with whom he was willing to negotiate. This 
rule was instated, Mary Ann Warden said, after some DEW Liners stole a large amount of fox 
furs from the Native store. Mary Ann’s father went to the station chief to report the robbery and -  
because there were no planes and nowhere to hide the furs -  the thieves were caught. She 
assumed that the station chief was a military officer, which was not the case, but is further 
evidence that women are more likely to perceive the DEW Line as military.
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In the area around Tuktoyaktuk on the east side of the McKenzie River delta, the 
DEW Line had always been overshadowed by extensive oil exploration, according to 
Sammy Lennie. “With the oil company you had roads all over the place. [W]hen you 
flew in to Tuk, lights like stars in the sky, that’s how many oil camps there were back 
then”102 (Lennie, April 3, 2009, Fairbanks).
In comparing Kaktovik’s situation with the military to Barrow’s, Carla Sims 
Kayotuk thought that Barrow’s military activity was more scientific and because of that 
had had impacts that were less connected with sickness. Any type of industry would have 
its own particular impacts, she conceded, but because it was the military in Kaktovik, the 
primary impacts were higher alcohol consumption rates and disease due to 
contamination.
Because the DEW Line sites were military installations and because the sites had 
several immediate impacts on adjacent communities, an easy assumption would be that 
people (or at least people who perceived the DEW Line as military) formulated their 
perceptions of the military at least partly based on their experiences with the radar 
system. No one interviewed for this project thought that this was the case, and there are 
several interesting factors surrounding this issue. In accordance with militarization 
theory, much of this is due to the fact that people equate ‘military’ with wartime and 
combat troops, meaning that all other aspects of preparation for war and defense, 
especially during peacetime, are understood as normal government business 
(Lutz 2001).
Although they did not believe that the DEW Line shaped their perception of the 
military, many individuals indicated that the opportunity to watch movies at the DEW 
Line sites was one of the best things about the radar bases. Moreover, many individuals 
indicated that their perception of the military was based much more on movies and, later, 
on television than it was on any actually military activity in the Arctic. Sammy Lennie 
recognized the DEW Line site as military because he saw radar bases depicted in the
102 I have heard elder Barrow residents say almost the exact same thing about exploration in PET 4 from 
the mid-1940s to 1953.
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James Bond and other Cold War spy movies he watched at the DEW Line site. In Point 
Lay, James Tazruk’s main reason for going to the DEW Line site was to watch movies 
and he had no doubt that his ideas about the military were more informed by the films 
than by the base in which he watched them. Bruce Iglangasak described being exposed to 
a great deal of Cold War propaganda via the movies he saw at the sites and said that the 
films entertained people with the notion that they were playing a part in some 
international intrigue. Some of the most powerful militarizing influences created by the 
DEW Line, therefore, were the movies that the bases made available.
There is every indication that indigenous Arctic residents, like many U.S. citizens, 
have come to perceive patriotism as support of the military and U.S. foreign policy. 
Through media like the movies shown at DEW Line sites, the U.S. propaganda campaign 
reached the Arctic periphery of the country during the Cold War. Nationalist propaganda 
of the era attempted to indoctrinate people with anti-communism and fear of the bomb 
while extolling notions of the nuclear family as the patriotic front line of civil defense 
(McEnaney 2000). The same security posture that resulted in the destruction of sod 
houses and ice cellars in the Arctic was encouraging families in the rest of the country to 
build bomb shelters -  safe subterranean dwellings with a secure supply of food.
Perhaps due in part to his Canadian perspective or the Cold War era in which he 
wrote, McMahon’s estimation (1988) was that Alaskan Inupiat are American nationalists. 
My research found that that assessment oversimplifies the complex situation involved 
with indigenous Americans’ feelings on the State, which do not lend themselves to 
generalizations. Just as most people interviewed for this research did not feel that the 
DEW Line sites shaped their ideas about the military, neither did most feel that bases 
significantly affected their level of patriotism. When discussing the issue, many people 
(especially non-elders) relegated patriotism to a low level of importance. Several people 
compared their situation to that of Russian citizens and expressed that whatever 
unfortunate things may have occurred to them and their homeland under U.S. rule, at 
least they were not Russian. All interviewees seemed acutely aware that things were far 
more difficult for indigenous people who had happened to be colonized by the Russians,
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they were particularly empathetic to the plight of those indigenous groups, and they 
considered that such a fate had not always been a distant possibility for them.
Etok considers that the original sale of Alaska was illegal and illegitimate and 
emphasizes that the Inupiat have never lost a battle or surrendered their land. Regardless 
of the historical circumstances, the Inupiat had become U.S. citizens and, as such, Etok 
had no dispute with PET 4, the ATG, the DEW Line and NARL. “Yeah, well, when your 
nation is distressed, you gotta come to the aid,” said Etok, who also pointed out that 
Alaska Natives have been fighting for the U.S. military since the Spanish American 
war103 (Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks).
Any discussion of patriotism made Robert Thompson anxious to ensure that no 
study of the DEW Line would ever portray the story of the forced relocations of the 
Kaktovikmiut as a patriotic sacrifice. He was quite certain that no one ever rationalized 
the moves as “doing their part for the national defense.104” Thompson expressed loyalty 
to country alongside the common sentiment regarding Russia and skepticism about the 
purchase of Alaska:
“I'd rather be an American citizen than a Russian citizen at this point in time, but 
actually the Russians were never here, so the legality o f United States owning this part o f  
Alaska is still in question by some people. The Russians never had the right to sell us. I  
know none o f my ancestors never said, ‘Well, yeah, I  want to be sold to the America, ’ but
103 Etok asserted that Inupiaq people did not see the DEW Line as an invasion o f their homeland because 
they were patriotic, had a “willing participation,” and were not the victims o f the government. He dismissed 
the treatment o f  the Kaktovikmiut, whom he faults for not standing up and resisting the treatment they 
received. In his opinion, they were rendered overly patriotic and passive due to “brainwashing” by the 
Presbyterian Church (Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks).
104 “I don’t think there's anybody saying, ‘Well, we'll do our part and serve our country by letting people 
bulldoze our houses in,’ and this sort o f  thing. I don't think anybody ever gave consent, it was just one of  
those kind o f things that the dominant society did to us, when they came in and nearly annihilated the 
whales - local people didn't have control over that, you better get out o f  the way or you are going to get 
killed. Literally. That's what happened in the Lower 48 - put everyone on reservations. Submit or die. I 
don't know if  they ever put it that way but that's probably what would have happened if  anybody had tried 
to stop the whalers getting their oil. It never got tested, but that's what happened in the rest o f the U.S.” -  
(R. Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
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somebody did that at some time. But all in all, I  was in the military, did my service fo r  my 
country, so to speak” (Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik).
Unsurprisingly, many people had been patriotic in their youth and grew skeptical 
during recent decades. Isaac Panik joined the military quickly after high school, 
concealing a back injury from high school to qualify. “I was very patriotic. My father and 
grandfather both served Uncle Sam, I wanted to be part of that” (Panik, Sep. 13, 2009, 
Wainwright). Isaac had really liked the people at the Wainwright DEW Line site when he 
had the chance to visit there, finding-them very open and very kind. The military 
provided ease of mind and made him feel safe. The Cold War was perceived as a very 
real threat and he was taught that the Russians were dangerous. Now, this is an 
aggravating subject for him and he suffers from headaches when he thinks about it. It 
bothers him he is not able to be patriotic like his father, but the more he looks into it, the 
more questions he has. He now thinks that he was “brainwashed” at Fort Benning and has 
researched the military’s actions (locally and globally) trying to reconcile what he thinks 
now with the way he was raised and with his community’s attitudes. “The more I look 
into the question, my trust with the military has changed a lot,” he said. While his 
sentiments are not uncommon, Isaac, like many of this project’s informants, is 
particularly outspoken and opinionated. His experience indicates that he has had to 
contend with an entrenched reluctance to criticize the military. “Yeah, you get a 
headache. All this stuff, you know, you try to talk to a regular person, they think you are 
crazy” (Panik, Sep. 13, 2009, Wainwright).
There are many indications that people are currently more openly skeptical about 
patriotism and the military than they were during the Cold War, and many are very 
candid that Inupiaq participation in military institutions is based purely on economic 
reasoning. Some people ascribed mistrust of the military to their entire community, while 
other interviewees/individuals (especially elderly men) claimed that everyone in town 
was very patriotic. In Wainwright, Elder Glenn Shoula recalled that when the National 
Guard first formed, every man in town was in it. Over time, interest dissipated and the
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Guard disbanded. Glenn did not know why and either felt that it was unfortunate that 
younger people were unpatriotic or that it was foolish that they were passing up a steady 
source of income (or both). Wainwright elder Rossman Peetook tries to convince young 
people to join the National Guard or the military because someday they will need the 
money -  the checks he receives now for his past service are of great assistance.
Many women said that the older generations -  especially those working at the 
DEW Line - were more patriotic than younger ones. As Nora Jane Bums remembered, 
“my grandpa, whenever he got a little tipsy, he would talk about [it]. I think they were 
brainwashing them about communists” (Bums July 31, 2008). Nora Jane claimed that 
high levels of participation in the military and patriotism stopped with her generation, 
evidenced by the fact that none of her classmates joined the army. She giggled in 
explaining that the National Guard finally tore down the armory in Kaktovik because it 
could not recmit any more villagers. Alice Agiak used to be very proud of the National 
Guard in Kaktovik, but television, education, and the Vietnam War changed that: “War. 
You see it on TV. Ridiculous. I don’t believe in them anymore. Not anymore” (Agiak, 
May 31, 2009, Kaktovik). Nora Jane also believed that the key reasons people became 
less militaristic were television and education, further corroborating the notion that 
militarization itself contributed to the importation of socially transformative forces that 
were often used to resist militarization.
The regional military history of the western Arctic, and particularly the 
experience with the Alaska Territorial Guard, has also contributed to current skepticism 
of the military. As described, many Inupiat had a history with the military before the 
Cold War. Hundreds of Inupiaq and Yupik men serve in World War II, while many more 
worked building airfields and pipelines and operating machinery. Coastal residents had 
been justifiably fearful of further attacks on Alaska, and almost every single man and 
several women enlisted in the Alaska Territorial Guard. ATG members were highly 
valued for their vigilance, sharp-shooting abilities and knowledge of the land and sea 
during World War II and the Korean war, and ATG leaders credited the ATG with 
challenging institutionalized racism in the state, aiding the passage of the
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Nondiscrimination Act of 1945, and playing a role in the formation of the Alaska 
Federation of Natives. In stark contrast, Cold War military activities replaced Natives 
with machines as defenders of the coastline and otherwise actively disenfranchised them. 
Instead of depending on Inuit to defend their homeland fo r  the nation, the military seized 
their land and trespassed them from it. Sharpshooters and local experts were no longer 
needed, only wage laborers and a little help locating fresh water sources. One interviewee 
said that the DEW Line made him become a leader- not because it was empowering but 
because he was so angry and felt forced to fight for the rights of his people.
MaryAnn Warden characterized the U.S. as a foreign power to the Inupiaq people 
and explained the extreme difficulty colonized people have pulling away from what she 
calls “their own country” when they don’t have their own power, military or otherwise. 
“They still depend on the U.S. to defend our country, but -  what price?” she asked. The 
Inupiat, according to MaryAnn, are in a situation where they depend on the U.S. military 
to protect their country, but she qualifies that “it is not the same as freedom.” “[T]hey 
have no power to do anything with the military- [] you don’t have a power over it and it’s 
a military world” (Warden, May 28, 2009, Kaktovik). According to MaryAnn, Inupiat 
only participate in the military for the jobs and if people are hesitant to speak poorly of 
the military it is because they are dependent on it, not because they are patriotic. Bruce 
Inglangasak corroborates this view on Native enlistment rates: “I think they are just doing 
it for the money... [T]he jobless and the hopeless are the ones that are probably getting 
picked” (Iglangasuk, May 24, 2009, Kaktovik).
Predictably, negative feelings associated with the DEW Line correspond with the 
obvious and perceived negative impacts of the bases on a particular community. People 
certainly enjoyed and exploited the positive things that the DEW Line brought, which are 
the more civilian aspects of the DEW Line (individuals, paychecks, movies). The 
negative aspects of the DEW Line are associated with the military: the commandeering of 
land and the ability to circumvent laws and responsibilities for social and environmental 
damage.
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Circumpolar Nuclear-Free Movement
Despite the extensive and pervasive contamination resulting from DEW Line
sites, local and global histories, combined with environmental conditions and a 
subsistence diet based largely on caribou, have resulted in a North Slope-wide opposition 
to anything nuclear that far surpasses any issues with the DEW Line. Any general anti­
militaristic sentiment that does exist on the North Slope is much strengthened by a 
widespread and completely socially acceptable anti-nuclearism.
While the people of Point Hope may have been happy with the military while 
anthropologist James VanStone was living there in 1956-57, that sentiment was largely 
reversed in subsequent years. In 1959, Project Chariot -  the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s plan to construct a large harbor near Point Hope by detonating several 
underground thermonuclear bombs - inspired an unprecedented unified opposition of 
Inupiat, scientists, churches, and the growing anti-nuclear movement. The plan was 
eventually dropped.
In 1992, the people of Point Hope revisited the Project Chariot controversy when 
author Dan O’Neill made public documents that he had uncovered while researching the 
Atomic Energy Commission’s history in Alaska. O’Neill had discovered that before 
abandoning the Chariot camp, government scientists had buried nuclear waste near the 
site as part of an experiment. When this news hit, the story ran in papers all over the 
world and shock waves rippled through the Inupiaq communities of northwest Alaska. 
The headlines in the Tundra Times read: “Atomic Arrogance: Fear, Anger Run Deep in 
Point Hope” (O'Neill 1994: 280).
The release of this news and O’Neill’s book in 1994 coincided with an 
investigative report, commissioned by the North Slope Borough, into the Iodine 131 
experiments that were performed by doctors with the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory. 
Legal action was taken that resulted in compensation to many of the individuals 
experimented upon, but this was not seen as commensurate with the wrongdoing. 
Disclosure of the experiments contributed significantly to previously held concerns, 
because confusion and fear regarding radiation had been part of life in the Arctic since 
the late fifties due in part to the studies designed to estimate the impact of Project
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Chariot. Those studies involved extensive monitoring of radioactivity levels and evidence 
of elevated levels of radioactive isotopes in both subsistence wildlife and people (Birch et 
al. 1997). By the 1990s, Inupiat were “desperately seeking an explanation for the high 
number of cancer deaths in their village” (ibid: 281). Taken together, the Iodine 
experiments and the radioactive waste dump from Project Chariot were immediately 
understood as the reasons. After Chariot, the fears of radiation, and finally the disclosure 
of the Iodine tests, many Inupiat lost trust in the federal government105.
Project Chariot and the Iodine experiments were only two of the many reasons 
that Inupiat are particularly opposed to any kind of nuclear power or weapons. Several 
nuclear events over the past 60 years have been more significant for indigenous Arctic 
residents than for most of the general public and have cemented an unusually strong and 
widespread resistance to any type of nuclear development. To varying degrees, the 
Inupiat became aware of nuclear weapons when the rest of the world did, at the end of 
World War II. The studies done for Project Chariot revealed that Arctic residents were 
already receiving higher doses of radionuclides due to atmospheric testing. During the 
1960s, many Inupiat were aware of underground nuclear tests on Amchitka Island. Also 
during these years, people increasingly became aware of the links between radiation and 
cancer. In 1988, the meltdown of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor rendered many herds of 
reindeer in Northern Europe inedible and, by that time, almost everyone on the North 
Slope was following the news on television along with the rest of the world.
Understandings of cancer on the North Slope, therefore, play a particularly strong 
role in shaping attitudes towards the military. These understandings, based on decades of 
experience with sickness and deaths due to cancer and fear of radioactive elements in the 
environment, explain the reaction to the Iodine experiments and account for the 
uncharacteristically adamant opposition to all things nuclear expressed by many residents
1 0 5 reveiation that these northern Alaska Natives were participants in such a large number of 
experiments has contributed to the fear, apprehension and anxiety that exists in the villages. The recent 
disclosure that one o f  these experiments involved the ingestion o f radiation has prompted the Inupiat to 
believe that other research in which they participated might have involved radiation or other harmful 
substances or activities as well. They no longer have faith or trust in the federal government, and feel that 
any atrocity might be possible in light o f  recent revelations,” (Birch et al. 1997: 96).
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of the North Slope. It was on a very personal level that people were shocked by the 
Iodine experiments. With every case of cancer, that shock has evolved since 1994 into a 
bitter anger and sense of betrayal: “Yes, [they] felt betrayed. Everyone here had been 
welcoming and helpful to the military,” explained one informant. In contrast to somewhat 
lackadaisical attitudes about the impacts of the DEW Line (and even Chariot), a Point 
Lay man said that the Iodine experiments absolutely affected his perception of the 
military: “I think that was crazy what they did. [] Like we are guinea pigs for them.” He 
had a fair understanding of the purpose of the experiments as well: “[T]hey were trying to 
figure out why we can stay in the cold and they can’t. I think that’s what they were 
greedy over or something.” This seems to be exceptionally stupid and insulting to people, 
because the answer to that question is right in front of everyone’s nose: “It’s our seal oil.” 
This is particularly offensive because the Inupiat had been exceptionally forthcoming 
with that kind of information for centuries with all the outsiders they had met.
People who are critical about the DEW line usually discuss it with a mixture of 
scom, humor, and resignation. Discussions of Iodine and Project Chariot could not be 
more different: people immediately become very serious and appear to be controlling a 
slow-burning rage. Many were immediately defensive about the question of whether or 
not the Iodine (or radioactive waste) had caused the cancer through which their relatives 
had suffered. They left no room for negotiation. The people had long known that 
something was wrong with them, and the nuclear revelations explained it. Like several 
other informants, one woman became extremely stem and focused when the issue of 
whether the Iodine caused her parents’ and grandparents’ health problems. “I know it 
did,” she said, with a tone that conveyed more than conviction.
Hosting a defensive radar site is among the least offensive and most acceptable of 
imposed military activities, while unsanctioned and dangerous testing on individuals 
without their knowledge or consent is a universally understood evil, precisely the type of 
action that the U.S. had addressed after the atrocities of WWII with the Nuremberg Code. 
Even if the contamination from the DEW Line (and NARL and PET 4 exploration) 
constitutes a more significant and longer-term health issue, it is tame by comparison to
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the nuclear issue in people’s minds. An acute awareness of the threat of cancer and the 
dangers posed by radiation rather than by other chemical contamination is common. Most 
people do not have a thorough understanding of the complex threats presented by POPs 
and therefore do not blame them for disease or irregularities.106 There is, then, an overall 
attitude of grudging acceptance of the DEW Line despite the negative impacts and the 
long-term health risks associated with it. By contrast, the level of betrayal and anger felt 
over the Project Chariot and the Iodine experiments is several orders of magnitude 
higher. As Etok articulated it, people were familiar with and trusted the military before 
the nuclear development, “but we did not expect them to blow up our birthright! Our 
homeland!”107 (Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks).
With the end of the Cold War, Arctic security scholars (e.g. Griffiths 1992) 
hoped that there would be a redefinition and modernization of global security concepts 
leading to a sudden and unexpected opportunity to explore the potential for the 
demilitarization of the arctic region and the negotiations for pan-Arctic civil 
cooperation. During the 1990s, there was a noticeable shift in the focus of most of the 
arctic states towards environmental cooperation and international security actions, 
notably the international program that aided in the safe decommissioning of the 
Russian government’s nuclear-powered submarine force. Contaminants in the Arctic 
are an issue that, like climate change, requires international cooperation in the region. 
Scholars have long recognized that protecting the Arctic environment and guarding the 
interests of all Arctic residents in ways that allow their full participation in political, 
social, and economic development requires broad-based cooperation on regional and 
circumpolar scales (Lyen and Gregorich 2006).
106 This is a situation that many epidemiologists deal with in their work: people don’t know or care about a 
product/material/substance unless it is carcinogenic and they ignore the other threats posed by non- 
carcinogenic substances. The focus on cancer has defined and driven the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) regulatory process for toxic chemicals, and the preoccupation with cancer has blinded the
public to evidence o f other dangers (Colbom et al. 1997).
107 Etok’s attitude illustrates how, on one level, the Iodine experiment and Project Chariot are convenient 
for the U.S. Air Force today. These events focus attention on negative things that the military did in the 
past. The events are over, the military has admitted to them, the victims have been compensated. There is 
relatively little ire or energy to direct towards an entrenched problem such as contaminated landfills.
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In recent years, the longer season of open water in the Arctic Ocean 
(particularly along the Northwest Passage), the rush for natural resources and the 
global security situation are increasing the strategic significance of the Arctic. The 
international media has made Arctic climate change and associated security issues a 
perennial focus, speculating about a new “Cold War” and discussing the “rush for 
resources” in alarming tones. Canadian Arctic security expert Bob Huebert’s 
investigations (2010) reveal that while recent policy statements issued by the Arctic 
nations have claimed adherence to the goals of civil cooperation and have dismissed 
this media portrayal as sensationalized hype, these countries are actually rebuilding 
their military forces and capabilities in the region.
Sheila Watt-Cloutier, while president of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, 
explained that the organization did not overtly oppose a new military build up in 
Nunavut for two interconnected reasons: no one believed they would be able to stop it 
and they wanted to be well-positioned to demand as much local control and benefits as 
possible should it occur (Watt-Cloutier, pers. comm.). Ongoing disputes over the 
amount of locals hired for clean up of old DEW Line sites are a legacy of Cold War 
military industrialization and exemplify possible future conflicts. Some communities 
have been working on cleaning up their DEW Line site for 10-15 years and, before the 
project’s completion, they are facing increased military activity in the region. Pond 
Inlet resident Phillip Paneak expressed one common sentiment: “We don’t want to see 
anything else on top of what we are cleaning up already” (Barrera 2007).
Mikhail Gorbachev’s watershed 1987 call for pan-Arctic peaceful cooperation 
reignited the push that began before the Cold War to create an Arctic Council. 
Understanding that scientific cooperation flourishes when backed by political 
cooperation, one initial mandate of the Arctic Council was to promote peace in the region 
(Roots 1992). U.S. participation required a caveat specifying that the Arctic Council had 
no jurisdiction over military security matters, while other Arctic Council founding 
philosophies embraced the idea that older notions of sovereignty impede the formation of 
a true Arctic entity.
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Ronald Aniqsuaq Brower of Barrow explained that it was precisely the history of 
nuclear developments in the North and propects for increased militarization that led to the 
creation in the mid-1970s of an international organization that would represent Inuit 
peoples in Greenland, Canada, Alaska, and Russia: the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC, 
originally Inuit Circumpolar Conference). When the ICC initially convened in 1977, one 
of the first resolutions they passed called for a nuclear-free zone in the Arctic (Appendix 
C). The ICC reaffirmed the resolution in 2006, and every person interviewed for this 
research was supportive of the spirit of the initiative. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
common qualifier of most interviewees that they are only speaking for themselves, 
several expressed the belief that most Inupiat supported the resolution.
Conclusion: Tracing the Ironies o f Arctic Militarization and Views on the Future
There is a measure of ambiguity about what we call militarization, and studies 
like this one indicate that individual details and community histories are far more 
edifying than generalizing concepts. Without in-depth ethnography, it is hard to know if 
people who think they are not militarized truly are not, or whether they are so militarized 
that they do not even realize it. Militarism is inherently complex and contradictory: for 
example, many Inupiat and other Americans are pro-military, yet anti-war.
After his exploration of the impacts of militarization in eastern Canada in the 
1980s, McMahon claimed that “without a sense of irony, you were lost in the Arctic: 
understanding the attitudes of the people became impossible” (ibid: 101). Investigating 
how the processes of modem militarization have shaped small communities and 
individual lives in the western Arctic is a process of exploring several large and obvious 
ironies and discovering many small and individualized ones. One conclusion is that the 
sheer number and scale of ironies associated with military activity in the Arctic actually 
serve as a bulwark to the social acceptance of militarized ideologies because they 
facilitate people’s ability to ridicule, disrespect, and minimize the power of the military 
over them. McMahon attempted to see the military in an Inuit context by explaining Inuit 
concepts like aynumut: a word that is used in impossible situations, as in: it cannot be 
helped. The Inuit view of the military is that there is no way of stopping it because it has
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so much power. A dismissive and mocking attitude is the only way they can counter it 
and make it easier to accept that, in other ways, the people are powerless over the actions 
of the military.
The DEW Line itself is the source of ironies on all scales, and the most obvious 
concerns national defense. Designed to defend against bombers, the Line was rendered 
largely obsolete by Soviet ICBM development the same year it was completed. On an 
international scale, the Canadian government had been coerced by the U.S. into 
participating as partners. Eventually, sites in Canada were kept on largely to assert 
Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, the main threat to which has historically been the 
U.S. On lesser scales, it is ironic how militarizing processes imported powerful antidotes 
to social militarization, for example in the form of civilian DEW Liners who stood up to 
the military on the side of the people.
Alaska’s broader military history includes its own paradoxical scenarios. The 
military sent anthropologists to study Alaskan villages that had not been militarized for 
the purpose of facilitating future militarization and sent medical doctors, under oath to 
preserve life, who injected people with radioactive Iodine.
This study itself is somewhat ironic. Although there are different degrees of 
antipathy depending on the North Slope community in question, there is a level of 
resentment at being studied ad nauseam by social scientists with no obvious benefits 
accruing to the people from the research. Furthermore, a study of how militarization has 
affected relatively powerless indigenous communities that focuses on the Inupiat is ironic 
because the Inupiat are not the most disenfranchised group of Native Americans by any 
measure. Compared to most tribes, the Inupiat of Alaska are significant powerbrokers. 
The bases on the North Slope have been cleaned up to far higher standards than in many 
other regions of Alaska. The Arctic Slope Regional Corporation is a globally significant 
and powerful corporation and the North Slope Borough is a wealthy regional 
government. It is ironic that despite the global attention on the Arctic and the relative 
power of North Slope institutions, the Inupiat are still subject to extreme environmental 
injustice.
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It is also ironic that, over 50 years after the DEW Line was constructed, the Air 
Force launched a public relations campaign in Kaktovik in the fall of 2008. Perhaps 
attempting to ameliorate community relations that had degraded during the contentious 
clean up process, an Alaska Command public relations officer explained that very few 
locals had been inside the radar site or had any understanding of what it did. Wanting 
local residents to have a “closer, more comfortable relationship with the station,” 
Elmendorf-based 611th Air Support Group arranged to have all the students at the Harold 
Kaveolook School be shuttled over for a grand open house and tour of the base. The Air 
Force Band of the Pacific’s Alaska Brass section flew to Barter Island and set up for a 
concert in BAR-Main’s vehicle bay and there was a large feast. Tory, a twelve-year-old 
resident of Kaktovik, characterized the fieldtrip as fun and cool. Tory also said that she 
wanted to join the military after the tour, in part because the outfits were so “cute.” The 
school principal was “thrilled with all this” because she believed it was important for the 
Kaktovikmiut to build a good relationship with the Air Force. “And the real key to that,” 
she explained, “is to reach the children.” She also thought it was a great opportunity to 
exploring future career choices the children may have (Callahan 2009).
Standing amid the flotsam and abandoned buildings of the DEW Line sites with 
the people who live next to them, surrounded by their land and history, there is absolutely 
no sense of ownership on their part. It is a normalized foreign element, but it is not theirs. 
The Kaktovikmiut never had a name for the military camp that was right across the road 
from their second village site because, according to one informant, they never owned it 
and they never gave it a name to own it. The DEW Line was just a place to work.
It is not because they are under the influence of militarism that the Kaktovikmiut and 
other North Slope Inupiat do not think about the role of the military in their history, but 
because they are not governed by the idea that recent economic dependence defines them 
in any meaningful way. After working at the DEW line for almost 30 years, elder Isaac 
Ahootchook deliberately emphasized, “it was just a job, just a job” (May 31, 2009, 
Kaktovik). The Kaktovikmiut, therefore, deny that the military has had power over the 
aspects of their lives that matter most. Lifelong Kaktovik residents have emphatically
329
stated that the military has had no impact on the town at all; that Kaktovik would be 
exactly the same had the military never come. Kaktovik, a community whose modem 
physical existence and economy can be directly traced to the military, demonstrates that it 
is possible for a small community to correlate very strongly with certain primary 
characteristics of militarization yet staunchly reject other core militaristic notions.
Sammy Lennie of Inuvik had a telling answer to the question of whether the 
Arctic is militarized: “Yeah, if you think about it that way” (April 3, 2009, Fairbanks). 
Most people do not think about it that way, and this is a tenet of militarization -  its power 
lies in part in its ability to fade into the background and be ignored. Perhaps it was simple 
to ignore because, according to Etok, the DEW Line did not bring a new level of 
militarization to the North Slope - it represented “militarization on the same level” the 
Arctic had already experienced108 (Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks). Etok claimed 
that militarization “started when they killed the first Indian” (ibid). While the North may 
be militarized, Etok believes that “the signature of peace is still alive in the Arctic” 
because at no time has a war occurred there and the people never abandoned their 
“superior occupation” (ibid).
Another characteristic of militarism is dependence on the military for a sense of 
pride and security. For the people with whom I’ve spoken, it is the resilience of their 
culture despite recent history that provides their source of pride, and their security comes 
from a belief that their communities could survive on their own without outside help.
Currently, climate change and the race for resources in the Arctic are the focus of 
major media speculation and sensationalism. No one knows whether and what kind of 
international cooperation or conflict will transpire, thus it is no surprise that the 
indigenous residents of the Arctic do not know what is coming either. They do feel as 
though it is largely out of their control and they do not know whether the Inuit/Inupiaq 
communities would be able to stop future military activity that would negatively affect 
their lives and livelihood. Some hope that, since the status of indigenous peoples’ rights 
is improving, “they maybe could slow them down a little bit.” Informants did not think
108 “Already militarized. Didn’t seem any different. Normal to people. The militarization had already been 
executed” (Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, Fairbanks).
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there are any indigenous people in the Arctic who want war or conflict in the region, but 
what they want will have little effect unless large and powerful nations support them.
Jimmy Jones Olemaun of Barrow did not think that the Inupiat would be able to 
prevent unnecessary military activity on their homelands. “No. No, no. Not in a thousand 
years. We can hold them off for a little while, make sure they do it more precautionary, 
but no” (Olemaun, Aug. 31, 2000, Peard Bay). Even Etok, famous for his regular and 
loud calls for resistance, conceded that he does not really think the Inupiat have the 
power to stop it: “No, it’s the military industrial complex” (Edwardsen, April 14, 2009, 
Fairbanks).
Richard Gordon (of Inuvik, NWT and Herschel Island, Yukon) characterized the 
struggle that his people are already engaged in as a war. “As aboriginal people, it is a 
war. .. .1 mean, our definition of war is going to be totally different from country -  where 
we fight to survive in our own land” (R. Gordon, July 24, 2008, Herschel Island, Yukon 
Territory).
Well-known Inupiaq environmental activist and eco-wildemess tour guide Robert 
Thompson also strongly supports a demilitarized zone in the Arctic and does have a 
concrete solution that would protect the Arctic from both continued oil industry and 
military activity: “What we got to do is get off of oil, that way we don’t have to fight 
about it.” Robert also commented on the principal idea that led to the DEW Line: “I 
guess [nuclear weaponry] serves its purpose, if there's so much either side is afraid to use 
them: mutually assured destruction. Maybe that takes the place of civilization” 
(Thompson, May 5, 2009, Kaktovik). Robert’s insight into militarism recalls Alfred 
Vagts’ A History o f Militarism, Civilian and Military, in which Vagts asserted that the 
true opposite of militarism is not pacifism, as most assume, but ‘civilianism.’
Many benefits of militarization are civilian in nature - in the case of the DEW 
Line: jobs, food, some good people, material goods, infrastructure, health care, 
transportation, and entertainment. Nationwide, the civilianization of militarization 
renders militarism more pervasive. However, the Inuit with whom I spoke did not
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believe that those basic civilian goods and services are only possible within a militarized 
economy.
In summary, this dissertation has described many of the far-reaching and multi­
layered effects of the small, remote, and seemingly innocuous elements of modem 
militarization. It has illustrated that ethnographic methods hold great potential for 
understanding the environmental destruction wrought by bases on local inhabitants and 
the actual subjective experiences of individuals in the midst of global political systems. 
As such, I hope that it contributes towards the larger goal of deconstructing militarized 
notions of security. The people with whom I spoke in the western Arctic see threats to 
their own physical health and the health of their land, ocean, and resources as the most 
critical security issues. Future defensive measures in the Arctic will only provide true 
security by respecting the wishes and civil rights of the region’s inhabitant and keeping 
human and environmental health as goals.
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Interviewees
Agiak, Alice. 05/31/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Agnasagga, George. 09/13/2009 Interview recorded in Wainwright, Alaska. Interview 
focused on Point Lay, where Agnasagga was bom and raised, Cape 
Beaufort/Cape Sabine, and Icy Cape.
Akootchook, Isaac. 05/31/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Akootchook, Lillian and Daniel.05/28/2009 Lillian and Daniel Interview recorded in 
Kaktovik, Alaska.
Akootchook, Roy. 05/23/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Alexie, Robert Sr. 07/06/2008. Interview recorded in Fort McPherson, Northwest 
Territories.
Arey, Nellie. 07/18/2008. Interview recorded at Running River Camp, Shingle Point, 
Yukon Territory.
Audi, Walt. 08/08/2008. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska. Audi is white, a former 
DEW Liner, and the first white man to move his family to Kaktovik.
Brower, Ronald Aniqsuaq. 12/11/2007. Interview recorded in Fairbanks, Alaska.
Brower is from Barrow.
Burns, Nora Jane. 07/31/2008 & 05/27/2009. Interviews recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Edwardsen, Charles Etok. 04/14/2009. Interview recorded in Faribanks, Alaska. 
Edwardsen is from Barrow, Alaska.
Ekak, Charles (Chuck). 09/2009. Interviews (not recorded) conducted over the course of 
two weeks in Wainwright.
Elavgak, Lillian. 10/01/2009. Interview conducted in Barrow, Alaska. Elavgak is 
originally from Kalovik, Alaska (adjacent to Point Lonely).
Gordon, Evelyn Masek. 05/25/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
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Gordon, Richard R. 07/24/2008. Interview recorded on Herschel Island, Yukon
Territory. Richard Gordon is the senior park ranger at Herschel and lives in Inuvik 
but has lived in Tuktoyaktuk.
Iglangasak, Bruce. 05/24/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Iglangasak, Tori Lynn. 05/28/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Kayotuk, Carla Sims. 05/29/2009 Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Lennie, Sammy L. 04/03/2009. Interview recorded in Fairbanks, Alaska. Lennie is a 
resident of Inuvik and grew up on the three DEW Line sites in the Mackenzie 
River Delta (Tununuk, Shingle Point, and Tuktoyaktuk).
Linn, Benjamin. 05/31/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Merriman, Harry. 03/24/2009. Interview recorded in Fairbanks, Alaska. Merriman is a 
lifelong Alaskan and worked at Barter Island as well as on the supply route for the 
Alaskan sites and at DEW Line sites in Greenland.
Meyook, Jonas and Thelma. 07/15-19/2008. Interview conducted at Shingle Point camp 
and Shingle Point DEW Line site (BAR-2). The Meyooks have a house at Shingle 
Point and live in Aklavik.
Nageak, Roy. 09/08 & 09/09. Interviews (recorded and written) conducted in Barrow, 
Alaska.
Niglik, John (alias). 05/30/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Oktallik, Jack. 09/16/2009. Interview recorded in Wainwright, Alaska. Oktallik is 
originally from Point Hope.
Olemaun, James (Jimmy Jones). 08/25/2009-09/12/2009. Interviews recorded in Peard 
Bay, Alaska. Olemaun is from Barrow.
Panik, Isaac. 09/13/2009. Interview recorded in Wainwright, Alaska.
Phillips, Harold. 12/13/2006. Interview recorded in Texas City, Texas. Phillips was a 
DEW Liner in the early years, working at Cape Beaufort, Point Lay, Icy Cape, 
Wainwright, and Barrow.
Tagarook, Ruth. 05/28/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Tazruk, James. 09/24/2009 James. Interview recorded in Point Lay, Alaska.
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Thompson, Jane Akootchook. 08/2005. Interviews conducted in Kaktovik, Alaska. 
Tulugak, Betsy (alias). 09/18/2009. Interview recorded in Wainwright, Alaska. 
Thompson, Robert. 05/19/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
Warden, Mary Ann Iqilan. 05/28/2009. Interview recorded in Kaktovik, Alaska.
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Appendix B 
Interview Questions
1. Potential open-ended questions for DEW Line interviews with Indigenous Arctic 
Residents to be omitted/added to/changed as interviews progress:
• Did you or any of your family members ever work at the DEW Line site?
• Did they (you) work at just this one site, or did they ever travel to other DEW
Line sites?
• Did your family live here before the DEW Line site was built?
• What are your earliest memories of the DEW Line site?
• What are your strongest memories of the DEW Line site?
• Has your family ever used anything that came from the site, such as building 
materials?
• Are you glad they tore it down? Why? / Do you think they should tear it down or 
would you prefer that some or all of the buildings stay?
• What have the most helpful things the DEW Line site has brought to the 
community?
• What are the negative things the DEW Line has brought to the community?
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• Do you think that this community would be the same if the DEW Line site was 
never built here? If not, how would it be different, would it even be here?
• Were you afraid of the DEW Line site as a child?
• Do you understand how the DEW Line site worked?
• Did you feel that Soviet bombers were the biggest threat?
• Do you think building the DEW Line site was worth it?
• What are the biggest security problems facing the Arctic today?
• How were the relations between the DEW Liners and the villagers?
• How much did those relations depend on who was in charge at the site?
• Do you know anything about contamination (pollution) from the DEW Line site?
• If so, have you noticed that contamination from the site has impacted local 
resources such as subsistence foods?
• (For older people) Do you remember when the DEW Line was built? What do 
you remember most clearly about it? Do you remember what your impression was 
of it at the time?
• Did you or someone in your family ever work on the DEW Line?
• What was your job?
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Do you feel that you learned a valuable trade or skill?
What did you think of the food at the DEW Line?
Did you make lasting friendships with white workers?
Did it make a difference to you that your job was at a military site as opposed to 
other industrial development?
Did you feel that you played an important role in the Cold War?
Do you think that the DEW Line changed the social order in your community?
Was your perception of the military shaped by the DEW Line? If so in what way?
Which do you think poses a more serious threat to the Arctic: war & terrorism, 
global warming, or contamination?
Do you think that the military importance of the Arctic coast has been overall a 
positive thing for your community or overall a negative thing or is that impossible 
to say?
Would you like the remaining DEW line buildings to be tom down or would you 
like them to stay?
Do you know of the DEW Line sites being used a landmarks?
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Do you think that there would be a good use for the material that is left -  is there 
any way to reuse anything from the site?
Have you ever used any material from the DEW Line?
When and how did people in your community become aware of contamination 
issues from the DEW Line?
Do you feel that contamination from the DEW Line has caused an increase in 
sickness in your community -  or do you feel that there has been an increase in 
cancer and other sicknesses but is it impossible to isolate the impact the DEW 
Line may have had?
What would have been the main differences if an industry that was not military 
had come to your community at the same time?
How much of an impact did the DEW Line have on people’s patriotism in your 
community?
Were you ever aware of any differences in the DEW Line sites in Alaska 
(Canada?)
What do you think your community would be like if the DEW Line had never 
come?
Do you think that having the DEW Line has attracted more animals to this area 
(ravens, foxes, polar bears) or are animals less likely to come near a site?
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• The Inuit Circumpolar Conference wanted to designate the entire Arctic coastal 
region a zone of peace, they wanted no military in the North, and they wanted to 
formally declare it a nuclear-free zone and for the land to be used for purposes 
that are peaceful and environmentally safe. Do you think this is a good idea and 
do you think that communities would suffer economically if that happened?
• Would you like to see the old DEW Line site be:
o tom down and completely cleaned up 
o remodeled into something useful for the entire community 
o refitted and operated as a military site?
• Is there anything from the DEW Line that you think would be important to 
remember as scientists study climate change?
• Do you feel that the building of the DEW Line changed your culture in a 
fundamental way?
• Do you think people in your community felt that they were playing a very 
important role in defending all of North America?
• How is the thinking of the younger generation different on this -  are they more or 
less patriotic than the previous generation?
• Do you think the DEW Line had an impact on how your community views itself 
politically and whether it made land claims easier or harder?
2: Potential questions and topics for oral Interviews with retired DEW Liners:
Work
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• What years did you work at the DEW Line?
• How long total did you work on the Line?
• Which site(s) did you work at?
• Do you know the local names for the sites?
• Can you estimate how many different people you worked with?
• What was your position / what were your positions?
• Can you describe your work: what were your duties, your schedule, was it boring 
or interesting, difficult or easy, etc.
• What were your personal reasons for working on the DEW Line?
General Culture
• In your opinion was DEW Line culture a unique one and if so, how?
• Was the mood generally upbeat or morose?
• Was this affected by the seasons and if so, how much?
• What do you think were the reasons most people had for working on the DEW 
Line?
Health Care
Alcohol
• Did your site have a bar?
• Were there rules regarding alcohol consumption? If so, what were the rules, and 
were they generally followed?
• Did native inhabitants drink alcohol at the site?
Relations with Locals
• In your opinion, what aspects of the DEW Line were most advantageous to the 
native residents?
• What aspects were least advantageous or disruptive?
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Environment
• In your opinion did the construction of the DEW Line constitute a transformation 
of the arctic environment?
• Did you and your coworkers have any concerns for the environmental impact of 
the DEW Line at the time?
Government/Military
• Did the consider the site you worked at to be a military installation?
• Did you consider the DEW Line as a whole to be a form of militarization?
• Do you think the native residents viewed it as a military operation? How do you
think that would affect their view of it?
• Were there many military rules?
What was the level of secrecy?
• Did most employees have respect for the mission? Was that the main reason they
were there, or was it more of an individual desire for money or adventure?
• Was patriotism more prevalent at the DEW Line than at civilian jobs?
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Appendix C 
Inuit Circumpolar Council Resolution on a Nuclear Free Zone in the Arctic
(Originally adopted in 1977, reaffirmed in 2007)
WHEREAS, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference developed a fundamental policy 
restricting the arctic and sub-arctic to those uses which are peaceful and environmentally 
safe;
WHEREAS, this policy is reflected in the several resolutions adopted by the general 
Assembly and the Executive Council since the formation of the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference in 1977;
WHEREAS, the governments of the United States and Canada intend to co-operate 
with each other to test the cruise missile in our northern Canadian homeland;
WHEREAS, the government of the United States has entertained the idea of basing the 
massive MX missile system in our Alaskan homeland;
WHEREAS, Atomic Energy Canada Limited plans to test the environmental and 
economic feasibility of the mini-Candu and the Slowpoke 3 (small nuclear reactors for 
generating electricity) in the Canadian north since they are prohibited from testing them 
in the Canadian south due to environmental restrictions; and
WHEREAS, the arctic and sub-arctic shall not be used for any nuclear testing or as a 
nuclear dump-site;
NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
emphatically restates its nuclear position:
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1. that the arctic and sub-arctic be used for purposes that are peaceful and 
environmentally safe;
2. that there shall be no nuclear testing or nuclear devices in the arctic or sub-arctic;
3. that there shall be no nuclear dump-sites in the arctic or sub-arctic;
4. that exploration and exploitation of uranium, thorium, lithium or other materials 
related to the nuclear industry in our homeland be prohibited.
FURTHERMORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Canadian government be notified of our 
opposition to the testing of the Cruise missile in our Canadian homeland and that they be 
requested to refrain from such tests;
FURTHERMORE BE IT RESOLVED that the United States government be notified of 
our opposition to the placement of the MX missile in our Alaskan homeland and that they 
be requested to cease with any such plans;
FURTHERMORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Inuit Circumpolar Conference study 
and research current international treaties to determine whether or not they comply with 
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference Arctic Policy;
FURTHERMORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Executive Council of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference lobby the United Nations and various international 
organizations to encourage members of the United Nations to adopt a policy for a nuclear 
free zone in the Arctic.
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Appendix D 
HomoSexyDEW
(A poem culledfrom words appearing in this order in the first few  pages o f Dick 
Morenus’s “DEW Line” (1957: 11-16))
Greatest dramas -  four men -  grave responsibility -  critical plunge -  atomic war
Four men -  long desk -  glassed-in command booth -  big room
Insured -  direct contact -  tensely alert -  swallowed -  sense of vital expectancy -  
dominated
Magic -  alert -  impending attack -  unerringly alert -  members
Scanning -  funneling -  heart and soul of our country’s system -  four men -  its brains
Drama -  climax close at hand -  hardly more than ten minutes -  alert -  quickly
Flashed -  ionospheric scatter broadcast -  men -  trouble -  mass attack -  mission -  serious
Drama -  target -  drop their loads of lethal luggage
Interceptor units -  speediest -  alert -  ready -  red, bright red -  “hot line” -  direct contact 
Mission -  action -  full-scale defense -  battle to the finish 
Alert -  activate -  quickly -  final -  attack
The General looked at his watch
Moment -  deep breath -  glanced -  officers beside him -  smilingly relaxed 
Play was over -  for the good of mankind
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Appendix E 
The Abandoned NORAD Station
White Alice
is deserted above the town 
The blank eyes
like displaced drive-in screens 
made obsolete 
by new technology.
It was from this place 
when I was a child 
that we were told 
a message would come.
We would hide under desks 
and wait for that nuclear sun 
which would bum us into 
shadows on stone.
Looming high above Nome
on the forehead of the mountain,
it looks towards the east
with the empty gaze
of a junkie lost
in a 60's dream,
linked into languages
of defense
which are as strange
as its useless shape,
as oblique
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as its looking-glass name 
and the games 
it reflects from a land 
once linked to this one, 
still woven tight to it 
by the long winters' ice.
But that Siberian coast, 
just beyond, 
the curve of sight 
is more like this 
than maps can tell 
and the land holds onto 
old languages, cousin 
to those the people 
here still remember, 
tongues which speak 
of the sea, which hold 
onto the seasons, words 
shaped by those 
close enough to this earth 
to survive.
(Bruchac,1989: 33)
